Agents' Abilities by Jaster, Romy
www.ssoar.info
Agents' Abilities
Jaster, Romy
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Monographie / monograph
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jaster, R. (2020). Agents' Abilities. (Philosophical Analysis, 83). Berlin: De Gruyter. https://
doi.org/10.1515/9783110650464
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-67672-1
Romy Jaster
Agents’ Abilities
Philosophical Analysis
Edited by 
Katherine Dormandy, Rafael Hüntelmann,  
Christian Kanzian, Uwe Meixner, Richard Schantz  
and Erwin Tegtmeier
Volume 83
Agents’ Abilities 
Romy Jaster
ISBN 978-3-11-064827-0
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-065046-4
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-064865-2
ISSN 2627-227X
DOI https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110650464
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 
4.0 License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. 
The Open Access book is available at www.degruyter.com 
Library of Congress Control Number: 2020932563
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck
www.degruyter.com
There is no such thing as a ‘self-made’ [wo]man.We are made up of thousands of
others. Everyone who has ever done a kind deed for us, or spoken one word of
encouragement to us, has entered into the make-up of our character and of our
thoughts, as well as our success.
(George Matthew Adams)
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Introduction
I cannot dance Tango, but some people can. My partner can play intricate songs
on the guitar. My dog can locate a hidden toy by sniffing around the apartment.
Some people can do a handstand, but very few can do it while drunk.
The statements I just made talk about agents’ abilities. They state of some
agent (or group of agents) that they have or lack the ability to perform a certain
action. In a way, ability statements are not particularly extraordinary; we ascribe
abilities to agents all the time, we have no trouble understanding ability ascrip-
tions, and some of those ascriptions, like the exemplary ones above, state plain
and obvious truths.
Trouble looms once we put our philosopher’s hat on. For as philosophers, of
course,we will want to know what makes ascriptions of ability true.What is it for
some agent to have an ability? What, in other words, are the truth conditions for
statements like the ones we started out with? Here, the answer is far from obvi-
ous.
What is clear is that the answer will have to appeal to modality in some way
or other. That is because apparently an agent need not actually perform a certain
action in order to have the ability to perform it. Yet, performing the action surely
has to be open to the agent in some sense – it has to be somehow possible for
her to do what she is able to do. In this sense, abilities aremodal properties: they
have something to do with the agent’s behavior in possible scenarios.
At this point, we are already knee-deep in the swamp of philosophical intri-
cacies. For, as a closer look quickly reveals, the modal truth conditions for ability
statements are actually hard to spell out. Some have tried to elucidate abilities in
terms of some kind of restricted possibility. Others have appealed to the modality
of counterfactuals. I say: both attempts are bound to fail. The modality of abil-
ities is more complex than that. The quest for the right truth conditions will
therefore take us beyond the common schemes of possibilities and counterfactu-
als very quickly.
Why should we bother with abilities to begin with? One answer is: that’s just
what we philosophers do. We try to wrap our head around interesting phenom-
ena.We want to understand what knowledge is, what rationality is, what truth is,
what meaning is. Surely, then, one natural question to ask is: what are abilities?
But there are further good reasons to yearn for a better understanding of
abilities. First, and obviously, abilities play a fundamental role in a wide
range of philosophical theories. Concepts (Millikan 2000, ch. 4; Evans 1982:
104), qualia (Lewis 1990), knowledge (Greco 2009, 2010: 3; Sosa 2015: part II),
actions (Mayr 2011, ch. 7–9), conceivability (Yablo 1993; Menzies 1998) – all of
OpenAccess. © 2020 Jaster, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
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these phenomena and many more have been crucially linked to or even analyzed
in terms of the notion of abilities. A better grasp of what it is for an agent to have
an ability will yield a better understanding of all of those views insofar as a core
notion figuring in the views will be more transparent.
A second motivation for a closer look at abilities is that abilities are closely
related to dispositions, which have attracted a lot of interest recently. Both dis-
positions and abilities are modal properties in the sense that they have to do
with the subject’s behavior in possible situations. For abilities, we have already
noted this fact: to have an ability to ϕ, one need not actually ϕ. Dispositions ex-
hibit an analogous modal structure. Sugar has the disposition to dissolve in
water, say, even if it is not actually submerged in water and thus does not actual-
ly dissolve. This similarity and others (→ 1.6) have led some philosophers to think
that abilities simply are dispositions of sorts (i.e. Ryle 1949; Moore 1912; Fara
2008; Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Smith 2003). This may or may not be true; in any
case, abilities should be of interest to anyone interested in dispositions, because
it may well turn out that the two phenomena call for an analysis along roughly
the same lines.
Abilities should also attract the interest of anyone interested in modal se-
mantics.¹ One (and as we will see, the most paradigmatic) way abilities can be
ascribed is via the modal auxiliary “can”. “Ela can cite the poem by heart”;
“Peter can pick locks in no time”; “I cannot do a summersault here and now”.
All of those statements are statements about an agent’s abilities. And all of
them contain the modal auxiliary “can”. This is interesting, because there is a
strong tendency in linguistics and formal semantics to try and provide a unified
semantics of statements involving that modal auxiliary. Ability statements there-
fore provide an important test case for such a semantics.Whatever form that se-
mantics takes, it had better cover “can” statements ascribing ability. Thinking
about the truth conditions of ability statements is therefore mandatory for any-
one interested in the semantics of “can” more generally.
Finally, abilities should be of interest to anyone interested in the free will
problem. One of the great impasses in the literature on freedom, and perhaps
one of the most tightly woven knots in philosophy as a whole, traces back to
a controversy about what it is for an agent to have an ability to act otherwise.
The problem is well-taken. Even post Frankfurt (1969), one cannot help but
feel that free will requires the ability to do otherwise.² And that ability seems ob-
 For the standard view cf. Kratzer (1977, 1981).
 In this seminal paper, Frankfurt famously argued that responsibility does not require alternate
possibilities. This finding is often extended to the conclusion that freedom, in the sense relevant
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viously incompatible with determinism. No one could have done otherwise, after
all, if every single one of everyone’s acts is determined to happen by the state of
the world and the laws of nature. Hence, the argument goes, free will is incom-
patible with determinism.We either lack free will or determinism has to be false
(locus classicus: van Inwagen 1983). This is one side of the debate; the side of the
incompatibilist.
The other side is that of the compatibilist. Compatibilists reject the line of
reasoning employed by the incompatibilist, and not just because it leads to
strange consequences. Instead, one typical compatibilist argument has it that
the ability to act otherwise is in fact compatible with determinism. How so?
Well, here compatibilists diverge. The classic idea, and one that has become
something like the default view in certain areas of philosophy, is that to have
an ability, and a forteriori the ability to act otherwise, it has to be true that
one would ϕ, if one were properly motivated to ϕ (locus classicus: Moore
1912, ch.1). This view, which is known as “the simple conditional analysis of abil-
ities”, will be discussed extensively in chapter 2. A more recent idea is that to
have an ability to ϕ, one has to have a disposition (or set of dispositions) of
sorts, a view which has recently regained new popularity under the heading
“new dispositionalism” (Fara 2008; Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Smith 2003) (→ 5.4, 6).
Whether one of those views is correct or not need not concern us at the mo-
ment.What is important is that both of the conditions just mentioned seem to be
compatible with determinism. The counterfactual can be true, even if the agent is
determined not to ϕ; and the disposition to ϕ when one is properly motivated to
ϕ can be had, even if it is determined that it does not manifest itself. This offers a
straightforward argument against the incompatibilist: contrary to appearances,
the ability to act otherwise is in fact compatible with determinism, and hence
the fact that freedom requires the ability to act otherwise does not rule out
the existence of free will in a deterministic world.
Who is right? This is one of the core questions in the free will debate. But to
answer it, one will obviously need an account of abilities generally. How, after
all, could one possibly decide whether or not the ability to act otherwise is com-
patible with determinism, if one does not have a firm grip on what it is for an
agent to have an ability to do anything whatsoever? This, then, is the fourth
line of motivation for a closer look at abilities. Coming to terms with free will re-
quires coming to terms with abilities first.
for responsibility, does not require alternate possibilities.Whether or not Frankfurt’s arguments
validate either of the two conclusions is a matter of thriving controversy. For some important
contributions, cf. Widerker & McKenna (2003).
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In view of all that, it is rather surprising that in-depth discussions of abilities
themselves are sparse in the literature. Most remarks on abilities are rather cur-
sory and scattered across various more or less unconnected debates; the few
more elaborate accounts in the literature are still rather sketchy; and even the
two most influential views of abilities are strangely insulated from one another
in that they are situated in two different parts of the philosophical landscape
and have been developed against the background of two different systematic en-
deavors.
On the one hand, there is the before-mentioned simple conditional analysis,
according to which having an ability is for a certain counterfactual to be true.³
On the other hand, there is what I will call “possibilism”, a view according to
which having an ability is for a certain restricted possibility to obtain. Both
views are dominant in the literature in that both enjoy the status of a default
view in certain areas of philosophy. Interestingly, though, there is little exchange
between the adherents of the two views and, as far as I can see, there is virtually
no assessment of both views at once.⁴
That is odd, to say the least, and it is unfortunate, given that both of the two
views voice important insights about abilities which elude their respective coun-
terparts completely. Odd as the situation is, though, it is not mysterious. There is
an obvious explanation for the striking division in the literature. And that expla-
nation, I take it, is that the two most dominant views of abilities have been de-
veloped with an eye towards very different systematic goals.
The simple conditional analysis has its origins in the free will debate, and
more specifically in the context of the compatibility problem of free will and de-
terminism. Both Moore (1912, ch. 7), and before him Hume (1748, 8.23/95), fa-
mously argued that determinism is compatible with the ability to act otherwise.
The reason for that, they thought, is that abilities, and thus the ability to act oth-
erwise, have to be understood in terms of a conditional.
Hume thought that for us to have the power to move, it has to be the case
that “if we choose to move, we (…) may” (ibid: 72). Moore gave a counterfactual
reading to this condition and argued that for an agent to have an ability to act
otherwise (in the sense relevant not just for free will, but also for actions to
 There is also what I will later call “the sophisticated conditional analysis”, according to which
abilities have to be analyzed in terms of a multitude of highly complex counterfactual condition-
als (Manley & Wasserman 2008; Sosa 2015: 98). While the sophisticated conditional analysis
clearly stands in the tradition of the simple conditional analysis, the view is so recent in the lit-
erature and differs so considerably from its historic source that I will discuss it separately later
on (→ 6.2).
 An exception is (Lehrer 1976).
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be voluntary) is for it to be true that the agent would have acted otherwise, had
she so chosen (Moore 1912, ch. 1). Moore’s work, in particular, has had major im-
pact in the philosophy of action and free will and was nothing short of ground-
breaking for people’s thinking about these issues. It is therefore unsurprising
that the conditional analysis has become the default point of reference for
most philosophers with a background in one of those areas.⁵
The other systematic goal that has guided people’s thinking about abilities is
a very different one: it is the task of coming up with a viable modal logic and
modal semantics. Here, the key project is to understand the logical and semantic
workings of modal auxiliaries like “can”, “must”, “may” and so forth. Since abil-
ities are paradigmatically ascribed via “can” statements, one subproject of this
overarching endeavor is to embed the logic and the semantics of ability state-
ments into whatever turns out to be the most plausible logic and semantics, re-
spectively, of the modal auxiliaries quite generally.
It is in this connection that possibilism has flourished. The starting assump-
tion both in semantics and logics has been that “can” expresses possibility, and
“must” expresses necessity. Logicians like von Wright (1951) and linguists like
Kratzer (1977, 1981) have built whole systems from there. And since ability ascrip-
tions have been taken to fall squarely on the possibility side of that dichotomy,
possibilism has become the default point of reference for most people with a
background in logics, semantics, or, generally, the more formally inclined fields
of philosophy.⁶
This, I take it, is the situation. There are two views, each of which is plausi-
ble enough to have become a default view in its respective field of application.
There is little to no exchange between adherents of the two views. And there is
no way for the two views both to be true at once. A systematic, careful and un-
prepossessed in-depth examination of the subject matter is thus far lacking.
The book at hand sets out to change this. In what follows, I provide a sys-
tematic and comprehensive account of agents’ abilities, or, more specifically,
of what it is for some agent to have the ability to engage in some behavior. Para-
digmatically, the behavior which an agent has an ability to perform will be an
 That is not to say that everyone in this field endorses the simple conditional analysis or a view
in that tradition. See for instance Horgan (1979) and Lehrer (1976) for a possibilist treatment of
the ability to act otherwise.
 Again, that is not to say that possibilism has been limited to the formal treatment of ability
statements. The view has been applied to the problem of time travel (Lewis 1976), and also,
as noted before, to the problem of free will (Horgan 1979; Lehrer 1976). Its origins, however,
lie in the formal treatment of “can” statements and it is in the formally oriented fields that pos-
sibilism has the status of a default view.
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action, in which case I will speak of agentive abilities. In other cases, the ability
is one to be engaged in behaviors that are not actions, such as smelling, digest-
ing, or unintentionally reading street signs,⁷ in which case I will speak of non-
agentive abilities. The view I will develop in this book accounts for both agentive
and non-agentive abilities alike.
As we’ll see, that view will be inspired by core ideas of both of the two views
of abilities that have dominated the literature so far. But it will be superior to
both of those views in that it will be apt to meet the adequacy conditions for
a comprehensive view of abilities and solve the problems that arise with each
of the other two views in particular.
The core idea underlying the account I put forward is that abilities are a mat-
ter of success across a sufficient proportion of modal space. For this reason, I
will dub the view “the success view of ability”, or simply “the success view” –
it is to be hoped that nomen est omen in this case.
Before walking you through the line of argument that is going to be in the
book, let me say a few words about what I am trying to accomplish. What I
am after, throughout the book is an analysis of what it is for an agent to have
an ability to ϕ. And by an “analysis” I mean informative and illuminating
truth conditions of canonical ascriptions of abilities. What I will try to provide,
then, is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to have some
ability to ϕ. Or, put differently again, I will try to fill the blank in the statement
“An agent has an ability to ϕ if and only if _______”.
Note that in discussing other accounts of abilities, I will treat those views as
answers to the question of how to fill that blank as well. I will, in other words,
discuss the existing views of abilities as analyses in the specified sense. I will not
consider whether they are fruitful contributions to any other philosophical proj-
ect, such as stating merely a necessary condition for having an ability or, less
ambitious still, highlighting a merely typical but systematically interesting fea-
ture of abilities.
Perhaps you are one of the philosophers who sense methodological pitfalls
when it comes to the project of coming up with an analysis. The project may
seem hopeless to you; philosophy does not provide us with many examples of
successful analyses, after all. Or you may be skeptical about intuitions and the
conceptual competence of philosophers,which makes you worry about the solid-
ity of the foundations on which analyses are often built. Both worries are quite
common these days. So let me say a few sentences about each.
 The example of the ability to read street signs unintentionally is brought up by Löwenstein
(ms.). I’ll make frequent use of this very fruitful example in the course of this book.
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As to the pessimism about the prospects of coming up with a successful
analysis of anything at all, I am inclined to respond that even though attempts
for comprehensive analyses may regularly fail, engaging in the quest for analyses
nevertheless brings progress. If there is a fact of the matter about whether some x
is F, then it should, in principle, be stateable which fact of the matter that is.
Things are terribly complex, of course, which is why stating the fact of the matter
that has to obtain for x to be F is typically extremely difficult. But trying to state
it is nevertheless worthwhile, because it forces the mind to be maximally strict.
And that results in lots of insights that would otherwise have escaped us.
Suppose no one had tried to analyze knowledge. Instead, philosophers
would have contented themselves with stating something along the lines of:
“knowledge has a lot to do with belief, justification, and truth”. First, of course,
it is not very likely that anyone would have taken the time to formulate this mun-
dane insight at all. But if they had, then there would not have been any reason to
object. Gettier would not have had any reason to think hard of cases in which
something is going on which cannot be captured in terms of belief, justification,
and truth. And maybe, just maybe, it would still not have occurred to people that
luck eats knowledge for breakfast. I therefore see just as much value in trying to
state an analysis as I see in the analysis itself.
Moreover, I take it that there is, in fact, progress being made in stating anal-
yses in philosophy. Take again the example of knowledge. To my mind, at least,
it is quite obvious that analyses have become better since Gettier’s days. People
have understood more about the relationship between knowledge and luck, the
role of reliability, and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions, to name but a few
dimensions on which understanding has progressed. And even though the anal-
yses that have been built on these insights still admit of counterexamples and
are far from uncontroversial, I take it to be clear that they are superior to the
pre-Gettier “justified true belief” analysis of knowledge. They are superior, be-
cause they are more insightful.
This is where the second worry enters the stage. All good and well, you may
think – perhaps an analysis need not be impeccable for it to be insightful. But
how on earth are we going to find out about the truth conditions of ability ascrip-
tions, or any philosophically interesting ascriptions at all, for that matter? Is this
one of those books in which every argument takes the form “We would not say ‘x
is F’ in this or that highly intricate, bizarre, and outlandish example; hence, the
case is not one in which x is F”?
Let me assure you: it is not. As you will see in the next chapter, the method-
ology I work with is carefully chosen to avoid walking on the thin ice of intu-
itions about what “we” would say in bizarre cases. There is little need for intu-
ition pumps about word use in this book. For as we’ll see in the next chapter, we
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can formulate quite a few adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of abil-
ities, which do not depend on shaky linguistic intuitions and which will serve as
guide rails for the discussion to follow.
Let me also emphasize what I won’t do. First, although I will be working with
a possible worlds framework throughout the book, I am explicitly neutral on the
metaphysics of modality. I view the possible worlds framework I will be working
with as just that: a framework. As philosophers, our job is to look at distinctions
and patterns that elude the untrained eye and which therefore often cannot be
described by using ordinary language. Ordinary language has evolved to draw
distinctions and describe patterns that matter in everyday life. It does not pro-
vide the means to speak clearly about the subtleties we need to pay attention
to in philosophical discourse. One purpose of formal frameworks, I take it, is
to provide a way of sharpening our language in such a way that philosophically
interesting distinctions can be drawn, and patterns described.When it comes to
modal notions, such as that of abilities, a possible worlds framework is simply a
very powerful framework to work with.
It is also the framework I know best. By using it, I do not want to commit to
any particular view about the underlying metaphysics of modality, nor do I want
to commit to any particular metaphysics of possible worlds themselves, nor to
any claim to the effect that the metaphysics of modality is one of possible worlds
to begin with.
If you yourself have strong metaphysical views, you can take this as an in-
vitation: whether your favorite modal metaphysics is one of possible worlds
(Lewis 1986), one of potentialities (Vetter 2015), or of something else entirely –
as long as your metaphysics respects the patterns and distinctions I am trying
to establish in the course of the book, I invite you to plug in whatever picture
of the metaphysics of modality you favor.
I will also abstain from the metaphysical question of whether abilities are
fundamentally categorical or modal properties; I don’t want to commit to any
view on whether there can be abilities without a categorical basis. Questions
like these were dominant in the literature on dispositions for a long time (Arm-
strong, Martin & Place 1996; Mackie 1973, 1977; Prior, Pargetter & Jackson 1982).
People wanted to know whether having the disposition to break, say, is having a
particular molecular structure or whether the disposition to break is instead a
modal property which, while possessed in virtue of that molecular structure,
is nevertheless distinct from it.
It was Lewis’s (1997) seminal paper that shifted the focus from this question
to the project of coming up with a viable analysis of dispositions. Lewis did not
really care whether or not breakability is ultimately realized by a categorical or a
modal property – in fact, that question can be answered either way, on his view.
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Instead, he was interested in the truth conditions for having a disposition. My
interest in abilities is analogous to Lewis’s interest in dispositions in this respect.
I want to know what the truth conditions for canonical ability ascriptions are; I
am not interested in the question whether agents’ abilities are fundamentally
based in categorical properties or in genuinely modal ones.
It is instructive to compare what I am and am not doing to the two projects a
functionalist about mental properties can pursue. Functionalists can be interest-
ed in two distinct questions. One question is: what are the truth conditions of
canonical ascriptions of being in pain, say? In response to this question, the
functionalist proposes that a subject is in pain if and only if the subject is in
a state with the causal pattern characteristic of pain states. The question I am
pursuing regarding abilities is analogous to this project. I want to know what
the truth conditions of canonical ascriptions of ability are. In response to this
question, I will propose that an agent has an ability if and only if the agent
has a property with the modal pattern characteristic of abilities.
Some functionalists, however, go on to ask a second question. The second
question is: which state(s) do(es) actually play the specified causal role? Several
sub questions come up: is it a physical state? A brain state? Is it just one or are
there many? And so forth. Likewise, I could in principle go on and search for the
property that underlies the specified modal pattern of abilities. Again, several
sub-questions come up: is it a categorical or a modal property? Is it the same
kind of property for every type of ability? And so forth. These are interesting met-
aphysical questions, no doubt. But I take it to be obvious that they specify a dif-
ferent project from the one specified by the other question I formulated. One is
the project of providing truth conditions of canonical ability ascriptions. The
other is that of settling the metaphysics of the subject matter. I am after the anal-
ysis and neutral on the metaphysics.
Why do I care so much for a viable analysis of ability ascriptions? On the one
hand, it seems to me to be the only plausible place to start thinking about abil-
ities. Even if one’s primary goal were to find out what kind of properties abilities
are, metaphysically speaking, one would, I take it, first have to provide a job de-
scription for the properties one is hoping to find. And that job description is pro-
vided by stating the truth conditions for having the property one is looking for.
Only then can one begin to check which kind of property is suited to do the job.
Coming up with an analysis of the concept of an ability thus seems like a natural
place to start one’s philosophical investigations.
On the other hand, we will see that the analysis brings all kinds of interest-
ing insights to light. By the end of the book, we will know quite a bit about the
relation between abilities and possibility; between abilities to counterfactuals;
between abilities and dispositions; between paradigmatic and less paradigmatic
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instances of abilities; we will know which role intentions and performances play
in having abilities; how abilities relate to success and failure; and a lot more.
Formulating truth conditions for ability ascriptions is by no means the only in-
teresting approach to abilities. But it is one very fruitful one and the one I am
going to pursue.
I will work towards a viable analysis of abilities on two methodological lev-
els, which will sometimes merge. One is the level of our semantic knowledge
about the truth and falsity of particular ability statements. (This is in line with
what I said about linguistic intuition pumps earlier, in so far as we will not
look at ability statements that are made in complicated or bizarre scenarios;
the truth and falsity, respectively, of the statements we will look at will be
very obvious.) The other is the level of our knowledge about whether or not
some agent has a particular ability. These are two sides of the same coin. If I
know that “S can ϕ” is true (and I understand that sentence), then I know
that S can ϕ, and vice versa. I will therefore switch back and forth between meta-
linguistic talk about ability statements and object talk about abilities a great deal
in the course of the book. If you have a strong inclination towards framing phil-
osophical inquiry in one of those two ways, feel free to translate my elaborations
into your favorite jargon whenever necessary.
So much for the preamble. Let me now proceed to give you an outline of the
line of argument I’ll develop in this book.
Chapter 1 lays the methodological foundation for the whole discussion to
follow in that it establishes what I will call adequacy conditions for a comprehen-
sive view of abilities. The adequacy conditions are conditions that will have to be
met by any theory of abilities in order for the theory to capture its subject matter
appropriately; being test conditions for accounts of abilities, they will hence play
a crucial methodological role in the critique of existing views as well as the con-
struction of a superior view.
The adequacy conditions themselves, I hope, are uncontroversial. There are
four of them. The first is that any comprehensive view of abilities will have to be
extensionally adequate; the second is that any comprehensive view of abilities
will have to elucidate the distinction between so-called general and specific abil-
ities; the third is that any comprehensive view of abilities will have to account for
the fact that abilities come in degrees and that ability statements exhibit a cer-
tain kind of context sensitivity that goes along with their gradable nature; the
fourth is that any comprehensive view of abilities will have to tell us something
interesting about the relation between agentive abilities, i.e. abilities to perform
actions, and non-agentive abilities, i.e. abilities to be engaged in behaviors that
are not actions.
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Once laid out, all of those conditions should be obvious. Yet, actually laying
them out brings a lot of progress. Starting from what we want a comprehensive
view of abilities to deliver, we will have a common ground on which to argue for
and against certain features of such a view – a common ground which has so far
been completely amiss in the literature.
Besides outlining these adequacy conditions, chapter 1 also develops three
explanatory challenges for an account of abilities – questions, that is, towards
which one can expect a comprehensive view of abilities to take a stance. The
first is how abilities relate to counterfactuals. The second is how abilities relate
to dispositions. The third is if and how ability statements can be embedded into
a more general semantics of “can” statements. The role of the explanatory chal-
lenges is less central to the project of coming up with a comprehensive view of
abilities, insofar as the explanatory challenges only really arise once we have
such a view on the table. They do not provide test conditions for a comprehen-
sive view, but questions one will want such a view to answer once it is formulat-
ed. Yet, formulating the explanatory challenges will help us get a better grip on
some important features of abilities and is therefore called for right at the begin-
ning of the book.
Chapters 2 and 3 turn to discussing the two most prevalent views of abilities
on the market, pointing out their appeal, but also pointing out that they fail and
why they fail. All this is done against the background of the adequacy conditions
from chapter 1.
Chapter 2 deals with the so-called simple conditional analysis, according to
which having an ability is a matter of some counterfactual conditional to be true.
In its most prominent form, the simple conditional analysis states that an agent
has an ability to perform an act ϕ if and only if the agent would ϕ if she intended
to ϕ. There are several variations of this account on the market, all of which have
in common that they use a counterfactual conditional to postulate a modal tie
between an agent’s motivational state to ϕ and the agent’s performance of ϕ-ing.
The simple conditional analysis has strong appeal. Abilities have something
to do with success. And success, in turn, has something to do with the tie be-
tween an agent’s intentions (or motivations in general) and her corresponding
performances. It is therefore no wonder that the simple conditional analysis
has become something like the default view in certain areas of philosophy.
Nevertheless, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis is fraut with
problems. In fact, any version of the view will inevitably run into trouble with
all of the four adequacy conditions laid out in chapter 1. As to extensional ade-
quacy, I will argue that the simple conditional analysis runs into trouble with
abilities that are masked as well as with cases in which the agent cannot form
an intention to ϕ to begin with. Moreover, the simple conditional analysis
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lacks the means both to elucidate the distinction between general and specific
abilities and to account for degrees of abilities and the corresponding kind of
context sensitivity that attaches to ability statements. Finally, the simple condi-
tional analysis fails to capture non-agentive abilities. All this strongly suggests
that abilities are not properly accounted for in terms of a single, simple counter-
factual conditional.
Chapter 3 yields an equally bad prognosis for the other very prevalent view
in the literature on abilities: a view I will refer to as “possibilism”. Possibilism is
the view that an agent has an ability if and only if it is possible, in a properly
restricted sense, for the agent to ϕ. Contrary to the simple conditional analysis,
possibilism does not put any emphasis on the modal tie between motivation and
performance. Instead, all the emphasis is put on the possibility of the perfor-
mance.
Like the simple conditional analysis, possibilism is driven by an appealing
thought, though a different one: the idea that abilities are always had in view
of certain facts. An agent may be able to play tennis in view of her basic physical
constitution, say, but not in view of the fact that her wrist is broken. Starting off
from this fundamental insight, it is then argued that having an ability is a matter
of compossibility with those varying sets of facts and whether or not we count an
agent as having an ability will vary, depending on the sets of facts we are inter-
ested in.
As I will argue, possibilism looks somewhat more promising than the condi-
tional analysis on first examination, because it avoids the extensional problems
that beset the conditional analysis and has no trouble accounting for non-agen-
tive abilities. Going through the adequacy conditions one by one, however, we
will see that possibilism is just as problematic as the conditional analysis. It,
too, fails to account for the distinction between general and specific abilities
as well as for degrees and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity of ability
statements. On top, it runs into a deep-rooted formal objection. Together, these
difficulties show clearly that abilities are not properly accounted for in terms
of restricted possibilities either.
The conclusion of chapter 2 and 3 is straightforward, then: given a plausible
set of adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of abilities, the two major
views of abilities, while both voicing an appealing intuition, seem misled in fun-
damental ways.
Luckily, we will have learned enough about abilities at this point for a more
informed way of thinking about abilities to take shape. In chapters 4–6, I lay out
a new view of abilities: the success view. The major intuition driving the success
view is that having an ability is a matter of success across a sufficient portion of
modal space.
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Chapter 4 develops this idea for the paradigm cases of abilities: abilities to
perform actions, or agentive abilities, as I will call them. As I will argue, having
an ability of this kind is for the agent’s intentions to be suitably tied to the
agent’s performances across the portion of modal space that matters. More spe-
cifically, I will argue that an agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if the
agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which
the agent intends to ϕ. Later in the chapter, I will provide a somewhat weaker
version of the view,which also accommodates some special cases: on the weaker
version of the success view of agentive abilities, an agent has an agentive ability
to ϕ if and only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which the agent intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not specify the
same action type – as long as ϕ-ing in response to ψ counts as a success. For
simplicity, I will work with the stronger version throughout the largest part of
the chapter, though.
As chapter 4 proceeds, it will become clear that the success view has lots of
merits. On the one hand, the view combines the core idea driving conditional
analyses with the fundamental insight underlying possibilism: the success
view does justice both to the idea that abilities are had in view of certain facts
and to the thought that agentive abilities are a matter of a modal tie between in-
tentions and performances.
On the other hand, the success view is apt to meet all of the adequacy con-
ditions for agentive abilities. It yields an account of degrees and context sensi-
tivity, it does not run into extensional problems with cases in which the agent
cannot form the intention to begin with, it provides a unified account of general
and specific abilities, it does not run into extensional problems with masked
abilities, and it avoids the formal problem that beset possibilism. In conclusion,
we can note that the success view yields a much better understanding of agen-
tive abilities than both the simple conditional analysis and possibilism.
Chapter 4 closes with the discussion of two objections to the success view of
agentive abilities, which will demand the modification I pointed out earlier.
Looking closely, for an agent to have an agentive ability, it does not have to
be the agent’s intention to ϕ that is properly modally tied to performances of
ϕing – it may well be some other intention. This will yield a somewhat weaker
reading of the success view of agentive abilities than the one I worked with
throughout most of the chapter. On that weaker reading, S has an ability to ϕ
if and only if S ϕs in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations
in which S intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not be identical – neither de
dicto, nor de re. I will offer a way to integrate the original and the weaker version
of the success view of agentive abilities in the course of chapter 5, where it will
become clear that both versions are instances of the success view of abilities tout
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court (covering the various kinds of agentive abilities as well as non-agentive
abilities).
In chapter 5, I will turn to non-agentive abilities. As I will argue, abilities are
quite generally a matter of success across a sufficient portion of modal space. In
the paradigmatic cases of agentive abilities, that is to say that S has an ability if
and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which the agent intends to ϕ. In the case of non-agentive abilities, a structurally
analogous analysis can be provided. On the view I will lay out in chapter 5, S has
a non-agentive ability if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant
possible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present, where an S-trig-
ger is a trigger for ϕ-ing, in response to which ϕ-ing is a success.
In the case of agentive abilities, that boils down to the analysis developed in
chapter 4, because an action is a success when it follows an intention to perform
that action (or another suitably related intention, which is why the success view
of abilities tout court covers the weaker version of the success view of agentive
abilities as well). In the case of non-agentive abilities, like the ability to digest,
hear, or read street signs unintentionally, the triggers in response to which such
behaviors are a success will usually be external features of the situation: that the
agent ingests food, is subjected to sound, or faces a street sign, say. Structurally,
however, there is no difference between agentive and non-agentive abilities.
Rather, the success view for agentive abilities turns out to be the paradigmatic
instance of an overarching analysis of abilities tout court.
Chapter 5 goes on to explore the relationship between abilities and disposi-
tions, reflect on the normative dimension of abilities that enters via the notion of
success, recapitulate the responses to the explanatory challenges that have
emerged throughout the previous chapters, and respond to a formal objection
against the success view. By the end of chapter 5, the success view is fully devel-
oped.
In chapter 6, the success view is situated within the contemporary literature.
The simple conditional analysis and possibilism are two very influential views in
the literature, but they are by no means the only views out there. In fact, there
have recently been new suggestions of how to analyze abilities, most of which
have emerged against the background of the new dispositionalism, according
to which having an ability to ϕ is a matter of having a (set of) disposition(s)
of sorts, and certain virtue-epistemological accounts of knowledge, according
to which knowledge of p is a matter of believing that p in virtue of one’s intel-
lectual abilities.
In the course of the chapter, we will look at four views, two of which are very
much in line with the success view and the other two of which fail for independ-
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ent reasons. By the end of chapter 6, it should be clear that the success view is a
very strong contestant in the literature on abilities.
Chapter 7, the last chapter of the book, gives a quick resumé and offers an
outlook of how the success view may actually be put to work. Two realms of ap-
plication are sketched. One is the grandfather paradox about time travel, where
the success view can be used to provide a more informed version of Lewis’s
(1976) solution to the paradox. The other one is the problem of free will, where
I will use the success view to sketch what I am going to call “alternate possibil-
ities contextualism” – a contextualist view of freedom ascriptions which allows
for a conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between compatiblists and
incompatibilists about freedom and determinism.
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1 Methodology
Peter Morriss, in a book on power, starts his investigation with what seems to be
a platitude:
Before we can start constructing an account of power we need to know what sort of thing
we are dealing with: we must decide just what it is that we are trying to analyze. And we
must decide, as well, how we go on about deciding that. (Morriss 2002: 2)
Why even state that platitude? Well, because, as Morriss points out,
[m]ost writers (…) pay far too little attention to these preliminary problems, with the result
that they go rushing off in the wrong direction, pursuing the wrong quarry.When they even-
tually catch it, they may claim to have caught the beast they sought; but how do they know,
if they didn’t know what they were looking for? (ibid.)
What Morriss suggests here is that the debate on power suffers from a severe lack
of methodological underpinnings. I am quoting him here, because as far as I can
see, the same remarks apply to the literature on abilities. Methodologically, the
debate is quite a mess.What is it that we are seeking to account for? How do we
test whether an account captures what it is supposed to capture? What is the
common ground from which we can start building competing views? These ques-
tions, while essential to the project of developing a viable understanding of abil-
ities, do not seem to have played much of a role in the debate thus far. That is
unfortunate. In fact, my guess is that the whole debate would have taken a dif-
ferent course had the preliminary issues been settled beforehand. Let us try and
do better. Let us do some methodological groundwork before we start.
Perhaps you are inclined to think that any such project is bound to fail and
that Morriss’s suggestion to specify what we are trying to analyze before going
about analyzing it is up a blind alley. Isn’t this just the paradox of analysis?
How are we supposed to state what we are trying to analyze if we don’t have
the analysis at hand yet? Isn’t the dog chasing its own tail here?
It is not. Here is what I think we should do. First of all, let us collect a few
things we know about abilities. Obviously, we don’t need to have an analysis of
abilities for that.We know that dogs wag their tails when they are happy without
having an analysis of doghood. In much the same way, there are a few features of
abilities that I take to be beyond dispute. Those features need to be identified.
This will help to get a better grip on the phenomenon we are seeking to under-
stand and moreover will provide the basis for the entire discussion to follow.
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By finding features that are essential for our understanding of abilities, we
will get what we can call adequacy conditions for theories of abilities – condi-
tions that will have to be met by any theory of abilities in order for the theory
to capture its subject matter appropriately. These adequacy conditions serve as
a blueprint for the critique of the most prevalent views on the market and for
the development of a superior alternative. They provide test conditions along
which the prospects of various potential accounts of abilities can be discussed
and evaluated.
Apart from those adequacy conditions, I think we can also identify what I
will call explanatory challenges for a theory of abilities. It is quite obvious
upon reflection that abilities relate in interesting ways to certain other phenom-
ena which have themselves been the subject of philosophical theorizing. An ob-
vious challenge for a theory of abilities is to spell out how abilities relate to those
other phenomena; in other words: to situate abilities in the broader theoretical
landscape. While less essential to the task of formulating a viable view than
the adequacy conditions, the role of the explanatory challenges must not be un-
derestimated. Locating a phenomenon’s position in a web of other phenomena
clearly helps get a more thorough grip on the phenomenon one is seeking to un-
derstand.
The adequacy conditions concern features of abilities that have to be cap-
tured, then. The explanatory challenges concern the relation of abilities to
other phenomena with which they are, for some reason or other, interestingly
linked. Formulating a set of each will provide us with a solid foundation from
which we can start our investigation.
1.1 Adequacy condition 1: Extensional adequacy
The first thing we can note about abilities is that we know quite a bit about their
distribution, so to speak.We know that virtually everyone has some abilities, for
instance. We know that there are some things pretty much anyone can do, like
making sounds. Yet, we also know that it is certainly not the case that anyone
can do anything. There are some things no human can do, like flying faster
than light. And we also know that we ourselves can do some things, while lack-
ing the ability to do others. I know that I can play the guitar a bit, but cannot
play the piano, for example. I have similar knowledge about others. I know
that most people I know can swim, say, but that my grandmother cannot. This
gives us a first adequacy condition for a comprehensive view of abilities:
A1. Any comprehensive view of abilities will have to be extensionally adequate.
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This adequacy condition suffices to identify some views of abilities as outright
false. As Maier (2014) remarks, for instance, Aristotle discusses and rejects a
view, according to which agents have the ability to do exactly what they actually
do. The passage he cites is the following:
There are some (…) who say that something is capable only when it is acting, and when it is
not acting is not capable. For example, someone who is not building is not capable of
building, but someone who is building is capable when he is building; and likewise too
in other cases.” (Makin 2006, 3, 1046b)
Aristotle rightly goes on to point out that “[i]t is not hard to see the absurd con-
sequences of this” (ibid.). The grounds for his dismissal, I take it, is the adequacy
condition I am suggesting; a view of abilities can only succeed if it is extension-
ally adequate.
What exactly does extensional adequacy amount to? We have to be careful
not to misinterpret this condition. A very common misinterpretation would be to
think that we need to have a clear and complete grasp of the extension of “abil-
ity” in order to be able to judge whether or not a view of ability is extensionally
adequate. If this were so, one might reasonably doubt that the extensional ade-
quacy of a view could ever be settled. For, arguably, we do not have such a clear
and complete grasp of the concept of ability, or any other concept, for that mat-
ter. With respect to some of our ideas about abilities and some of our particular
judgments about whether or not an agent in such and such a condition has an
ability to ϕ, we may well be mistaken. Disagreement can be taken as an indicator
here: whenever people disagree and the disagreement is not merely verbal, one
of them has to be wrong. Apart from our misjudgments, there may be a grey area
of cases to which our concept of ability may or may not apply. Having a concept
need not necessarily imply that it be sharp enough to cover every single case.
Philosophical theorizing may be partly normative: systematizing our thinking
about a subject matter will often give us a reason for a particular sharpening
of the concept within the grey areas.
What does extensional adequacy amount to, then? To three conditions: the
clear cases of an agent having an ability have to be covered; the clear cases of an
agent lacking an ability have to be excluded; and absurd consequences have to
be avoided. This can be done without having a clear and complete grasp of the
concept involved. All that is required is that we have a clear grasp on the applic-
ability of the concept to some cases. I think we can confidently say that this con-
dition is met in the case of abilities.
The first adequacy condition is not peculiar to a view about abilities. Exten-
sional adequacy is a standard that any philosophical theory of any subject mat-
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ter whatsoever will have to live up to. Let us now move on to adequacy condi-
tions that emerge specifically in connection with abilities.
1.2 Adequacy condition 2: General and specific abilities
Throughout the literature on abilities, it is taken for granted that there are two
different types of abilities. There are what we can call “general abilities” on
the one hand, and “specific abilities” on the other.¹ Intuitively, the distinction
is well-taken and the examples used in order to illustrate it all exhibit the
same basic structure. Yet there is little systematicity in the way the distinction
is being drawn; a lot of the pertinent ideas on the issue are implicit, rather
than explicit, in people’s writings, and many ideas surrounding the distinction
are highly contested. In what follows, I will try and identify the core idea of
the distinction. Later on in this book (→ 4.5), we’ll turn to the more controversial
issues and see how several ideas about general and specific abilities that float
around in the literature relate.
The distinction between general and specific abilities is usually introduced
by way of examples. Maier, for instance, asks us to
[c]onsider a well-trained tennis player equipped with ball and racquet, standing at the serv-
ice line. There is, as it were, nothing standing between him and a serve: every prerequisite
for his serving has been met. Such an agent (…) has the specific ability to serve. In contrast,
consider an otherwise similar tennis player who lacks a racquet and ball, and is miles away
from a tennis court. There is clearly a good sense in which such an agent has the ability to
hit a serve: he has been trained to do so, and has done so many times in the past. Yet such
an agent lacks the specific ability to serve (…). Let us say that such an agent has the general
ability to serve. (Maier 2014, 1.3)
Essentially along the same lines, Vihvelin points out that
‘ability’ is used in two different ways. Does someone with a broken leg have the ability to
ride a bike? That depends. Speaking one way, we might agree that she has the ability. (She
took lessons, she knows how; she has the necessary skills and competence.) Speaking an-
other way, we might deny that she has the ability. (Her leg is broken; her bike-riding skills
are temporarily impaired). (Vihvelin 2004: 448, fn.3).
Intuitively, the distinction emphasized in these two passages is clear enough. The
point is simply that when we ask whether some agent has the ability to serve, for
 The distinction goes by a variety of names. Whittle (2010) speaks of local vs. global abilities,
Berofsky (2002) speaks of token vs. type abilities. Nothing hinges on these terminological issues.
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example, the answer may vary, depending on the sense of “ability” we have in
mind. When we think about an agent’s general abilities, we abstract away from
the agent’s present situation a great deal. It does not matter whether the agent
lacks a racquet, or has a broken leg, etc. Thus, in the general sense of “ability”,
Walter may have the ability to walk even though he is bound to a chair. Sally may have the
ability to sing even though she freezes whenever her Aunt is present. Chip may have the
ability to cook even though no cooking equipment is available to him now. (Whittle
2010: 2)
More generally put, “[a]n individual with [a general] ability may be unable to ex-
ercise it in a particular case because a temporary obstacle is present” (Berofsky
2002: 196). As you can tell from these statements, there is a core understanding
of general abilities, which is voiced over and over again by writers across the
board: unfavorable temporary circumstances do not rob us of our general abili-
ties.
Specific abilities are different. When we are interested in an agent’s specific
abilities, we do not abstract away from the agent’s actual situation. If the agent
has a broken leg or lacks a racquet, then this deprives her of the specific ability
to ride a bike and play tennis, respectively. In the specific sense of “ability”, one
is unable to walk when tied up, to sing when nervous to the point of freezing,
and to cook without any equipment at hand.
When people move away from particular examples and try to give a more
general account of the distinction between general and specific abilities, they
usually do so in much the same way in which I have framed the distinction in
the last paragraph. Thus, Mele points out that
a general practical ability (…) is the kind of ability to A that we attribute to agents even
though we know they have no opportunity to A at the time of attribution and we have
no specific occasion for their A-ing in mind. (…) [A] specific practical ability [is] an ability
an agent has at a time to A then or on some specified later occasion. (Mele 2003: 447)
In very much the same spirit, Whittle distinguishes between “what an agent is
able to do in a large range of circumstances, and what the agent is able to do
now, in some particular circumstances” (Whittle 2010: 2). And again in similar
terms,Vetter points out that general abilities are “retained through great changes
in circumstances” (Vetter, ms.) and calls this feature the robustness of such abil-
ities. What seems to be common ground, then, is that the having of a general
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ability is largely independent of particular features of the agent’s situation, while
the having of a specific ability is not.²
Note, by the way, that often no explicit distinction is made between a lack of
opportunity and unfavorable internal features of the agent when philosophers
think about factors that deprive an agent of a specific ability. The lack of a spe-
cific ability which Maier envisages involves the lack of a racquet and a ball and
being absent from a tennis court. This looks very much like a lack of opportunity
to play tennis. Vihvelin, in contrast, notes cases in which the agent’s leg is bro-
ken or her bike-riding skills are temporarily impaired. These look more like un-
favorable internal features of the agent in virtue of which the agent cannot ride
her bike in her current situation.³
One may or may not like the fact that the notion of “specific abilities” that
seems to prevail in the literature does not differentiate between external and in-
ternal conditions for establishing a lack of a specific ability. I will come back to
this in chapter 4.5, b. For now, let us simply note that the having of a specific
ability, as the term is commonly used, seems to require both: opportunity and
the agent’s being in a favorable condition herself.
From the fact that specific abilities do, but general abilities do not depend
on particular features of individual situations, we can derive another insight
about general and specific abilities, which is implicit in virtually everything
that is written in connection with the distinction: general and specific abilities
can, and often do, diverge. Thus, an agent may well have a general ability to
ride her bike, say, and yet lack the specific ability to do so. This should be ob-
vious from what has been said so far. The fact that someone has the ability to
ϕ independently of any specific set of circumstances, or, as Whittle puts it,
across a broad range of circumstances, does not imply that the same agent
has the ability to ϕ in one very specific set of circumstances. Some obstacle
may be present in those circumstances – the situation may be such that the
agent cannot ϕ in that particular situation.
 It is the same core difference that Honoré has in mind, I believe, when he says that what he
calls “can (particular)” is so labelled “because it is used primarily in connection with particular
actions” while what he calls “can (general)” is so labelled “because it is most commonly used in
connection with types of actions” (Honoré 1964: 463 f.). Linguistically, Honoré’s claim here may
not be entirely sensible (cf. Palmer 1977: 3). The idea underlying it seems to be the very same
thought one finds in all of the quotes we have looked at before, however.
 Note that Vihvelin (2013) uses the terms “narrow ability” and “wide ability” to distinguish be-
tween abilities that are had in virtue of intrinsic features (narrow abilities) and extrinsic features
(wide abilities) of the agent.
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What we know, then, is that there is a difference between general and spe-
cific abilities and that that difference has something to do with the fact that the
having of specific abilities depends on the agent’s particular situation, whereas
the having of a general ability does not. A question that naturally comes up is:
what does the having of a general ability depend upon, then? The answer to this
question is usually that general abilities have something to do with what we can
call the modal reliability of an ability: the agent has to be able to ϕ across a
whole variety of situations. Whittle is very explicit on this point. For while she
would agree that general abilities do not require that the agent be able to per-
form some act in a particular situation, she stresses that it does nevertheless re-
quire that the agent be able to perform across particular occasions. To put it in
her terms, there has to be a large range of circumstances in which the agent is
able to do what she is said to have a general ability for.
The same picture is outlined by a number of authors. Honoré, for instance,
notes in connection with general abilities that
[i]f a typist claims that she can type sixty words a minute, she is asserting (…) not merely
that she has once managed by a fluke to get to sixty words in the minute. (Honoré 1964:
465)
Rather, what the typist commits herself to is something along the lines of the
claim that “[s]he normally succeeds (…) when [s]he tries” (ibid., my emphasis).
In the same spirit, Maier points out that
[i]n order to have a general ability, it is not sufficient that one now have Aing as an option;
rather it depends on one’ s relation to A in a wide range of circumstances. (Maier 2013: 11)
We can note at least three points, then. First, the having of a specific ability, but
not the having of a general ability, depends crucially on the features of the
agent’s particular situation. Secondly, an agent can have a general ability with-
out having the corresponding specific ability. Thirdly, the having of a general
ability requires that the agent be able to ϕ across a range of different situations.
As you will note, then, we don’t know much. Our short list of insights, while
certainly useful in order to explicate our intuitive grasp of the distinction be-
tween general and specific abilities, is no more than a first step towards a
firm understanding of the two notions. From a comprehensive view of abilities,
we are entitled to expect a great deal more. How exactly do general and specific
abilities relate, for instance? How do they fit into a view of abilities as a whole?
How do the truth conditions of ability ascriptions vary, depending on the use of
ability we have in mind? And can we nevertheless formulate uniform truth con-
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ditions for the having of an ability, if abilities come in the two distinct stripes we
distinguished?
A comprehensive view of abilities, I take it, will have to provide answers to
all of those questions. They emerge from the mere acknowledgement of the dis-
tinction between general and specific abilities, without presupposing anything
specific about either of the two kinds of abilities or the relation between them.
If there is a difference between general and specific abilities, then we will
want to know what that difference is, and we will want to understand how
the truth conditions for having the one and the other kind of ability relate.
This gives us a second adequacy for a comprehensive view of abilities:
A2. Any comprehensive view of abilities will have to elucidate the distinction between gen-
eral abilities on the one hand and specific abilities on the other.
1.3 Adequacy condition 3: Degrees and context sensitivity
In the last section,we saw that abilities come in two kinds: there are general abil-
ities on the one hand, and specific abilities on the other. Equally obvious, but
very rarely acknowledged in the debate is a second feature of abilities: abilities
come in degrees.⁴ Glenn Gould has the ability to play the piano to a higher de-
gree than any amateur pianist; my grandmother sews better, my cousin drives
better, my father draws better than I do. A meteorologist who predicts the weath-
er correctly in 9 out of 10 cases is better at predicting the weather than his col-
league, who goes wrong every other time. The archer who hits the target every
time she shoots is better than the archer who fails from time to time.We practice
things to become better at them. We admire people who have outstanding abil-
ities in some field or other. Degrees of abilities, I take it, are phenomena with
which we are all most familiar.
Linguistically, we have various means to express relations between the de-
grees of two agent’s abilities – ability ascriptions are gradable.We can say things
like “Max can play the guitar better than I”, or we can say even more explicitly
“he has the ability to play the guitar to a higher degree”. Typically, however, we
use more subtle ways to grade ability ascriptions. We say “He plays the guitar
better” or “He is better at playing the guitar”, and in those statements the
modal for ability is altogether dispensed with. Sometimes, we also use construc-
tions like “He is a more able player”. All of those kinds of statements are ways of
 This is a feature ability share with dispositions. For dispositions, gradability has been prom-
inently noted by Manley & Wasserman (2008).
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grading abilities – of making statements about the degree of an agent’s ability in
relation to one of her own or some other agent’s or agents’ abilities.
What this indicates is that, typically, the having of an ability is not an all-or-
nothing matter, but rather a matter of having the ability to some degree or other.
Perhaps there are exceptions. Perhaps there are abilities that do not seem to
allow for gradation in any useful sense. Examples for such abilities are extreme-
ly hard to come by, though. Even abilities to perform very basic actions – the
ability to push a certain button or to raise one’s finger, for instance – seem to
be gradable on closer examination. A child may have to develop enough strength
to push a certain button, and the stronger she gets the better she gets at pushing
it. A recovering stroke patient may get better and better at raising her finger. At
least for general abilities, it is very hard (though perhaps not impossible) to think
of examples that do not allow for degrees in any useful sense.
Does it make sense to think of specific abilities as coming in degrees as well?
On the one hand, whether or not someone is able to perform a given action in a
given situation seems to be an all-or-nothing matter. Either the agent can ϕ in a
particular situation or she cannot. Maier, in one of the very rare passages on de-
grees of ability that can be found in the literature, subscribes to this very view
when he writes that
[i]n some given circumstances, an agent either does or does not have the option of Aing. In
the case of general abilities, there are further distinctions to be drawn. For example, one
agent may have the general ability to speak Mandarin, but another agent may have the gen-
eral ability to a greater degree (she knows more phrases, is quicker to respond, and so
forth). (Maier 2013: 12)
What Maier calls “options” are very closely related to what we have been calling
“specific abilities” (→ 6.4). And options, Maier claims, are not gradable. Looking
more closely, I doubt that the restriction of gradability to general abilities is cor-
rect, though.
Just think of two pianists whose general abilities to play a difficult piece are
perfectly on a par. Now suppose one of them has had too much coffee this morn-
ing and is still a little shaky. In that case, it seems that that pianist has the spe-
cific ability to play the difficult piece here and now to a lower degree than the
other one. The pianist who does not suffer from a coffee overdose is better at
playing the piece than the overdosed pianist. It is not that the overdosed pianist
lacks the specific ability altogether. She can play the piece here and now. The
problem is rather that her present condition does not allow for as good of a per-
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formance as the one the other player is able to deliver in the same situation. It
thus seems that she has the specific ability, albeit to a lower degree.⁵
Which factors play a role in determining an agent’s degree of an ability? This
question, though quite natural in the face of the obvious gradability of abilities,
is not touched upon in the literature very often. However, Millikan offers helpful
guidance here when she distinguishes between two senses of “learning to do
something better”. In a first sense, learning something better can “consist in
learning how to turn out a more polished product” (Millikan 2000: 55), as in
the statement “She learns to play the violin better”. In a second sense, “you
can learn to do the same thing under more circumstances. For example, you
may learn to drive a car safely even on ice” (ibid.).⁶
This suggests that abilities can be graded along at least two dimensions. On
the one hand, there is what we can call “the dimension of achievement”. Here,
what matters is the quality of the performance the agent is able to deliver. The
higher the quality of the performance the agent is able to deliver, the higher
is, prima facie, the degree of the agent’s ability to ϕ.
Examples are easy to come by. The singer who sings perfectly on every occa-
sion is clearly a better singer than the agent who sings poorly every time. The
weather forecaster who gets the weather conditions exactly right each time is
better than the one who gets them only roughly right. A barista who serves
you a perfectly crafted coffee is better at making coffee than an average waiter.
On the other hand, there is what we can call “the dimension of reliability”.
Here, what matters is the range of circumstances across which the agent man-
ages to deliver a performance. The archer who hits the target every single time
she shoots is obviously better at hitting the target than the archer who misses
every other time. And the weather forecaster who is right in most cases is better
at predicting the weather than her colleague who goes wrong most of the time.
Note that it is not important that the circumstances across which an agent
achieves higher reliability differ substantially from one another. Millikan’s exam-
ple of someone learning to drive on ice, who was unable to do that before, may
 Maier responds to these considerations by acknowledging that there may be “some other no-
tion which is similar to options but for being gradable”. He goes on to argue, though, that “we
already have a non-gradable notion, and that is the one which I am picking out with the term
“option”” (ibid.: n13).
 Actually, Millikan proposes a third sense, which is also strongly emphasized by Sosa (2015):
the sense in which you get better at something by “getting better at recognizing risky situations,
getting better at knowing when not to try, or not to try this way but rather to try some other way”
(Millikan 2000: 56). In order to keep things reasonably simple, I will neglect this third sense in
what follows.
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suggest this. But in fact, an agent also becomes more reliable in doing something
the more reliably she succeeds in doing that thing in the very same kinds of cir-
cumstances.
The dimension of reliability and the dimension of achievement are usually
not considered in isolation.When we grade an agent’s overall ability to perform
some given act, we set the dimensions off against each other. Which dimension
carries which weight is a matter of the particular ability under consideration and
also of the context in which the grading takes place.
An archer’s ability to hit a target is usually only evaluated on the dimension
of reliability. The more reliably the archer hits the target, the better she is at hit-
ting it. The piano player’s ability to play a certain piece is usually only evaluated
on the level of achievement. The player who is able to deliver the better perfor-
mance is usually counted as the better player even if she can perform in far fewer
circumstances than another player.
In most cases, we take both dimensions into account and set them off
against each other in ways determined by context. The weather forecaster’s abil-
ity to predict the weather, for instance, is exhibited to a higher degree the more
precise her prediction of the weather is across the more situations. In cases of
that kind, an increased level of reliability can outweigh a comparably low
level of achievement and vice versa.
The inherently gradable nature of many abilities is a particularly important
aspect within a theory of abilities, because it seems to underlie yet another cru-
cial feature that will have to be captured by such a theory: ability ascriptions ex-
hibit a kind of context sensitivity that is generally exhibited by statements involv-
ing gradable expressions. Take a gradable adjective like “tall”. “Tall” is
gradable – Elsa is tall, for instance, but Max is a little taller. The same goes
for “rich”, “flat”, “dark”, “sweet”, “boring”, and a long and well-known list of
further adjectives. The gradability of such expressions reflects an important fea-
ture of the properties they pick out: richness, flatness, darkness, sweetness, bor-
ingness, and the like all come in degrees. Grading gradable adjectives is a way of
saying that the property they express is exhibited to a higher degree in one case
than in another.
Importantly, gradable adjectives are context sensitive (Kennedy 2007). And
even more importantly, their context sensitivity emerges directly from their grad-
ability and the underlying fact that the properties they express come in degrees.
The reason for that is easy to grasp, and we may focus on “tall” as an example.
While instances of tallness, say, are simply heights arranged along a scale in as-
cending order, the gradable adjective “tall” ascribes tallness simpliciter. And
which property is that? That varies across speaker contexts. If we talk about a
particularly tall two-year-old, “tall” will pick out a very different property than
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when we talk about a particularly tall basketball player or, even more to the
point, a particularly tall building.
What we have is a scale of heights, or different degrees of tallness, if you
will, and what the context does is fix a threshold on that scale above which
the predicate applies simpliciter. That is just to say that “tall” and statements in-
volving that predicate are context sensitive: the truth conditions for “x is tall”
vary across contexts. In fact, the context sensitivity that is exhibited by gradable
predicates is of a very specific kind: it is a sensitivity to what is often referred to
as standards – they are sensitive to what speakers consider a sufficient degree on
a scale.
Context sensitivity is most obvious when one and the same statement is true
in the mouth of one speaker, but false in the mouth of another speaker. When I
think of Lasse’s height in comparison with the heights of his kindergarten
friends, I may truly say “Lasse is tall”. But when you think of the way he desper-
ately tries to reach the window sill, you may truly say “Lasse is not tall”. Those
two utterances seem contradictory on the surface, but in fact they are not: I pick
out different properties by “tall” across the two statements and therefore express
perfectly compatible propositions by them.
Coming back to ability ascriptions, we can note that quite the same phenom-
enon can be observed. Someone who has driven a car once or twice and man-
ages to get from A to B without running someone over, but drives extremely poor-
ly otherwise, may be counted as having the ability to drive in one context, but
not in another, for instance. When asked whether she can drive, she may truly
say “yes” when a car needs to be moved from one space in an empty parking
lot to another, say, but she may truly say “no” when a car needs to be moved
from one neighborhood of a crowded city to another.
What this illustrates is that in different contexts, different degrees of the
ability to drive are required in order for us to be willing to count someone as hav-
ing the ability simpliciter. In the context in which a car needs to be moved on the
empty parking lot, a very low degree of ability is required – pretty much any kind
of driving is good enough for the purpose at hand in that context. In the second
context, in which a car needs to be moved across town, in contrast, not any kind
of driving will do. To count as having the ability to drive in that context, the de-
gree of the ability to drive has to be high enough to make it through the city with-
out running someone over, for example.
Ability ascriptions seem to exhibit a structure akin to ascriptions of other
gradable predicates, then. The degrees to which the agent has the property
picked out by the predicate form a scale, and context sets a threshold on that
scale in order to determine which degree has to be exhibited in order for the
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predicate to apply simpliciter in the context.⁷ For this reason, a lot hinges on a
viable account of degrees. Once we have degrees, the corresponding kind of con-
text sensitivity comes for free. Without degrees, the context mechanism for abil-
ity ascriptions remains mysterious as well.
This yields a third adequacy condition for a comprehensive view of abilities.
A3. Any comprehensive view of abilities will have to account for degrees of abilities and the
corresponding kind of context sensitivity that attaches to ability ascriptions.
1.4 Adequacy condition 4: Agentive vs. non-agentive abilities
Abilities are paradigmatically abilities to perform actions. When we think of ex-
amples of abilities, what immediately comes to mind are abilities to do things
like playing the flute, picking bike locks, reciting a poem by heart, and the
like. Let’s call an ability to perform an action an “agentive ability”. Agentive abil-
ities are clearly the most paradigmatic cases of abilities.
On closer inspection, however, the relation between abilities and actions is
not quite as tight as it seems at first sight. Surely, we want to say that most peo-
ple have the ability to smell, see, and taste, for instance. But having a sense per-
ception is obviously not an action. In smelling, seeing, and tasting the agent re-
mains pretty much passive. Having sense perceptions is a suffering, to employ an
old-fashioned term, rather than an action. Hence, it seems as though there are
things agents can have an ability for which are not intentional actions. For a
lack of a better term, let us call those entities “mere behaviors” and let us call
an ability to show those mere behaviors “non-agentive abilities”.⁸
Non-agentive abilities include abilities of various kinds. We already talked
about abilities to have sense perceptions. But non-agentive abilities also include
abilities to undergo a range of biological processes. Just think of abilities like di-
gesting, producing saliva, adapting the size of one’s pupils to the lighting con-
ditions, sweating, sensomotorically tracking one’s body parts, and so on. Most
humans have those abilities; some don’t. “She has lost her ability to digest
food”, “He is no longer able to produce saliva”, and “She cannot track her
body parts anymore” are perfectly reasonable denials of abilities. But again,
the performances being talked about are not actions.
 In fact, things are slightly more complicated. The context does not only set a threshold on the
scale, but also determines the ordering on that scale (cf. Heller 1999).
 Note that some authors may want to reserve the term “ability” for what I am referring to as
“agentive abilities” and refer to non-agentive abilities in some different way (Maier 2014, 1.2).
28 1 Methodology
I have heard people say that there is a derived sense of “intentional action”
in which the having of a sense perception and the undergoing of biological proc-
esses can be performed as actions. All I have to do is bring the stimulus about
that gets the process started. To digest, eat. To hear, expose yourself to sound.
In such cases, the digesting and the hearing may be counted as intentional ac-
tions. Are they really, though? To me, counting those behaviors as actions
sounds quite bizarre. But I guess a lot will depend on one’s systematic goals
in using the notion of an action here. Clearly, digesting and smelling are not ac-
tions in the paradigmatic sense of the word. Once started, the agent does not
have any control over the process, she cannot abort it, she does not govern it.
But perhaps some people will still want to count some instances of digesting
and smelling as actions.
Luckily, nothing much hinges on this question. What is important for our
purposes here is a different thing: non-agentive abilities can be and typically
are exercised without a foregoing intention to exercise them. They can thus be
exercised by being engaged in a mere behavior, which is clearly not an action.
The agent who digests without intending to do so exercises her ability to digest,
but her digesting is clearly not an action. The agent who hears without a forego-
ing intention exercises her ability to hear, but her hearing is clearly not an ac-
tion, either. Even if non-agentive abilities may sometimes be exercised intention-
ally (which I am very hesitant to accept), all that matters for my purposes here is
that they need not be exercised intentionally, and typically aren’t.
Having said this, let’s note that there is a more extreme class of non-agentive
abilities as well. There are also abilities which cannot be exercised intentionally
at all – not even in the very peculiar sense in which one may be able to hear or
digest intentionally. The most obvious examples for abilities of that kind are abil-
ities which can for conceptual reasons only be exercised without a foregoing in-
tention. Examples are the ability to read street signs or advertisements uninten-
tionally (Löwenstein 2013, 2016), to understand a word in a foreign language (van
Inwagen 1983: 8– 13) or follow a conversation at a different table without wanting
to, or to recognize a familiar face in a crowd or a pattern of numbers without ac-
tively striving for recognizing it. These abilities wear their status as non-agentive
abilities on their sleeves, and in contrast to the instances of non-agentive abili-
ties we looked at in the beginning, they can, in fact, only be exercised if no in-
tention to exercise them precedes them.
To see this point entirely clearly, note that the ability to read street signs is
not the same ability as the ability to unintentionally read street signs. A first
grader may already have the former ability – she can read street signs alright,
but she has to put a lot of effort into it. Most grown-ups, however, also have
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the latter ability – reading street signs is something that just happens; they have
acquired the ability to read them unintentionally.
What we can note, then, is that there are two very different classes of abil-
ities. On the one hand, there are the paradigm cases of abilities: abilities to per-
form intentional actions. On the other hand, there are abilities like the ability to
digest, read street signs unintentionally, or dissociate. In other words, there are
abilities which need not, or even cannot, be exercised as actions. Abilities of that
kind are what I have called “non-agentive abilities”. From the distinction be-
tween agentive and non-agentive abilities we can derive a fourth adequacy con-
dition for a comprehensive account of abilities:
A4. Any comprehensive account of abilities will have to account for agentive as well as
non-agentive abilities.
1.5 Explanatory challenge 1: Abilities and counterfactuals
So far, I have stated a set of adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of
abilities – conditions that will have to be met by any view that aims at capturing
its subject matter appropriately. The adequacy conditions are of crucial methodo-
logical importance for what follows. They will serve as guide rails for the critique
of existing accounts and for the construction of a superior view.
Let us now proceed to some explanatory challenges that arise once we have
a comprehensive view of abilities on the table. Let us formulate, that is, a bunch
of questions that arise quite naturally with respect to abilities and for which we
can hope to get an answer from a comprehensive view, once we have it.
The first explanatory challenge arises from the insight that abilities seem to
be somewhat closely related to certain counterfactuals. Typically, if I have the
ability to ϕ, it is also true that I would ϕ if I tried, chose, desired, intended …
to ϕ. The exact formulation of the counterfactual need not concern us right
now. The important point is that if an agent has an ability to perform some
given action, then her performance of the action will typically be counterfactu-
ally linked to some suitable motivational state of hers, and vice versa. Normally,
it holds that if I can whistle then I would whistle if I intended to. Vice versa, it
normally also holds that if I would whistle if I intended to whistle then I have the
ability to whistle.
In the debate on abilities, there is a strong emphasis on counterfactuals. In
fact, many have taken the link between abilities and counterfactuals of this sort
to be of the strongest possible kind: according to what we will later get to know
as the simple conditional analysis (→ 2), for an agent to have an ability is precise-
30 1 Methodology
ly for some such counterfactual to be true. In the course of chapter 2, it will be-
come clear that the simple conditional analysis exhibits some severe shortcom-
ings. The link between counterfactuals and abilities is way more intricate than
the simple conditional analysis would have us believe. Yet, it is hard to dispute
that there is an interesting link between the having of an ability and counterfac-
tuals of some sorts. And in fact, this link emerges directly from two essential fea-
tures of abilities themselves.
The first of these two features is that abilities are modal properties in the
sense that there is a difference between their instantiation and their exercise,
and they need not actually be exercised in order to be actually instantiated.
For some abilities this is very obvious: I have the ability to run around a tree
with a sombrero on my head while singing the national anthem, for instance,
but so far I have never exercised that ability and presumably I never will.
The second crucial features is that for every ability – even for strikingly
weird ones like the one I have just mentioned – there have to be certain condi-
tions which would bring their exercise about. If I have the ability to do a hand-
stand, say, there has to be some possible world in which I do a handstand. For
what would it be for me to have the ability if there is absolutely no possibility in
which I could actually bring the action about? The performance of the act would
be metaphysically impossible. And since it seems clear that no one has the abil-
ity to do what is metaphysically impossible, there has to be a world in which I
actually do a handstand.
Given the standard semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973; Stalnaker
1968), this feature alone suffices to show that for every ability there has to be
some true counterfactual with the performance of the act in the consequent. If
I have the ability to run then there has to be a true counterfactual of the form
“If C were the case, then I would run”. All that has to be the case is that C speci-
fies conditions which are such that the closest worlds in which those conditions
obtain are also worlds in which I run. In the worst case, C will not be a very in-
teresting set of conditions – C may simply pick out a world in which the subject
runs by specifying it completely. If we are lucky, however, the counterfactual will
be more interesting in kind and show a counterfactual dependence relation, not
just between entire world states and the agent’s performances, but between
some motivational state of the agent and her performances, say.
So there are two factors that constitute the link between abilities and coun-
terfactuals; their modal nature on the one hand, and the fact that certain condi-
tions would bring the exercise about on the other. What kind of counterfactuals
will turn out to be interestingly related to abilities and whether counterfactuals
play any important role in the formulation of an analysis of abilities remains to
be seen (→ 6.2). It is definitely something we can wish to learn more about from a
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comprehensive view of abilities, though. Let’s formulate this as our first explan-
atory challenge for a comprehensive view of abilities, then:
E1: From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn how abilities relate to
counterfactuals.
1.6 Explanatory challenge 2: Abilities and dispositions
The next feature of abilities I want to draw attention to has received a lot of rec-
ognition recently: abilities resemble dispositions in many interesting ways.
Dispositions are properties like the fragility of a vase, the solubility of a lump
of sugar, or the irascibility of a person. In recent years, people have become more
and more interested in dispositions. That is because, just like abilities, disposi-
tions are modal properties – there is a difference between their instantiation
and their manifestation, and obviously, they can be instantiated without being
manifested. A vase can be fragile without actually breaking. A lump of sugar
can be soluble without actually dissolving. A person can be irascible without ac-
tually losing her temper. For this reason, it has seemed promising to many to re-
late dispositions to all kinds of other modally laden phenomena such as law-
hood (e.g. Bird 2005, 2007), essentiality (e.g. Harré & Madden 1975; Mumford
2004; Bird 2005, 2007; Whittle 2008), and causality (e.g. Mumford & Anjum
2011) on the one hand, and to core modal notions such as necessity and possi-
bility (e.g.Vetter 2015) on the other. The views that have emerged in the course of
this debate are as manifold as in any other philosophical debate. But there
seems to be a broad consensus that an understanding of modal phenomena in
general will also require an understanding of dispositional properties.
The increased interest in dispositions has also shaped the contemporary de-
bate on abilities. There has always been some tendency to assume a very close tie
between the two phenomena (e.g. Ryle 1949; Moore 1912; Vihvelin 2004, 2013;
Fara 2008; Smith 2003). The more elaborate the understanding of dispositions
has become, the more similarities between dispositions and abilities have be-
come visible. And the more of those similarities have become visible, the more
explicitly have some authors tried to treat abilities as some particular kind of dis-
positions and to account for the former by whatever means will turn out appro-
priately to account for the latter.⁹
Apart from their shared status as modal properties, there are at least two fur-
ther important features that dispositions share with abilities. First, both disposi-
 This doctrine is particularly stressed by so-called new dispositionalists (→ 5.4, 6).
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tions and abilities are quite intimately related to counterfactuals; and not just
that: the counterfactuals to which they are related structurally resemble the
counterfactuals that seem to play an important role in connection with abilities.
For fragile things, for instance, it will often hold that they would break if they
were struck. And for soluble things, it will often hold that they would dissolve
if they were placed in a liquid. Compare that with counterfactuals that seem
to hold for agents having abilities: for an agent who is able to do a handstand,
it will often hold that the agent would do a handstand, if she intended to. And
for an agent with the ability to whistle, it will often hold that the agent would
whistle, if she intended to whistle. The structural resemblance of all of those
counterfactuals is obvious: for dispositions as well as abilities, the conditional
posits a counterfactual dependence relation between what we can call a typical
stimulus condition and the manifestation of the modal property. In the case of
abilities, the stimulus that comes to mind is the agent’s intention (or some
other motivational state). In the case of dispositions, the stimuli will typically
be external events.
In the last section, I said that the simple conditional analysis of abilities ex-
hibits some severe shortcomings (→ 2). Interestingly, however, this does not re-
sult in an asymmetry between abilities and dispositions. Rather, it strengthens
the similarities between the two. For as we will see later on (→ 6.2) the link be-
tween dispositions and the counterfactuals that link their stimuli to the relevant
manifestations seems to be just as complicated, and partly for the same reasons.
It is even more tempting, therefore, to think that abilities may just be dispositions
of a certain sort.
The second important similarity between dispositions and abilities has to do
with the role of degrees and context sensitivity. Just like abilities, dispositions
come in degrees (Manley & Wasserman 2008). A champagne glass is more fragile
than a coffee mug or a brick, Klaus Kinski was more irascible than most Bud-
dhist monks, an aspirin is more soluble than honey. Moreover, disposition as-
criptions seem to be context sensitive: “engineers working with slabs of concrete
and chemists working with glass electrodes may ascribe different properties with
the predicate ‘fragile’” (ibid.: 76).
As in the case of abilities, the two points seem to be tightly related; again, it
is plausible to think of the context sensitivity of disposition ascriptions in terms
of degrees: to take fragility again as an example, it seems to be the case that
varyingly high degrees of fragility will be required in different contexts for the
term “fragile” to apply simpliciter. In the chemists’ context, for instance, a higher
degree of fragility will be required than in the engineers’ context.
So both dispositions and abilities are modal properties, seem to be somehow
connected to counterfactuals of roughly the same form, both come in degrees,
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and ascriptions of both therefore exhibit the same kind of context sensitivity. In
view of those similarities, the thought that abilities simply are dispositions sug-
gests itself very naturally.
Yet, the exact relationship between abilities and dispositions is far from ob-
vious on closer inspection. Surely, the ability to do a handstand is not simply the
disposition to do a handstand; obviously, I can have the ability without having
the corresponding disposition. The same goes for “the ability to kill cats, to stand
on my head on the commuter train, and to play bebop on the violin” (Millikan
2000: 52). If abilities are dispositions at all, it therefore has to be a different,
and presumably a more subtle one.
Moreover, there seems to be an important difference between abilities and
dispositions which prima facie speaks against the idea that abilities are disposi-
tions: abilities have an obvious active component, whereas dispositions seem to
be passive in kind.When we think of paradigmatic cases of dispositions – solu-
bility, breakability, irascibility – we will note very quickly that the manifestation
of that disposition is something which the subject undergoes, rather than exer-
cises. In the case of abilities, this is very different. Here, the paradigmatic cases –
think of the ability to sing a song, to build a shag, to play tennis – all have an
action as their manifestation: the agent controls what is going on and she also
controls whether to exercise the ability at all. All this raises an explanatory chal-
lenge for an account of abilities:
E2. From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn about the relation be-
tween abilities and dispositions.
1.7 Explanatory challenge 3: Abilities and “can” statements
When we want to ascribe an ability to an agent, we have quite a few linguistic
means available. On the one hand, we can say “S has the ability to ϕ” or “S is
able to ϕ”. On the other hand, though,we can say “S can ϕ” and ascribe the abil-
ity to ϕ via what I will call a “can” statement – a statement involving the modal
auxiliary “can”. Thus, we can say things like “Jane can cook”, “John can do a
summersault”, and “Jack cannot run very well”.What we express via those state-
ments is that Jane, John, and Jack each do or do not have a certain ability – the
ability to cook, to do a summersault, and to run, respectively.
Importantly, that is not to say that all “can” statements are ability ascrip-
tions, though. “Careful, you can trip here”, “You can’t do that!”, and “Ann can-
not be the murderer” are but a few examples of “can” statements which clearly
do not express an ascription or denial of an ability. What we can note, then, is
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that abilities can be ascribed via “can” statements of a particular kind. There is
what we may call the “can” of ability.
Note that the use of “can” statements is not restricted to the ascription of
either general or specific abilities. A brief look into the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA)¹⁰ gives us a variety of real-life examples in which “S
can ϕ” (or its negative “S cannot ϕ”) is used to express that S has (or lacks)
some ability to ϕ. And as is easy to see, there are examples for both “can” state-
ments which express general, and “can” statements which express specific abil-
ity. Here are a few examples in which a “can” statement is used to ascribe (or
deny) a general ability – what is said is that some agent has, independent of
their actual situation, the ability to perform some action.
1. At least I am young and strong, and I can swim.
2. You can walk and chew gum at the same time.
3. Oh, yeah. Some people can not dance.
4. She can not cook, she says, but she’s learning.
Examples for the use of a “can” statement by means of which a specific ability is
ascribed are just as easily to come by:
1. You’re wrong, your honour. You can stop this right now before you do it.
2. There is nothing you can do about it now.
3. “He’s settling down. You can handle him safely now.”
4. People are measured only by what they can do here and now, immediately.
In examples 10– 15, “can” ascribes a specific ability – the can-statement express-
es that the agent has the ability to perform some given action in some given sit-
uation. This is indicated very clearly by the use of expressions such as “now” or
“here and now”, which serve the purpose of picking out a specific situation.We
can note, then, that abilities in general can be ascribed via “can” statements.
That abilities can be ascribed via “can” statements is a very interesting and
far-reaching insight. According to the standard view on “can” statements (Krat-
zer 1977, 1981), “can” statements obey a uniform semantics. And according to
that semantics, all “can” statements express restricted possibility. On that
view, then, to say p can be the case is only to say that it is possible, in a properly
restricted sense, that p be the case.
That ability ascriptions can be expressed via “can” statements is thus a far-
reaching insight, because either the standard semantics is true and ability as-
criptions, too, express restricted possibility, or ability statements do not express
 http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
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restricted possibility and the standard semantics does not meet its claim to uni-
versality – it would be false when it comes to the “can” of ability.
Thus, we get an interesting result, no matter which of the two possibilities
turns out right. If ability statements do indeed express restricted possibility,
then this takes us a very long way towards a comprehensive view of abilities.
The basic structure of the view would be settled: S can ϕ, on that view, if and
only if it is possible, in the properly restricted sense, for S to ϕ. What would re-
main to be seen is what kind of restrictions are the relevant ones.
If ability statements do not express restricted possibilities, however, then
there is something wrong with the standard semantics. The “can” of ability
would behave differently from what the standard semantics predicts. In that
case, it would have to be shown in detail how the semantics of ability statements
differs from the standard semantics for “can” statements.
Whatever one thinks about abilities, then, one had better have some view on
the connections between ability ascriptions and the standard semantics for can-
statements. This can be formulated in terms of an explanatory challenge for an
account of abilities:
E3. From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn how ability ascriptions
relate to the semantics for “can” ascriptions in general.
1.8 Upshot
In this chapter, we have identified four adequacy conditions for a comprehensive
view of abilities and three explanatory challenges. The adequacy conditions will
serve as guide rails for the discussion to follow: they provide conditions that will
have to be met by any view of abilities that sets out to capture its subject matter
appropriately. Here they are in a nutshell.
Any comprehensive view of abilities will have to…
– A1. … be extensionally adequate.
– A2. … elucidate the distinction between general and specific abilities.
– A3. … account for degrees of abilities and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity
that attaches to ability ascriptions.
– A4. … account for agentive as well as non-agentive abilities.
The explanatory challenges, in contrast, point to questions that apply only after
having settled on a comprehensive view of abilities. They point to questions to-
wards which one can expect a comprehensive view of abilities to take a stance.
Here they are.
36 1 Methodology
From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn…
E1: … how abilities relate to counterfactuals.
E2. … about the relation between abilities and dispositions.
E3. … how ability ascriptions relate to the semantics for “can” ascriptions.
We are now in a position to dive into the discussion of the two most prevalent
views in the literature. The next chapter turns to the so-called “simple condition-
al analysis of abilities”. Chapter 3 turns to what I will refer to as “possibilism”.
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2 The simple conditional analysis
This and the next chapter are all about learning from others. And by that I mean
not just learning from their mistakes, but also learning from their insights.What I
will do, therefore, is take a detailed look at the two most prevalent traditional
views of abilities, extract their most appealing insights, and argue why none
of them is suited to provide a comprehensive view of abilities.
The first view I will discuss, and the one that will concern us in this chapter,
is what I will refer to as the “simple conditional analysis of abilities”. On that
view, having an ability is a matter of a certain counterfactual being true. In its
most prominent version, the view states that an agent has an ability to ϕ if
and only if the agent would ϕ, if she so chose (Moore 1912, ch. 7). The view
can be traced back to Hume, who famously held that
[b]y liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the deter-
minations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move,
we also may. (Hume 1748, 8.23/ 95)
The simple conditional analysis used to be very popular among compatibilists in
the free will debate, who, like Hume and Moore, saw it as a means to provide a
compatibilist position on free will and determinism. But it was also met with
sympathy by many logical positivists, including Schlick (1939) and Ayer (1946).
Different versions of the view differ with respect to the motivational state fig-
uring in the antecedent of the counterfactual.What all of the views have in com-
mon, however, is that they analyze abilities in terms of a single counterfactual
conditional, according to which the agent would have performed an action, if
she had been properly motivated to perform it.
I am emphasizing that the simple conditional analysis works with just one
counterfactual, because we will see in chapter 6.2 that there are more sophisti-
cated ways of analyzing abilities by employing counterfactual conditionals. In-
stead of using just one counterfactual, the views we will be looking at in that sec-
tion work with a large quantity of such conditionals, each of which has a highly
specific antecedent. They can therefore be seen as a refined successor of the sim-
ple conditional analysis. I will subsume them under the label “the sophisticated
conditional analysis” later on.
Since the sophisticated conditional analysis avoids very many of the prob-
lems that are going to be brought up for the simple conditional analysis in
this chapter, I want to emphasize very clearly that this chapter deals exclusively
with the simple conditional analysis and its problems. It deals with views that
analyze abilities in terms of a single counterfactual conditional of the form “If
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S had been properly motivated to ϕ, S would have ϕ’ed”. Seeing the limitations
of that kind of view will be extremely helpful in seeing how to do better. And at
this point in the book, this is just the kind of insight we are after.
For simplicity and vividness, I will concentrate on one particular version of
the simple conditional analysis in what follows. And for reasons of uniformity
with my own account of abilities, that version will be one which posits a counter-
factual connection between the agent’s intentions and her performances. More
precisely, I will focus on the view that
SCAA. An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S would ϕ, if S intended to ϕ.
I would like to emphasize, however, that none of the arguments that are going to
be developed in this chapter hinge on the differences between this version of the
simple conditional analysis and any other version of the view. Everything I say in
this chapter applies to any analysis of abilities in terms of a single counterfactu-
al, which ties some kind of motivational state of the agent to her corresponding
performances.
I think we can say without reserve that SCAA is an extremely appealing view
at the outset. Abilities, we know, are modal properties – there is a difference be-
tween their instantiation and their manifestation, and the former does not re-
quire the latter. For an agent to have the ability to do a handstand, say, the
agent need not actually do a handstand. Yet, of course, the ability to do a hand-
stand clearly has something to do with the agent’s effectively doing handstands;
if not in the actual circumstances, then surely in possible circumstances. The
conditional analysis captures this thought rather elegantly: to have the ability
to do a handstand, the agent need not actually do a handstand; what she
needs to do is do a handstand when intending to do one. That seems like a
very reasonable requirement.
In view of the initial plausibility of the view, it is unsurprising that SCAA is
still the default view in many areas of philosophy and the view many try to cling
to when encountering objections. The idea that abilities will turn out to be a mat-
ter of some counterfactual or other being true is still very deeply entrenched in
the contemporary debate.
In what follows, I will argue that this idea is mistaken. The claim I will es-
tablish in the course of this chapter is that abilities are not properly accounted
for in terms of SCAA, no matter how exactly the counterfactual is spelled out.
SCAA faces a number of structural problems, which together amount to the fail-
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ure of the view, and it does so regardless of the details of any specific version of
the account.¹
The structure of the section is as follows. Since we are dealing with counter-
factuals a lot in this chapter, I will start, in the next section (2.1), by elaborating
on the semantics of counterfactuals generally. This will provide us with a crisp
terminology and a firm grip on the lines of argument to come. Readers familiar
with the standard semantics for counterfactuals are well-advised to skip that sec-
tion.
The subsequent sections are devoted to the critique of the simple conditional
analysis. As I will argue, the analysis fails because it runs into problems with all
of the adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of abilities. The view is ex-
tensionally inadequate, because it runs into problems with masks (→ 2.2) and
cases in which the agent cannot form the intention to ϕ to begin with (→ 2.3),
it fails to provide an account of general and specific abilities (→ 2.4), it fails to
offer an account of degrees of abilities and the corresponding kind of context
sensitivity that attaches to ability statements (→ 2.5), and it fails to provide an
understanding of non-agentive abilities (→ 2.6). By the end of this chapter, it
should be clear that the simple conditional analysis, while highly appealing at
the outset, is deeply flawed. Abilities are not a matter of the truth of a counter-
factual.
2.1 Modal semantics: Counterfactuals
A counterfactual, as I use the term, is a modal statement in the form of a subjunc-
tive conditional – it states that p would be the case, if q were the case. This is a
modal statement insofar as p, and thus q, need not be the case for such a state-
ment to turn out true. Most counterfactuals have an antecedent which specifies a
non-actual event; thus, the name “counterfactual”. Despite the name, however,
this is not essentially so. Some subjunctive conditionals specify an actual even in
their antecedent, and they typically also go by the name “counterfactual”.² I’ll
stick to that practice throughout the book.
Let’s get some counterfactuals before us. Here are some true ones. If I had
gotten up at 6, I would have heard the church bells; if you were the president
 Note that the criticism I am going to develop is not meant to provide an exhaustive assess-
ment of problems that beset the simple conditional analysis. There is, for instance, a huge
amount of literature on the “iffyness” of ability statements, which took its starting point with
Austin’s (1956) famous criticism of the simple conditional analysis, which I will not go into here.
 This is consistent with Lewis’s (1973) use of the term.
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of the United States, you would be more powerful than you are now; if birds
didn’t have feathers, they would be cold in the winter. Here are some false
ones. If I had gotten up at 8, I would have heard the church bells; if you were
the president of the United States, you would be less powerful than you are
now; if birds didn’t have feathers, they would wear little knit sweaters.
What makes counterfactuals true and false, respectively? The standard se-
mantics (Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968) states the truth conditions of a counterfac-
tual in terms of possible worlds. Possible worlds are complete ways things can
be – “single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation[s]” (Menzel 2016).
Theoretically, possible worlds can be thought of as a variety of things. Lewis
famously thought of them as real entities, viz. entities of the same kind as the
actual world, but causally, temporally, and spatially completely unrelated to it
(Lewis 1986). Most philosophers, however, do not think of them as material en-
tities. Usually, possible worlds are thought of as abstract objects (Plantinga 1974,
1976), as sets of propositions (Adams 1974; Fine 1977) or as “useful theoretical
entities having no independent reality” (Menzies 2014) at all. I am not going
to commit on this issue throughout this book; you are free to make your pick.
We can now introduce a very important notion: the notion of similarity, or
closeness. Possible worlds resemble each other with respect to what is true in
them. They resemble each other in certain aspects, but also overall. And this al-
lows us to impose an ordering on them. This ordering can be thought of in spatial
terms:
[I]magine all possible worlds spewed out across the logical universe, with the actual world
in the center [and suppose that] the relative distance from a given world to the actual world
is a measure of the relative similarity of that world to the actual world. (Heller 1999: 116).
The more similar a world is to the actual world, the closer it is to the actual world
in modal space. The more dissimilar, the further away. This is all the apparatus
we need to state the truth conditions for counterfactuals. Because we can now
state, with Lewis (1973: 16), that
STANDARD-1. “If p were the case, q would be the case” is true at a world w if and only if (i)
some p-world where q holds is closer to w than any p-world where q does
not hold or (ii) there is no possible p world, in which case the counterfactual
is vacuously true.
Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents need not concern us in this chap-
ter, so let’s ignore condition (ii). The important condition for our purposes here is
condition (i): the condition that some p-world where q holds is closer than any p-
world where q does not hold. Complicated as the condition seems at first sight,
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the idea underlying it is actually very simple and intuitive. It is just that “a coun-
terfactual is true, if it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the ante-
cedent true along with the consequent than to make the antecedent true without
the consequent” (Menzies 2014).
Apply this to an example. Why wouldn’t birds wear sweaters, if they didn’t
have feathers? The answer provided by STANDARD-1 is: because it is not the
case that some world in which they lack feathers, but wear sweaters is closer
than any world in which they lack feathers and don’t wear sweaters. Many
worlds in which they lack feathers and don’t wear sweaters are much closer.
Despite the fact that (i) is quite intuitive on second glance, it is obviously a
bit unwieldy. I will therefore help myself to a modification of the condition,
which we gain if we accept what is known as the limit assumption: the assump-
tion that there are always closest p-worlds.³ Plausible at first, the limit assump-
tion is actually very controversial, and Lewis takes it to be false. Take a counter-
factual with the antecedent “If I were taller”. The problem with such a
counterfactual is that it is hard to see what the closest worlds are in which I
am taller. Since height is continuous, there will be an infinity of increasingly sim-
ilar worlds between the most similar world in which I am exactly one centimeter
taller and the actual world.Which is the most similar world in which I am taller
(at all), then? It seems like there is none.
To deal with the possibility of ever more similar worlds, Lewis formulated
the truth conditions of counterfactuals along the lines of STANDARD-1. Neglect-
ing problems with the limit assumption, however, one can simplify the first con-
dition quite a bit and restate the truth conditionals for counterfactuals as fol-
lows:
STANDARD-2. “If p were the case, q would be the case” is true at a world w if and only if (i)
the p-worlds that are closest to w are q-worlds or (ii) there is no possible p
world, in which case the counterfactual is vacuously true.⁴
Instead of postulating that some world in which the antecedent and the conse-
quent holds be closer to w than any world in which the antecedent is true, but
the consequent false, our new condition (i) simply postulates that the closest
worlds to w in which the antecedent is true are worlds in which the consequent
is true as well. The new condition implies the earlier condition, given that there
 One of the central differences between the otherwise very similar views of Lewis and Stalnak-
er on counterfactuals is that Stalnaker accepts, while Lewis denies the limit assumption (Lewis
1973: 78).
 This comes very close to Stalnaker’s version of the semantics.
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are closest antecedent-worlds, which is just what the limit assumption presup-
poses.
In what follows, I will act as though the limit assumption were unproblemat-
ic and use STANDARD-2 whenever I state or refer to the truth conditions for coun-
terfactuals. Note, though, that I am thereby choosing simplicity over precision. I
trust that the reader will bear in mind that problems with the limit assumption
can be resolved by employing the more sophisticated STANDARD-1 instead.
So far, we have only looked at counterfactuals with false antecedents. Let us
now briefly look at a less common, but equally important case for our concerns
in this chapter: counterfactuals with true antecedents. Consider the counterfac-
tual “If I had a dog, I would go for a walk every day”, and suppose I actually
have a dog. How do we determine the truth conditions of such a counterfactual?
As before: move to the closest antecedent-worlds and determine whether the
consequent is true in them. Which ones are the closest antecedent-worlds,
though? Here, people diverge.
Most people accept what is called “centering”: the idea that every world is
closest to itself and no other world is as close. Given centering, the closest ante-
cedent-worlds for counterfactuals with true antecedents will always be only the
actual world itself. Thus, to find out whether it is true that I would go for a walk
every day if I had a dog, all we need to check is whether I actually go for a walk
every day. If I do, the counterfactual is true. If I don’t, it’s false.
But not everyone endorses this part of the semantics. Nozick (1981: 176), for
instance, rejects it, and holds that the sphere of the closest antecedent worlds
will contain a few non-actual worlds, even in the case of counterfactuals with
true antecedents. Hence, to determine whether or not I would go for a walk
every day, if I had a dog, it will not do to determine whether or not I go for a
walk every day in the actual world. It will also have to be true that I go for a
walk every day in the other closest, non-actual worlds in which I have a dog.
The counterfactual is true only if I go for a walk every day in those worlds as
well.
Whether or not centering is a good idea will not – and need not – be settled
here, because it is irrelevant to the arguments that are going to be developed in
what follows. For simplicity, I will assume that it holds. Whenever I anticipate
that issues about centering could be thought relevant to one of my arguments,
I’ll provide a brief commentary on why the argument works either way.
This very brief introduction into the semantics of counterfactuals will do. A
counterfactual (with a possible antecedent) is true if and only if the consequent
is true in the closest antecedent worlds.What we need to do now is apply this to
the simple conditional analysis.
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The simple conditional analysis states that an agent has an ability to ϕ if
and only if the agent would ϕ, if she intended to ϕ. What this translates into,
on the standard semantics, is that an agent has an ability if and only if the
agent ϕ’s in the closest possible worlds in which the agent intends to ϕ. Thus,
to find out whether an agent has an ability, we need to move to the closest
worlds in which the agent intends to ϕ and check whether she effectively ϕ’s
in those worlds. If she does, she has the ability. If she doesn’t, she lacks it.
Quite intuitive, at first glance. As we’ll see in the next sections, though, the
view is not very plausible at all, because it runs into problems with so-called
“masks” (2.2) as well as cases of impeded intentions (2.3), and it fails to account
for the distinction between general and specific abilities (2.4), degrees and the
corresponding kind of context sensitivity of ability ascriptions (2.5), as well as
for non-agentive abilities (2.6).
2.2 Extensional inadequacy I: Masks
In this and the next section, we will see that the conditional analysis is exten-
sionally inadequate; the view invites counterexamples which show that the con-
ditional analysis is neither necessary nor sufficient for an agent to have an abil-
ity. In this section, we will focus on the first type of counterexamples –
counterexamples which show that the conditional analysis is not necessary.
As I’ll argue, then, it may well be that some agent has an ability to ϕ, and yet
it may be false that the agent would ϕ if she intended to ϕ. How? Simply thus:
something may interfere with the exercise of the ability. Call an ability which is
had but whose exercise would be interfered with a masked ability, and call the
interfering factor a mask (Johnston 1992). Here are some everyday examples of
masked abilities. My ability to swim may be masked by a cramp. My ability to
sing a certain song may be masked by my hoarseness or my shyness or my for-
getfulness of the lyrics. My ability to hit the bull’s eye may be masked by my sud-
den dizziness.
In all of those cases, the counterfactual is false: it is not true that I would
swim or sing or hit the bull’s eye if I intended to do so, because the closest in-
tention worlds will be worlds in which the mask will be present. In the closest
worlds in which I form the intention, I thus fail. Yet I do have the relevant abil-
ities. Hence, masking cases show that the truth of the counterfactual is not nec-
essary.
There is an even simpler way to come up with masking cases: all we need to
do is cite cases in which an agent who has an ability to ϕ actually intends to ϕ
and fails.Whenever an agent has an ability to ϕ, but fails to realize her intention
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to ϕ, we have a case of masking: something came in the way. Again, the counter-
factual is false in such a case: it is not the case that the agent would ϕ, if she
intended to, because she did intend to ϕ and didn’t ϕ.
This is one of the places where centering may be thought to play a role in the
argument. If centering is false, then the closest worlds contain not just the actual
world, but also other worlds in which the agent intends to ϕ. And couldn’t it be
that what masks the ability in the actual world is not present in those worlds?
The smaller and more random the feature is which interferes with the exercise
of the ability in the actual world, the more plausible it is that the same interfer-
ence is not present in the other closest worlds, after all. Thus, one may think, it
does not do to cite an actual intention and failure to falsify the counterfactual, if
one rejects centering.
As far as I can see, this line of thinking is misled, though. Even if the closest
worlds contain some in which the interfering factor is not present, this will not
help to rescue the truth of the counterfactual. To see that, let’s go through the
truth conditions very carefully. First, let us assume that the limit assumption
is true, and a counterfactual is therefore true if and only if all of the closest an-
tecedent worlds are consequent worlds. In that case, the conditional analysis
postulates that the agent ϕ’s in all of the closest worlds in which she intends
to ϕ. Let’s now assume that centering is false. The closest intention worlds
will now contain some non-actual worlds that are still very close. Let’s also as-
sume, for the sake of the argument, that the agent does in fact ϕ in some of those
closest worlds.
The important point is that the counterfactual will still be false in that case.
For as long as the actual world is among the closest intention worlds, a failure to
ϕ in the actual world will suffice to falsify the counterfactual. Rejecting centering
is to reject that the actual world is the sole member of the set of closest worlds. It
is not to reject that the actual world is among the closest worlds.Whether or not
we accept centering: the actual world will always be among the closest worlds to
itself. Hence, the argument runs smoothly, no matter whether or not centering is
accepted or not.
What if we also reject the limit assumption? Then we will have to work with
the slightly more complicated truth condition for the counterfactual to be true.
But even then, the counterfactual will be false, if the actual world is an antece-
dent, but not a consequent world.
Suppose the limit assumption is false. Then a counterfactual is true if and
only if there is some antecedent world in which the consequent is true that is
closer than any antecedent world in which the consequent is false. Thus spelled
out, the simple conditional analysis postulates that there be some intention
world in which the agent ϕ’s that is closer than any intention world in which
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the agent does not ϕ. Let’s again reject centering. The sphere of the closest inten-
tion worlds will be slightly larger than the sphere containing only the actual
world. And let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that the agent does in fact
succeed to ϕ in some of the closest intention worlds.
Even so, the counterfactual will be false, given that the agent intends to ϕ
and fails in the actual world. That is because it is not true, in that case, that
some world in which the agent intends to ϕ and ϕ’s is closer than any world
in which the agent intends to ϕ and fails. There may be closest worlds in
which the agent intends to ϕ and succeeds, but none of them will be closer to
the actual world than the actual world itself. They will be just as close, but
not closer. No matter how we position ourselves regarding the various ways of
analyzing counterfactuals, an actual intention and failure suffices to falsify
the counterfactual figuring in the conditional analysis.
Masks provide a simple lesson, then. The counterfactual is too strong to be a
necessary condition for an agent to have an ability. Abilities can be had, and yet
it may be true that an intention would fail to be realized. Actual intentions do
quite often fail to be realized. And if no actual intention is formed, the world
may be such that it would fail to be realized. This is all we need to show that
the simple conditional analysis fails to state a necessary condition for an
agent to have an ability.
Can the conditional analysis be ameliorated? At first sight, it may seem like a
good idea to add specifications into the antecedent to exclude masking cases.
Aune suggests that the relevant conditional in the case of abilities is not “I
will if I choose”, but rather “if I want to lift it, try to lift it, and nothing interferes
with my attempt, I will certainly succeed” (Aune 1963: 338, my emphasis).⁵ On
closer inspection, though, this strategy proves problematic.
To see that, let’s take a step back from abilities and look into the recent lit-
erature on dispositions. For readers familiar with that literature, masks and their
impact on conditional analyses are not a dark horse. Conditional analyses have
been very prominent not just in connection with abilities, but also, and in fact
foremost, in connection with dispositions.
According to what we can call the simple conditional analysis of dispositions,
something has a disposition to exhibit some behavior if and only if it would ex-
hibit that behavior if it were to undergo an appropriate stimulus (Ryle 1949;
Goodman 1954; Quine 1960). Sugar is soluble, on this view, if and only if it
would dissolve if it were placed in liquid. A poison is toxic if and only if it
 We also find the formulation: “if Jones were to try to do X under absolutely noninterfering, or
nonfrustrating, conditions, he would be successful” (ibid.: 401).
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would cause harm if it were ingested. A person is irascible if and only if she
would freak out if she were provoked.
The analogy between the conditional analysis of abilities and the condition-
al analysis of dispositions should be obvious. In both cases, a counterfactual tie
is postulated between some trigger and the manifestation of the ability and the
disposition, respectively. In view of this similarity, it does not come as a surprise
that cases of masking have been raised as a problem against the conditional
analysis of dispositions as well. A poison may be ingested together with an anti-
dote, in which case it is not true that the poison would cause harm if it were in-
gested (Bird 1998).⁶ An irascible person may be provoked, but her wife may be
around to soothe her. In that case, she would not freak out if she were provoked.
And so forth.
Masking is a very prominent objection against the simple conditional anal-
ysis of dispositions and is extensively discussed in that connection. And of
course, we find an analogue of Aune’s proposed amelioration of the counterfac-
tual in connection with dispositions, too. Most famously, the analogous sugges-
tion is made by Lewis when he writes that
we might offhand define a poison as a substance that is disposed to cause death if ingested.
But that is rough (…) [W]e should really say ‘if ingested without its antidote’. (Lewis 1997:
145)
The suggestion is clear. Just as Aune suggests for abilities, the idea is to retain the
general scheme of the analysis, but to specify the antecedent in such a way that
masks are explicitly ruled out. A number of authors (i.e. Choi 2006, 2008; Gun-
dersen 2002; Mumford 1998, ch. 4) have followed Lewis’s lead. While the ac-
counts differ in their exact formulation, they all state essentially the same
idea: x has a certain disposition to ϕ if and only if x would ϕ if a stimulus oc-
curred and conditions C obtained, where conditions C will have to be understood
to exclude masks. Following Whittle (2010), we can call this the specifier ap-
proach.
There is definitely something to this approach. It certainly calls attention to a
certain discomfort I believe most people have when they first encounter the ob-
jection of masks. Somehow it seems clear that when we say things like “to be
toxic is to cause harm, if ingested”, we implicitly intend “if ingested” to be un-
derstood as something along the lines of “if ingested under the right conditions”.
Analogously for the conditional in “to have an ability to swim is to swim if one
tried to swim”. Of course, what is meant is “if one tried to swim under the right
 Bird calls masks in general “antidotes”.
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conditions”. And if that’s what is meant then coming up with masks is just cheat-
ing; it exploits the fact that we have not made that additional condition explicit
right away. Once it is made explicit, however, those apparent counterexamples
turn out to be simply irrelevant for the truth of the conditional.
Legitimate as this intuition seems, however, there are two problems with the
specifier approach. The first is that it is far from clear whether C – the good con-
ditions – can be spelled out in a non-trivial way at all. That is because for each
disposition and ability, respectively, there is an indefinite variety of potential
masks:
The kazoo’s disposition to buzz when blown through (…) can be masked by stuffing the
kazoo full of paper. It can also be masked by coating the kazoo’s vibrating reed with
wax; or by putting one’s finger over the end of the kazoo; or by submerging the end of
the kazoo in honey; or …. Given any finite list of potential maskers (…), it seems that a
masking situation not on that list could always be imagined. (Fara 2005: 51)
Fara’s point is clear. No specification of the circumstances could ever be com-
plete when it comes to the exclusion of the crucial counterexamples. It thus
seems that the only way of specifying C would have to be the specification of
a feature that all of the potential counterexamples have in common. Given the
diversity of the examples, however, it is hard to think of such a feature.
Indeed, as Fara rightly points out, “the only relevant property that cases of
masking have in common with each other is that they are cases of masking”
(ibid.). And this shared property helps little when it comes to the specification
of C. For surely, we should not say that something has a disposition to ϕ if
and only if it would ϕ in the absence of masks. So formulated, the conditional
states a triviality; it states that something has a disposition to ϕ if and only if it
ϕ’s as long as nothing prevents it from doing so. Obviously, on this account,
every object has every disposition whatsoever (Bird 1998: 231).
Abilities do not differ from dispositions when it comes to the diversity of po-
tential masks: my ability to swim can be masked by my legs being bound togeth-
er, by some weight on my feet, by panic, by a cramp, by too many people leaving
too little space… But those masks do not seem to have anything in common be-
sides the fact that they prevent my ability to swim from being exercised. Hence,
the problem of the plentitude and diversity of potential counterexamples arises
for abilities as well; it will either turn out impossible to specify C or we are once
more heading towards the triviality problem.
Aune’s suggestion falls prey to the second horn of the dilemma: stating that
to have an ability is for it to be true that the agent would ϕ, if she intended to
and nothing interfered, does indeed seem trivial. For what else is an interference
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than simply a feature of the situation that results in a non-occurrence of what-
ever actions is intended from being performed?
The second problem with the specifier approach is related, but different. For
even if the circumstances which pose an interference could be specified, the
specifier view will run into problems. To see that, suppose you and I both
have the ability to hit the bull’s eye. We both hit it in seven out of ten cases.
In three out of ten cases, the ability is masked. But now suppose those three
cases are not the same ones in your case and in mine.Whenever you fail, I suc-
ceed.Whenever I fail, you succeed.We both have the ability to hit the bull’s eye,
but that ability is masked in completely different conditions.
This case poses a problem for the specifier approach, because the specifier
approach does not provide any means to specify our shared ability to hit the
bull’s eye. Your ability will be the ability to hit the bull’s eye in conditions in
which the set of impediments A does not obtain, whereas my ability will be
the ability to hit the bull’s eye in conditions in which a different set of impedi-
ments B does not obtain. Even if the impediments could be specified in a non-
trivial way, then, the specifier view fails to account for the fact that one and the
same ability may be masked by completely different factors in different agents
(cf. Manley and Wasserman 2008: 75n20).
We can conclude that masks are problematic for the conditional analysis:
there is good reason to doubt that there is a non-trivial counterfactual, the
truth of which will turn out to be necessary for the having of an ability.
2.3 Extensional inadequacy II: Impeded intentions
Masks show that the conditional analysis does not state a necessary condition
for the having of an ability. Let me now argue that it also fails to state a sufficient
condition. To see the problem, let’s recall that an agent has the ability to ϕ, ac-
cording to the simple conditional analysis, if and only if she would ϕ, if she in-
tended to ϕ.Why is that condition not sufficient? The reason is very easily stated:
it may well be true that an agent would perform a certain action if she intended
to perform it, but be unable to form the intention to begin with. In that case, the
counterfactual is true, while the ability is lacking (Moore 1912, ch. 1 & 7; Chis-
holm 1966, 1976; Lehrer 1968; van Inwagen 1983: 119; Whittle 2010).
Illustrations are easy to come by. Comatose patients (van Inwagen 1983: 119)
lack the ability to raise their arms. Yet, the conditional analysis yields that they
have the ability. That is because the counterfactual turns out true for the coma
patient: if she intended to raise her arm, she would. To see that, let’s frame
the issue in the standard semantics for counterfactuals. To find out whether
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the coma patient has the ability to raise her arm, we have to move to the closest
possible worlds in which she intends to raise it, according to the conditional
analysis. But since the coma prevents the agent from forming an intention to
raise her arm in the first place, we have to move beyond the coma worlds in
order to reach the closest possible intention worlds. Since the agent is not in a
coma in those worlds, however, there is no reason to assume that she would
not succeed in raising her arm in those worlds. Hence, the counterfactual
turns out true, while the agent obviously lacks the ability.
In case you wonder whether it makes a difference which motivational state
figures in the counterfactual, let me point out that it does not. The coma case is a
counterexample to any version of the conditional analysis. A coma prevents an
agent from forming any motivational state of raising her hand whatsoever –
coma patients can neither try to raise their hands, nor can they intend, choose,
or want to raise them. No matter what motivational state we insert, the analysis
fails.
Can we think of further cases with such an impact? I think we can. Just con-
sider a brainwashed follower of a cult.⁷ Can the person leave the cult? No. Being
as brainwashed as she is, she cannot. But would she leave the cult, if she formed
the motivation to leave? Presumably yes. What the brainwash plausibly does is
prevent the agent from forming the motivation to leave to begin with. Hence,
the closest motivation worlds will be worlds in which the agent is not brainwash-
ed. And hence, there is nothing to prevent the agent from leaving the cult in
those worlds.
Again, it seems that the counterexample works against all versions of the
conditional analysis alike. Brainwash prevents the agent from forming any mo-
tivation to leave whatsoever. Intending, choosing, wanting, and trying to leave
are all beyond the range of things a thoroughly brainwashed person can do.
Hence, the example seems to refute the conditional analysis as such, and not
just a particular version of it.
What all this shows is that the conditional analysis runs into deep structural
problems with a certain class of cases.Whenever an agent cannot ϕ in virtue of
an impairment that prevents her from forming the intention (or any kind of mo-
 An example that is often cited is that of a phobic, who cannot touch spiders because she can-
not form the intention or make the attempt to begin with (Lehrer 1968). I don’t find that example
particularly well chosen, because it is not entirely clear whether the phobic is really impaired on
the motivational level. Furthermore, the phobia case invites discussions about potential varian-
ces in plausibility between the various versions of the conditional analysis with different moti-
vational states in the antecedent. For those reasons, I prefer to talk about coma patients and
brainwashed agents instead.
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tivation) to ϕ to begin with, the counterfactual will come out true, while the
agent obviously lacks the ability to ϕ. Let’s call this the problem of the impeded
intention.
It is important to note that the problem of the impeded intention does not
hinge on the claim that there is no good sense of “ability” in which the coma
patient does in fact have the ability to raise her arm (and likewise for the brain-
wash case). Presumably, there is such a sense. The ability to raise one’s arm may
not be the best example to see that. But consider abilities which actually require
a lot of expertise. Suppose the coma patient is a world-famous juggler. There is, I
take it, good sense to be made of the claim that the coma patient still has the
ability to juggle.
That this claim can be made perfect sense of does not attenuate the problem
of the impeded intention, however. There may be a good sense in which the
coma patient can juggle. Yet, there is an equally good sense in which she cannot
juggle. The reason for the lack of that ability is obviously that the coma patient is
in a coma. Obviously, a coma is an impediment to juggling, and a very severe one
at that. Hence, a comatose agent is unable to juggle (in a very sense of “ability”).
I don’t think there is much room for disagreement here. The problem with the
conditional analysis is that it fails to account for that very good sense in
which the coma patient lacks various abilities.
The problem of the impeded intention is a very deep-running problem, then,
because it shows that the whole structure of the counterfactual is ill-suited when
it comes to analyzing abilities. The ability to ϕ depends, in part, on the ability to
form the intention to ϕ. And so, the mere fact that there is a counterfactual con-
nection between the intention and the agent’s performance is, by its very nature,
insufficient to show that the agent has the ability. When the agent cannot form
the intention to ϕ to begin with, she also cannot ϕ. The simple conditional anal-
ysis seems to exhibit a deep structural flaw at this point.
There is a natural rejoinder for the proponent of the simple conditional anal-
ysis. If the problem of the impeded intention is that the agents in the examples
cannot form the intention in the first place, why not simply add a second condi-
tion? Why not simply postulate that the agent also has to be able to form the in-
tention in the first place? This further requirement, it can be argued, is already
implicit in the conditional analysis, and once pressed, the proponent of the con-
ditional analysis may simply state it as an additional condition of her view. Ac-
cording to the full account, then, there has to be a counterfactual connection be-
tween the agent’s intentions and performances on the one hand, but the agent
also has to be able to form the intention in the first place.
As we will see in connection to the account of abilities that I will lay out in
chapter 4, this strategy is actually a very good idea. The ability to ϕ does indeed
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require the agent also to have the ability to form the intention to ϕ. The problem
is just that it cannot be spelled out with the toolbox available to the proponent of
the conditional analysis as it stands. For what is it to be able to form the inten-
tion to ϕ? It is to have yet another ability. But surely, it will not do to simply re-
apply the conditional analysis to that ability all over: it is not a very promising
move to suggest that the ability to intend to ϕ is had if and only if the agent
would form the intention to ϕ, if she intended to form the intention to ϕ.⁸ The
analysis becomes either circular at this point or we slip into a regress. Either
way, we will not have made much progress.
The problem remains. As the coma case and the brainwash case show, it
may well be that an agent would ϕ if she intended to ϕ, and yet she may be ut-
terly unable to ϕ.We can conclude that the simple conditional analysis, besides
failing to state a necessary condition for an agent to have an ability, also fails to
state a sufficient condition.
2.4 The problem with general and specific abilities
In the last two sections, we saw that the simple conditional analysis runs into
extensional problems. In this and the next two sections, I’ll show that the simple
conditional analysis also fails to account for the other three adequacy conditions
within a comprehensive view of abilities.
Let’s start with the condition that any comprehensive view of abilities will
have to elucidate the relation between general and specific abilities. As I will
argue, the simple conditional analysis fails to account for both general and spe-
cific abilities individually. Consequently, the relation between the two remains in
the dark as well.
That the simple conditional analysis fails to provide an account of general
abilities is quite easy to see. Take the general ability to do a handstand. Obvious-
ly, you can have that ability, even if you are presently dizzy or on a shaky boat,
say. That’s just what makes the ability general: whether or not you have them
does not hinge on the temporary features of your current situation; temporary
unfavorable circumstances do not deprive you of your general abilities. The spe-
cific ability to do a handstand, in contrast, does hinge on such features. You can-
not do a handstand here and now when you are here and now dizzy or on a
shaky boat.
 Moore (1912, ch. 7) makes this suggestion: having the ability to choose, he notes, is for it to be
the case that the agent would choose, if she chose to choose.
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It should be quite obvious that the simple conditional analysis fails misera-
bly as an account of general abilities. A counterfactual is true if and only if the
closest worlds in which the antecedent is true are also worlds in which the con-
sequent is true. To find out whether a counterfactual holds, that is, we move
away from the actual world only far enough to make the antecedent true. To
find out whether someone would do a handstand if she intended to, say, we
move to the very closest worlds in which the agent intends to do a handstand.
As much as possible remains as it is in actuality in those worlds. Hence, a
dizzy agent is dizzy in those worlds, and an agent on a shaky boat is still on
a shaky boat in those worlds.
Will the agent do a handstand in those intention worlds? Of course not. The
counterfactual will come out false for dizzy agents and agents on shaky boats,
then. But we said that the agent can have the ability to do a handstand despite
her dizziness and unfavorable location, respectively. Hence, the counterfactual
does not do justice to abilities that are general in that way.
Quite generally put, the problem with an account of general abilities in
terms of the conditional analysis is that a general ability abstracts away from
very many features of an actual situation, whereas the semantics of a counterfac-
tual factors all of the features of the actual situations in when determining the
closest antecedent worlds. Hence, the tension between general abilities and a
counterfactual account of such abilities runs rather deep.
How about specific abilities? At first one may think that the conditional anal-
ysis is rather well suited as an account of abilities of that kind. Especially in view
of the failures it exhibits with respect to general abilities, this may seem quite
plausible at first. A specific ability is an ability to perform an act in a given sit-
uation. It thus seems like a good idea to look at what the agent would do in an
intention situation that is as similar as possible to that very situation. Hence, it
seems as though specific abilities do not conflict with the semantics of the coun-
terfactual in the destructive way as general abilities. When I am dizzy or on a
shaky boat, I cannot do a handstand here and now, with those impediments
in place.When it comes to specific abilities, it therefore seems to be a good fea-
ture of the semantics of counterfactuals that we look for intention worlds that
resemble the actual world as closely as possible with respect to as many features
as possible – including the impediments to the exercise of the ability that are
actually in place.
The plausibility of this line of thought hinges on a topic we touched on ear-
lier: the maskability of abilities. To see that, note that the reason I cited for the
inappropriateness of the conditional analysis for general abilities can be formu-
lated in terms of their maskability. General abilities can obviously be masked.
The actual world can contain impediments to the exercise of the ability without
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thereby depriving us of the ability altogether. Dizziness and being located on a
shaky boat are masks for one’s general ability to do a handstand, for example.
The important point is that it is in virtue of the maskability of general abilities
that that such abilities cannot be accounted for in terms of a counterfactual. The
general ability is there despite the masks. Yet, the mask prevents the exercise of
the ability. But since the worlds relevant to the truth of the counterfactual are the
closest intention worlds of the agent, the mask will usually be present in such
worlds. Hence, the counterfactual will turn out false whenever the actual
world contains a mask for an agent’s general ability.
We can conclude from this that the simple conditional analysis runs into
problems with any maskable ability whatsoever. So the question we need to an-
swer in order to find out whether or not the conditional analysis is suitable as an
account at least of specific abilities is whether or not specific abilities can be
masked or not. If they cannot, the conditional analysis will very plausibly
state at least a necessary condition for the having of such abilities. If they can
be masked, in contrast, then the simple conditional analysis is no more plausible
as an account of them than of general abilities.
The question whether or not specific abilities are maskable is not easily an-
swered; philosophers seem to have very different ideas about this question (e.g.
Fara 2008; Vihvelin 2004; Clarke 2009).What is indisputable, though, is that un-
less virtually every fact, no matter how random or small, of the actual situation
matters for whether or not some agent has the specific ability to perform some
act in that situation, masks will be perfectly possible. Unless virtually every
fact counts, there can always be a feature of the actual world that would come
in the way of the exercise of an ability.
Does every fact count for an agent’s specific abilities? Let’s test your intu-
itions. Suppose you intend to hit the bull’s eye and you fail, even though you
usually hit it and the situation was perfectly favorable to your hitting it. Does
your failure in that situation show that you did not have the specific ability to
hit your target? Only when you answer this in the affirmative should you sub-
scribe to the idea that specific abilities cannot be masked. If, in on the other
hand, you believe that there is at least one good sense of “specific ability” ac-
cording to which you did have the specific ability in that situation, albeit one
that you failed to exercise, you should instead commit to the idea that even spe-
cific abilities can be masked.
If the latter is true – if some specific abilities can, in fact, be masked – then
the simple conditional analysis will not yield the proper account of specific abil-
ities, either. There can always be some influence present in virtue of which it is
not true that the agent would perform some action, if she intended to perform it.
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Maskable specific abilities do not differ from general abilities at all in this re-
spect.
My own view on specific abilities, upon which I will elaborate in chapter 4.5,
is that there is indeed a good sense of “specific ability” according to which spe-
cific abilities can be masked. I take it to be reasonable that there are more or less
specific abilities among the ones we rightly think of as specific. In fact, I believe
that the most fruitful picture of the distinction between general and specific abil-
ities is a more or less scalar one, according to which there are more or less gen-
eral and specific abilities, with maximally specific ones on one end of the scale
and maximally general ones on the other. They differ with respect to the set of
facts that matters for whether or not the agent has the ability. Thus, I believe
that even fairly specific abilities can be masked, while the most specific ones
are essentially unmaskable (→ 4.5d).
If this is correct, then the conditional analysis will at best state a necessary
condition only of the most specific abilities we can think of – abilities which are
such that any failed attempt shows that the agent did not have the ability in the
first place. Slightly less specific abilities, abilities for which lots of facts about
the actual situation matter, but which still allow for masks, in contrast, will
be as badly accommodated by the counterfactual as any general ability.
Moreover,we should be very clear on one thing. Despite the fact that the sim-
ple conditional analysis may actually state a necessary condition for some very,
very specific abilities, it is nevertheless inappropriate as an analysis of abilities
of that kind. The reason for that has to do with the problem of the impeded in-
tention once more. The problem of the impeded intention is not limited to gen-
eral or even fairly general abilities at all. Quite to the contrary. While there may
be some sense in which even the coma patient retains the very general ability to
raise her arm, there is obviously no sense in which the coma patient has the spe-
cific ability to raise her arm in her particular situation, coma and all. Hence, the
problem of the impeded intention seems even more pressing with respect to spe-
cific abilities, and a forteriori particularly pressing with respect to the most spe-
cific ones among the already specific abilities.
2.5 The problem with degrees and context sensitivity
In the last section,we saw that the simple conditional analysis fails to provide an
account of general and specific abilities. In this section, I’ll argue that the view
also fails to account for the third adequacy condition: it fails to offer an account
of degrees and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity that attaches to abil-
ity ascriptions.
2.5 The problem with degrees and context sensitivity 55
Abilities, we said in chapter 1, come in degrees. Glenn Gould has the ability
to play the piano to a higher degree than I do; my dog has the ability to smell to a
higher degree than most of us; my grandmother sews better, my cousin drives
better, my father draws better than I do. One meteorologist may be better at pre-
dicting the weather than another. Two archers may be varyingly good at hitting
the target. We practice things to become better at them. Abilities can be im-
proved.We admire people who have outstanding abilities in some field or anoth-
er. In a nutshell: degrees of abilities are phenomena with which we are all most
familiar.
Looking more closely at degrees of abilities, we saw that the degree of an
agent’s ability can be influenced on two dimensions. The degree of an ability de-
pends, first, on the quality of the agent’s performances, and secondly on the
range of circumstances across which the agent is able to deliver those perform-
ances. We called those two dimensions achievement and reliability, respectively.
We also said that the gradable nature of abilities results in a specific kind of
context sensitivity of ability ascriptions. The degree of an agent’s ability to ϕ re-
quired for the agent to count as having the ability to ϕ simpliciter varies across
contexts. A darts player who misses 99% of the time, but who manages to hit the
bull’s eye every 100th time does not usually count as having the ability to hit it.
There may be contexts in which we count her as having the ability, though. She
has what it takes; it is within the range of what she can do. The context, we said,
determines some threshold along the scale of degrees of abilities above which an
agent counts as having the ability simpliciter. Once we have degrees, then, we
also have the mechanism for the corresponding context sensitivity.
The problem with the conditional analysis is that it is structurally ill-suited
to yield an account of degrees of abilities. That is not to say that it fails to ac-
count for all variances in the degrees of two agents’ abilities whatsoever. The
conditional analysis can account for the fact that my partner is a better driver
than I am, for instance, because (ignoring the problem of masks) it will rightly
yield that while my partner can drive, I cannot. If he intended to drive, he
would succeed. If I intended to drive, I would fail – I usually stall the engine
right away. Given that anyone who has an ability at all has that ability to a higher
degree than anyone who completely lacks it, my partner will come out more able
than I.
But apparently, that does not give us the full range of degrees we are striving
for. It does not, for instance, yield that my partner is a better driver than his
friend. The problem with my partner’s friend is not that she cannot drive at
all. The problem is rather that she is not particularly good at it. This difference
between my partner and his friend cannot be captured in terms of the counter-
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factual, though. Both would drive if they intended to. Yet, one of them would
drive perfectly fine, whereas the other one of them would drive crazily.
Now, you may want to respond that this is not as much of a problem as it
seems at first sight. Here is a suggestion for how the proponent of the conditional
analysis may account for the difference between my partner and his friend. In a
first step, let’s attach values to the quality of an agent’s performance. My partner
gets a 10 and his friend gets a 1, say. And now let’s specify the quality of the
agent’s performance in the consequent. Then we get the following two condition-
als: if my partner intended to drive, he would drive with quality 10. If his friend
intended to drive, she would drive with quality 1.We can now say that the degree
of an agent’s ability is higher the higher the value attached to the agent’s perfor-
mance in the consequent.
This seems like a reasonable suggestion, but unfortunately it does not take
us very far, either. First of all, the problem of masks re-emerges with new force.
Suppose my partner is drunk. Then he, too, would drive crazily, if he intended to
drive. In such circumstances, the simple conditional analysis, as we have just
constructed it, yields that he is not good at driving at all. Again, the problem
seems to be that the counterfactual ties agents’ abilities way too closely to the
circumstances they are actually in. This is a problem for the account of degrees
to the same extent as it is a problem for the simple conditional analysis quite
generally.
The problem I have just pointed out does not have primarily to do with de-
grees, though – in fact, it is just the problem of masks in a slightly different
guise. (What it shows, though, is that the problem of masks is getting more
and more complicated the closer one looks at it.) What really strikes me as a
problem specifically in connection with degrees is something else: the problem
is that conditionalists cannot account for the dimension of reliability at all.
How are we to measure the respective degrees of two meteorologists’ abili-
ties to predict the weather correctly, for example? Let us call our two meteorol-
ogists Fred and Ted. Fred has developed an algorithm, by means of which he can
predict 99 percent of all weather constellations correctly. Ted has developed a
faulty algorithm – it goes wrong for 45 percent of all weather constellations.
Clearly, Fred is better at predicting the weather. Nevertheless, the counterfactual
will often come out true for both of them alike. For suppose we are in a situation
in which the weather is be predicted correctly by both meteorologists alike. Then
the counterfactual will come out true for both of them. Who is the better mete-
orologist? According to the conditional analysis, they are on a par.
The problem that degrees of abilities pose for the conditional analysis is thus
again that the counterfactual is too closely tied to the agent’s actual situation. To
account for degrees and specifically for the dimension of reliability, we need a
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means to evaluate the agent’s performances across various kinds of circumstan-
ces. The counterfactual, however, only ever evaluates the agent’s performance in
one set of circumstances: the circumstances in which the agent intends to ϕ and
which are otherwise as similar as possible to the agent’s actual circumstances.
2.6 The problem with non-agentive abilities
There is one adequacy condition left to discuss. Any comprehensive view of abil-
ities will have to account for agentive as well as non-agentive abilities. It should
be obvious that the simple conditional analysis does not look too well-equipped
with respect to that condition either. The simple conditional analysis, with its
focus on the counterfactual tie between intentions on the one hand and perform-
ances on the other, is tailor-made for agentive abilities – abilities to perform
paradigmatic instances of intentional actions. In cases of that kind, it is quite
appealing to think that the having of such an ability has something to do with
the tie between the agent’s intention to do ϕ and her effectively doing ϕ. To
have the ability to jump, it has to be true that you would jump, if you intended
to jump. To have the ability to sing, it has to be true that you would sing, if you
intended to sing. As I argued, the simple conditional analysis fails even here, but
at least it looks very plausible at first.
In the case of non-agentive abilities, however, the simple conditional analy-
sis looks highly suspicious even at the outset. Non-agentive abilities are abilities
to be engaged in certain behaviors that are not actions. It is therefore crucial for
non-agentive abilities that they can (or can only) be exercised without a forego-
ing intention on the agent’s part. A view which determines whether or not an
agent has an ability by looking at the tie between intentions and performances
thus seems inadequate right from the beginning.⁹
Now, perhaps the proponent of the simple conditional analysis need not
admit defeat right away. In defense of her view, she might say: Look, it may
seem odd to analyze abilities like the ability to digest or to produce saliva in
terms of a counterfactual tie between intentions and performances. But in fact
the analysis yields the right results. That is because of course I would digest,
if I intended to. All I would have to do is eat something. And of course I
would produce saliva, if I intended to. All I would have to do is bite my tongue.
 Note that, again, nothing hinges on the particular motivational state that figures in the anal-
ysis. I will not comment on this any more as I go along.
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Thus, the counterfactual comes out true for those kinds of abilities. That is all
that counts.¹⁰
There are at least two reasons why this strategy is unsuccessful. First, it
yields an ugly disconnection between the conditions for having an ability and
the conditions for exercising an ability.¹¹ It seems very natural for the proponent
of the conditional analysis to pair her claim that an ability to ϕ is had if and only
if the agent would ϕ, if she intended to, with the further claim that an ability is
exercised if and only if the agent’s ϕ-ing results (non-deviantly) from an inten-
tion to ϕ. In the case of agentive abilities, this seems very plausible. If I hit
the bull’s eye upon intending to hit it, I have exercised my ability to hit it. If I
hit it by accident, though I actually intended to hit the outer ring, say, I take it
that I have not exercised the ability to hit the bull’s eye. My hitting the bull’s
eye is a mere accident in that case. The simple conditional analysis has a
good story to tell about this: an ability is exercised if and only if the action fol-
lows an intention to perform it.
In the case of non-agentive abilities, things look rather different. Obviously,
not every instance of digesting is a result of intending to digest. Indeed, the in-
tended instances of digestion are very rare; usually, the digestion occurs without
any foregoing intention on the agent’s part. Yet, one will surely want to say that
the unintended instances of digesting are, in fact, exercises of the agent’s ability
to digest. But here, the proponent of the conditional analysis does not have a
good story; and whatever she says here will either result in a disanalogy with
the agentive case or – if both cases are treated along the same lines – with
the consequence that my hitting the bull’s eye by accident counts as an exercise
of my ability to hit the bull’s eye as well. That does not seem auspicious.
Even if the proponent of the simple conditional analysis is willing to go for
one of those options, however, there is a second and even stronger reason why
non-agentive abilities cannot be accounted for by in terms of a counterfactual
link between intentions and performances: there are some non-agentive abilities
to ϕ which are never preceded by an intention to perform ϕ. Just think of the ex-
amples I cited in chapter 2.6 – the ability to unintentionally read street signs, for
instance. Or the ability to hear what someone says without listening.With respect
to those examples, the limitations of the simple conditional analysis jump right
at us. Clearly, it is not the case that I would read street signs unintentionally, if I
intended to. Once I intend to unintentionally read street signs, I am bound to fail.
 Erasmus Mayr (personal conversation) suggested this strategy to me, without, I think, en-
dorsing it.
 For the same point in connection with dispositions, see Vetter (ms.).
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Thus, the simple conditional analysis yields that I lack the ability to unintention-
ally read street signs. This is the wrong result.
What seems rather strange even in the case of digesting and producing sal-
iva is therefore obviously wrong when it comes to other non-agentive abilities.
We can conclude that abilities of the non-agentive kind are not properly account-
ed for by the simple conditional analysis. The modal tie between intentions and
performances,while very plausible for agentive abilities, is obviously ill-suited to
account for abilities of the non-agentive variety.
As we will see in chapter 4, my own view bears some similarities to the sim-
ple conditional analysis in that it, too, analyzes agentive abilities in terms of a
modal tie between intentions and performances. I want to emphasize very clear-
ly, however, that it does not stop there. For as I’ll show in chapter 5, the view can
be neatly extended to cover non-agentive abilities as well. However, the exten-
sion I suggest for my own view could, in principle, just as well be integrated
into a framework operating with counterfactual conditionals. I’ll briefly get
back to all this in chapter 6.2, when I discuss the sophisticated conditional anal-
ysis I have been talking about earlier.
Since we are so far dealing with the conditional analysis as it is, however, let
us just note that, as it stands, the view fails to provide the tools that would be
needed to account not just for agentive, but also for non-agentive abilities. To-
gether with the problems we noted in the last four sections, we therefore get
the result that the simple conditional analysis runs into trouble with all of the
adequacy conditions we have identified for a comprehensive view of abilities.
Hence, the simple conditional analysis is certainly not the way to go.
2.7 Upshot
Let me once again walk you through the main insights of this chapter. In this
chapter, we looked at what I called the simple conditional analysis. I used that
notion as an umbrella term for any view which analyzes abilities in terms of a
counterfactual tie between some motivational state to ϕ and the agent’s effec-
tively ϕ-ing. For plasticity, I focused on one specific version of the view, namely
that an agent has an ability if and only if she would ϕ, if she intended to ϕ.
Five problems were laid out for the simple conditional analysis, all of which
consisted in failures to do justice to one of the adequacy conditions for a com-
prehensive view of abilities.
First, the simple conditional analysis fails to state a necessary condition,
which was shown by pointing to cases of masking (→ 2.2). In masking cases,
there is some impediment which would prevent the agent from exercising her
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ability upon intending to do so. A cramp, for instance, masks the ability to swim.
I argued that masks are a rather severe problem for the simple conditional anal-
ysis, because they show that the ability can be had, while the counterfactual
turns out false. I also argued that the so-called specifier approach – an amelio-
ration of the view that tries to exclude masks by specifying the antecedent – is
much harder to spell out than one might think.
Secondly, the simple conditional analysis also fails to spell out a sufficient
condition. This was established by showing that it may well be true that the
agent would ϕ, if she intended to ϕ, and yet the agent may be unable to ϕ, be-
cause she may be unable to form the intention to ϕ to begin with. I called this
“the problem of the impeded intention” (→ 2.3). Masks and impeded intentions
show that the simple conditional analysis is extensionally inadequate.
Thirdly, the simple conditional analysis runs into problems with general and
specific abilities (→ 2.4). General abilities elude the analysis completely, because
it is a characteristic feature of general abilities that they can be had, even if the
agent is currently in unfavorable circumstances. Since the counterfactual is al-
ways evaluated at the closest intention worlds, the counterfactual will come
out false in such cases. That is a problem.
The view works better with respect to specific abilities, although a lot hinges
on the highly controversial question of whether or not specific abilities can be
masked. Even if they cannot be masked, however, the simple conditional analy-
sis will at best state a necessary condition for the having of such an ability, since
the problem of the impeded intention is particularly powerful when it comes to
specific abilities.
Fourthly, the simple conditional analysis fails to account for degrees of abil-
ities and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity that attaches to ability
statements (→ 2.5). The degree of an ability to ϕ has to do, in part, with the
range of possible circumstances across which the agent is successful in ϕ-ing.
Since the counterfactual only ever evaluates the closest circumstances in
which the agent intends to ϕ, however, the simple conditional analysis does
not provide the tools to account for this fact. Consequently, the corresponding
kind of context sensitivity of ability statements – one that has to do with a var-
iable threshold on the scale of degrees – remains in the dark as well.
Finally, the simple conditional analysis fails to account for non-agentive
abilities (→ 2.6). The tie between intentions and performances, while initially
plausible in the case of agentive abilities, will certainly not do the job when it
comes abilities like smelling, digesting, or reading street signs without intending
to read them. For abilities of that kind, the counterfactual will at best miss the
point, and at worst come out straightforwardly false.
2.7 Upshot 61
Taken together, these problems indicate very clearly, I should think, that the
simple conditional analysis is on the wrong track. That is not to say that it may
not serve as a starting point for a much more sophisticated view operating with
counterfactual conditionals. But as it stands, it is definitely mistaken.
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3 Possibilism
In the last chapter, we looked at the simple conditional analysis, which has its
roots in the literature on voluntary actions and free will. In this chapter, we
will look in detail at the other one of those two major views: the view that an
agent has an ability to ϕ if and only if it is possible, in a properly restricted
sense, for the agent to ϕ. I will refer to that view as “possibilism” in what fol-
lows.
Possibilism has its roots in the quest for a formal understanding of the
modal auxiliaries, such as “must”, “might”, and – most crucially for our purpos-
es – “can”. The view emerged primarily in the course of the attempt to give a uni-
fied semantic and logical account of modal auxiliaries and has played a major
role in the more formal regions of philosophy, as well as in logics and linguistics.
Thanks to influential proponents, such as the linguist Kratzer (1977, 1981) and the
logician von Wright (1951), possibilism is now the point of reference for most
people with a background in those areas.¹ Interestingly, counterfactuals, or in-
deed conditionals in general, do not seem to play any role in those more formally
oriented attempts to analyze ability statements. Instead, “can” statements in
general, and a forteriori “can” statements expressing ability, are viewed as cate-
gorical statements about what is restrictedly possible for the agent to do.
To get a grip on possibilism, the natural place to start is Kratzer’s modal se-
mantics. In the next section, 3.1, I will give an outline of the crucial elements of
that semantics, with a focus on “can” statements. In section 3.2, I will show how
ability statements enter the picture; here, possibilism is introduced more formal-
ly.With the firm understanding of the view at hand, we can then move on to the
discussion of possibilism. As we will see in sections 3.3 to 3.6, possibilism looks
somewhat less problem-fraut than the simple conditional analysis in some ways,
but, and this is the major import from the chapter, it ultimately fails as well – the
truth conditions of ability statements are not properly stated in terms of restrict-
ed possibility. By the end of the chapter, we will have learned enough about abil-
ities and the challenges in capturing them to be prepared to tackle the task of
coming up with a superior view.
 Even though possibilism has its roots in the formal treatment of modal auxiliaries, it has not
been limited to those areas. In the philosophical literature, proponents of the view have applied
possibilism to the problem of time travel (Lewis 1976) and also, but less famously, to the problem
of free will (Lehrer 1976; Horgan 1979), where possibilism has never quite managed to make it to
center stage.
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3.1 Modal semantics: Restricted possibility
In most areas of linguistics, “can” statements are taken to exhibit a unified se-
mantics. According to that semantics, which has been developed in most detail
by Kratzer (1977, 1981), “can” is a sentence operator which takes a proposition as
its argument and forms a new proposition from it. “Pigs fly”, for instance, can be
taken as an argument for claims such as “Pigs can fly” or, in the negated form,
“Pigs cannot fly”. The structure of such statements is CAN(Pigs fly) and ¬
CAN(Pigs fly), respectively.
What does the CAN operator do? It assigns possibility to the proposition over
which it has scope. “Pigs can fly” states that it is possible that pigs fly. “Pigs can-
not fly” states that it is not possible that they fly. CAN(Pigs fly) is thus equivalent
to some statement of the form ◊(Pigs fly), where the diamond is the possibility
operator.
What is it for something to be possible? To say that something is possible, ac-
cording to the standard semantics, is for there to be a possible world in which that
thing is the case. In other words, it is to apply existential quantification to the pos-
sible worlds. For it to be possible that pigs fly, say, there has to be a possible world
in which pigs fly. To make a statement of the form CAN(p), then, is to state a pos-
sibility, the possibility that p. In possible worlds terminology, the truth conditions
for such a statement are that there is a possible world in which p.
The kind of quantification that is applied to possible worlds is called the
modal force of a modal expression. Expressions like “can” or “might” express
possibility: the modal force of such expressions is existential quantification.
For a possibility statement to be true, there has to be at least one world
among the possible worlds in which the proposition over which the modal rang-
es is true.
Expressions like “must” or “ought”, in contrast, express necessity. The
modal force of such expressions is universal quantification. For a necessity state-
ment to be true, all possible worlds have to be such that the sentence over which
the modal ranges is true in them. Since we are concerned with Kratzer’s seman-
tics in connection with the idea that ability ascriptions express possibilities, the
modal force we are going to be concerned with throughout the chapter will be
existential quantification.
So much for the very basic framework. Let us now move on to the more com-
plex bits. The complexity comes about in virtue of the fact that possibility state-
ments (and modal statements in general) are virtually never unqualified – when
we say that something is possible and thereby state that there is a possible world
in which that thing is the case, we usually do not usually quantify over the total-
ity of all worlds, but rather over a certain subset of those worlds – Kratzer calls
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this subset the modal base of the modal. In other words, possibility statements
are usually statements of what we can call restricted possibility.When we think
about whether p is possible, we are thinking about whether p is the case in some
of the worlds that matter in our context. Let’s call the worlds in the modal base
the relevant worlds. (I’ll use the terms “modal base” and “relevant worlds” inter-
changeably throughout the book.)
Which worlds are relevant is a matter of the conversational background, ac-
cording to Kratzer. Where Kratzer speaks of the conversational background, I’ll
speak of a context. The idea is the same. It is simply that
when a botanist says, in a foreign country with unfamiliar vegetation, ‘Hydrangeas can
grow here’, she says not just that in some metaphysically possible worlds there are hydran-
geas growing on this soil. She speaks only about worlds where the biology of hydrangeas,
the geology and the climate of the country are as they are in actuality. When a detective
says, ‘Mary [cannot] be the murderer’, she speaks about a different set of worlds: those
that are compatible with everything she knows. In each case the conversational back-
ground selects a set of propositions; propositions about the actual facts of biology and ge-
ology, or the propositions that are known to the detective. The modal base is the set of
worlds in which those propositions are true. (Vetter 2015: 68)
On Kratzer’s view, then, “can” and other modals are actually used relationally:
there is no absolute “can”, but rather always a relational “can in view of”.
This relative modal phrase has two arguments: the first argument is provided
by a phrase which specifies the facts in view of which it is true to say of someone
that she can perform a given act – the set of propositions which determine the
modal base. It is provided by the meaning of a phrase like “the biology of hy-
drangeas and the features of the soil”, or “what the detective knows”. The sec-
ond argument is provided by the meaning of a sentence like “Hydrangea grow
here”, or “Fred is the murderer” (cf. Kratzer 1977: 341). It specifies what can be
the case in view of the facts specified in the first argument.
The “in view of” locution will prove very handy in the course of the book. It
is a good means to express, in ordinary language, that we are talking about a
restricted realm of possible worlds. I will often use phrases of the form “S can
ϕ in view of p”, and when I do so, I use the “in view of” phrase in the very
way Kratzer intends it: as a means to express that we are restricting the possible
worlds in accordance to the facts specified by “p”. The “in view of” locution pro-
vides the means to pick out the modal base worlds in a non-technical fashion.
Before we look more closely at some of the details of Kratzer’s semantics,
let’s summarize the basic idea briefly. Kratzer offers an account of “can” state-
ments, such as “Hydrangeas can grow here”. Her fundamental insight is that
any such statement carries a (typically implicit) “in view of p” supplement. To
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say that hydrangeas can grow here, in some context, is to say that they can, in
view of some set of facts, grow on whatever place is referred to by “here” in that
context. The “in view of” locution is to be interpreted in terms of compossibility.
To say that hydrangeas can grow here is to say that the growth of hydrangeas on
this spot is compossible with the features of the soil, the biology of hydrangeas,
and whatever else matters to us in the context. To say that the two facts are com-
possible is to say that there is a relevant world – a world in which the soil and
the biology of hydrangeas is as in actuality – in which hydrangeas grow.
A note on terminology. In what follows, I will often say that we hold certain
facts fixed or constant across possible worlds or modal space. I find this a handy
way of saying that certain facts go into the modal base, or, to put it differently
still, that the relevant worlds are worlds in which those very facts obtain.
I will also often say of certain facts that they get varied across the possible
worlds or across modal space. I use this locution as a means to put emphasis
on the fact that certain features of the actual world are irrelevant for the deter-
mination of the relevant worlds, which form the modal base.When I say that hy-
drangeas can grow here, for instance, lots of features of the actual world are var-
ied: my body weight, who the president of the United States is, and usually also
whether or not there is a car standing right on the spot where it is said to be pos-
sible for the hydrangeas to grow. It is important to note that this talk about fix-
ation and variation of facts does not add anything to Kratzer’s framework, nor
does it alter anything about it. It is merely a different way of putting things.
So much for the overview. Let us now proceed to some more subtle parts of
the semantics. In particular, there are two aspect I would like to highlight, be-
cause they will prove helpful in embedding the possibilist semantics of ability
statements in the possibilist semantics of “can” statements quite generally.
The first is that there are generally two kinds of modal bases. Vetter’s examples
above illustrate this nicely. On the one hand, there are so-called circumstantial
bases. Here, the relevant worlds are determined by propositions about facts in
the world which do not depend on our epistemic access to them. The statement
“Hydrangeas can grow here” is an example of a statement with a circumstantial
base. The modal base contains facts about biology, the soil, and so on. “Pigs
can’t fly” can also be read as a statement about circumstantial possibility. It is
naturally read as the statement that in view of their anatomy, their lack of
wings and so forth, pigs cannot fly.
On the other hand, there are so-called epistemic bases. Here, the relevant
worlds are fixed by facts we have knowledge about. “John cannot be the murder-
er” is naturally read along those lines. It is naturally read as the statement that,
in view of what the detective knows about the crime and John’s whereabouts, it
is not possible that John be the murderer. Note that “Pigs can’t fly” can also be
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read as a statement about epistemic possibility: in view of what we know about
pigs, they cannot fly.
Both circumstantial possibility and epistemic possibility are realistic. That is
to say that the actual world is always contained in the modal base. The reason
for that is that the facts which determine which worlds count as relevant in a
given context – the features of the world we hold fixed across possible worlds –
are always that: features of the actual world. And since any world in which those
facts obtain go into the modal base, the actual world will always automatically
be among them. Epistemic possibility does not differ from circumstantial possi-
bility in this respect. Since knowledge is factive – we can only know p, if p is
true – the set of worlds in which the things we know are held fixed will always
automatically contain the actual world.
Let’s now move on to the second more subtle feature of Kratzer’s framework.
So far, I have introduced one important role of the context, or the conversational
background, as Kratzer calls it: the context fixes a set of relevant worlds for pos-
sibility statements. Differently put, it determines a set of facts which are then
held fixed across possible worlds. Something is possible, in the correspondingly
restricted sense, if the so determined relevant worlds contain a world in which
that thing is the case.
But this is not the only role the context plays in Kratzer’s framework. The
context also determines the so-called ordering source. As Kratzer observes,
modal expressions are gradable. Some things are more easily possible than oth-
ers. For some things there is a good possibility, for others merely a slight possi-
bility. And so on.
The modal base is the wrong tool to account for this kind of graded modals.
To account for the fact that there is a better possibility for Kim to be the murderer
than there is a possibility for Jim to be the murderer, it will not do to check
whether or not the modal base contains a world in which Kim is the murderer
and whether or not it contains one in which Jim is the murderer. If each agent
can be the murderer in view of what we know, say, then we will find both a
world in which Kim is the murderer and one in which Jim is the murderer
among the worlds in which we hold fixed what we know. To account for the
fact that there is a better possibility for the one than for the other, we need a
means to establish a scale of some kind.
The ordering source is designed to do just that (Kratzer 1981: 46 f.). It ranks
the relevant worlds in accordance to their closeness to some ideal. Ordering sour-
ces come in different kinds. A bouletic ordering source ranks worlds by how
close they are to fully satisfying the speaker’s desires. A deontic sources ranks
worlds by how close they come to meeting the demands of morality or the
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law. A stereotypical ordering source ranks worlds by how close they are to being
entirely normal.
We can think of the ordering source as a set of propositions, which together
express some ideal. Roughly, a world is closer to the ideal the more propositions
of the ideal are true in it. A world in which all the laws are respected, for in-
stance, is closer to the deontic ideal than a world in which some or all laws
are broken.
That there is a better possibility for Kim being the murderer than there is one
for Jim being the murderer will presumably be a matter of a stereotypical order-
ing source. The ideal is a world in which everything is normal. Worlds in which
Jim is the murderer are less extraordinary than worlds in which Kim is the mur-
derer. Thus, there is a better possibility for the former than for the latter, despite
the fact that there is some possibility for each.
3.2 Possibilism: The details
Against the background of this overview,we can now return to our original topic:
the understanding of ability statements in terms of restricted possibilities as it is
suggested by possibilists. Probably the best-known expression of possibilism in
the philosophical literature can be found in the following famous passage by
Lewis:
To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain
facts. Which facts? That is determined (…) by context. An ape can’t speak a human lan-
guage – say, Finnish – but I can. Facts about the anatomy and operation of the ape’s larynx
and nervous system are not compossible with his speaking Finnish. The corresponding
facts about my larynx and nervous system are compossible with my speaking Finnish.
But don’t take me along to Helsinki as your interpreter: I can’t speak Finnish. My speaking
Finnish is compossible with the facts considered so far, but not with further facts about my
lack of training.What I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, relative to another,
more inclusive, set. (Lewis 1976: 149)
In this passage, Lewis formulates the sketch of a view of abilities which treats
ability statements as restricted possibility statements. What we do, when we as-
cribe the ability to ϕ to an agent, according to Lewis, is quantify existentially
over a restricted domain of relevant possible worlds and postulate that the
agent ϕ’s in at least one of those worlds.
To say that ability statements express possibility is to say, in Kratzer’s termi-
nology, that the modal force of ability statements is that of existential quantifi-
cation. This is the core claim of possibilism. The interesting question is: what is
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their modal base? What is obvious is that the modal base will have to be circum-
stantial, rather than epistemic. What matters for an agent’s abilities is what the
agent can do in view of certain facts in the world; the question is not what she
can do in view of what we know about those or any other facts.
But which facts matter? Here, Lewis suggests a contextualist view: which
facts go into the modal base – which features of the world are held fixed across
modal space – depends on the speaker context. Sometimes, we may be interest-
ed in what Lewis can do in view of his anatomy. Sometimes, we may be interest-
ed in what he can do in view of his amount of training. Depending on the con-
text, it will vary which facts go into the modal base.
Kratzer, whose work contains only a few scattered remarks specifically about
ability ascriptions, suggests the very same picture. In the most explicit passage I
know of, she considers the sentence “Ich kann nicht Posaune spielen” (“I cannot
play the trombone”) and writes:
Depending on the situation in which I utter this sentence, I may say quite different things. I
may mean that I don’t know how to play the trombone. I am sure that there is something in
a person’s mind which becomes different when he or she starts learning how to play the
trombone. A programme is filled in. And it is in view of this programme that it may be pos-
sible that I play the trombone. Or suppose that I suffer from asthma. I can hardly breathe.
In view of my physical condition I am not able to play the trombone, although I know how
to do it. I may express this by uttering [“Ich kann nicht Posaune spielen”]. Or else imagine
that I am travelling by sea. The ship sinks and so does my trombone. I manage to get to a
lonely island and sadly mumble [“Ich kann nicht Posaune spielen”]. I could play the trom-
bone in view of my head and my lungs, but the trombone is out of reach. (Kratzer 1981: 54)
Kratzer and Lewis both endorse a contextualist account of ability statements,
then. The modal base of ability statements varies in accordance to the context
in which the statement is uttered. Again, the same picture is laid out by Horgan,
an almost entirely forgotten proponent of possibilism. As Horgan writes in a bril-
liant paper on free will,
[w]hen we say that (…) someone could have done something he did not actually do, we are
saying that it was possible for the given (…) action to occur, even though it did not actually
occur. I.e., we are asserting a statement of the form ◊ϕ, where ◊ is the possibility-operator
of modality. And according to contemporary semantical treatments of modality, ◊ϕ is true if
and only if ϕ is true in some possible world that is accessible from the actual world. So if we
wish to apply possible-world semantics to everyday “could”-statements, the key question
we face is this:What is the relevant notion of accessibility? I suggest that the accessible pos-
sible worlds are those in which the circumstances are sufficiently similar to the circumstan-
ces which prevailed in the actual world. (…) The notion of circumstantial similarity is ob-
viously quite vague (…). We resolve the vagueness (…) in varying ways, depending on the
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context in which a given “could”-statement is used and the speaker’s purposes in using it.
(Horgan 1979: 346)
Lewis, Kratzer, and Horgan all voice the same idea: ability ascriptions have dif-
ferent modal bases, depending on the context of utterance.²
We are now in a position to formulate the possibilist’s view a bit more pre-
cisely. In the beginning, we said that an agent has an ability, according to pos-
sibilism, if and only if it is possible, in a properly restricted sense, for the agent
to ϕ. More specifically, though, possibilism is an explicitly contextualist view
about ability statements: it is the view that an agent S has an ability to ϕ if
and only if it is possible, in the properly restricted sense, for the agent to ϕ,
where the proper restrictions will vary across contexts.³ Or, to put it in possible
worlds terminology,
POSS. an agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if there is a relevant world in which the
agent ϕ’s, where the set of the relevant worlds will vary across ascriber contexts.
It is the contextualist aspect of possibilism in particular, I take it, that makes the
view extremely appealing. Ability statements do in fact seem to exhibit a certain
context sensitivity that seems to have to do with our focus on certain features of
the agent and facts of her situation. Can I jump the fence? Well, in a sense I can:
I have done it many times in the past and it was easy. In a different sense, I can-
not: my leg is currently broken. Can Emma kill her husband? In a sense, she cer-
tainly can: she owns a gun and knows very well how to use it. In a different
sense, she cannot: she has tried it before when her husband was asleep and
never managed to actually pull the trigger. Can Fred play the piano? In a
sense, yes: he has had lessons since he was five years old. In another sense,
 One should not be distracted by the fact that Horgan operates with the notion of circumstan-
tial similarity. As Lewis (1981) shows in connection with counterfactuals, there is no substantial
difference between what he calls “ordering semantics” – a semantics which works with restric-
tions to the similar worlds – and “premise semantics” – a semantics which works with restric-
tions to worlds in which the relevant facts obtain.
 The explicitly contextualist formulation of the view adds something important to the original
formulation: the original formulation leaves it open whether or not it varies which facts are held
constant. Compare nomological possibility, for instance, to see this: p is nomologically possible
if and only if there is a relevant world in which p is the case. But the relevant worlds will always
be the worlds in which the laws of nature are held constant. In the case of abilities, there is no
such general criterion to determine the relevant worlds. The overtly contextualist formulation of
the view makes this fact explicit.
70 3 Possibilism
he cannot: he once had a blackout on stage and ever since his fingers grow stiff
when he sits down to play.
These examples show very clearly that possibilism voices a very important
insight. There is definitely something to the idea that abilities are always had
in view of certain facts, to use Kratzer’s terminology once more. It is in view of
my stable intrinsic features that I can jump the fence, and in view of my broken
leg that I cannot. It is in view of Emma’s owning and mastering her gun that she
can kill her husband, and in view of her personality that she cannot. It is in view
of Fred’s amount of training that he can play the piano, and in view of his trau-
ma that he cannot.
Possibilism spells this out in terms of the restrictions we impose on the pos-
sible worlds. Sometimes, we hold only the agent’s stable intrinsic features fixed
and vary her current state; sometimes, however, her current state is held fixed as
well. Sometimes, we hold only the agent’s possession and her mastery of it fixed
and vary her personality traits; sometimes, however, we hold the personality
traits fixed, too. Sometimes, we hold only the agent’s amount of training fixed
and vary psychological impediments; sometimes, however, we hold the psycho-
logical impediments fixed as well. Depending on the modal base, the truth con-
ditions of ability statements vary in the right way to account for our ordinary
practice of ability ascription.
Possibilism is therefore not just attractive as a formal framework, which al-
lows us to embed ability statements into a more general formal system encom-
passing “can” statements quite generally. Rather, it is also a way of understand-
ing and systematizing the variances in the truth conditions of ability statements
in ordinary language.
What about the ordering source? According to Kratzer, the ordering source is
empty in the case of disposition statements, and the same, I take it, goes for abil-
ity statements (Kratzer 1981: 64).Whether this is really true need not concern us
at the moment. We’ll get back to this when we talk about degrees of abilities (→
3.5). For now, let’s just leave it at that.
We are now equipped with a rather solid understanding of possibilism and
the formal framework underneath it. Thus armored, let us now dive into the dis-
cussion of the view. Here is a road map of the following sections.
The next two sections discuss a few up- and down-sides of possibilism. In
the next section, 3.3, we’ll see that the restrictions to varying modal bases will
prove very fruitful in the handling of some of the issues that proved problematic
for the simple conditional analysis. Thanks to the possibilist’s fundamental in-
sight that abilities are always had in view of certain facts and that the facts
that matter vary across contexts, possibilism has no trouble at all with masks,
for instance, and it provides a major leap towards an understanding of the dif-
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ference between general and specific abilities. Here, the view has some obvious
merits. In the course of the section, however, we will also see that possibilism
clearly fails as an account of general abilities. The possibilist condition is simply
insufficient for the having of such an ability. Just as the simple conditional anal-
ysis, possibilism exhibits a severe shortcoming in this regard.
Section 3.4 takes an equally balanced perspective. On the one hand, we are
going to see that there are some obvious merits emerging from the fact that pos-
sibilism is somewhat simpler than the simple conditional analysis. Since possi-
bilism does not focus on a modal tie between intentions and performances, but
only on the possibility of the performance itself, possibilism does not have prob-
lems with impeded intentions and non-agentive abilities. Yet, we are also going
to see that that simplicity comes at a price. The possibilist encounters serious
trouble in delineating the boundary between abilities and other statements of re-
stricted possibility. Possibilism may actually be a bit too simplistic when it comes
to setting abilities apart.
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 focus on further problems with the view. In section 3.5, I
will argue that possibilism fails to account for degrees of abilities and the con-
text sensitivity of ability ascriptions that attaches to their gradable nature. In sec-
tion 3.6, finally, I will side with Kenny (1976) in arguing that possibilism fails on
formal grounds as well. Taken together, the problems outlined in the following
sections are going to show very vividly that possibilism, while highly promising
at the outset, turns out to be just as problematic as the simple conditional anal-
ysis on closer inspection.
3.3 Upsides & downsides I – General vs. specific abilities &
masks
One reason why possibilism looks more promising than the simple conditional
analysis at first is that the view seems to bring us a lot closer to understanding
the difference between general and specific abilities and offers a neat under-
standing of the workings of masks. These are the upsides I will talk about in
this section. The downside, however, will follow suit. As we will see in the last
bit of the section, possibilism fails as an account of general abilities. The condi-
tion it states is far too weak here.
Let’s start by focusing on the promising perspective on the distinction be-
tween general and specific abilities that is delivered by possibilism. According
to the possibilist, an agent has an ability to ϕ if and only if there is a relevant
world in which the agent ϕ’s. The important notion with respect to the distinc-
tion between general and specific abilities is that of relevance: which worlds
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count as relevant in a given context varies. These variances, the possibilist can
argue, generate abilities that are sometimes general, and sometimes specific.
Without using the terminology of general and specific abilities, Kratzer is
quite explicit on the fact that she thinks of the distinction between general
and specific abilities along those lines. Recall that, on her view, a speaker,
call her Angelika, may say different things by uttering sentences like “Ich
kann nicht Posaune spielen” (“I cannot play the trombone”). On the one
hand, Angelika may express that she does not know how to play the trombone.
On the other hand, she may express that the fact that she can hardly breathe or
the fact that no trombone is available prevents her from doing it. As is easy to
see, what Kratzer points at in distinguishing these uses of the sentence is the
same distinction we recognized by the terms “general abilities” and “specific
abilities”. If one does not know how to play, one lacks a general ability to
play. If one does not have a trombone available or has trouble breathing, one
lacks a specific ability.
The way the distinction is accounted for is in terms of varying modal bases,
or, put another way, of varying sets of relevant worlds.When we think about the
general ability to play the trombone, we hold only certain intrinsic facts about
Angelika’s brain structure fixed – the “programme [that] is filled in” (Kratzer
1981: 54) when she learns how to play the trombone. When we think about the
specific ability to play the trombone, in contrast, we also hold facts about her
particular situation fixed: her breathing problems, for instance, or her current
lack of a trombone.
This implies that, taken out of context, the question “Can Angelika play the
trombone?” does not admit of a simple yes-or-no answer. In one sense, she can.
In a different sense, she cannot. She has the general ability, but lacks the spe-
cific one. The possibilist does not seem to have trouble with any of this. Both An-
gelika’s general ability to play the trombone and her lack of the specific ability to
do it seem to be accounted for by the possibilist’s framework very smoothly. They
are both abilities in the sense that they can be accommodated by the same anal-
ysis. Quite generally, having an ability, according to the possibilist, is for it to be
restrictedly possible for the agent to ϕ. General and specific abilities just differ
with respect to the kinds of facts that go into their respective modal bases. Pos-
sibilism thus promises a unified account of both kinds of abilities.
By the same token, possibilism offers a neat understanding of masking. A
masked ability, recall, is an ability which is present, but whose exercise would
be interfered with. The interfering factor, we said, is a mask. My ability to
swim may be masked by a cramp. My ability to sing a certain song may be
masked by my hoarseness or my shyness or my forgetfulness of the lyrics. My
ability to hit the bull’s eye may be masked by my sudden dizziness.
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The problem for the simple conditional analysis, recall, was that in masking
cases, the counterfactual is false. It is not true that I would swim or sing or hit
the bull’s eye, if I intended to do so, because the closest intention worlds will be
worlds in which the mask will be present. In the closest worlds in which I form
the intention, I thus fail. Yet, I do have the relevant abilities. Hence, masking
cases show that the truth of the counterfactual is not necessary.
Possibilism does not run into the same problem. When we are evaluating
whether or not someone has the ability to swim, say, we are not moving into
the closest intention worlds and seeing what happens there. Instead, we are re-
stricting the possible worlds to the ones in which the relevant facts obtain and
see whether or not there is one among them in which the agent swims. The im-
portant point with respect to masks is that, as long as the mask is not among the
relevant facts, the modal base will comprise lots of worlds in which the mask is
not present. Applied to our example: as long as we are not interested in the abil-
ity to swim in view of the current cramp, but simply in the general ability to
swim – the ability to swim in view of one’s fitness, say –, there will be quite a
few worlds among the modal base in which the agent does not have a cramp
and will thus swim. Possibilism is therefore quite apt to account for the fact
that abilities can be had, and yet interfered with. They can be had in view of
one set of facts, while their exercise would be interfered with by a different set
of facts.
In chapter 2.2, when we talked about the problems the simple conditional
analysis faces with respect to the distinction between general and specific abil-
ities, we saw that the topic of general and specific abilities and the topic of
masked abilities are connected. It is very obvious that general abilities can be
masked, but unclear whether the same holds for specific abilities. Against the
background of the preceding paragraphs, we can note that possibilism can
make perfect sense of the controversy about the maskability of specific abilities.
It promises a somewhat scalar account of more or less specific and general abil-
ities. Let me explain.
Take the specific ability to do a handstand here and now. Does an agent who
is, here and now, extremely scared of doing a handstand nevertheless have the
specific ability to do a handstand here and now? Some may want to say she
does – despite her fear, she has what it takes; her fear is just a mask. Others
may want to say she doesn’t. Given that she is as fearful as she is, she genuinely
cannot do it. Her fear is not a mask, on that view, but actually deprives her of the
specific ability.
For a similar example, let us ask: does the agent have or lack the specific
ability to do a handstand here and now if, although nothing inhibits the agent’s
exercise of her general ability to do a handstand on the macro level, the micro
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facts happen to be such that something will interfere with the agent’s exercise of
doing a handstand? Suppose, for instance, a hyperacidity prevails in the agent’s
muscles so that any attempt to do a handstand is bound to fail due to a cramp in
the agent’s biceps. Does this deprive the agent of the specific ability to do a
handstand here and now? Or does it just mask it? I take it that people will dis-
agree about such questions.
For the possibilist, this should not come as a surprise. What it suggests is
that there is actually no such thing as the correct understanding of specific abil-
ities. The disagreements we have just considered can be solved only by resolving
them. If we count only worlds as relevant in which absolutely everything, includ-
ing the hyperacidity in the agent’s muscles, is as in actuality, then it will be cor-
rect to say that the agent lacks the ability to do a handstand. If the hyperacidity
is not among the facts we hold constant, we will correctly ascribe the ability to
her; the hyperacidity will be a mere mask. Likewise in the first example. If the
agent’s fear is not among the relevant facts, we will ascribe the ability and
count the fear as a mask. If it is, the fear deprives the agent of the ability.
Whether or not a specific ability is maskable will therefore depend on the
comprehensiveness of the modal base. If absolutely every fact of the agent’s sit-
uation is held fixed across modal space, then any impediment to the exercise of
whatever act we are considering will itself have to be held fixed. Hence, the
agent’s ability to do a handstand is not masked by the agent’s fear or a hyper-
acidity in her muscles, but annihilated. On this interpretation of a specific ability,
then, specific abilities do not allow for masks. The modal base narrows down to
exactly one world: the actual one.
If, in contrast, we are thinking of specific abilities in such a way that some
facts of the agent’s situation may still vary, then there is room for masks. For now
we can abstract away from the fear and hyperacidity, say, and vary them across
the possible worlds. And once we allow for that, the agent may very well come
out as having the specific ability to do a handstand, despite her actual fear or her
actual hyperacidity.
The picture this suggests is that abilities can be more or less specific, de-
pending on just how comprehensive the set of facts is that determines the rele-
vant worlds among which we then look out for a world in which the agent per-
forms whatever act it is we are interested in. There are maximally specific
abilities on one pole – for those abilities, we have to hold fixed absolutely
every feature of the situation, be it ever so tiny. Along the scale, we can then
align less specific abilities – abilities which allow for more and more variance
of features of the agent’s particular situation. The disagreement about the mask-
ability of specific abilities can be resolved that way. Once we see that the two op-
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posing parties in the disagreement focus on varyingly extreme kinds of specific
abilities, their disagreement vanishes into thin air.
This exposition has been quite simplistic, and much more would have to be
said about a scalar understanding of general and specific abilities. Since I myself
endorse a treatment of the distinction between general and specific abilities
along very similar lines, we will have lots of time to turn to that task later on
(→ 4.5). For now, let’s just note that the possibilist has a very interesting story
to tell about the relation between general and specific abilities. In virtue of its
appeal to varyingly comprehensive modal bases, it accommodates both and al-
lows for a scalar picture of with maximally specific abilities on one pole, less
than maximal, but yet specific abilities in the middle and general abilities to-
wards the other end of the scale.
So much for the upside of possibilism with respect to the distinction be-
tween general and specific abilities and the understanding of masks. Now on
to the downside. Although possibilism seems to capture one important aspect
of the difference between general and specific abilities, we will now see that pos-
sibilism fails as an account of general abilities. More specifically, the problem is
that the possibilist condition is not sufficient for the having of a general ability. It
is much too easily met.
One way to approach the problem is to note that the modal base of ability
statements is always realistic, according to the possibilist. Since what we hold
fixed across modal space are always features of the actual world, the actual
world is necessarily part of the modal base; it is always among the set of relevant
worlds. To illustrate, suppose we are interested in an archer’s ability to hit the
bull’s eye. If we are interested in her general ability, we hold certain features
of the archer herself fixed: her brain structure, her vision, her muscular consti-
tution maybe.What we do not hold fixed is her broken arm, say. If we are inter-
ested in the specific ability, we hold the broken arm fixed, too. Regardless of
whether we are interested in the general or the specific ability, then, the relevant
worlds will be those in which certain facts – states of affairs that obtain in the
actual world – obtain. And of course, the actual world will be among those
worlds. It will be a member of the set of worlds in which a certain subset of
the actual facts obtain.
Obviously, this yields a problem. If the actual world is always among the rel-
evant worlds, then any agent will automatically have the ability to do whatever
she does in the actual world. To see that, just recall that to have an ability to ϕ,
according to the possibilist, is for there to be a relevant world in which the agent
ϕ’s. And given that the actual world is a relevant world, this condition is obvi-
ously met if the agent ϕ’s in the actual world.
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The problem with this is that a singular successful performance of some act
ϕ, be it in the actual world or in any of the merely possible worlds, will rarely, if
ever, suffice to show that an agent has a general ability to ϕ. If I hit the bull’s eye
in the actual world, this does not show anything at all about my general ability to
hit the bull’s eye. This shows that I had the (maximally) specific ability to hit the
bull’s eye, certainly. But clearly, a singular success does not show that the agent
has a general ability. This is a serious problem for the possibilist. The view ap-
parently misses out on an important dimension here.
It is important to see that even though I have approached the problem from
the assumption that the modal base always comprises the actual world, the
problem itself has nothing to do with that particular feature of possibilism.
Rather, it has to do with the existential quantification over the modal base
quite generally. That is why I said in the beginning that the problem with possi-
bilism is the modal force it assigns to ability statements. It is the single most es-
sential feature of possibilism – the commitment to an analysis of abilities in
terms of possibility – that causes the trouble.
To see that this is so, note that just as a singular successful performance of ϕ
in the actual world suffices to make it true that the agent ϕ’s in a relevant world,
a singular successful performance of ϕ in any other single one of the worlds that
comprise the modal base is equally insufficient for an agent to have a general
ability to ϕ. Yet, possibilism predicts otherwise. Once there is a successful perfor-
mance of ϕ to be found in the modal base worlds, the agent comes out as having
the ability. Apparently, this is not a satisfactory account of general abilities.
The upshot of this section is mixed. On the one hand, possibilism clearly has
a few merits over the simple conditional analysis in that it, first, offers an under-
standing of one important dimension on which general and specific abilities
seem to differ and, secondly, yields an understanding of the workings of
masks. On the other hand, possibilism does not really seem to capture what it
is for an agent to have a general ability. The condition stated by the possibilist
is not sufficient for an agent having a general ability.
3.4 Upsides and downsides II – Impeded intentions, agentive
vs. non-agentive abilities, and other possibilities
In the last section, we saw that possibilism has one very important advantage
over the simple conditional analysis. In this section, we will turn to a second fea-
ture that is both a merit and a problem for the view. Possibilism is very simple. It
analyzes the ability to ϕ simply in terms of the possibility of ϕ-ing and not, as
the simple conditional analysis, in terms of a modal tie between the agent’s in-
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tentions to ϕ and her performances of ϕ-ing. Consequently, possibilism does not
run into problems having to do with the postulation of such a tie. Specifically, it
does not have the problems with impeded intentions or non-agentive abilities.
This should not be overvalued, however. For as I will argue, possibilism may
in fact be overly simplistic in that it fails to explain what it is that unifies abilities
and sets them apart from mere physical possibilities, say.
That possibilism does not run into the problem of the impeded intention is
easy to see. In cases of an impeded intention, recall, the agent is unable to ϕ in
virtue of an impediment that prevents her from intending to ϕ in the first place.
One of the examples I used to illustrate the problem was that of the coma patient
(van Inwagen 1983: 119) who cannot raise her arm in virtue of being in a coma.
The coma does not just prevent the agent from raising her arm, though, it also
prevents her from intending to raise her arm to begin with. And this caused trou-
ble for the simple conditional analysis.
Since the simple conditional analysis analyzes abilities in terms of a counter-
factual tie between intentions and performances, to find out whether or not the
agent has an ability, we had to move into the closest intention worlds and see
whether or not the agent raises her arm there. But since the closest intention
worlds are not, in fact, coma worlds, the counterfactual comes out true. If the
agent intended to raise her arm, she would, because she would not be in a
coma in that case. That is the wrong result.
The possibilist does not have the same problem. The possibilist restricts the
possible worlds to the ones in which the relevant facts obtain. And among those,
she checks for performance worlds. In virtue of this feature of the view, cases of
impeded intentions are unproblematic. In the case of the coma patient, the coma
will usually be among the relevant facts. Usually, we want to know what the
coma patient can do in view of her coma. Is there an arm raising world among
the so restricted worlds? Of course not. The modal base will neither contain
arm raising worlds, nor will it contain any worlds in which the agent intends
to raise her arm to begin with. The worlds the possibilist looks at all contain
the very impediment that prevents both the intention to ϕ as well as ϕ-ing.
Thus, there will not be ϕ-ing worlds among the relevant worlds. And hence, pos-
sibilism rightly yields that the coma patient and other agents whose intentions
are impeded lack the ability to raise their arms, or whatever it is they cannot
do in virtue of that impediment. Clearly, possibilism has an advantage over
the simple conditional analysis here.
What about the good sense in which the coma patient can raise her arm,
though? Recall that when we talked about impeded intentions in connection
with the simple conditional analysis (→ 2.3), we said that there is a good
sense in which the coma patient retains quite a lot of her abilities – despite
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her coma. The ability to raise one’s arm is not the best example to see that. But
when you think of abilities that were acquired by a lot of training, like juggling,
for instance, you will come to sense that there is a rather good sense in which
one will want to say that the coma patient has retained that ability.
Possibilism has no trouble with any of this. In fact, it can account for both
the sense in which one will want to say that the coma patient can, and the sense
in which one will want to say that she cannot raise her arm, juggle, or whatever
one is interested in. The key feature of possibilism here is the variance in the
modal base. Sometimes, we are interested in what the agent can do in view of
her coma. In that sense, she cannot do much. Sometimes, we are interested in
what she can do in view of her amount of training in a certain discipline, or
her muscular constitution, or a certain “programme in her brain”, as Kratzer
(1981: 54) has put it. In that sense, the coma patient has the ability to do
quite a lot of things.
The possibilist can explain that smoothly. When we are interested in what
the coma patient can do in view of her coma, the modal base will comprise
only coma worlds. And among those, there is no arm raising world and no jug-
gling world. But when we are interested in what the coma patient can do in view
of her amount of training in something, the coma is varied across the possible
worlds and the modal base will comprise all kinds of worlds in which the
agent is not, in fact, in a coma. Among the so selected set of worlds, there
will be quite a few in which the agent raises her arm and juggles. The possibilist
is therefore apt to account for both senses of “having an ability” here – the sense
in which the coma patient can, and the sense in which she cannot do certain
things.
One last note on this, just to tie things back to the topics we have touched
upon earlier. All this can also be put in terms of masks. Depending on how
we select the modal base, the coma will either be a mask of the agent’s ability
to juggle, say, or it will deprive her of it. When the modal base comprises only
coma worlds, the coma is an annihilator of the ability – the agent cannot juggle.
When the coma is varied, the coma is a mask – the agent retains the ability to
juggle, despite being in circumstances that conflict with the exercise of that abil-
ity. Things fall into place quite neatly here. Cases of impeded intentions are
smoothly accommodated by possibilism.
Now on to non-agentive abilities. Here, too, possibilism looks more promis-
ing than the simple conditional analysis. Again, this has to do with the fact that
intentions do not play a prominent role in the possibilist account. Non-agentive
abilities, recall, include the ability to see, smell, or hear; to digest, dissociate, or
produce saliva; to unintentionally read street signs or to understand something
without listening. All of those things can, or can only, be exercised without a
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foregoing intention on the agent’s part. This spelled trouble for the simple con-
ditional analysis (→ 2.6).
Possibilism does not have the same problem. According to the possibilist, an
agent has an ability if and only if there is a relevant world in which the agent ϕ’s.
This condition works equally well for non-agentive as for agentive abilities. An
agent has the ability to bake a cake if and only if there is a relevant world in
which she bakes a cake. An agent has the ability to produce saliva if and only
if there is a relevant world in which she produces saliva. An agent has the ability
to unintentionally read street signs if and only if there is a relevant world in
which she reads street signs unintentionally. The fact that saliva is usually pro-
duced without a foregoing intention and street signs can only be read uninten-
tionally, if no foregoing intention is formed, does not cause a problem at all for
the possibilist. The modal base can comprise intention worlds and non-intention
worlds alike. Intention worlds do not enjoy any special status.
So much, again, for some of the upside of possibilism. Let’s now turn to a
downside once more. The downside is that the simplicity of possibilism comes
at a price. It is hard to see what unifies abilities and sets them apart from
other restricted possibilities, such as mere physical possibility, say, on the pos-
sibilist framework. There is good reason to suspect that possibilism may in
fact be a bit too simplistic; there seems to be an important dimension of what
it is for an agent to have an ability that eludes the view.
Nomological possibility is possibility in view of the laws of nature, epistemic
possibility is possibility in view of what is known, deontic possibility is possibil-
ity in view of what is allowed. Apart from those sharply contoured possibilities,
there are other possibilities, of course. Possibility in view of certain facts of a sit-
uation, for instance. It may be possible in view of the security measures that a
rollercoaster car derails, but not in view of the actual condition of the car and
the rails. It may be possible in view of the closeness of a cliff that you fall off
the mountain you are standing on, but not in view of your degree of carefulness.
If possibilists are right, then the possibility involved in the latter two possi-
bility statements resembles that of ability ascriptions very closely. In both cases,
we have existential quantification over a circumstantial modal base.Yet, “the car
can derail” and “you can fall of the cliff” are not ability ascriptions, but rather
ascriptions of what is often called a “physical possibility”. A natural question to
ask the possibilist is: what is the difference?
I don’t think the possibilist has a fully convincing response to this question
at hand. I guess what possibilists should reply is that the kind of possibility in-
volved in ability ascriptions and statements like “the car can derail” and “you
can fall off that cliff” is actually the same. That is the essence of their view
about abilities, after all. They could then go on to try and characterize ability as-
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criptions in terms of other features of such ascriptions. One way one may try to
do so is by characterizing ability ascriptions as statements that express restricted
circumstantial possibility statements which relate agents to actions. “The car can
derail” and “you can fall off that cliff” is not an ability ascription, according to
this characterization, whereas “the president can start a war” is.
In view of the fact that there are such things as non-agentive abilities, how-
ever, it should be obvious that this characterization won’t do. For possibilism to
cover non-agentive abilities as well, the possibilist can hardly characterize ability
statements by postulating that they relate agents to actions. Smelling, digesting,
and reading street signs unintentionally are not (typically) actions. Yet, one can
have the ability to do these things. Abilities will therefore have to be individuated
differently, and it is hard to see how the possibilist is supposed to tackle this task
with the tools available to her. Perhaps it can be done. But there is definitely an
open question here.
3.5 The problem with degrees and context sensitivity
So far, we have noted both merits and problems of possibilism. In this and the
next section, it will become obvious that the debits problems preponderate. In
this section, we will see that possibilism fails to account for degrees and the cor-
responding kind of context sensitivity that attaches to ability statements. In the
next section, we will see that the view is formally inadequate in that the most
basic laws governing possibility fail to hold for ability statements.
Abilities, we said (→ 1.3), come in degrees. Glenn Gould has the ability to
play the piano to a higher degree than I do; my grandmother sews better, my
cousin drives better, my father draws better than I do. One meteorologist may
be better at predicting the weather than another. Two archers may be varyingly
good at hitting the target.
Looking more closely at degrees of abilities, we saw that the degree of an
agent’s ability can be influenced on two dimensions: the degree of an ability de-
pends, first, on the quality of the agent’s performances and, secondly, on the
range of circumstances across which the agent manages to deliver those per-
formances. We called those two dimensions the dimension of achievement and
the dimension of reliability respectively.
We also said that the gradable nature of abilities results in a specific kind of
context sensitivity of ability ascriptions. That is because the degree of an agent’s
ability to ϕ required for the agent to count as having the ability to ϕ simpliciter
varies across contexts. A darts player who misses 99% of the time, but manages
to hit the bull’s eye every 100th time does not usually count as having the ability
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to hit it. There may be contexts in which we count her as having the ability,
though. She has what it takes; it is within the range of what she can do. The con-
text, we said, determines some threshold along the scale of degrees of abilities
above which an agent counts as having the ability simpliciter. Once we have de-
grees, then, we also have the mechanism for the corresponding context sensitiv-
ity.
The problem with possibilism is that it fails to account for degrees and, con-
sequently, for the corresponding kind of context sensitivity of ability ascriptions.
As in the case of the simple conditional analysis, the problematic cases are not
so much the ones in which achievement is the dimension which matters, even
though they, too, require a supplementation of the possibilist framework as it
stands. To see that, reconsider the driving abilities of my partner and his friend.
Both of them can drive a car, but while my partner is a very good driver, his
friend drives poorly. At first sight, this is a problem for the possibilist. The pos-
sibilist holds that an agent has an ability to ϕ if and only if there is a relevant
world in which the agent ϕ’s. And obviously, this is true for my partner and
his friend alike. His friend can drive, after all. It is thus possible, given her
amount of training and so forth, that she drives. The problem is that she is
not very good at it. So, her driving performances will be of rather low quality.
As it stands, possibilism does not have the means to account for this kind of dif-
ference between two agents.
Of course, the possibilist framework can easily be supplemented by an ac-
count of degrees that track variances on the level of achievement. The possibilist
can avail herself of a strategy analogous to the one I suggested in connection
with the simple conditional analysis (→ 2.5). She can attach values to the quality
of an agent’s performance and postulate that the degree of an agent’s ability is
higher the higher that value is.Were achievement the only dimension that count-
ed, an account of degrees of abilities would be quite easily available for the pos-
sibilist.
But achievement is not the only dimension that counts. To come up with a
comprehensive account of degrees of abilities, variances on the dimension of re-
liability will have to be accounted for as well. This is where possibilism exhibits a
deep structural shortcoming. Reconsider Ted and Fred, our two meteorologists.
Fred has developed an algorithm, by means of which he can predict 99% of
all weather constellations correctly. Ted has developed a faulty algorithm – it
goes wrong for 45% of all weather constellations. Clearly, Fred is the better me-
teorologist. Possibilism, however, has no means to distinguish between the de-
grees of Ted’s and Fred’s weather prediction abilities. For both, there will be rel-
evant worlds in which they predict the weather correctly. According to the
possibilist, the two are on a par.
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The problem with possibilism is that the existential quantifier does not seem
to be particularly well-suited to account for degrees. Once there is one perfor-
mance world among the relevant worlds, the possibilist condition is satisfied.
There does not seem to be any room for the kind of scale that would have to
be established in order to account for differences on the dimension of reliability.
But wait a minute! Did we not talk about degrees of possibility earlier on?
And wasn’t there a tool that Kratzer employed in her semantics to account for
such degrees? – The tool that comes to mind here, of course, is the ordering
source I mentioned when I first introduced the standard semantics of “can”
statements (→ 3.1). And indeed, it seems to be just the right means for the pur-
pose at hand. It is designed to account for degrees of possibility. Why not use it
in order to account for degrees of ability, too?
Unfortunately, the ordering source does not do the job. The ordering source,
recall, ranks the possible worlds according to some ideal. One very common or-
dering source is a stereotypical one. In the stereotypical ideal, everything is nor-
mal and the possible worlds are then ranked in accordance to their similarity to
that ideal – the more normal a world is, the closer it comes to the stereotypical
ordering source. We saw that a stereotypical ordering source is what is at work
when it comes to the detective’s judgement that there is a better possibility of
Kim being the murderer than of Jim being the murderer. Each of them can be
the murderer, but the closest worlds in which Kim is the murderer are much clos-
er to the ideal of normality than the closest worlds in which Jim is the murderer.
So far, so good. The crucial question is: can the same kind of strategy be em-
ployed for degrees of ability? Is there an ordering source, such that the closest
worlds in which Fred predicts the weather correctly are always closer to the
ideal than the closest worlds in which Ted predicts the weather correctly? At
first, it may seem plausible that the stereotypical ordering source is already
the right one for the purpose at hand. For are not worlds in which Fred predicts
the weather correctly more normal than worlds in which Ted predicts the weath-
er correctly? After all, Fred is far more reliable in his weather predictions than
Ted.
But we need to be careful.What we need to ask is: what would be the case in
the most normal world imaginable? Then we have to find out how close to that
world the closest world is in which Fred predicts the weather as opposed to the
closest world in which Ted predicts the weather. The answer suggests that the
stereotypical ordering source will not do the job of telling Fred’s and Ted’s re-
spective degrees of the ability to predict the weather apart. For it seems that
in the most normal world imaginable, both Fred and Ted will predict the weather
correctly. Both have a quota of correct predictions that exceeds 50%, after all.
Thus, it would seem that a world in which both agents predict the weather cor-
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rectly is, ceteris paribus, more normal than any world in which one of them
makes a wrong prediction.⁴ Hence, the closest worlds in which Fred makes a
right prediction is just as close to the ideal as the closest world in which Ted
makes a right prediction.
From here, we can move in two directions. We can either try and come up
with all kinds of ordering sources and see whether one of them is suited to ac-
count for degrees of agents’ abilities. Or we can think about the prospects of solv-
ing the problem of degrees by the use of ordering sources quite generally. I sug-
gest we do the latter. The ordering source as such fails to provide a proper means
to account for degrees of ability.
To see that, note that reliability is a matter of performances across various
situations – it is a matter of a quota. If I am more reliable than you are in hitting
a target, then this has to do with my hitting the target across a wider range of
circumstances. The possibilist, however, can only ever take one world into ac-
count. Even if we rank the worlds in accordance to some ideal, then, – stereo-
typical or of any other kind – we will still have to judge the agent’s degree of abil-
ity on the basis of her performance of just one world, namely that which comes
closest to that ideal. Given the nature of reliability – its tight connection to the
idea of a quota – this strategy seems faulty in a very substantial way. No matter
what kind of ranking we impose on the possible worlds, the fact that there is a
difference between two agents in the worlds closest to the ideal will never ensure
that this difference mirrors the agents’ differences in terms of some relevant
quota across worlds.⁵
3.6 A formal problem
Up to this point, several doubts concerning the viability of a possibilist account
of abilities have accumulated. Possibilism is unable to set abilities apart from
mere physical possibilities (→ 3.4), it fails to account for general abilities (→
3.3), and it sits more than awkwardly with the idea of degrees of ability (→
3.5). In this section, we will confirm the impression that there is indeed some-
thing wrong with the view. As I will lay out in what follows, possibilism is actual-
ly formally inadequate. There are formal considerations which show rather clear-
ly that the “can” of ability is not the “can” of possibility.
 We can stipulate that the predictions of both agents are better the more normal the weather
conditions are.
 Vetter (2015) argues against a possibilist understanding of degrees of dispositions along the
same lines.
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According to the possibilist, the “can” of ability functions as a restricted pos-
sibility operator. But as Kenny (1976) has convincingly shown, the “can” of abil-
ity cannot be accounted for in terms of a possibility operator, because the “can”
of ability does not obey the most fundamental laws of the logic of possibility.
Since the possibility operator is defined by the formal rules that govern it, this
is a knock-down argument. It just does not make any sense to claim that the
“can” of ability is a restricted possibility operator, if none of the most basic prin-
ciples of the possibility operator apply. Let us go through Kenny’s argument to
see how it works.
Suppose the possibilist is right in her verdict that ability statements, such as
“S can ϕ”, express something along the lines of “It is possible (in some properly
restricted sense) for S to ϕ”. Then the logical form of ascriptions of ability ascrip-
tions would be CAN(S ϕ’s), where CAN is a properly restricted possibility opera-
tor. If CAN is a possibility operator, then it will have to be construed as a sen-
tence operator. And the sentence it ranges over will express a proposition
according to which some subject engages in some doing, paradigmatically an ac-
tion. All of that should be familiar from the section on the basic Kratzer seman-
tics (→ 3.1). On this construal, ability ascriptions would be akin to other forms of
restricted possibility statements, such as deontic, nomological, or epistemic pos-
sibility claims.
The problem Kenny notes is that ability statements do not exhibit the right
kind of logic to pass for possibility statements; they fail to obey the most basic
laws of possibility. To see that, note that the weakest system of modal logic suit-
able for alethic interpretations of the operators is the system KT. One axiomati-
zation of KT contains (among other principles) the axiom schemata
T. p → ◊(p)
K. ◊(p) ∨ ◊(q)↔ ◊(p∨q)
The validity of these two principles can be derived directly from the possible
worlds semantics of the possibility operator. In possible worlds terminology,
the T-axiom reads: if p is the case in the actual world, then there is some
world in which p is the case. That is clearly valid, because the actual world,
of course, is some world.
The K-axiom can be split up into two conditional claims. From left to right it
states that
K1. ◊(p) ∨ ◊(q) → ◊(p∨q)
From right to left it states that
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K2. ◊(p∨q) → ◊(p) ∨ ◊(q)
In possible worlds terminology, K1 reads: if there is some world in which p is the
case or there is some world in which q is the case, then there is some world in
which p or q is the case. Apparently, this is a logically valid principle, for “p or q”
will hold both in any p-world and in any q-world. Hence, if there is some p-world
or some q-world, eo ipso, there will be some p-or-q-world.
Likewise for K2. In possible worlds terminology, the principle reads: if there
is some world in which p or q is the case, then there is a world in which p is the
case or there is a world in which q is the case. Again, this principle is clearly
valid. Since any p-or-q world is either a p-world or a q-world, there being a p-
or-q-world implies that there is a p-world or a q-world.
As Kenny points out, neither of these schemata is correct, if the possibility
operator (the diamond) is interpreted as the “can” of ability. His arguments pro-
ceed by counterexample. Let’s start with the T-axiom p → ◊p. Interpreting the
possibility operator in terms of the “can” of ability, the theorem states that
T_CAN. If S ϕ’s, then S can bring it about that S ϕ’s.
Note that I am using the formulation “S can bring it about that S ϕ’s”. This lo-
cution has the purpose of reflecting, in ordinary language, that the “can” of abil-
ity functions as a sentence operator on the possibilist’s framework. Nothing sub-
stantial hinges on this. It just helps to integrate natural language ability talk into
the schemes of the modal laws governing possibility.
On the face of it, T_CAN looks like a valid principle. As Geach points out, it
seems to be a truism that “what a man does he can do; that is clear if anything in
modal logic is” (1957: 15). And according to Mele,
there is an ordinary sense of ‘able’ according to which agents are able to do whatever they
do. In this sense of ‘able’, an agent’s having A -ed at a time is conceptually sufficient for her
having been able to A. (Mele 2002: 447 f.)
Suppose Geach and Mele are right. Suppose, that is, that there is, in fact, an or-
dinary sense of the “can” of ability which is in line with axiom T.⁶ The problem is
just that there are other senses of the “can” of ability which are clearly not. For
 You may struggle with the idea that there is such a sense. I do not want to commit on this
issue. As it will turn out, my own view has the resources to account for a sense of “specific abil-
ity”, according to which a subject has the specific ability to do whatever she did. But my view
does not commit me to endorsing this sense (→ 4.5, b & d).
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general abilities, for instance, the principle clearly fails. As Kenny points out, for
instance,
“[a] hopeless darts player may, once in a lifetime, hit the bull, but be unable to repeat the
performance because he does not have the [general] ability to hit the bull. (…) Counterex-
amples similar to [this] will always be imaginable whenever it is possible to do something
by luck rather than by skill. But the distinction between luck and skill is not a marginal
matter in this context: it is precisely what we are interested in when our concern is [general]
ability, as opposed to logical possibility or opportunity” (Kenny 1976: 214).
What Kenny points out here is that the having of a general ability requires more
than just an individual success. This insight is not new; I emphasized the same
fact in the section about general and specific abilities (→ 3.3), when I argued that
possibilism fails to account for general abilities. The new twist to this insight is
that possibilism is therefore at odds with the logic of possibility. The T-theorem,
while valid for all established alethic interpretations of the possibility operator,
is clearly invalid for the “can” of general ability. This fact casts additional doubt
upon any view according to which the “can” of general ability is understood in
terms of the possibility operator.
Let’s now turn to the K-axiom, which seems likewise problematic, if the dia-
mond is interpreted as the “can” of ability. As Kenny points out, it fails in both
directions, but in what follows, I will focus on K2.⁷ Inserting the “can” of ability
for the diamond, K2 reads
K2_CAN. If S can bring it about that S ϕ’s or ψ’s, then S can bring it about that S ϕ’s or S
can bring it about that S ψ’s.
On the face of it, this, too, looks like a valid principle, and indeed, it has many
true instances. If I can bring it about that I ride my bike or drive my car, then I
can bring it about that I ride my bike or I can bring it about that I drive my car. If
I can bring it about that I eat an apple or a banana, then I can bring it about that
I eat an apple or I can bring it about that I eat a banana.
 Interpreting the diamond as the “can” of ability, K1 states that if S can bring it about that S φ’s
and S can bring it about that S ψ’s then S can bring it about that S either φ’s or ψ’s. This is false,
as can be seen when ψ is non-φ. The president has the ability to bring it about that the president
destroys Moscow and he has the ability to bring it about that the president does not destroy Mos-
cow. Yet, he doesn’t have the ability to bring it about that the president destroys Moscow or the
president does not destroy Moscow. Why does he lack that ability? Because (The president de-
stroys Moscow or the president does not destroy Moscow) is a necessity, and according to
Kenny no one has the ability to bring about a necessity.
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But there are problem cases. Suppose I am faced with a stack of cards that is
turned face-down (Kenny 1976: 215). In that case, I have the general ability to
pick red or black. Yet, it seems, I neither have the general ability to pick red
nor do I have the general ability to pick black. It is therefore false that
#. If S can bring it about that S picks black or red, then S can bring it about that S picks
black or S can bring it about that S picks red.
For an even better example, suppose I have the general ability to hit the dart
board (ibid: 215 f.). This implies that I have the general ability to hit the upper
or the lower half of the dart board.⁸ Yet, I may well lack the general ability to
hit the upper half of the bull and also lack the general ability to hit the lower
half. It is therefore false that
##. If S can bring it about that S hits the upper half or S hits the lower half, then S can
bring it about that S hits the upper half or S can bring it about that S hits the lower
half.
Why is this an even better counterexample to K2_CAN? Because it can be
strengthened. The example works better the more discriminatory we get. That I
can hit the dartboard implies that I can hit one square-millimeter on the
board, or another, or another, and so on. But it obviously does not imply that
I can hit any particular square-millimeter on the board.
The important point is that in both examples, the left-hand side of the con-
ditional is satisfied while the right-hand side is not. And, as Kenny points out,
“[s]imilar counterexamples can be constructed in connection with any other dis-
criminatory skill” (ibid. 215). Kenny has a very strong point here. The “can” of
ability disobeys the rules of the possibility operator. This makes it almost impos-
sible to cling to the view that the “can” of ability is a “can” of possibility.
3.7 Upshot
Let’s go through the main line of thought of this chapter once more. In this chap-
ter, we looked at possibilism – the view that an agent has an ability to ϕ if and
only if it is restrictedly possible for the agent to ϕ; or, to put it in the possible
 If you don’t like the inference from “having the ability to hit the board” to “having the ability
to hit the upper half or having the ability to hit the lower half”, never mind.We can run the argu-
ment by assuming right away that the agent has the latter ability.
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worlds terminology we used throughout the chapter, if and only if there is a rel-
evant world in which the agent ϕ’s.We noted quite a few merits about possibil-
ism, but also a number of problems, which together showed very clearly that
abilities are not, in fact, restricted possibilities.
Let’s start with the merits. First of all, possibilism seemed much better suited
than the simple conditional analysis in making sense of the distinction between
general and specific abilities (→ 3.3). The crucial tool here was the variance in the
set of worlds that go into the modal base: having a general ability, on the pos-
sibilist framework, is for there to be a ϕ-ing-world among one set of worlds,
whereas having a specific ability is for there to be a ϕ-ing-world among a differ-
ent set of worlds.When I have a broken leg, say, I still have the ability to dance in
view of the “dancing program” in my brain, but not in view of my broken leg.
And depending on whether or not we hold the broken leg or merely the dancing
program fixed, there either will or won’t be a world among the thus-restricted set
of worlds in which I dance. This looks very promising at the outset and seems to
capture a very important dimension on which general and specific abilities dif-
fer.
By the same token, possibilism allows for an understanding of the workings
of masks (→ 3.3). The broken leg is a mask for the general ability to dance. It is a
fact in the world that would interfere with the exercise of the ability. Yet, it does
not deprive the agent of the ability, because it is not among the set of facts that
are held fixed across the possible worlds.When we are interested in the general
ability to dance, we are not interested in the ability to dance in view of one’s cur-
rently broken leg, but rather in the ability to dance in view of the dancing pro-
gram in one’s brain or one’s overall bodily constitution, or what have you. Yet,
the broken leg clearly deprives us of the more specific ability to dance in view
of one’s broken leg. Here, the broken leg is held fixed, and hence there is no
dancing world among the modal base worlds. Possibilism explains all this
very smoothly.
The third merit we noted was that possibilism does not run into the problem
of the impeded intention (→ 3.4). The coma patient cannot raise her arm, on the
possibilist framework, because the coma will have to be held fixed across the
possible worlds and hence there will not be any arm raising worlds among
the modal base. Since the possibilist does not put emphasis on the link between
intentions and performances, there is no need to move beyond the coma worlds
in order to reach the closest intention worlds. Instead, the possibilist checks for
performance worlds among the coma worlds. And voilà: there are none. This is
the right result. Again, that is not to say that there is no sense in which the coma
patient retains certain abilities. The possibilist can account for both senses, de-
pending on whether or not the coma is held fixed.
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Fourth, and relatedly, possibilism does not run into problems with non-
agentive abilities (→ 3.4). Since abilities, quite generally, are understood in
terms of the possibility of performance, non-agentive abilities do not pose any
particular problem. Having the ability to dance is for it to be possible for the
agent to dance. Having the ability to produce saliva is for it to be possible for
the agent to produce saliva. Since no emphasis is put on the tie between inten-
tions and performances, no problem emerges from abilities that can or can only
be exercised without a foregoing intention on the agent’s part.
But there were also some severe problems with the view.
First, there was a problem with general abilities (→ 3.3). Possibilism may
shed light on one dimension on which general and specific abilities differ, but
it certainly fails as an account of general abilities. Having a general ability to
ϕ seems to require a certain quota of success in ϕ-ing. There being just one
world (actual or possible) in which the agent ϕ-s certainly isn’t enough. The
last word on general and specific abilities obviously has not been spoken by
the possibilist.
Secondly, the possibilist fails to properly delineate abilities from other pos-
sibilities, like physical possibilities (→ 3.4). What is the difference between a
statement of the form “I can dance” or “I can read street signs unintentionally”
and a statement of the form “You can fall off the cliff”? All three express restrict-
ed circumstantial possibility. You and I are both agents. And reading street signs
unintentionally is no more an action than falling off a cliff is. This indicates that
possibilism is actually a bit too simplistic. There is something about abilities that
sets abilities apart from physical possibilities. And whatever that feature is, it
does not seem to be properly captured by the possibilist.
Thirdly, there was the problem with degrees and the corresponding kind of
context sensitivity that attaches to ability statements (→ 3.5). The problem with
possibilism is that the existential quantifier does not seem to be particularly
well-suited to account for degrees. Once there is one performance world
among the relevant worlds, the possibilist condition is satisfied. There does
not seem to be any room for the kind of scale that would have to be established
in order to account for differences of degrees that trace back to differences on the
dimension of reliability – i.e. the range of circumstances in which the agent
manages to deliver a performance. The ordering source does not provide help
here. Degrees of abilities fail to be accounted for by the possibilist. As a conse-
quence, the context sensitivity of ability statements that results from the grada-
ble nature of abilities remains mysterious as well.
Fourthly, there was the formal problem with the possibilist’s core claim: abil-
ity statements do not express restricted possibility statements, because ability
statements do not obey the most fundamental logical laws governing possibility
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statements. Since the possibility operator is defined by the laws that govern it,
this is a decisive problem. Possibilism is deeply flawed.
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4 The success view I – Agentive abilities
So far, this book has been rather destructive. Let us now switch into construction
mode. In this and the next chapter, I will take all of the insights from the last two
chapters and use them to come up with a new, and, as I will argue, superior view
of abilities: the success view of ability. I will proceed in two steps. In this chapter,
I’ll be dealing exclusively with agentive abilities and developing the success view
for abilities of that kind. In the next chapter, the view is going to be extended to
cover non-agentive abilities as well. By the end of the next chapter, we’ll have
arrived at a fully general and comprehensive view of abilities – the success
view of abilities tout court.
Why start with agentive abilities? For three simple reasons. First, the para-
digmatic cases of abilities are of the agentive kind. When asked to name a few
abilities, most people come up with abilities to play instruments, do some
sport or other, drive a car, cook a dish, play a game, and so on. This is no coin-
cidence. A brief look into the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)
makes it evident that ascriptions of agentive abilities are by far the most preva-
lent ones. I take it to be reasonable to start an investigation of the subject matter
from there.
Secondly, the success view of agentive abilities will turn out to be rather con-
crete where the success view of abilities tout court will necessarily have to remain
somewhat abstract. In the following sense: abilities tout court, I will argue, are a
matter of success; and success, in turn, I will argue, is a matter of a certain
modal tie between certain triggers and responses. The good thing about agentive
abilities is that we can actually specify what the crucial trigger is in such cases;
namely an intention to ϕ (or, on a weaker reading, some other properly related
intention). When it comes to the success view of abilities tout court, all we can
say is that the trigger will have to be such that ϕ-ing in response to it counts
as a success. I therefore take it to be helpful to have worked out the success
view of agentive abilities before moving on to the more abstract formulation of
the view. (If this sounds somewhat obscure to you at this point, fear not. All
of this is going to be developed very systematically in this and the next chapter.)
Thirdly, and relatedly, the success view of agentive abilities can in large parts
avail itself of descriptive terms where the success view of abilities tout court em-
ploys normative terminology. In the typical cases, to have an agentive ability is
for a certain modal tie between the intention to ϕ and performances of ϕ-ing to
obtain; no normative vocabulary here. For an agent to have an ability tout court
is for there to be a certain modal tie between a certain trigger and the agent’s ϕ-
ing, where the trigger is specified as one in response to which ϕ-ing counts as a
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success.What counts as a success obviously has a normative dimension to it. Not
that there is anything wrong with this normative component. In fact, I take it to
be clear that abilities have some normative dimension to them. Yet, it is not par-
ticularly easy to pinpoint where exactly the normativity stems from. It is there-
fore somewhat comforting that the more specific version of the view – the suc-
cess view of agentive abilities – can in large parts do away with normative
notions.
All this being said, let’s forget about non-agentive abilities for the time
being, and concentrate on the paradigmatic instances of abilities: abilities to
perform actions. Let us focus on abilities like the ability to sing, to dance, or
to jump; to eat, to cook, or to pour water; to sketch a tree, to chase a cat, or
to hole a putt; and so on. Let’s focus exclusively on agentive abilities and forget
about the rest.
Here is a road map for the chapter. In the next section, 4.1, I will introduce
the basic framework of the success view of agentive abilities in quite some detail.
As I go along, it will become evident that the success view incorporates key in-
sights both of the simple conditional analysis and possibilism. That is because
the success view of agentive abilities incorporates both the idea that abilities
have something to do with a modal tie between intentions and performances
and the idea that abilities are always had in view of contextually variant sets
of facts. In a way, then, the success view of agentive abilities can be seen as a
hybrid view of the simple conditional analysis and possibilism. I view this as
a merit. I take it to be highly likely that other philosophers were not completely
off course in their assessment of the topic.
In section 4.2, I am going to talk in some detail about the notion of an inten-
tion as it figures in the formulation of the view and provide a rationale for for-
mulating the success view in terms of intentions and not some other candidate
motivational state on the agent’s part.
In sections 4.3–4.7, I show that the success view of agentive abilities is su-
perior to both the simple conditional analysis and possibilism in that it accounts
for all of the adequacy conditions (apart from accounting for non-agentive abil-
ities, of course) and does not run into any of the problems that beset the other
two views.
More specifically, I will argue that the success view provides an account of
degrees and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity that attaches to ability
statements (→ 4.3), circumvents the problem of the impeded intention (→ 4.4),
provides a fully comprehensive account of general and specific abilities (→
4.5), yields an understanding of the workings of masks (→ 4.6), and does not
only avoid the formal problem that besets possibilism, but actually explains
where that problem stems from (→ 4.7). In view of those merits, I will conclude,
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by the end of the section 4.7, that the success view is a very promising view in-
deed.
Sections 4.8 and 4.9, finally, are devoted to the discussion of two objections
to the success view that come to mind quite naturally. In section 4.8, I’ll discuss
the objection that the success view runs into problems with what I will call “un-
intentional agentive abilities” – agentive abilities which can only be exercised as
long as the agent does not intend to exercise them.
In section 4.9, the worry is refined by examining a specific kind of uninten-
tional agentive abilities: abilities that can only be exercised as long as the agent
does not intend to exercise them, because the agent is epistemically impaired in
certain ways. In response to these worries, I will introduce a somewhat weaker
version of the success view, which accommodates such cases. By the end of
the chapter (→ 4.10), we’ll be in a position to formulate a fully comprehensive
account of agentive abilities.
I would like to emphasize beforehand that I am hugely indebted to Manley
and Wasserman’s work on dispositions. The idea that abilities have something to
do with proportions is greatly inspired by their work. On their view, x has a dis-
position to M, “if and only if x would M in some suitable proportion of [stimulus
cases]” (Manley & Wasserman 2008: 76, my emphasis). Although Manley and
Wasserman’s account of dispositions differs from my views on abilities in
some crucial respects (their view is a more sophisticated version of the condi-
tional analysis of dispositions and is going to be discussed in detail in chapter
6.2), I nevertheless view it as a very close relative to the success view of ability
in that it emphasizes the notion of a proportion – a feature that can be found in a
variety of views, all of which are going to be discussed in chapter 6.
4.1 The general framework
On the view I want to develop and defend in this chapter, having an agentive
ability is a matter of modal success. More specifically, I will argue that for an
agent to have an agentive ability to ϕ, that agent’s intentions to ϕ and her per-
formances of ϕ-ing have to match up in the right way across a certain portion of
modal space. Agentive abilities are a matter of a specific modal tie between in-
tentions and performances on this account.
As you will note, this idea pays tribute to the intuition that also drives the
simple conditional analysis of abilities. According to the simple conditional
analysis, an agent has an ability if and only if the agent would ϕ if she intended
to ϕ. Thus, the simple conditional analysis, too, postulates a specific modal tie
between the agent’s intentions and her performances. But as we have seen in
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chapter 2, that tie is not plausibly construed in terms of a counterfactual condi-
tional.
What is the modal tie that matters, then? Here is my suggestion. According to
what I will call the success view of agentive abilities, or simply SUCCESSAA, in
what follows,
SUCCESSAA. an agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficiently high
proportion of the relevant possible situations in which she intends to ϕ.
Thus, a darts player has the ability to hit the bull’s eye if and only if she hits it in
a sufficiently high proportion of relevant possible situations in which she in-
tends to hit it. An engineer has the ability to construct a super-efficient engine
if and only if she succeeds in constructing one in a sufficiently high proportion
of relevant possible situations in which she intends to construct one. And a pia-
nist has the ability to play a certain piece if and only if she succeeds in playing it
in a sufficiently high proportion of relevant possible situations in which she in-
tends to play it.
In fact, this is a simplification. As we will see later on, SUCCESSAA is only
approximately correct. Really, the proportion that matters will have to be weight-
ed (→ 4.3) and the agent’s intention does not necessarily have to be the intention
to ϕ, but may well be some other intention, in response to which ϕ-ing counts as
a success (→ 4.8). But those complications need not bother us right now. SUC-
CESSAA is close enough to what I take to be the truth to get along with it through-
out the largest part of the chapter. The full-fledged version of the success view of
agentive abilities, which does justice to the full amount of complexity of its sub-
ject matter, is going to emerge as we go along and can be found in the upshot in
section 4.10. For now, let’s keep things as simple as possible.
What is a proportion? A proportion, as I am using the term, is simply a por-
tion or part in its relation to the whole.¹ The proportion of blondes among the
Swedes, for instance, is the portion of blonde Swedes in relation to all Swedes.
Mathematically, a proportion corresponds to a certain ratio. To use our example
again, the proportion of blondes among the Swedes corresponds to the ratio of
blonde Swedes to the totality of Swedes. It can be expressed by a fraction. The
ratio of blonde Swedes to all Swedes is v, such that v = size of the set of blonde
Swedes/size of the set of all Swedes.
 I follow the Oxford dictionary here, which defines “proportion” as “a portion or part in its re-
lation to the whole; a comparative part, a share; sometimes simply, a portion, division, part”
(Simpson & Weiner 1989).
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The same goes for the proportion of performance cases among the relevant
intention situations, as it figures in SUCCESSAA. It, too, corresponds to a ratio: the
ratio of relevant intention situations in which the agent ϕ’s to the totality of all
relevant intention situations. Again, this can be expressed by a fraction. The
ratio that matters is v, such that v = size of the set of relevant intention situations
in which the agent ϕ’s/size of the set of the all relevant intention situations.We
can call this ratio the agent’s modal success rate. Hence, SUCCESSAA states that
an agent has the ability to ϕ if and only if her modal success rate is high enough.
It is important to note that the modal success rate is not to be conflated with
the agent’s quota of successful attempts in the actual world. Let’s distinguish the
two ratios very carefully. The modal success rate is the proportion of the success
cases among the relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ. The
agent’s quota of successful performances in the actual world, in contrast, is what
we can call her track record ²: it is the proportion of the success cases among the
actual intention situations.
The agent’s track record plays a heuristic role. By looking at an agent’s track
record,we find out about situations in which the agent’s intentions were success-
fully realized and situations in which they weren’t. That gives us good reasons to
infer certain beliefs about patterns of success across possible worlds. In the end,
though, it’s the modal success rate that counts.
To get a better grip on SUCCESSAA, let’s visualize the view by means of a
Venn diagram.
 I borrow this term from Greco (2007: 60f.)
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What matters for an agent’s agentive ability to ϕ, according to SUCCESSAA, is
the proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant intention situations. In the di-
agram,we have the relevant possible situations in the box. In the vertically dash-
ed area, we have the relevant intention situations. In the horizontally dashed
area, we have the relevant intention situations in which the agent ϕ’s.What mat-
ters is the proportion of the horizontally dashed area among the vertically dash-
ed area. If it is sufficiently high, the agent has the ability to ϕ. If not, she lacks it.
Quite simple thus far. And quite intuitive, I hope. Let’s dive deeper. Thus far,
I have only emphasized the similarities between SUCCESSAA and the conditional
analysis; both stress the importance of a certain modal link between the agent’s
intention to ϕ and the agent’s effective performances of ϕ-ing. But a second
glance at SUCCESSAA reveals that the condition also draws on an important
idea of possibilism. For what matters for an agent to have an ability, according
to SUCCESSAA, is the agent’s performances across a certain restricted domain of
possible situations. And this feature is something the view obviously shares with
possibilism.
While the proponent of the simple conditional analysis always moves to the
intention worlds that are overall closest to the actual world, the possibilist re-
stricts the possible worlds in correspondence to whatever features of the actual
world are of interest in a given context and evaluates the agent’s performances in
any of those worlds. The exact same procedure is used in the case of SUCCESSAA:
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we first determine the relevant possible situations. For this reason, I will often
employ Kratzer’s terminology and refer to the relevant possible situations as
the modal base and to the facts that determine that modal base as the facts
“in view of which” the agent has an ability.
Note that SUCCESSAA speaks of situations where possibilism speaks of
worlds. That is because what matters, according to SUCCESSAA, is the ratio of per-
formances of ϕ-ing to intentions to ϕ. Worlds, of course, can contain many in-
stances of intending to ϕ. When we think about the ratio of performances to in-
tentions, all of those instances count. That is why worlds are not fine-grained
enough to figure in SUCCESSAA. For this reason, SUCCESSAA is formulated in
terms of situations. A situation, as I use the term, is a proper part of a world.
It is a world at a certain stretch of time.
Which situations go into the modal base will vary. Like possibilism, SUCCES-
SAA is a contextualist view about abilities in the sense that the set of the relevant
possible situations varies across contexts. Let’s make this explicit. SUCCESSAA,
as I will defend it in the course of this book, is to be understood as the view that
SUCCESSAA_context. an agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficiently
high proportion of the relevant possible situations in which she intends
to ϕ, where the set of the relevant possible situations will vary across as-
criber contexts.
Both possibilism and SUCCESSAA restrict the possible worlds and situations, re-
spectively, to the ones that count as relevant in a given context, then. In both
cases, certain facts of the actual world are held fixed across modal space. Others
vary wildly. Sometimes, any situation will count as relevant in which the agent’s
intrinsic features are as in actuality. Sometimes, to count as relevant, a situation
will additionally have to resemble the actual situation with respect to varying
sets of extrinsic features of the agent.
In connection with possibilism, we have seen that this contextual restriction
to different sets of worlds in terms of relevance took us quite a few steps towards
an account of more or less general or specific abilities. As we’ll see later on in
some detail (→ 4.5), SUCCESSAA preserves this extremely fruitful feature of pos-
sibilism, but moreover provides the resources for a full-fledged account of gen-
eral and specific abilities.
There are two important differences between SUCCESSAA and possibilism.
First, in contrast to the possibilist, we do not look at the agent’s performances
across all relevant possible situations, but only across a certain subset of
those situations. The link between intentions and performances, which is also
what proponents of the simple conditional analysis are after, is established by
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adding a second restriction on the situations that count.What matters is not just
the agent’s performance across the relevant possible situations in general, but
rather across the relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ.
This second restriction, which is clearly not part of the possibilist framework,
is what secures the modal link between intentions and performance. But it
does so by a core means of possibilism – by imposing restrictions on the
modal realm.
The second difference is that according to SUCCESSAA, the possibilist is
wrong in assuming that abilities can be analyzed in terms of the possibility op-
erator. While abilities are indeed a matter of the agent’s performance across rel-
evant possible situations, one performance case is rarely enough. That is why
possibilism ran into the destructive formal problems we looked at and had trou-
ble accounting for general abilities and degrees. Possibilists get the modal force
of ability statements wrong; ability statements are not possibility statements.
What is the right modal force? On my view, abilities have to be understood in
terms of what we can call “proportional quantification”: there has to be not one,
but a sufficient proportion of relevant intention situations in which the agent ϕ’s.
What does “a sufficiently high proportion” amount to? That will vary – and
rightly so. We know that there is context sensitivity involved in the degree of
an ability that is required for an ability ascription simpliciter to apply. And as
I will lay out in due course (→ 4.3), the (weighted) proportion of performance
cases among the relevant intention situations corresponds to the degree of an
agent’s ability. More specifically, I will argue that the higher the (weighted) pro-
portion of performance cases is among the relevant intention situations, the
higher the agent’s degree of ability. And so, since it varies which degree of ability
is required for the agent to count as having the ability simpliciter in a given con-
text, it will also vary which proportion of performance cases counts as sufficient.
Despite some important similarities, then, SUCCESSAA differs substantially
from possibilism.What remains to be done is to set the view apart from the sim-
ple conditional analysis a bit more carefully as well. The major difference be-
tween the success view and the simple conditional analysis is that the success
view is not formulated in terms of a counterfactual conditional. Now that we
have a grip on the idea of proportional quantification and the restriction to rel-
evant possible situations that figures so prominently in SUCCESS, it should be
easy to see that this difference has far-reaching consequences.
By formulating the simple conditional analysis in terms of a counterfactual,
the proponent abilities are analyzed in terms of the agent’s performance in the
closest worlds in which the agent intends to ϕ. An agent has an ability to ϕ,
on that view, if and only if the agent ϕ’s in the closest worlds in which she in-
tends to ϕ. SUCCESSAA is at the same time more liberal and more restrictive than
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that. It is more liberal since the agent need not ϕ in the closest intention situa-
tions. A ϕ-ing performance in one of the less close, but still relevant intention
situations is just as valuable as in the very closest ones. At the same time, SUC-
CESSAA is more restrictive, because in most contexts one performance case just
won’t do, no matter how close it is: the agent has to ϕ in a sufficient proportion
of the relevant intention situations, and as we will see later on (→ 4.3; 4.5), that
will usually require that she ϕ’s in more than just one situation.
The main idea of SUCCESSAA should have come across. But there are many
details which are going to be provided as we go along. In the next section (→
4.2), I’ll talk about the notion of an intention and provide a rationale for formu-
lating the view in terms of that motivational state and not another. Afterwards, in
sections 4.3–4.7, we’ll see that the success view is very powerful. Rightly devel-
oped, it delivers a fully comprehensive account of agentive abilities, which ac-
counts for all of the adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of such abil-
ities and does not run into any of the problems that beset the simple conditional
analysis and possibilism, respectively.
4.2 The proper motivational state
The success view shares one important feature with the simple conditional anal-
ysis: both stress the importance of a certain modal link between the agent’s in-
tentions to ϕ and the agent’s effective performances of ϕ-ing.When I introduced
the simple conditional analysis, I said that different versions of the view differ
with respect to the motivational state that figures in the antecedent of the coun-
terfactual. Different versions of the view feature motivational states as diverse as
trying, intending, wanting, choosing, and desiring. For reasons of exposition, I
did not dwell on those differences, but focused on the similarities between the
various versions instead. For plasticity, I just picked one motivational state
and formulated the simple conditional analysis in terms of intentions. But I
could just as well have formulated it very broadly as the view that an agent
has an ability to ϕ if and only if the agent would ϕ, if the agent were properly
motivated to ϕ.
I could have availed myself of the same non-committal formulation in my
formulation of SUCCESSAA. SUCCESSAA could have been formulated as the view
that an agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if the agent ϕ’s in a suffi-
ciently high proportion of relevant possible situations in which the agent is prop-
erly motivated. Instead, I have chosen a more committal formulation: SUCCES-
SAA, as I have formulated it, postulates a modal tie between a particular kind
of motivational state and the agent’s performances. What counts, on my view,
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is the tie between the agent’s intention to ϕ and her effectively ϕ-ing. In this sec-
tion, I will elaborate a bit on the notion of an intention, as it figures in the anal-
ysis, and on the rationale for focusing on intentions and not some other candi-
date motivational state.
An intention, as I am using the term in the course of this book, is simply an
action-initiating propositional attitude in the sense that it is part of its causal role
that it will typically initiate behavioral episodes corresponding to its content. I
will assume that the behavioral episodes which are caused by intentions (in
the right way)³ are actions. Further, I will assume that it is the causal impact
of an intention that explains the intentionality of an action. I hope to be firmly
ensconced in the action-theoretical common sense or at least the respectable tra-
dition with these assumptions.
We can differentiate between intentions to ϕ right away and intentions to ϕ
in the future. Intentions, as they figure in SUCCESSAA are intentions to ϕ right
away. Intentions to ϕ in the future can be given up, and it therefore does not
count against an agent’s ability, if an agent intends to ϕ in the future, but
does not ϕ when the time comes. So “intention”, as I use it, is always the inten-
tion to ϕ at t, where t is, roughly, the next moment.
Let me now talk about the rationale for focusing on intentions, so under-
stood, and not some other candidate motivational state. First, the motivational
state figuring in the account has to be action initiating the sense that it will typ-
ically lead to action. A state that is motivational but not action-initiating in this
strong sense will not do. To see that, take ordinary desires. Desires are motiva-
tional, but not action initiating. They constitute, qua desire, a mere prima
facie motivation towards the desired action. This has two reasons.
On the one hand, desires can be overridden by other desires. I can have a
desire to go dancing, but that desire can be overridden by an even stronger de-
sire to go to sleep (yes, I am getting old). In that case, dancing will not be the
favored course of action. Instead, I’ll presumably end up curled up in my bed.
On the other hand, desires alone will not do anyway; without a proper belief,
no action will ensue. Even an overriding desire to go dancing will only result
in dancing, if I believe that there is a party somewhere. Otherwise, I’ll end up
sleeping all the same.
These features of desires indicate that desires are not the suitable motiva-
tional states to figure in an account of abilities. My not acting on a desire to
 “In the right way” means “by non-deviant causal chains”. How to think of non-deviance is a
problem of action theory and falls outside the scope of this book. For an overview see (Wilson &
Shpall 2012, section 2).
4.2 The proper motivational state 101
go dancing, which is either overridden by an opposing desire or paired with an
action-inhibiting belief, does not speak against my ability to go dancing. That is
why the success view cannot be formulated in terms of desires or any other mere-
ly prima facie motivating state, such as wants.We get distorted results, if we eval-
uate the proportion of dancing cases among the relevant possible situations in
which the agent is merely prima facie motivated to dance. Any situation in
which the agent has an overriding desire or want to go to sleep or believes
that there is no party around, would have to be counted against the agent’s abil-
ity to dance. Certainly, this is the wrong outcome.What we need is an action-in-
itiating state: a state which typically initiates action. Intentions are just that.
Yet, the need for an action-initiating state does not rule out a number of dif-
ferent motivational states. It does not speak against a formulation of the success
view in terms of choices, decisions, tryings, or attempts, for instance. To see why
those motivational states are ill-suited to figure in the analysis, we need to focus
on a different requirement that goes along with a satisfactory formulation of an
account of agentive abilities: the motivational state had better itself not be an
action.
Otherwise, a regress looms. The success view, as it stands, is supposed to
offer an account of agentive abilities – abilities to perform actions. The way
the view aims at this goal is by postulating a modal tie between a suitable mo-
tivational state to perform some action on the one hand and the effective perfor-
mance of the action on the other. If this is true, however, then the motivational
state figuring in that modal tie had better not itself be an action. Otherwise, one
will rightly wonder what it is for the agent to have an ability to perform that kind
of action.
For illustration, let’s assume that the success view were formulated as the
view that an agent has an agentive ability if and only if the agent ϕ’s in a suffi-
ciently high proportion of relevant possible situations in which the agent tries to
ϕ, and let’s assume, as many have, that trying is an action.⁴ Then the question
will naturally arise what it is for an agent to have the ability to perform that ac-
tion: what is it for an agent to have the ability to try?
For the proponent of the success view, the only reasonable available answer
is to state that an agent has an ability to try if and only if the agent tries in a
sufficiently high proportion of the relevant possible situations in which the
agent tries to try. And so on. Ad infinitum, with ever less plausibility.⁵ The
same goes for choosing, deciding, attempting, and any other motivational
 See for instance Adams (1994).
 Note that Moore (1912, ch. 7) does not seem to think that there is any problem with this.
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state that seems to be an action itself.We can conclude that the success view had
better be formulated in terms of a motivational state that is itself clearly not an
action. Intentions, I take it, meet this requirement.
4.3 An account of degrees and context sensitivity
In this and the next four sections, I will, piece by piece, demonstrate the merits
of SUCCESSAA. In this section, I will turn to the way the success view accommo-
dates degrees of abilities and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity that
attaches to ability statements. Providing an understanding of those phenomena
is a central task in developing a viable account of abilities. In fact, it is one of the
adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of abilities. As I have laid out in
chapter 1.3, any comprehensive view of abilities will have to accommodate de-
grees and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity of ability statements.
On the view I will lay out in this section, the crucial tool provided by SUC-
CESSAA is the notion of the agent’s modal success rate. Roughly, we can say that
the higher the proportion of ϕ-ing cases is among the relevant intention situa-
tions, the higher the degree of an agent’s ability.⁶
Let’s recall that abilities can be graded along two dimensions. On the one
hand, there is the dimension of reliability. It can count, towards the degree of
an agent’s ability, how large the range of the circumstances is in which the
agent manages to perform an action. On the other hand, there is the dimension
of achievement. It can count, towards establishing the agent’s ability, how high
the quality of the agent’s performance of an act is that the agent manages to de-
liver.
In what follows, I’ll give an account of both dimensions individually, but on
top of that I’ll also sketch an account of agents’ degrees of abilities quite gener-
ally. That means that I’ll give an account of degrees which holds, no matter
which dimension carries which weight. It thus unifies the two dimensions and
reveals a way to think of a mechanism of how to set them off against each
other in contexts in which they are set off.
The account of degrees of reliability is quite easily developed. SUCCESSAA is
tailor-made for the understanding of degrees along that scale. Reliability has to
 A very similar account is developed for degrees of dispositions by Manley & Wasserman
(2008). Manley and Wasserman’s account is a very sophisticated version of the conditional anal-
ysis, but it also features the notion of proportions of (centered) worlds and uses that notion to
account for degrees. See also Maier (2013). Both accounts are going to be discussed in detail
later on (→ 6.2, 6.4).
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do with the range of possible circumstances in which an agent manages to per-
form a certain action. The modal success rate measures just that: the range of the
possible circumstances in which the agent’s intentions are followed by the cor-
responding action. Thus, the modal success rate is the measure for reliability. The
more reliable archer is one who hits the target in a higher proportion of relevant
possible situations in which she intends to hit it. The more reliable weather fore-
caster is one who predicts the weather correctly in a higher proportion of rele-
vant possible situations in which she intends to predict the weather. And so
forth.
At first sight, it is not obvious that SUCCESSAA accounts equally smoothly for
the dimension of achievement. To see the issue, think of the two pianists, one of
whom plays perfectly on every occasion, while the other one plays poorly on
every occasion. On the dimension of achievement, the first pianist is better.
But prima facie, this dimension does not fit well with the success view. The no-
tion of being better in terms of achievement seems to be essentially qualitative. It
does not seem to have to do with the range of cases in which one performs at all.
What counts is how well one performs. And that, it might seem, cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of the purely quantitative measure that is given by compar-
ing proportions of cases in which performance takes place. In a nutshell: the
modal success rate in ϕ-ing does not seem to be qualitative enough to account
for the dimension of achievement.
Fortunately, this is less of a problem than it may seem at first sight. Propor-
tions matter. But not every ϕ-ing case is counted equally when it goes into the
proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant intention situations. Instead, we
need to weigh the cases we are counting.⁷ Here is how.
The qualitative dimension that enters in on the level of achievement can be
modeled quantitatively by giving certain situations a higher value the closer the
performance in those cases comes to some (contextually determined) ideal. The
idea behind this is simple. If someone plays a piano piece flawlessly, that counts
more towards her ability to play the piano than her playing the same piece badly.
If someone plays a piece with verve and emotion, that counts more towards her
ability to play the piano than if she plays the same piece like an automaton. And
so forth. This notion of “counting towards the ability” can be captured by adding
extra value to a situation the more the performance in that situation counts to-
wards the ability in question. The more verve an agent’s play exhibits in a given
 This is also suggested by Manley & Wasserman (2008) in connection with the gradability of
dispositions. In assessing the fragility of a vase, it is not only important in which proportion of
stimulus worlds it breaks, but also how extensively it breaks. Apparently, shattering counts more
towards an object’s fragility than cracking.
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case, the higher the value we attach to that case. The less mistakes an agent
makes in a given case, the higher the value we attach to those cases.
Depending on the context, it will vary which qualities matter most. In some
contexts, flawlessness is the major virtue we are after. In others, verve is more
important. This is mirrored in the values we attach to the cases. The more impor-
tant verve is, the more value we attach to the verve-cases. The more important
flawlessness is, the more value is given to the flawlessness-cases. And so on.
We can think of that in terms of numbers. An ideal performance gets a 1. A per-
formance that is too miserable to count as an act of ϕ-ing at all gets a 0.
When is an agent better on the achievement level? That depends. Some-
times, all that matters is her best performance across the relevant intention sit-
uations. When we are evaluating two piano players’ abilities to play a certain
piece, we may sometimes be willing to count that agent more able on the ach-
ievement level who manages to deliver the best performance, no matter how mis-
erably the agent plays in most other cases. In such cases, the highest value wins,
so to speak.
Perhaps there are also contexts in which the lowest achievement value is
what counts. It is not implausible, for instance, that there are contexts in
which an emergency doctor’s ability to prevent damage is counted as higher
the fewer people die under her care and not the more people come out complete-
ly healed in the end. In such contexts, the higher the lowest value of cases in
which damage is prevented, the better the doctor on the achievement level.
Finally, there also seem to be cases in which we are interested in the average
value of the agent’s performances. Usually, a hedge fund manager who plays
full-risk all the time and wins a fortune every once in a while losing huge
amounts of money in most cases does not count as better, in terms of achieve-
ment, than someone who plays it cool and wins a few percentages in each trans-
action. Here, what often counts seems to be the average achievement value.
Which achievement value is of interest in a context can vary and often we
will have to set the dimensions off against one another. A very high peak
value will sometimes outweigh a poor average and a devastating off-peak
value. But likewise, a very low off-peak can outweigh a good average value
and an amazingly high peak value. Let’s assume, for the time being, that the
average value is always what counts. I’ll come back to the interplay between
the various achievement values in due course.
Let’s take stock. What we have is an account of both degrees of reliability
and degrees of achievement. An ability’s degree of reliability corresponds to
the proportion of relevant intention situations in which the agent performs the
intended action. An ability’s degree of achievement corresponds to whatever
achievement value matters to us, but for the time being we assume it corre-
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sponds to the average achievement value of the agent’s performances. Some-
times, we are interested in reliability only. Sometimes, in achievement only.
Which of the two matters varies with the kind of ability we are considering,
and presumably also with other context factors. So far, so good.
In many cases, however, this is not enough.Very often – in fact: usually – we
are not just interested in one of the two dimensions. Usually, an agent’s overall
degree of an ability depends on both her degree of reliability and her degree of
achievement. What we really want, then, is a unified account of degrees, taking
into account both the dimension of reliability and the dimension of achievement
at once.We want what I would like to call a weighted proportion⁸ – a value that is
higher the better someone performs in the more cases.
Obviously, there are various ways of generating such a value, but not all of
them work equally well. For instance, we will have to make sure that reliability
and achievement as a whole can be of unequal importance for the degree of an
agent’s ability. Sometimes, reliability is what matters most. Sometimes, achieve-
ment.
Here is a toy model for the way in which the two dimensions might be set off
against each other. In a first step, we evaluate the dimension of reliability. We
determine the proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant intention situations.
The higher the proportion, the higher the number. In a second step, we deter-
mine value for the agent’s achievement. For simplicity, we are working with
the average value, and that value is obtained by adding the values for the agent’s
individual performances and dividing it by the number of relevant intention sit-
uations. The situations in which she does not perform at all get a 0.
We can now add these values. But before we actually add them, we have to
determine how much weight to put on each value.We can do this by using a mul-
tiplier. Let m and n be multiplier variables. Let R be the value for reliability. Let A
be the value for the agent’s achievement. Then the agent’s success rate, SR, will
be determined along the following lines:
SR = (m x R) + (n x A)
If we are interested in reliability only,we set n = 0. If we are interested in achieve-
ment only, we set m = 0. If we are interested in both, we weigh them by attaching
to each a multiplier that suits our focus. By that procedure,we obtain the weight-
 I borrow this term from Manley & Wasserman (2008). Manley and Wasserman give no account
of how the correlates of reliability and achievement are to be set off in the case of dispositions,
but as far as I can see, they, too, will need something like the toy model I will suggest for degrees
of abilities.
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ed proportion we were after – a value that is higher the better the agent performs
in the more situations and in which the dimensions of reliability and achieve-
ment can be set off against each other according to the focus we put on each di-
mension in a given context.
By the same kind of procedure, we can determine the agent’s overall ach-
ievement value, by the way. The challenge, recall, was basically the same: the
agent’s achievement often depends on a variety of values – the peak value,
the off-peak value, and the average value of the agent’s performance. Obviously,
this interplay can be modeled along the same lines as the interplay between ach-
ievement and reliability as a whole. We can simply add all of the values which
count and determine the extent to which they go into the sum by attaching ap-
propriate multipliers to each of them beforehand.Whatever overall value comes
out for the agent’s achievement is the one we are inserting into the formula for
the agent\s overall success rate in ϕ-ing.
I should emphasize that I am not arguing that we really do this kind of cal-
culation when we evaluate an agent’s degree of ability.What I have described as
a calculation procedure is not really a procedure that falls into distinct steps. In
fact, it is not even a procedure at all. It is a toy model of degrees of abilities in a
possible worlds framework. It gives us an idea of how the notion of degrees of
abilities, though highly qualitative in that it involves how highly we appreciate
a given performance in a given context, can nevertheless be modeled in quanti-
tative terms: as a numeric measure we project onto possible situations and which
will change across contexts, depending on the one hand on our standards for
what counts as a performance of ϕ at all, what counts as a good or bad perfor-
mance, and what counts as a brilliant performance, and on the other hand on
how important reliability and achievement are, respectively.
In virtue of the fact that the model is for illustrative purposes only, it is not of
crucial importance that you agree with every detail of it. Perhaps you think there
is more to be said about the dimension of achievement; perhaps you think that
my discussion of the exemplary cases is not fully satisfactory; perhaps you have
other quarrels with the details of the account. That is okay. As long as those quar-
rels do not concern the structural ingredients of the account (i.e. an account of
degrees in terms of weighted proportions), I am fine with that. The ways in which
we grade abilities are obviously very complex, and my account in terms of the
two dimensions and the ways in which they are set off against each other is per-
haps too coarse to account for every single way in which two agents’ degrees of
ability can vary. So be it, then.
What matters is that the basic notion of the success view, the notion of a suc-
cess rate, is structurally suited to account even for the qualitative parts of our
thinking about degrees and can account for the fact that various different dimen-
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sions, such as achievement and reliability, go into our calculations when we
evaluate an agent’s overall degree of ability. Proportions matter – all we have
to do is weigh the cases that are counted in an appropriate way.What I have out-
lined is one structural idea of how to do so. There may be other ways, and there
may definitely be ways to improve the model I have sketched. I am content if my
understanding of degrees is structurally on the right tracks, and I believe it is.
Here is the upshot of this section. According to the success view of ability, an
agent has the ability to ϕ only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficiently high proportion of
relevant possible situations in which she intends to ϕ. In the preceding para-
graphs, I have elaborated on the right understanding of “proportion”.What mat-
ters is not just the sheer number of ϕ-ing cases. Rather, “proportion”, as it occurs
in the formulation of the success view, has to be interpreted as the weighted pro-
portion that corresponds to the weighed sum of both, the agent’s reliability value
and her achievement value. The weighing is a matter of context. Sometimes, re-
liability counts more. Sometimes, achievement. The success view accounts for
that.
Context sensitivity costs nothing on this picture. Once we have the scale es-
tablished by varying success rates, and hence varying degrees of ability, the con-
text simply sets a threshold on that scale. The threshold is provided by the no-
tion of sufficiency. For an agent to have an ability simpliciter in a given context,
the agent has to exhibit a sufficiently high weighted success rate in ϕ-ing. And
which weighted success rate counts as sufficient will vary. In what follows, I will
not speak of the weighted proportion and success rate anymore. I take it to be
clear that “proportion” and “success rate” have to be understood along those
lines, and I trust that the reader will bear it in mind.
4.4 Impeded intentions and the existential requirement
SUCCESSAA analyzes abilities in terms of a modal tie between intentions and per-
formances. In this respect, it resembles the simple conditional analysis rather
closely. For this reason, one very pressing question is whether SUCCESSAA may
not actually fall prey to the problem of the impeded intention as well. In view
of the fact that the postulation of the counterfactual tie gave rise to the problem
of the impeded intention in the case of the simple conditional analysis, the pos-
tulation of a very similar tie may seem like a very bad idea.
To evoke the problem, recall that the counterfactual tie between the agent’s
intentions and performances postulated by the simple conditional analysis is ob-
viously not sufficient for an agent to have an ability. Reconsider Betty, our coma
patient. For Betty, the counterfactual comes out true: she would raise her arm if
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she intended to raise it. That is because the closest worlds in which she intends
to raise her arm are worlds in which she is not in a coma. And in those worlds,
she would presumably also raise her arm.
An analogous worry seems to apply to SUCCESSAA. For may not the modal
success rate be quite high in the case of a coma patient? The agent’s intention
to raise her arm will only occur in situations in which the agent is not in a
coma, after all. And in such situations, nothing impedes her raising her arm.
Hence, it seems as though the modal success rate will be averagely high for
the coma patient. If this were true, then SUCCESSAAwould run into an analogous
problem as the simple conditional analysis: the modal success rate is averagely
high, while the agent lacks the ability, because she cannot form the intention to
begin with. Like the simple conditional analysis, the condition stated in SUCCES-
SAA would turn out to be insufficient in that case.
Luckily, this objection relies on a misunderstanding of SUCCESSAA. SUCCES-
SAA states that to have an agentive ability to ϕ, the agent has to ϕ in a sufficiently
high proportion of relevant possible situations in which she intends to ϕ. This
condition is not met in the case of the coma patient. In contexts in which we
want to say that the coma patient lacks the ability to raise her arm, the set of
relevant possible situations will contain only situations in which the agent is
in a coma at the outset. But among those situations, there will be no intention
cases to begin with. And from this it follows that there will not be a sufficiently
high proportion of performance cases among the relevant intention situations.
Let me explain.
When there are no relevant intention situations, to determine the proportion
of performance cases among the relevant intention situations, one would have to
determine the proportion of performance cases among the empty set. And de-
pending on the exact mathematical understanding of “proportion”, that propor-
tion will either be unspecified or zero. Either way, it will not be the case that
there is a sufficient proportion of performance cases among the relevant inten-
tion situations. SUCCESSAA fails to be met either way, then.
Let me elaborate on this last point in some more detail. First, let’s recall that
SUCCESSAA applies proportional quantification to the relevant intention situa-
tions. What SUCCESSAA states is that an agent has an ability if and only if
there is a sufficiently high proportion of performance cases among the relevant
intention situations. This condition can be violated in two ways. It is violated,
first, if there is no proportion of performance cases among the relevant intention
situations to begin with. It is violated, secondly, if there is a proportion, but the
proportion is not sufficiently high. Depending on how exactly we spell out the
notion of a proportion, SUCCESSAA will fail to be met on either one of those
two grounds.
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If “proportion” is spelled out as a ratio, as I have done in terms of the modal
success rate, then the proportion of performance cases among the relevant inten-
tion situations will be unspecified, if there are no relevant intention situations to
begin with.We are dividing by zero in that case. To see that, let I be a value rep-
resenting the size of the set of the relevant possible situations in which S intends
to ϕ. Let P be a value representing the size of the set of the performance cases
among those intention situations. Given the interpretation of a proportion in
terms of a ratio, SUCCESSAA states that an agent has an ability to ϕ if and
only if
SUCCESSAA_ratio. there is a value v: v = P/I, such that v is sufficiently high.
From this, it follows that the proportion of performance cases among the rele-
vant intention situations is unspecified in the coma case. In the coma case,
the value for I is zero. It will thus not be true that there is a sufficient proportion
of performance cases among the relevant intention situations. There is no such
proportion. SUCCESSAA is therefore not met in this case.
If “proportion” is given a less formal interpretation – an interpretation along
the lines of a share or a part, say – then one may be able to make sense of the
notion of a proportion of cases among the empty set. Even so, however, that pro-
portion can only ever be zero in that case. No subset of the empty set will ever
contain anything. If that is true, then SUCCESSAAwill fail to be met on that inter-
pretation of “proportion” as well, since the proportion of performance cases
among the relevant intention situations will not be sufficiently high in that
case. Zero situations just won’t do.
We have just revealed an important entailment of SUCCESSAA. On any sensi-
ble interpretation of SUCCESSAA, SUCCESSAA is only met if there is a relevant in-
tention situation in the first place. In other words, the view entails that it has to
be possible, in the properly restricted sense, for the agent to form the intention.
Call this the existential requirement:
EX. An agent has an ability only if there is a relevant possible intention situation.
That SUCCESSAA entails the existential requirement is a very welcome conse-
quence. When we looked at the simple conditional analysis, we saw that a
very natural way of responding to the problem of the impeded intention is to
try and supplement the counterfactual by a further requirement. Not only does
it have to be true that the agent would ϕ, if she intended to ϕ, she also has
to be able to form the intention in the first place. The problem was that the pro-
ponent of the simple conditional analysis did not have the resources to explain
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what on earth the truth conditions for this supplementary claim were supposed
to be.
The success view, in contrast, can do justice to that insightful intuition. It is
true that for an agent to be able to ϕ, the agent has to be able to form an intention
to ϕ to begin with. And what is it for the agent to be able to form the intention?
Well, as a minimal requirement, it is for the existential requirement to be true:
there has to be a relevant possible situation in which the agent intends to ϕ.
When the intention is impeded, the existential requirement is not met. Hold-
ing the coma fixed, there are no relevant intention situations to begin with.
Hence, the proportion of hand-raising cases among the relevant intention situa-
tions is either unspecified (if a proportion is a ratio) or nil (on a less formal read-
ing). Hence, SUCCESS fails to be met either way in such cases.
The same goes for the brainwashed follower of a cult. The agent cannot leave
the cult, because she cannot form the intention to leave in the first place. SUC-
CESS yields exactly that. For the brainwashed agent, there is no sufficient pro-
portion of situations in which the agent leaves the cult among the relevant pos-
sible situations in which she intends to do so. That is because there are no
relevant possible situations in which she intends to leave the cult to begin
with. The relevant possible situations will be situations in which the person is
as brainwashed as she is. And since the brainwash prevents the person from
forming the intention to leave, there will not be any situations among the rele-
vant ones in which the agent intends to leave. The set of the relevant intention
situations is therefore empty, and hence the proportion of the situations in
which the agent leaves among the relevant intention situations is either unspe-
cified or nil. The success view therefore rightly yields that she lacks the ability to
leave the cult. Cases of an impeded motivation can be accounted for very
smoothly, then.
Proponents of the simple conditional analysis who have followed my argu-
ment up to this point will probably perk up their ears right now. Doesn’t an anal-
ogous treatment of cases of an impeded intention lend itself to them as well?
Why can’t proponents of the simple conditional analysis simply say that for
an agent to have an ability, two requirements have to be met. First, it has to
be the case that the agent would ϕ, if she intended to ϕ. Secondly, there have
to be worlds in which the agent intends to ϕ and those worlds have to be similar
enough.
That, it seems, solves the problem of the impeded intention. For while the
counterfactual would still be met by the coma patient, the additional condition
would not.Worlds in which the coma patient intends to raise her arm are simply
too far out, given that the coma patient is actually in a coma. That, the proponent
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of the now somewhat less simple conditional analysis could say, is why the coma
patient lacks the ability to raise her arm.
The account I have just sketched has actually been formulated in the litera-
ture. On Peacocke’s (1999) account, S has the ability to ϕ if and only if the coun-
terfactual is true of S and the world in which S tries to ϕ is close (309). Peacocke
then spells out closeness in terms of what we can reasonably rely on. A world is
close, on his account, if and only if we cannot reasonably rely on it not obtaining
(ibid: 310). As it seems, then, the proponent of the simple conditional analysis
can avail herself of roughly the same solution for the problem of the impeded
intention, but the account would have to be extended considerably.
4.5 An account of general and specific abilities
In section 4.3, I have used SUCCESSAA to come up with an account of degrees of
abilities and the corresponding context sensitivity of ability statements. In doing
so, I have shown how one very important adequacy condition that spelled trou-
ble for both the simple conditional analysis and possibilism is met by SUCCES-
SAA. Let’s now move on to the other adequacy condition. Any comprehensive
view of abilities has to shed light on the distinction between general and specific
abilities. Let’s see what SUCCESSAA has to offer in this regard.
According to SUCCESSAA, an agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if
she ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of relevant intention situations. The important
notion here is that of relevance. Which situations count as relevant in a given
context varies. And these variances generate abilities that are sometimes gener-
al, and sometimes specific.
In the case of general abilities, we are interested in what an agent can do,
independently of her current situation. Hence, we are interested in the agent’s
abilities in view of her stable, mostly intrinsic features. In such a case, the rele-
vant possible situations will comprise any situation that resembles actuality with
respect to those features. The temporary, extrinsic features of the agent’s current
situation are varied. In the case of specific abilities, in contrast, we are interested
in what the agent can do in view of her very situation. Hence, the relevant pos-
sible situations will comprise only situations that are like actuality with respect
to the features of the agent’s current circumstances. Thus, we will also hold a
large number of the temporary, highly extrinsic features of the agent fixed.
For illustration, consider Fred’s ability to do a handstand. Does Fred have
that ability when his arm is broken? That depends. In one sense, he does – he
has had training, he has often done a handstand in the past, he rarely failed
when he tried to do it. But in another sense, he cannot do a handstand. He
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can’t do a handstand here and now, broken arm and all. In the terminology of
general and specific abilities, this can be expressed by saying that Fred has
the general ability to do a handstand, but not the specific ability.
SUCCESSAA can account for all this. That is because the relevant possible sit-
uations will differ, depending on whether we are thinking about the general or
the specific ability.When we are thinking about Fred’s general ability, we are in-
terested in what he can do in view of his muscular constitution and his sense of
balance (plus background assumptions about the laws of nature, normality of
the world, etc.). Thus, we abstract away from the broken arm and count all sit-
uations as relevant in which Fred resembles his actual self in terms of his
sense of balance and his muscular constitution, say. Among those situations,
there is a sufficient proportion of cases in which Fred does a handstand. SUC-
CESSAA therefore rightly yields that he has the general ability.
When we are interested in Fred’s specific ability, we are interested in what he
can do in view of his sense of balance, his muscular constitution and the fact
that he has a broken arm. (Again, add the background assumptions. I won’t men-
tion that anymore as I go along.) Thus, we factor the broken arm in – only situa-
tions will count as relevant in which Fred’s arm is as in actuality. Among those
situations, Fred will not do a handstand in a sufficient proportion of intention
situations. Hence, SUCCESSAA rightly yields that Fred lacks the specific ability.
We can note, that SUCCESSAA is superior to the simple conditional analysis
and possibilism when it comes to general and specific abilities. Unlike both
views, SUCCESSAA accounts for the fact that general and specific abilities can
come apart and that we are often willing to ascribe the general, but not the spe-
cific ability to ϕ to an agent. Moreover, it yields a unified account of ability state-
ments, with general and specific abilities turning out to be essentially of the
same kind. In contrast to both the simple conditional analysis and possibilism
it thus has the advantage of meeting the second adequacy condition for a com-
prehensive account of abilities. It makes sense of the distinction between general
and specific abilities and it elucidates their relation.
You will have noted that the account I just suggested avails itself of the very
same mechanism the possibilist suggested for the treatment of general and spe-
cific abilities. According to the possibilist, recall, the difference between general
and specific abilities is a difference in the sets of facts that go into the modal
base. While we factor in lots of features of the agent’s actual situation in the
case of specific abilities, we only hold certain stable, mostly intrinsic features
fixed in the case of general abilities. With respect to the agent with the broken
arm, say, we hold the broken arm fixed when thinking about what the agent
can do here and now, broken arm and all, but vary the fact that the agent has
a broken arm when thinking about what the agent can do quite generally, inde-
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pendently of her current situation. Thus, the set of the relevant possible situa-
tions is going to vary, depending on whether we are interested in an agent’s gen-
eral or specific ability.
With respect to these features, my own account of general and specific abil-
ities does not differ much from the possibilist’s. I draw heavily on Kratzer’s idea
that the difference between the two kinds of abilities is essentially one of differ-
ent modal bases. Yet, there is a very important difference, having to do with the
kind of quantification that is applied to the relevant possible situations or
worlds.
True to her name, the possibilist applies existential quantification to the pos-
sible worlds: to have an ability is for the agent to ϕ in one of the relevant worlds.
According to SUCCESSAA, in contrast, we need to apply what I called proportional
quantification: to have an ability, on this account, is for there to be a sufficient
proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant possible situations in which the
agent intends to ϕ.
This difference matters a lot. For as we saw back in chapter 3.3, the possibi-
list eventually fails to account for general abilities. No matter how unrestrictive
we are about the relevant worlds – no matter, that is, how few features of the
actual world we hold fixed – for an agent to have a general ability to do a hand-
stand, say, it is not enough for that agent to do a handstand in just one of the
relevant worlds. For an agent to have a general ability to do pretty much any-
thing whatsoever we expect her to show a somewhat reliable performance across
various situations in those worlds.
Recall the characterizations of general abilities from several sources in the
literature we looked at in the beginning in chapter 1.2. According to Whittle, a
general ability is an ability to perform across a range of particular occasions. Ac-
cording to Honoré, a typist’s claim to have the general ability to type amounts to
the claim that “[s]he normally succeeds (…) when [s]he tries” (Honoré 1964: 465,
my emphasis). And according to Maier, one’s general ability “depends on one’s
relation to A in a wide range of circumstances” (Maier 2013: 11). This is where the
kind of quantification matters. A single world just won’t do. That is why accord-
ing to SUCCESSAA, an agent has an ability only if the agent performs in a suffi-
ciently high proportion of the relevant possible situations. How large a propor-
tion has to be in order to be sufficient can vary. But in the case of general
abilities, one world will rarely do.
Thus, SUCCESSAA has two instead of just one parameter to account for the
distinction between general and specific abilities. Not only does it vary which sit-
uations go into the modal base in each case, it also varies how large the propor-
tion of performance cases has to be in order for the agent to have the relevant
kind of ability. In part, the success view draws heavily on the tool box of the pos-
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sibilist, then. But it adds one crucial tool to the box. Only thanks to that addition-
al tool is the success view capable of offering a complete account of general and
specific abilities, whereas possibilism is bound to fail for structural reasons.
So far, I have given you the main outlines of the way I am thinking about
general and specific abilities. Let me now provide you with some details. I
will do so by discussing some of the ideas about general and specific abilities
that have been floating around rather unsystematically in the literature.
4.5.1 General abilities
The most common way in which general abilities are distinguished from specific
abilities is that agents have general abilities in virtue of their intrinsic properties
alone, whereas they have specific abilities in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic
properties. Berofsky, for instance, writes that “[a]n individual possessed of a
power (sic!) can take advantage of an opportunity by virtue of some intrinsic
characteristic” (Berofsky 2002: 197). Basically the same point is made by Vetter,
who holds that
the general ability to serve is possessed by an agent if and only if that agent has certain
intrinsic features that enable her to serve; it does not depend on the agent’s external cir-
cumstances. Her specific ability, on the contrary, is gained and lost with changes in her ex-
ternal circumstances (…). Her general ability to serve is an intrinsic property of the agent;
her specific ability is an extrinsic property. (Vetter ms.)
In this passage, Vetter suggests that the generality of an ability and its intrinsi-
cality are two sides of the same coin. Having a general ability is for the agent
to have some set of intrinsic properties. At first sight, this seems very reasonable,
given the core idea of generality we identified: a general ability is an ability that
is independent of the agent’s specific situation. And if it is independent of the
agent’s specific situation, then it has to depend on intrinsic properties of the
agent alone. Quod erat demonstrandum. A close tie between generality and in-
trinsicality also seems reasonable in view of some classic examples: the ability
to serve depends solely on the way the agent is constituted. The ability to
walk, sing, or cook as well.
Yet, I submit that intrinsicality is not the crucial feature when it comes to
general abilities. To see that, note, first, that there are lots of intrinsic features
we vary when considering an agent’s general abilities: we vary the broken leg
when thinking about the ability to jump, the current nervousness when thinking
about the ability to meditate, and the drugged brain when thinking about the
ability to solve a mathematical puzzle. We therefore certainly don’t hold all in-
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trinsic features of an agent fixed when it comes to general abilities. Of course,
Berofsky and Vetter do not suggest that we do. What they seem to be saying is
just that we hold only intrinsic features of the agent fixed.
But that, too, seems very questionable. There are clear examples for what we
would intuitively count as general abilities which do not depend on intrinsic
properties of the agent alone. The ability to baptize. The ability to impress
John. The ability to recognize a particular building. All of these abilities are
fully general in the sense that we do not have a particular situation in mind
when ascribing them and having them requires that the agent manage to exer-
cise them across a large range of circumstances. Yet, all of these abilities depend
as much on extrinsic properties of the agent as they depend on her intrinsic
properties. The ability to baptize depends in part on the social practices in
which the agent is embedded. The ability to impress John depends a great
deal on John. And the ability to recognize a building depends to a large extent
on the look of the building. As it seems, then, the relation between the generality
of an ability and its dependence on intrinsic properties of the agent is not as
tight as Vetter and Berofsky suggest.
That is why I have stated my account of general abilities in terms of stable,
mostly intrinsic features of the agent. Stability, I submit, is what plays the key
role. When we are thinking about what the agent can do independently of her
situation, what we are holding fixed are features that the agent retains through-
out a great number of situations. Those features will very often be intrinsic to the
agent. But they need not be intrinsic to her; all that matters is that they are stable
in the sense that the agent retains them across great changes of circumstance.
Which of the stable, mostly intrinsic features of an agent we hold fixed will
vary. We may be interested in an agent’s general ability sing on stage and hold
fixed that the agent is so anxious of singing on stage that she immediately
freezes as soon as she goes on stage. But we may also vary her nervousness.
Each time, we are interested in one of the agent’s general ability: an ability
she has in view of some relevant set of stable, mostly intrinsic features of hers.
4.5.2 Specific abilities
Let’s now look at specific abilities.We know that a specific ability is an ability to
perform some action in some particular situation. I said before that this means
that the facts of the situation will be held fixed in the modal base. But just which
and how many of the facts of the situation have to be held fixed? Here, one can
take various routes. As a result, one will get a whole spectrum of varyingly spe-
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cific abilities, all of which are legitimate in their own right, and none of which
deserve privilege over the others.
Out of these many varyingly specific abilities, I will pick out three, because I
take them to be particularly interesting. There are what I call particular abilities,
which are abilities in view of the totality of facts obtaining at some specific time.
There are what I call conative abilities,which are abilities in view of all but a few
facts obtaining at some specific time – certain mental states of the agent are left
undetermined in the set of facts that go into the modal base. Finally, there are
what I call opportunities: abilities in view of the external facts, where it will to
some extent be a matter of context which facts count as external. As we’ll see,
there is room for more classes of specific abilities, but the three I just mentioned
seem to me to be the most prevalent ones.
Suppose I intentionally jump a fence. In a very good sense of “specific abil-
ity”, my intentionally jumping the fence proves that I had the specific ability to
jump the fence. For this to be so, I need not have a general ability to jump that
fence; my jump a moment ago may have been the first and the last time I was
and will ever be able to succeed – a wondrous fluke, a marvelous stroke of
sheer luck. Yet, I did it, and so I was obviously able to do it at that moment.
This interpretation of specific abilities, though quite extreme in some ways,
is quite well established in the literature. It is the sense of ability according to
which each agent was able to do whatever they intentionally did and unable
to do what they intended but failed to do. It is the sense of ability Geach has
in mind when he says that “what a man does, he can do” (Geach 1957: 15). Fol-
lowing Honoré, it can be dubbed a “particular ability”:
To summarize the use of ‘can’ (particular) in relation to particular actions: success or fail-
ure, on the assumption that an effort has been or will be made, is the factor which governs
the use of the notion. If the agent tried and failed, he could not do the action: if he tried
and succeeded, he was able to do it. (Honoré 1964: 464)
Particular abilities are fully in line with SUCCESSAA. They are abilities in view of
the agent’s total situation: what we need to hold fixed is the totality of features of
the agent’s circumstances. In the case of particular abilities, the relevant possi-
ble situations will narrow down to just one: the actual situation.⁹ The modal suc-
cess rate will therefore become an all or nothing matter. If the agent intends to ϕ
and succeeds, she has the particular ability, because she will thereby ϕ in a suf-
ficient proportion – all – of the relevant intention situations. If she intends to ϕ
 I am assuming determinism here and throughout my discussion of particular abilities.
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but fails, she lacks it, because she will not ϕ in any of the relevant intention sit-
uations.
What if the agent cannot intend to ϕ in the first place in the actual world?
Then she will lack the particular ability. Recall that one way for SUCCESSAA to be
violated is for the relevant possible situations not to contain any intention cases
to begin with. This is just what the existential requirement states. For an agent to
have an ability, there have to be relevant intention situations – it has to be pos-
sible for the agent to intend to ϕ to begin with. If the relevant possible situations
narrow down to the actual situation, as they do in the case of particular abilities,
an agent therefore lacks the ability, if the actual situation is not an intention sit-
uation.
At first sight, this may strike you as strange. Come to think of it, though, it
becomes apparent that it is not. To see that, note that we are talking exclusively
about agentive abilities so far. If a situation is such that it is impossible for the
agent to intend to ϕ in it, then it seems just right that the agent also cannot per-
form an act of ϕ-ing in that very situation. In view of the fact that the agent can-
not (in the properly restricted sense) intend to ϕ, the agent cannot perform an act
of ϕ-ing. This is all as it should be. Actions are behavioral episodes brought
about by an intention.Without an intention, no action can ensue.¹⁰ SUCCESSAA,
including the existential requirement, yields the right verdict here.
I said that particular abilities are rather extreme in some ways. And they are.
Specific abilities are abilities to ϕ in a particular situation. But of course, a sit-
uation can be individuated more or less finely. In the case of particular abilities,
the situation is individuated in the finest possible way, namely by the totality of
facts obtaining in a certain time span.We are holding absolutely every feature of
the agent’s circumstances fixed.
That need not be so, though.We may just as well think of a less extreme in-
terpretation of specific abilities. We can be interested, for instance, in what the
agent can do in the situation she is in, and yet abstract away from certain fea-
tures of that situation. We may care about an agent’s ability to swim here and
now, say, but abstract away from the fact that the agent is strongly disinclined
to swim (she does not want to get her hair wet and sees no reason in favor of
swimming, say).
In the sense of a particular ability, the agent lacks the ability to swim in such
a case. In view of her strong disinclination towards swimming, the agent cannot
 Note that the notion of an intention at work here is not particularly challenging. The agent
does not have to be aware of the intention, and the intention does not have to be a conscious
state.
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form the intention to swim. But in a slightly less extreme sense, she may well
have the specific ability: abstracting away from the fact that the agent has no in-
clination to go swimming, it may well be that there is a sufficiently high propor-
tion of relevant intention situations in which the agent swims. Her intentional
state is not held fixed, after all. Hence, the relevant possible situations will con-
tain quite a few intention situations. And among those, there may well be quite a
few in which the agent effectively swims.
For another example, consider a person who holds a firecracker and a lighter
in her hands, but is anxious to light the firecracker. Does that person have a spe-
cific ability to light it? In the sense of a particular ability, she does not – in view
of her current anxiety, she cannot intend to light it. There will not be any inten-
tion situations among the relevant possible situations. But according to a slightly
less extreme interpretation, she does have the specific ability. Abstracting away
from her current anxiety to light the firecracker, she can light it in the situation
she is in. Holding fixed virtually every fact apart from her current anxiety, there
are relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to light the fire crack-
er, and in a sufficient proportion of those situations, the agent will effectively
light it.
Are those still specific abilities we are thinking about? I should think so.We
are, after all, asking what the agent can do here and now, in some particular sit-
uation. The mere fact that we are abstracting away from some of the features of
the situation – most commonly, the agent’s temporary mental states – does not
show that we are already in the realm of general abilities altogether. Specific
abilities, I should think, can vary with respect to the completeness of the facts
of the actual situation that go into the modal base. We can abstract from a
small fraction of the features of the actual situation and yet be talking about
an ability the agent has to ϕ in the very situation she is in.
I would even go as far as saying that we usually abstract from the facts de-
termining the agent’s motivational states when thinking about an agent’s specif-
ic abilities. In this, I side with Berofsky, who writes that
[a] person who has the power to act may fail to do so for reasons having to do with her
motivation or her will. (…) We normally distinguish between these [conative conditions]
and the other conditions (ability, opportunity), regarding only the latter’s absence as de-
priving one of the power to act. (Berofsky 2002: 196)
What Berofsky points out in this passage is that we normally do not count an
agent as unable to perform some action in a particular situation just because
the person is temporarily disinclined to perform that action or has other ac-
tion-preventing motivational states. I take this to be exactly right. Specific abil-
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ities whose modal base does not contain the motivational states of the agent are
therefore an important class of specific abilities. Following Berofsky’s choice of
words, I will call specific abilities of this kind “conative abilities”.
To see how common conative abilities are, note that it is abilities of that kind
which seem to underlie much of our thinking about whether or not agents could
have done otherwise. “Could have done otherwise”-locutions create a context in
which it is the agent’s specific abilities, and not her general abilities, which are
at issue.When I say “I could have asked for help”, I am not just saying that I have
the general ability to ask for help. Rather, I state that I had the ability to ask for
help in the very situation I am picking out by my use of the past tense. It is spe-
cific abilities that matter. But the way we actually talk about things people could
have done differently suggests that it is not particular abilities that are at issue in
such contexts.
Take the disinclined swimmer once more. Usually, we will want to say that
the agent could have swum – she just wasn’t motivated to. Likewise in many
other cases in which the agent’s motivation is what prevents the act: the vegeta-
rian could have eaten the meat, she just wasn’t motivated to. The moral person
could have stolen the wallet, she just wasn’t motivated to. I could have asked for
help, I just wasn’t motivated to.What this shows is that we usually abstract away
from agent’s motivations when thinking about what the agent could have done
differently. Since “could have done otherwise” locutions are very common in or-
dinary discourse, this shows that it is very often not particular, but rather cona-
tive abilities that concern us when we are thinking about agents’ specific abili-
ties.
Finally, let me talk about opportunities. What is an opportunity? Frankly, I
don’t think anyone has a clear idea. But I think Kenny is right when he points
out that “an opportunity is something external” (Kenny 1976: 218). Thus, an op-
portunity for ϕ-ing, in the most natural understanding of the term,will simply be
favorable external circumstances for ϕ-ing. The world outside the agent has to
provide what it takes to perform ϕ, so to say. If that is true, then for an agent
to have an opportunity will simply be for the agent to ϕ in a sufficient proportion
of intention situations in which the external circumstances of the situation are
held fixed, according to the success view.
But what counts as external to the agent? Does a broken leg count as a lack
of opportunity? Or does it simply prevent the agent from taking an opportunity? I
take this to be rather unclear. Moreover, I take it to be unclear how many of the
external features of the situation have to be taken into account. Does an agent
have an opportunity to hole a putt when there is a bump in the grass which
the agent does not see, and which will ultimately take the ball off course?
Maybe. Maybe not.
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What this suggests is that the notion of an opportunity is context sensitive
along two dimensions.Whether or not we count someone as having an opportu-
nity will depend, first, on how completely the external facts of the situation go
into the modal base, and secondly, it depends on which features we count as ex-
ternal to the agent in the first place. Depending on one’s choices along those two
dimensions, an opportunity may in some contexts simply come out identical to
an agent’s conative abilities – we hold everything fixed except the agent’s moti-
vational states. In other contexts, however, the modal base will not comprise the
agent’s broken leg. And this is surely something we want to hold fixed in the
case of conative abilities.
Can having an opportunity also just amount to the having of a particular
ability? I don not think this would be a natural interpretation of “opportunity”.
It would be rather odd to treat an agent’s own motivational states – the agent’s
disinclination to swim, for instance – as something that deprives the agent of the
opportunity to swim. It should be coherent, in any context, to say: “I had the op-
portunity, but I did not feel any inclination to take it”. If the agent’s motivational
states entered the modal base of an opportunity in some contexts, then this
would not be truly utterable in that context. I take it to be settled, therefore,
that “opportunity” carries an at least somewhat external connotation and that
the minimal requirement for circumstances to be external to an agent is for
the circumstances not to comprise the agent’s own motivational states.
4.5.3 Dependence
So far, we have looked at general and specific abilities individually. Let’s now
check how far the two depend on one another. We know that an agent can, in
a given situation, have a general ability to ϕ without having the specific ability
to ϕ in that very situation. This is one of the essential insights the distinction be-
tween the two is built upon. But what about the other way around? Does the hav-
ing of a specific ability require that the agent also has the corresponding general
ability?
Some authors seem to think so. Berofsky’s concept of specific abilities (or
token-abilities, as he calls them), for instance, seems to be simply that of an op-
portunity to exercise one of one’s general abilities (Berofsky 2002: 196). To have a
specific ability, then, the agent would have to have the general ability first.Whit-
tle objects to this by pointing out that an agent may be perfectly able to jump 5
feet high in very specific circumstances, while at the same time being unable to
jump 5 feet high across a large range of circumstances (Whittle 2010). This sug-
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gests that an agent may very well have a specific ability to ϕ without also having
the corresponding general ability as well.
Who is right? Again, that seems to me to depend on one’s use of “specific
ability”. The three types of specific abilities I characterized in the last section
do not seem to require that the agent have a corresponding general ability.
Take particular abilities. My intentionally jumping the fence proves that I
had the particular ability to jump the fence, irrespective of my having or lacking
a general ability to jump the fence. My jump a moment ago may have been the
first and the last time I was and will ever be able to succeed. Yet, I did it, and so I
was obviously able to do it at that moment.
Likewise, in the case of conative abilities. Suppose a child holds a firecrack-
er in her hand but has no intention to light it. Suppose further that the lighter
she holds in her hand is extremely easy to handle, whereas the child is unable
to operate most lighters. In that case, she has the conative ability, because she
lights the fire cracker in a sufficiently high proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which she intends to light it. The relevant possible situations will
only contain situations that are like the actual situation in the non-motivational
aspects of the situation, among them the fact that the child holds the easy-to-
handle lighter in her hand.
Yet, the child lacks the general ability to light a firecracker, because in the
vast majority of intention situations relevant for that ability she fails to light a
firecracker. That is because the relevant possible situations will this time contain
any situation in which the child is as in actuality with respect to her stable, in-
trinsic features. In the vast majority of those situations, she will get hold of light-
ers that are harder to operate. And hence, she will not light the firecracker in
most of them.
Again, likewise in the case of opportunities. There is very good sense to be
made of a once in a lifetime opportunity for committing the perfect crime – the
circumstances being favorable this one time for getting away with what one did.
Yet, this does not entail that the agent has a general ability to commit the perfect
crime. Only some specific abilities will depend on the having of a general ability.
That is not to say that there is no good sense of “specific ability” which re-
quires a corresponding general ability.We can define a solid particular ability as a
compound of a general and a particular ability. Likewise, we can define a solid
conative ability as a compound of a general and a conative ability. Finally,we can
define a solid opportunity as a compound of a general ability and an opportunity,
thus capturing what Austin (1956: 218) famously called the “all-in” sense of abil-
ity. As far as I can see, these are perfectly legitimate senses of “specific ability”.
And those senses do of course depend on the agent having the relevant general
ability at the outset.
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What about the other way around? When I first introduced the distinction
between general and specific abilities (→ 1.2), I said that it is taken for granted
that one can have a general ability without having a corresponding specific abil-
ity. In that sense, general abilities do not depend on specific abilities. But at the
same time, it does not seem very plausible that one should have a general ability
to ϕ without there being any possible situation in which one also has the specific
ability to ϕ. Quite to the contrary! When I have the general ability to sing, say,
this seems to entail that there are various possible situations for which it is
true that I have the specific ability to sing in those very situations. In this
sense, general abilities do depend on the specific abilities.
This way of thinking about the relation of general and specific abilities is im-
plicit in a number of passages in the literature, and in fact it seems to underlie
the whole idea of the reliability of general abilities.When Whittle says that a spe-
cific ability requires that the agent be able to do something in particular circum-
stances, whereas a general ability requires that she be able to do it in a large
range of circumstances (Whittle 2010), what she is saying is basically that one
general ability goes along with many specific abilities. Maier is even more explic-
it on his commitment to such a picture: on his view, a general ability is actually
constituted by a certain number of specific abilities – abilities to do something in
particular situations (Maier 2013).
Maier and Whittle are on the right track here. General abilities to ϕ do re-
quire that there are situations in which the agent has a specific ability to ϕ. I
also think that it makes sense to think of general abilities as being made up
of specific abilities.¹¹ It would be overly complicated to go through all of the in-
terpretations of specific abilities to show to what extent the having of general
abilities depends on the having of each of the different kinds, but it can easily
be shown that Whittle’s and Maier’s remarks make sense when it comes to par-
ticular abilities.
The argument for the claim that to have a general ability to ϕ, there have to
be some situations in which the agent has the particular ability to ϕ, is very
straightforward. Take the general ability to light a match. To have that ability,
there will obviously have to be quite a few situations in which the agent has
the particular ability to light a match – in which she intends to light one and suc-
ceeds. If there were no such situations, then SUCCESS could not be met for the
general ability to light a match to begin with. It is only met, after all, if the pro-
 Unless, of course, specific abilities are interpreted solidly, i.e. such that they entail the hav-
ing of a general ability.When I speak of specific abilities, I mean the specific abilities of the non-
solid kind, unless otherwise noted.
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portion of the relevant intention situations in which the agent lights a match is
high enough. If there are no intention situations in which the agent intends to
light the match and lights it, then this cannot be true. A general ability to ϕ
therefore entails that the agent also has a particular ability to ϕ in at least
some situations.
Let me emphasize that those situations – the situations in which the agent
has the particular ability to ϕ – need not be actual. It is perfectly possible for an
agent to have a general ability to light a match without having a particular ability
to light a match in any actual situation. One need not ever actually intend to ϕ
and ϕ in order to have a general ability to ϕ, after all. Perhaps there is always
reasons for me not to intend to light a match. Or there is never a match around.
All this is perfectly compatible with my having the general ability to light a
match.
To what extent can general abilities be thought of as being constituted by
particular abilities? Again, the line of reasoning is quite straightforward: we
can think of a an ability to ϕ as being constituted by the set of the relevant pos-
sible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ and ϕ’s. A particular ability is
then constituted by exactly one set of situations – the one relevant possible sit-
uation in the modal base in which the agent intends to ϕ and does ϕ. General
abilities are correspondingly constituted by the sets of situations in their
modal bases in which the agent intends to ϕ and ϕ’s. Each such situation con-
stitutes a particular ability to ϕ in those very circumstances. Hence, general abil-
ities can be seen as being constituted by particular abilities.
4.5.4 Success and failure
A very controversial issue in the literature is how specific abilities relate to indi-
vidual failure and success. In the case of general abilities, it is obvious that such
abilities can be retained, even when an actual intention to exercise them is not
successfully realized. This can be put in terms of the maskability of general abil-
ities. General abilities can be masked: my ability to swim can be masked by a
cramp in my foot, my ability to sing can be masked by my temporary hoarseness,
my ability to hit the bull’s eye can be masked by me being distracted, and so
forth. All of those things prevent my intention from being successfully realized,
but they do not deprive me of my general ability. General abilities are not lost in
virtue of a singular failure, then.
Reversely, an individual success does not bestow an agent with a general
ability. The agent may successfully ϕ in a specific situation and yet she may
not have a general ability to ϕ. This has to do with the reliability of general abil-
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ities. To have such an ability, the agent has to be able to perform successfully in a
variety of situations. A singular success cannot guarantee any such thing.
The interesting question is how specific abilities relate to failure and success.
There are two questions here. First: does an individual success show that the
agent had the specific ability to ϕ in the situation she was in? And secondly:
is the having of a specific ability compatible with failure? Both questions are
highly controversial within scholarly discourse.
As to the first question, many think that if an agent ϕ’s, then this suffices to
show that the agent had the specific ability to ϕ. Austin, for instance, holds that
when a golfer holes a putt, “it follows merely from the premise that he does it,
that he has the ability to do it, according to ordinary English” (Austin 1956: 218).
Mele (2002) thinks that things are more complicated than that. And Whittle
(2010) thinks that there is a sense of “specific ability”, which requires that the
agent be able to reliably replicate her action under the very same circumstances.
I am not quite sure what it would take for a subject to be able to replicate an act
under the exact same circumstances, but Whittle clearly commits to the view
that a singular success does not suffice for the having of certain kinds of specific
abilities. Things are controversial, to say the least.
Likewise for the second question. Does a failure to ϕ show that the agent did
not have the specific ability to ϕ? Or are specific abilities maskable in the sense
that they can be retained even if the agent tries and fails? Here, too, intuitions
vary. Fara (2008) is clear on the matter: he thinks specific abilities can be
masked. Whittle (Whittle 2010) thinks that some fairly specific abilities can be
masked, but that the most specific abilities cannot. A third stance would be
the view that if you try and fail, this shows that you lacked the specific ability
to ϕ (von Wright 1963: 61).
We can note that the connection between specific abilities and success and
failure is far from clear. There are quite a few ideas floating around, and thus far,
there is little understanding of the way they relate and which of the conflicting
ideas captures the primary notion of specific abilities, if there is such a thing.
Against the background of the various distinctions we drew between various
kinds of specific abilities, however, it should by now be clear that a lot hinges
on one’s understanding of a specific ability here.
Particular abilities are maximally closely related to failure and success. An
agent has a particular ability in a certain situation if and only if she intends
to ϕ and succeeds. If she intends to ϕ and fails, she lacks the particular ability.
An individual success therefore bestows, and an individual failure deprives the
agent of a particular ability. This entails that particular abilities are not maska-
ble. Whatever it is that prevents the agent from successfully ϕ-ing goes into the
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modal base. It therefore deprives her of the ability to begin with and does not, as
in the case of general abilities, mask it.
Things are more complicated in the case of conative abilities. Here, we vary
whether or not the agent intends to ϕ. Hence, the relevant possible situations
will contain some in which the agent intends to ϕ and some in which the
agent does not intend to ϕ. The agent has the conative ability if and only if
she ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant intention situations. Whether
or not an actual success suffices for the agent to have an ability and whether
or not an actual failure suffices for the lack of the ability depends crucially on
the standards for what counts as a sufficient proportion. Perhaps the agent
has to ϕ in all of the relevant intention situations in order to count as having
a conative ability in a context. If this is the case, then an actual failure deprives
the agent of the ability, but an actual success does not bestow her with it. If the
agent has to ϕ in one of the relevant intention situations, in contrast, then it is
the other way around. If she has to ϕ in a few, neither is the case. So here, con-
text will play a crucial role. The same, I take it, goes for opportunities.
4.5.5 Degrees of specificity
General and specific abilities differ in the kinds of facts that go into their respec-
tive modal bases. In the case of general abilities, we hold only the stable, mostly
intrinsic features of the agent fixed. In the case of specific abilities, we also hold
various features of the situation fixed. By now we know that the kinds of facts
that go into the modal base also vary within the class of general abilities and
within the class of specific abilities.
In the case of the general ability to shoot a rabbit, we may hold only the
agent’s properties underlying the agent’s shooting skills fixed or we may addi-
tionally hold her moral reservations against shooting animals fixed. In the
case of the general ability to juggle, we may want to hold fixed that the agent
is currently in a coma, or we may vary this fact and only hold the properties un-
derlying the agent’s juggling skills fixed. And so on. Likewise for specific abili-
ties.We may hold the totality of the facts about the agent and her situation fixed,
we may vary the agent’s motivational states, we may vary certain facts about the
external situation, or vary both some motivational states and some external
facts.
Intuitively, this seems to indicate that abilities form some sort of scale, along
which various abilities to ϕ can be ordered in accordance with their specificity
and generality, respectively. The more facts are held fixed, the more specific is
an ability. The less facts are held fixed, the more general. Or so it seems.
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Actually, things are a bit more complicated. As I will argue, there is indeed
sense to be made of an ordering of abilities according to their degree of specif-
icity, but first of all, that ordering will only be partial (not any two abilities to ϕ
stand in the “is more specific than” relation to one another), and secondly, the
sheer number of facts that are held fixed across situations is not the proper cri-
terion for the ordering. Let me take these points in reverse order.
Seeing that the number of facts is not the crucial criterion for specificity is
easy. It is, for instance, not at all clear why my ability to do a handstand with
a broken arm (one fact?) should be less specific than my ability to do a hand-
stand on a stage while being drunk (two facts?). The sets of facts that are held
constant in both cases are simply different. It is not reasonable to think that
their sheer number has anything to do with the ability’s specificity.
Yet, some abilities do seem to be more specific than others. My ability to sing
on stage when Adele sits in the audience seems to be more specific than my abil-
ity to sing on stage, for instance.What seems to matter, then, is that the facts that
are held constant are properly related. In which way? One idea would be to say
that
SPECIFICITYPRELIMINARY. an ability A1 is more specific than another ability A2, if and only if
the set of facts held fixed in the case of A2 is a proper subset of the
set of facts held fixed in the case of A1. If A1 is more specific than
A2, then A2 is more general than A1.
This yields the right results in the cases we looked at. My ability to do a hand-
stand with a broken arm does not come out more specific than my ability to do a
handstand on stage while being drunk, whereas my ability to sing on stage when
Adele is present does come out more specific than my ability to sing on stage.
But we need to take one further subtlety into account. I take it that we want
to be able to say that your ability to sing on stage when Adele is present is more
specific than my ability to sing on stage. And this does not follow, if the facts we
are holding constant in my case have to be a proper subsets of the facts we are
holding fixed in your case.We will, among other things, hold your larynx system
fixed in your case while holding my larynx system fixed in my case, after all.
This suggests that it is not actually the facts themselves which have to be re-
lated in the right way in order to yield degrees of specificity, but kinds of facts.
What we are holding fixed are facts about the agent’s larynx system. That means
we are holding facts about you fixed in your case and facts about me in my case.
This suggests that
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SPECIFICITY. an ability A1 is more specific than another ability A2 if and only if the kinds
of facts that are held fixed in the case of A2 are a proper subset of the kinds
of facts that are held fixed in the case of A1. If A1 is more specific than A2
then A2 is more general than A1.
It should by now be clear why we will not end up with a full linear ordering of
abilities to ϕ. It is simply not the case that any two abilities to ϕ will stand in the
“is more specific than” relation to one another, if specificity is spelled out in the
way I just proposed. The ability to do a handstand with a broken arm and the
ability to do a handstand on stage while being drunk, for instance, are clear ex-
amples of abilities that do not match up neatly with respect to their respective
degrees of specificity.
4.5.6 Hypothetical circumstances
There is one rather intricate issue we have to turn to before closing the section on
general and specific abilities: we need to turn to the role of hypothetical circum-
stances. To see what I am getting at, take the ability to do a handstand with a
broken arm as opposed to the ability to do a handstand. On the account of gen-
eral and specific abilities I have just given, the former is more specific than the
latter. In the case of the former, we hold the agent’s broken arm fixed; in the case
of the fully general ability, we don’t.
Now let’s suppose the agent does not actually have a broken arm. Then we
obviously cannot think of the broken arm as something we hold fixed. What we
hold fixed, across possible situations, are always features of the actual situation.
Hence, the distinction between the ability to do a handstand and the ability to do
a handstand with a broken arm cannot, in such a case, be captured in terms of a
difference in the facts we hold fixed, with the broken arm being among the fixed
facts in one case but not in the other. And that means that the account of degrees
of specificity cannot be applied to the distinction between the ability to do a
handstand and the ability to do a handstand with a broken arm.
This points to a more general issue. Earlier, we saw that, according to Krat-
zer, the modal base of an ability is always realistic. We hold certain facts of the
actual situation fixed across the possible situations, and hence the actual world
will always be contained in the situations which make up the modal base. This is
just as it should be: as Kratzer so insightfully taught us, agents have abilities in
view of certain facts. The modal base is the set of situations in which those facts
are held constant – it is the set of situations in which the facts obtain in view of
which an agent has or lacks an ability.
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What the example of the broken arm shows, however, is that hypothetical
circumstances – circumstances that are not facts, but non-actual states of af-
fairs – play a vital role in our thinking about abilities as well. We may be inter-
ested in an agent’s ability to do a handstand with a broken arm, no matter
whether or not the agent actually has a broken arm. We may be interested in
an agent’s ability to run a marathon in hot weather, no matter whether the run-
ner is actually located in Sumatra or at the North Pole. And we may be interested
in an agent’s ability to jump on one foot when completely drunk, even if the
agent has never had a sip of alcohol. Hypothetical circumstances enter into
our thinking about abilities quite often, then. The question I will pursue in
this section is: how do they enter?
The answer is a bit complicated, because hypothetical circumstances can
enter in a variety of ways. So far, we have thought about the role of circumstan-
ces only in terms of the facts about the agent and her situation that are held
fixed across the possible situations – the sets of circumstances in view of
which the agent has the ability. That is to say that the structure of ability state-
ments, as we have thought of it so far, looked like this:
CAN. S can, in view of C*, ϕ.
C* is the set of circumstances in view of which the agent has the ability. That set
of circumstances is always factual: only facts – states of affairs which obtain at
the actual world – can go into C*. Since C* determines the modal base of an abil-
ity, the modal base of abilities is always realistic: the actual situation is always
among the modal base situations.
In fact, however, the structure of abilities is way more complex. As I will lay
out in what follows, ability statements have four, instead of just one, placehold-
ers for circumstances. Really, they have the following structure:
CAN*. In C1, S can, in view of C* and when C3, ϕ-in-C2.
As before, C* is the set of circumstances in view of which the agent has the abil-
ity. This set of circumstances is factual. It determines a realistic modal base. C1,
C2, and C3 are further sets of circumstances. Importantly, all of those circum-
stances can be purely hypothetical. To see what I am getting at, let’s look at
an example of an ability ascription which features hypothetical circumstances
and see how it can be interpreted. Let’s assume that Fred is actually in a
place with cold weather. On this assumption, let’s see how we can interpret a
statement like the following:
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(A) Fred can, in view of his physical constitution (C*), run a marathon in hot weather.
As I will argue, there are three distinct interpretations available, depending on
whether the hypothetical circumstances – Fred being in hot weather – enter
the ability ascription via C1, C2 or C3. Here is the first interpretation:
(INT-1) In hot weather (C1), Fred has, in view of his physical constitution (C*), the ability to
run a marathon.
In INT-1, the hypothetical circumstances are outside the scope of the ability as-
cription. What is stated is that Fred has a certain ability under certain circum-
stances. A statement of this form does not imply that the agent actually has
the ability to run a marathon. It is a statement about an ability that is had
under certain conditions, and it entails a statement about the agent’s abilities
in actuality only if the conditions specified in C1 are actual and not merely hypo-
thetical.
The statement can therefore also be interpreted in the subjunctive mode. It
can be read as the statement that if the weather were hot, Fred would (in view of
his physical constitution) have the ability to run a marathon. If we translate this
into the framework of the success view, INT-1 states the following:
(INT-1SUCCESS) If Fred were in hot weather (C1), then Fred would run a marathon in a suffi-
cient proportion of the possible situations in which Fred has his actual phys-
ical constitution (C*) and intends to run a marathon.
The hypothetical circumstances give a condition for the having of an ability,
which is itself structured as before. Within the scope of the ability operator, hy-
pothetical circumstances play no role.
For the second interpretation, let’s assume that the hypothetical circumstan-
ces enter the ability ascription via C2. That is to say: they enter the ability ascrip-
tion in the form of a specification of the action type the agent is said to be able to
perform – in a statement of the form “S can ϕ”, they qualify “ϕ”. If we interpret
the statement along those lines, it states the following:
(INT-2) Fred has, in view of his physical constitution (C*), the ability to run-a-marathon-in-
hot-weather (C2).
The hyphens indicate an action type: running-a-marathon-in-hot-weather is a
different action type from just running a marathon. The hypothetical circumstan-
ces do the same job as any other action type qualifier: running-in-hot-weather
functions like running slowly, running on one leg, or running in circles. In con-
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trast to the first interpretation, the second interpretation does entail that the
agent actually has the ability in question. It states that Fred has, in view of
his physical constitution, the ability to perform a certain action type, namely
running-a-marathon-in-hot-weather.
How is INT-2 accommodated by the success view? According to the success
view, S has an ability to ϕ if and only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficiently high pro-
portion of relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ. Since ϕ-
ing corresponds to running-a-marathon-in-hot-weather in INT-2, INT-2 therefore
states the following:
(INT-2SUCCESS) Fred runs a marathon-in-hot-weather (C2) in a sufficiently high proportion of
the possible situations in which Fred agent has his actual physical constitu-
tion (C*) and intends to run-a-marathon-in-hot-weather (C2).
Running-a-marathon-in-hot-weather is treated just like any other qualified action
type, then. An agent has the ability to run on one leg, according to the success
view if and only if the agent runs on one leg in a sufficient proportion of relevant
possible situations in which the agent intends to run on one leg. Running-a-mar-
athon-in-hot-weather is accommodated in the very same way.
Finally, let’s turn to the third interpretation: here, we want to express that
Fred has, in view of his physical constitution, the ability to perform the action
type of running a marathon when certain hypothetical circumstances obtain –
namely, when the weather is hot. We are stating the following, then:
(INT-3) Fred has, in view of his physical constitution (C*) and when the weather is hot (C3),
the ability to run a marathon.
That this makes sense and is an important way of interpreting the ability state-
ment in question (and ability statements containing hypothetical circumstances
quite generally) becomes most apparent when we think of contexts in which two
agents’ abilities to perform one and the same action type are compared. Suppose
I say, bracketed terms being implicit: “Frieda can (in view of her physical consti-
tution) run a marathon”. And you say “Yeah, but Fred can (in view of his physical
constitution) run a marathon even in hot weather”. Then it seems to me that, in-
tuitively, the best way to make sense of this conversation is in terms of the third
interpretation I have suggested.
Your statement is definitely not intended to state, along the lines of the first
interpretation, that there are certain hypothetical circumstances in which Fred
has one and the same ability that Frieda has in actuality. You seem to be com-
mitting to Fred having an ability in actuality as well, namely the ability to run
a marathon under certain hypothetical circumstances.
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Likewise, I believe, it is also not very useful to think of your statement as
saying that Fred has the ability to perform a rather different action type than
Frieda. Rather, what you seem to be saying is that Fred can perform one and
the same action type as Frieda, but he can do so under more conditions –
while Fred can run a marathon in situations in which the weather is hot, Frieda
cannot.
How can the third interpretation be accommodated by the success view? My
suggestion is that INT-3 should be understood along the following lines:
(INT-3SUCCESS) Fred runs a marathon in a sufficiently high proportion of the possible situa-
tions in which (i) his physical constitution is as in actuality (C*), (ii) he is in
hot weather (C3), and (iii) he intends to run a marathon.
On this interpretation, the hypothetical circumstances impose a further restric-
tion on the situations among which we check for intention situations, among
which, in turn, we check for performance cases.We first restrict the possible sit-
uations to the ones in which the relevant facts obtain, yielding a realistic modal
base with the actual situation in it. But then we impose a second restriction.We
restrict the situations further to the ones in which certain hypothetical circum-
stances obtain. In this step, the actual situation gets kicked out.
INT-3 yields a modification of some of the things I have about the set of rel-
evant possible situations. So far, I have identified the relevant possible situations
with the situations in which the facts obtain in view of which an agent has an
ability.When hypothetical circumstances enter an ability statement via C3, how-
ever, the relevant possible situations will in fact be a subset of those situations:
those in which those hypothetical circumstances obtain as well.
Quite often, hypothetical circumstances do not play a role.We may, after all,
simply be interested in an agent’s ability to do things in the very circumstances
she is actually in.We may be interested in an agent’s ability to run a marathon in
hot weather when the agent is actually in hot weather. In such cases, our think-
ing about what an agent can do is simply a thinking about what the agent can do
in view of certain intrinsic or extrinsic features of hers – being in hot weather,
say.
But, and this is where hypothetical circumstances become relevant, we may
also be interested in an agent’s ability to run a marathon in hot weather when
the agent is actually in a cold environment. In that case, the restriction to hot
weather situations has nothing to do with the features in view of which the
agent has the ability. The hypothetical circumstances come into play from the
outside, so to speak. The relevant possible situations are a subset of the relevant
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possible situations in which facts of the actual situation are held fixed in that
case.
What I contend, then, is that ability statements will sometimes have to be
read as statements of the form “In view of C* and when C3, S can ϕ”, where
C3 specifies a contextually determined set of circumstances, which may well
be hypothetical. When we ask whether some agent has the ability to run a mar-
athon in hot weather, we will always have to restrict the realm of possible situa-
tions to the ones in which the weather is hot. But for the agent in Sumatra, that
comes down to a restriction to situations that are similar to hers with respect to
the weather conditions, whereas for the agent at the North Pole it amounts to a
restriction to situations that differ from hers with respect to that feature.
Let us take stock.What I have laid out in the last paragraphs are three ways
in which hypothetical circumstances can enter ability ascriptions. Depending on
how they enter, we get different interpretations of an ability statement with a ref-
erence to hypothetical circumstances: that a certain ability is had under certain
hypothetical circumstances (INT-1); that the agent has an ability to perform
some-action-in-certain-hypothetical-circumstances (INT-2); or that the agent
has an ability to perform some action when certain hypothetical circumstances
obtain (INT-3). Each of those interpretations is accommodated differently by the
success view.
What does all this have to do with general and specific abilities? I have said,
in the last section, that
SPECIFICITY. an ability A1 is more specific than another ability A2, if and only if the kinds
of facts that are held fixed in the case of A2 are a proper subset of the kinds
of facts held fixed in the case of A1. If A1 is more specific than A2, then A2 is
more general than A1.
Since specificity is formulated in terms of facts that are held fixed, the definition
does not accommodate cases in which hypothetical circumstances play a role.
This may strike you as mislead. The ability to run a marathon in hot weather,
you may think, is obviously more specific than the ability to run a marathon,
no matter whether or not the agent is actually in hot weather. The suggestion
would then be that specificity can come about via any of the sets of circumstan-
ces which can figure in an ability ascription. Specificity via the actual facts we
hold fixed would turn out to be but one way among many in which specificity
can come about, according to that account.
Basically, I think this is exactly right. Yet, I will reserve the terms “specific”
and “general” for ways in which different sets of actual circumstances can relate
within ability ascription, as spelled out in SPECIFICITY. In the remainder of this
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section, I will give some definitions for the various similar relations – relations
between further sets of circumstances, C1, C2, and C3, that can figure in ability
ascriptions. For reasons of taxonomical clarity, each of these relations will be
dubbed differently. Besides specificity, abilities can differ in their dependency,
complexity, completeness, determinacy, and locality.
First, dependency. Let us say that
DEPENDENCY. an ability A1 is more dependent than an ability A2 if and only if the kinds of
circumstances under which A2 is had are a proper subset of the kinds of
circumstances under which A1 is had. If A1 is more dependent than A2,
then A2 is more independent than A1.
Dependency comes about when varyingly inclusive sets of circumstances enter
an ability ascription via C1. The more inclusive the set of circumstances on
which the having of an ability depends, the higher the degree of dependency.
DEPENDENCY thus yields that “In hot weather and with a broken leg, S has
the ability to run a marathon” ascribes a more dependent ability than “In hot
weather, S has the ability to run a marathon”.
Further, let us say that
COMPLEXITY. an ability A1 is more complex than an ability A2 if and only if the kinds of
circumstances that go into the action description in the case of A2 are a
proper subset of the kinds of circumstances that go into the action descrip-
tion in the case of A1. If A1 is more complex than A2, then A2 is more simple
than A1.
Complexity comes about when varyingly inclusive sets of circumstances enter an
ability ascription via C2. The more inclusive the set of circumstances that deter-
mine the action type of the ability ascription, the more complex the ability. COM-
PLEXITY thus yields that “S has the ability to run a marathon-in-hot-weather-
and-with-a-broken-leg” ascribes a more complex ability than “S has the ability
to run-a-marathon-in-hot-weather”.
Further, let us say that
DETERMINACY. an ability A1 is more determinate than an ability A2 if and only if the kinds
of hypothetical circumstances that (partly) determine the relevant possible
situations in the case of A2 are a proper subset of the kinds of hypothetical
circumstances that (partly) determine the relevant possible situations in
the case of A1. If A1 is more determinate than A2, then A2 is more indeter-
minate than A1.
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Determinacy comes about when varyingly inclusive sets of circumstances
enter an ability ascription via C3. The more inclusive the set of kinds of hypothet-
ical circumstances that partly determine the relevant possible situations, the
higher the degree of completeness. DETERMINACY thus yields that “S has the
ability to run a marathon when the weather is hot and S has a broken leg” as-
cribes a more determinate ability than “S has the ability to run a marathon
when the weather is hot”. Since the circumstances that enter via C3 combine
with the facts that are held fixed in an ability ascription (C*) to determine the
relevant possible situations, a higher degree of determinacy will, ceteris paribus,
yield a more exclusive set of relevant possible situations.
Finally, the relevant possible situations as a whole may be more exclusive in
the case of one ability than in the case of another. I will speak of locality in that
case. Let us say that
LOCALITY. an ability A1 is more local than an ability A2 if and only if the circumstances,
actual and hypothetical, that determine the relevant possible situations in the
case of A2 are a proper subset of the circumstances, actual and hypothetical,
that determine the relevant possible situations in the case of A1. If A1 is
more local than A2, then A2 is more global than A1.
4.6 Masks
So far, we have seen that the success view delivers an account of degrees of abil-
ities as well as of general and specific abilities and that it circumvents the prob-
lem of the impeded intention. In this section, I will argue that it also circumvents
the problem of masks, as it emerged in connection with the simple conditional
analysis.
According to the simple conditional analysis, an agent has an ability to ϕ if
and only if the agent would ϕ, if she intended to. For the simple conditional
analysis, the problem with masks is that there are cases in which an agent
has the ability to perform some action, and yet it is not true that the agent
would perform the action if she intended to perform it. In fact, it can pretty
much always be the case that the world is such that something would interfere
with the exercise of the intended performance. A sudden gust of wind can blow
the golf ball off course and prevent the able agent from holing the putt. A broken
leg can prevent the swimming champion from actually swimming. And a cramp
in a gymnast’s arm can prevent her from doing the handstand she has so often
done before.
The problem has to do with the truth conditions of the counterfactual. A
counterfactual is true if and only if the closest worlds in which the agent intends
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are worlds in which she succeeds.¹² That means that we must depart from the
actual world no further than necessary to reach an intention world. That is a
problem. If the actual world happens to contain an interfering factor for the ex-
ercise of an intention on the agent’s part, then this interfering factor will in all
likelihood also be present in the closest worlds in which the agent intends to
ϕ. Hence, the agent’s intention will not be realized in that world.
Having said this, it should already have become apparent why the same
problem does not arise for the success view. The success view does not just
take situations into account which are, apart from the fact that the agent intends
to ϕ in them, as similar to the actual situation as possible. Rather, most facts of
the actual situation are completely irrelevant to the determination of the set of
situations that matters to the agent’s ability. When we are thinking about the
golfer’s ability to hole a putt, we are usually not interested in the ability to
hole a putt in view of the actual wind regime. Hence, the wind regime is not
held constant across possible situations.
What is held constant? That depends. The agent’s bodily and mental consti-
tution could be one set of features. If we then ask whether the agent holes the
putt in a sufficient proportion of situations in which those circumstances obtain
and she intends to hole it, the answer may well be “yes”. This is so despite the
fact that the actual situation is one in which the agent’s intention would not have
been successfully realized.
Masks are not a problem for the success view, then, because the mask – the
interfering factor in the actual situation – is usually varied across the relevant
possible situations. That means that the very few situations in which the mask
is present do not in any sense have priority over situations in which it is not pre-
sent. Hence, the fact that the actual situation is a mask situation is not of partic-
ular interest. The actual situation does not have any special status among the
realm of the relevant possible situations.
It is worth noting that a feature that is a mask for one ability may well be a
circumstance that deprives the agent of another, more specific ability (no matter
whether the higher specificity is achieved in terms of locality or more determi-
nateness). The wind regime, for instance, is a mask for the golfer’s general ability
to hole a putt, but it really deprives her of her ability to hole a putt in view of the
actual wind regime. The agent has the former ability but lacks the latter. The rea-
son for her lack of the latter is that we have hold a feature fixed that is merely a
mask for the former ability and therefore gets varied in that case.
 Again, I neglect problems with the limit assumption.
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For another example, compare the ability to do a handstand and the ability
to do a handstand with a broken arm. In the case of the ability to do a hand-
stand, broken arms usually get varied. In the case of the ability to do a hand-
stand with a broken arm, in contrast, they are held constant. Again, the agent
has the former ability, but lacks the latter. The reason for that is that the feature
that figures as a mask for the former ability gets fixed in the case of the latter
ability. The agent does a handstand in a sufficient proportion of the possible sit-
uations in which she intends to do a handstand and her muscular constitution,
say, is as in actuality. But she does not do a handstand in a sufficient proportion
of the possible situations in which she intends to do a handstand and her arm is
broken.
4.7 Formal considerations revisited
This chapter is about to draw to a close.What remains to be discussed before we
move on is the impact of the last objection we looked at in chapter 3, in our dis-
cussion of possibilism. As Kenny has convincingly shown, possibilism is bound
to fail in virtue of the fact that the ability operator – the “can” of ability – does
not obey even the most basic laws governing possibility. This section explores
whether or not the same or a related objection arises for the success view as well.
Kenny’s argument against possibilism, recall, goes like this. The focus is on
two modal axioms, T and K2, the first of which holds for most, and the second for
any possibility operator:
T. p → ◊(p)
K2. ◊(p v q) → (◊(p) v ◊(q))
As Kenny shows, both T and K2 fail to state laws when ◊ is interpreted as the
ability operator. From this he concludes that the “can” of ability cannot be inter-
preted in terms of restricted possibility.
I take it to be obvious that the argument, as it stands, does not affect the
success view. The success view does not interpret abilities in terms of restricted
possibility. Hence, it is not to be expected that the “can” of ability obeys the
same laws as the possibility operator. Hence, to make the reverse point, a failure
to meet the basic laws of possibility does not pose a problem for the success
view.
That SUCCESSAA analyzes CAN, the “can” of ability, as something other than
restricted possibility should be obvious, but let me make the differences explicit
once more. According to the success view,
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SUCCESSAA. an agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of
relevant possible situations in which S intends to ϕ.
Compare this condition to the truth conditions for possibility statements:
◊. It is possible that p if and only if there is at least one p world among the relevant worlds.
Apart from the fact that SUCCESSAA is formulated in terms of situations instead of
complete worlds, there are two important differences between those two condi-
tions. First, SUCCESSAA imposes a second restriction on the realm of the possible
situations. The possible situations get restricted not only to the relevant ones, but
rather to the relevant ones in which the agent intends to ϕ. Secondly, and more
importantly, while ◊ requires only that there be at least one p-world among the
restricted set of worlds, SUCCESS requires that there be a sufficient proportion of
performance cases among the restricted set of situations.
These differences are crucial – ability ascriptions behave very differently
from possibility ascriptions. For that reason, it is not to be expected that they
obey the modal laws governing possibility – no matter how basic those laws
are in that realm.
Interestingly, Kenny seems to think that his argument shows that any possi-
ble worlds analysis of ability is bound to fail (1976: 226). But this strikes me as a
clear non sequitur from the insight that abilities cannot be understood as restrict-
ed possibilities. For the inference to go through, the only available possible
worlds analysis of abilities would have to be one in terms of possibility. Clearly,
this assumption is misled, if the success view is on the right track. Kenny’s ob-
jection from formal inadequacy does not affect the success view.
But wait a minute, you may say. So possibilism fails because it analyzes abil-
ities as restricted possibilities and is therefore committed to the validity of cer-
tain modal inferences, which fail to hold for ability statements. And the reason
this does not affect the success view is that the success view does not analyze
abilities in terms of restricted possibilities and is therefore not committed to
the validity of the same inferences. But isn’t this, too, a non sequitur?
Agreed. Even though the success view does not explicitly analyze abilities in
terms of restricted possibilities, SUCCESSAA may still turn out to entail the very
same inference rules Kenny has shown to be invalid for ability statements. In
that case, Kenny’s argument would be easily adaptable as a refutation of the suc-
cess view. For then we could easily argue:
i. If SUCCESSAA is true, then T and K2 should generally hold for CAN (because T and K2
are implied by SUCCESSAA)
138 4 The success view I – Agentive abilities
ii. T and K2 do not generally hold for CAN.
iii. Hence, SUCCESSAA is false.
In the remainder of this section, I am going to show that (i) is false.¹³ Let “CAN”
once more stand for the “can” of ability, and let it function as a sentences oper-
ator with scope over a proposition. Adapting T and K2 for CAN,we get the follow-
ing two principles:
T*. S ϕ’s → CAN(S ϕ’s)
K2*. CAN(S ϕ’s v S ψs) → CAN(S ϕ’s) v CAN(S ψs)
Both, we know, fail to state laws. SUCCESSAA is perfectly in line with that. In fact,
the truth of SUCCESSAA explains why T* and K2* fail to state laws.
On the one hand, it is not generally true, according to SUCCESSAA, that if S
ϕ’s, S has the ability to ϕ. That is because it is not generally true that if S ϕ’s,
then S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which S intends to ϕ. Take the general ability to hit the bull’s eye and suppose
all we hold fixed is the agent’s amount of training (plus some background as-
sumptions). Then obviously, the mere fact that I hit the bull’s eye in actuality
does not prove that I hit the bull’s eye in a sufficient proportion of relevant pos-
sible situations in which I intend to hit it. It may clearly be the case that I fail
miserably in almost all of the other situations in which I have had the same
amount of training. In a nutshell: SUCCESS does not entail the general truth
of T*, because SUCCESS yields that T* fails whenever “ability” is given a less
than maximally specific interpretation.
SUCCESSAA does not entail the general truth of K2, either. By inserting the
truth conditions SUCCESSAA postulates for ability statements into K2, we get:
K2*. If S ϕ’s or ψ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which S
intends to ϕ or ψ, then S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situa-
tions in which S intends to ϕ, or S ψ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant pos-
sible situations in which S intends to ψ.
This is not a valid principle either. It is, for instance, true that I draw a red card or
a black card in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which I intend to draw a red card or a black card. Actually, the proportion of
 Refuting (i) does not suffice to show, of course, that SUCCESSAA does not falsely entail the
validity of any other invalid inferences. Since I cannot show, for any invalid inference, that SUC-
CESS does not entail its validity, however, I assume that refuting (i) is all that is required at this
point.
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such situations is presumably extremely high – there is not much that could stop
me from realizing that kind of intention when faced with a stack of cards. It is
not true, in contrast, that I draw a red card in a sufficient proportion of relevant
possible situations in which I intend to draw a red card. My intention to draw red
is not as closely linked to a successful performance. In fact, it will be no higher
than 50% – mere luck, given that there are only two colors available.
We can conclude that Kenny’s counterexamples against possibilism do not
spell any kind of trouble for the success view. On the one hand, the success
view does not postulate that abilities are some kind of restricted possibilities.
It is therefore not per se committed to the claim that the ability operator obeys
the basic laws for possibility. On the other hand, there is no reason to assume
that the success view is otherwise committed to the problematic principles. In-
stead, as I have shown, the truth conditions for ability statements given by SUC-
CESSAA account for the counterexamples against T* and K2* perfectly. If SUCCES-
SAA is true, then it rightly follows that T* and K2* are not generally true.
4.8 Finks and other unintentional abilities
In the last five sections, we saw that the success view is extremely powerful in
that it accounts for all of the adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view
of (agentive) abilities and does not run into the problems that proved destructive
for the simple conditional analysis and possibilism. In this and the next section,
I will discuss an objection to the success view that comes to mind quite easily. As
it seems, there are cases in which an agent has an ability to ϕ, but can only ex-
ercise it if she does not intend to ϕ. Call abilities of that kind “unintentional abil-
ities”. In response to this objection, I will formulate a weaker version of the suc-
cess view, according to which having an unintentional ability is for the agent to
ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which the agent
intends to ψ, where “ψ” specifies a different action type than “ϕ”, but ϕ-ing in
response to intending to ψ counts as a success.
According to the success view, an agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and
only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations
in which the agent intends to ϕ. But can we not easily think of cases in which
an agent has an agentive ability, but can only exercise it if she does not intend
to? In such cases, the success view yields wrong results. The modal success
rate – the proportion of performance situations among the relevant intention sit-
uations – will be zero. The success view will therefore falsely predict that the
agent lacks the ability in such cases.
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The reader familiar with the debate on dispositions will presumably imme-
diately think of cases that exhibit a similar structure: cases of finkish disposi-
tions. Call a disposition finkish if and only if the occurrence of the stimulus in-
terferes with the manifestation.¹⁴ Many examples of finkish dispositions are
quite far out – sorcerers and magic often play a crucial role (Lewis 1997); but
in fact, we are surrounded by finkish dispositions in everyday life. An ordinary
fuse, for instance, is a fink for a wire’s disposition to conduct electricity when
touched by a conductor (Molnar 1999). The wire has that disposition, but once
it is attached to a fuse, touching the wire will make it go dead. Like in masking
cases, the object will therefore not show the manifestation when the stimulus oc-
curs. The reason, however, is not that something external interferes with the
manifestation after the stimulus occurs (as in the case of masks), but rather
that that the stimulus itself interferes with the manifestation.
Can we think of similar cases in the sphere of abilities? Let’s call an ability
finkish if and only if the intention itself interferes with the successful exercise of
the ability. At first, it seems easy to think of abilities which meet this character-
ization. Some abilities wear their finkishness on their sleeves. Think of the ability
to unintentionally read street signs;¹⁵ or the ability to follow a conversation at
another table without listening. Abilities of this kind can only be exercised
when the agent does not intend to exercise them. That seems to be a problem
for the success view. According to the success view, an agent has an ability to
ϕ only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations
in which the agent intends to ϕ. In cases in which the agent’s intention interferes
with her ϕ-ing, this condition will never be met. Hence, the success view seems
to be unable to account for agents’ finkish abilities.
We have to be careful here, though. The examples I just gave for finkish abil-
ities are not very auspicious. The success view, as it stands, is an account of abil-
ities to perform actions, recall. But reading street signs unintentionally and fol-
lowing a conversation at another table without listening are not actions. Rather,
they are what I called “mere behaviors” (→ 1.4). Abilities to perform mere behav-
iors are what I called non-agentive abilities. Abilities of that kind are not prop-
erly captured in terms of a tie between intentions and performance. They call for
a slightly different analysis. I will turn to non-agentive abilities in the next chap-
ter.
 In the case of finkish dispositions, the stimulus interferes with the manifestation by making
the disposition itself vanish (Lewis 1997). I am using the term “finkish” more liberally here.
 I owe this example to David Löwenstein.
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Can we think of finkish agentive abilities? Differently put: are there actions
which the agent has the ability to perform, but yet the intention to perform
those very actions interferes with the successful performance? I think we can.
Here are a few examples:
CASUAL. Frieda has the ability to walk casually, but as soon as she intends to walk casu-
ally, she is so self-conscious that her walk becomes stiff and unnatural. Thus, it is not the
case that she walks casually in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in
which she intends to walk causally.
IN TUNE. Fred has the ability to sing in tune, but as soon as he intends to sing in tune, he
becomes so strained that he inevitably sings out of tune. Thus, it is not the case that he
sings in tune in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which he intends
to sing in tune.
WITTY. Emma has the ability to make witty and hilarious remarks in talks, but whenever
she intends to make witty and hilarious remarks, she overdoes it and tends to create awk-
ward situations. Thus, it is not the case that she makes witty and hilarious remarks in a
sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which she intends to make witty
and hilarious remarks.
The structure of these cases is as follows. There is something an agent has an
ability to do, but the intention to do the very thing gives rise to some kind of im-
pediment to actually doing the thing in question. Frieda becomes self-conscious,
Fred becomes strained, Emma overdoes the joking. The intention itself results in
an impediment to successful performance.What the agents are able to do are ob-
viously actions: walking casually, singing in tune, and making witty and hilari-
ous remarks. Hence, they are not excluded by the explicit restriction of SUCCES-
SAA to agentive abilities.
Apparently, then, there are agentive abilities to ϕ which do not require the
agent’s performances of ϕ-ing to be appropriately tied to the intention to ϕ.
Sometimes, agents have an ability to ϕ and yet fail miserably in situations in
which they intend to do the thing in question. I think this is just the way things
stand. The cases do indeed pose counterexamples to the success view as I have
formulated it. In finkish cases, there will not be a sufficient proportion of perfor-
mance cases among the relevant intention situations.
It is worth noting that finkish abilities are only a special case of a much
broader range of counterexamples to the success view as it stands. In the finkish
case, the intention itself interferes with the successful performance of ϕ-ing. But
this need not be so. To come up with counterexamples to SUCCESS, there may
just as well be an impediment to the agent’s successful performance of ϕ-ing
upon intending to ϕ, which is completely independent from the agent’s forming
the intention to ϕ itself. Here are two cases of that kind:
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HANDSTAND.When Ela intends to do a handstand against a wall, she always fails, because
she doesn’t have the slightest idea of how to do it. But when she intends to put her hands
on the ground, throw up her legs and hit her feet through the wall, she ends up doing a
perfect handstand.¹⁶
POUR ÉLISE. Peter has the ability to play “Pour Élise” without any mistakes. A forteriori, he
has the ability to play the middle part of “Pour Élise” without any mistakes. However, he
never succeeds in playing the middle part without mistakes upon intending to. He can only
play the piece, and thus the middle part, flawlessly in one go – start to finish.¹⁷
In both cases, the agent has an ability to perform an action, yet the agent does
not exhibit the modal tie between intentions and performances postulated by
SUCCESSAA. It is not the case that there is a sufficient proportion of ϕ-ing situa-
tions among the relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ. Yet,
the reason for the agents’ respective failures to meet SUCCESSAA has to do with
impediments that are fully independent from the forming of the intention to ϕ
itself. In HANDSTAND, the problem is that Ela does not know enough about
the proper method of doing a handstand. In POUR ÉLISE, the problem is that
whatever program in Peter’s brain underlies his piano playing ability, this pro-
gram can only run through the whole piece flawlessly, but not through parts.
In neither case does the intention to ϕ itself cause the trouble.
Finkish abilities are a special instance of a whole range of cases in which an
agent has an ability which can only be exercised as long as the agent does not
intend to exercise it, then. Let us call such abilities “unintentional abilities”. Un-
intentional abilities obviously pose a problem for the success view.
Luckily, unintentional abilities can be dealt with. Despite their obvious im-
pact on the success view, unintentional abilities merely show that the view
has to be extended a bit. Thus far, the success view says that for an agent to
have an ability to ϕ, the agent has to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of relevant pos-
sible situations in which she intends to ϕ. That is obviously not the case in the
examples above. The agent’s ϕ-ing is not appropriately tied to her intention to ϕ.
There is, however, a different intention to which each agent’s performance of
ϕ-ing is appropriately tied, even in the case of unintentional abilities. In the fink-
ish cases, Frieda walks casually in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possi-
ble situations in which she intends to walk, for instance. Fred sings in tune in a
sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which he intends to
sing. Emma make witty and hilarious remarks in a sufficient proportion of the
relevant possible situations in which she intends to make remarks.
 The case has been brought to my attention by Wolfgang Schwarz (personal conversation).
 The case has been brought to my attention by Barbara Vetter (personal conversation).
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In the non-finkish cases, the same structure can be observed. Ela does a
handstand in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which she intends to hit her feet against the wall. Peter plays the middle part
of “Pour Élise” flawlessly in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible sit-
uations in which he intends to play “Pour Élise”.
This suggests the following modification of the success view. On a more lib-
eral understanding of the modal tie between intentions and performances that is
required for an agent to have an ability to ϕ,
SUCCESSAA*. an agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if there is some intention ψ,
such that S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of similar situations in which she
intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not specify the same action type.
This formulation is more liberal than the original formulation in that the inten-
tion to which the agent’s performances of ϕ-ing have to be modally tied can (and
as a rule, will be), but need not, be the intention to ϕ itself. It may well be some
other intention.
Is the modification ad hoc? It is not. Instead, SUCCESSAA and SUCCESSAA*
simply account for two varyingly strong senses of what it is for an agent to
have an ability. There seems to be an important difference between an under-
standing of abilities according to which the agent’s ϕ-ing has to be appropriately
tied to the intention to ϕ itself on the one hand, and an understanding of abil-
ities according to which the agent’s ϕ-ing merely has to be tied to some inten-
tion, on the other.
In the former, but not in the latter case, the agent is able perform the act in
question at will and is able to perform it upon request. Usually, I should think,
this is the sense of ability we are interested in when we are thinking about abil-
ities to perform actions. This sense is captured by the original success condition
SUCCESSAA. Very importantly, it is a sense in which the agents in the examples
lack the ability to ϕ. Frieda cannot walk casually upon request; Fred cannot
sing in tune upon request; Emma cannot make witty and hilarious remarks,
Ela cannot do a handstand, and Peter cannot play the middle part of “Pour
Élise” flawlessly upon request.
Cases of unintentional abilities – cases in which the performance of the ac-
tion is properly linked, not to the intention to perform that very action, but some
other intention – seem to be deficient in one very crucial respect, then. There is a
somewhat accidental element to abilities of that kind. Frieda’s walk tends to turn
out to be casual, Fred’s singing tends to turn out to be in tune, and Emma’s re-
marks tend to turn out to be funny. Likewise, Emma’s attempt to hit her feet
against the wall tends to result in a handstand, and Peter’s play of “Pour
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Élise” tends to involve a flawless performance of the middle part. But this par-
ticular feature of their respective actions is not something the agents bring
about intentionally – it is not fully controlled by the agents.¹⁸
This suggests the following picture: whenever an agent has an agentive abil-
ity, there is some action which the agent can perform upon request – there is an
action which is appropriately linked to the agent’s intention to do that very thing.
In the examples, the actions of that kind are walking, singing, giving talks, per-
forming certain bodily movements, and playing “Pour Élise” start to finish. For
those actions, the original success condition SUCCESSAA holds.
In some cases, however, the ability we ascribe is not the ability to do that
very thing, but a different thing: walking casually, singing in tune, making hilar-
ious remarks, doing a handstand, and playing the middle part of “Pour Élise”
flawlessly, for instance. Why do we do that? Because the thing the agent is
able to do upon request is such that it usually turns out in a certain way: casu-
ally, in tune, and so forth. That is why the agent’s walking casually, singing in
tune, and making witty and hilarious remarks are themselves modally tied in
the right way to the intention to do whatever the agent can do upon request.
The original formulation of the success condition is still the primary one on
this picture. But the more liberal formulation comes into play whenever there
is something the agent can do, even though she cannot do it upon request or
at will.
End of story? Not quite. One may object that SUCCESSAA* is in fact a bit too
liberal. On my account, an agent has an ability to ϕ, in the liberal sense, when-
ever there is some intention, no matter whether it is the intention to ϕ or not, to
which the agent’s ϕ-ing is closely enough tied. But that does not seem right, does
it? Suppose I have the disposition to twitch my left eye whenever I am nervous,
and to feel nervous whenever I talk to Ben, which in turn I do pretty much when-
ever I intend to. It seems as though SUCCESSAA* yields that I have the ability to
twitch my left eye. There is some intention – the intention to talk to Ben – such
that I twitch my left eye in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations
in which I form that intention. And that is weird. It does not seem as though I
have an ability to twitch my left eye. My eye twitching is just something that hap-
pens to me when I am nervous. I have no control over it whatsoever.
 That there is a lack of control might be least obvious in Peter’s case of playing the middle
part of “Pour Élise”. But what actually happens in that case, I take it, is that once Peter starts
playing the piece, some automatism sets in, which carries him flawlessly through the whole
piece. Peter does not, in that sense, fully control what is going on. He is being carried along
a great deal. Of course, there is some control involved: the agent can stop playing the middle
part. But there is not full control over what is happening and how.
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Again, we have to be careful here, though. Recall that we are dealing exclu-
sively with agentive abilities. Agentive abilities are abilities to perform actions.
And twitching my eye fails to be just that: it is not an action. Hence, there is in-
deed one restriction to SUCCESSAA*, which I should once more add very explic-
itly: ϕ-ing has to be an action. It must not be a mere behavior.
Are there still counterexamples to SUCCESSAA*? I find it hard to think of one,
but perhaps there are some. If you can think of one, let me put you on hold until
the next chapter. For as we’ll see there, SUCCESSAA* is not fully spelled out quite
yet.What is missing, and what is actually quite crucial to the success view, is the
requirement that there has to be success involved in the performance of ϕ-ing.
More specifically, SUCCESSAA* misses out on the fact that in addition to the
agent’s ϕ-ing in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which the agent has some intention, the agent’s ϕ-ing in response to that inten-
tion also has to count as a success. Really, then, SUCCESSAA* needs to be re-
placed by the following, more subtle view:
SUCCESSAA_COMPLETE. An agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if (i) there is some
intention ψ, such that S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of similar situa-
tions in which she intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not specify the
same action type, as long as (ii) ϕ-ing in response to ψ counts as a suc-
cess.
Condition (ii) may not be fully accessible at this point, but things will fall into
place in the next chapter. For now, let us just note that there is a more liberal
notion of having the ability to ϕ, which has to do with the fact that what the
agent intends to do need not be precisely what she ends up doing. In the next
section, I’ll differentiate this insight further.
4.9 Impairments by ignorance
The cases in the last section seemed to indicate that agentive abilities do not re-
quire a proper link between the intention to ϕ and the agent’s ϕ-ing. That is be-
cause in cases of finkish abilities and unintentional abilities more generally that
link is violated. Yet, the agent has the ability. I argued that unintentionally abil-
ities are very interesting, but not actually problematic for the success view.What
they show is that there are actually two senses of an agent being able to do
something, which should be kept separate. The sense in which the agent has
the ability in cases of unintentional abilities is weaker than the standard
sense of ability, but a proper sense nevertheless. What I established in the last
section is a distinction between two varyingly strong readings of the success con-
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dition, which provides the resources to distinguish systematically between those
two senses.
In this section, we’ll look at a further kind of unintentional agentive abilities:
cases that involve what I will call impairments by ignorance. Here are some cases
illustrating this phenomenon:
C MINOR. Klaus has the ability to grab a C minor chord. But he doesn’t know that the chord
he so effortlessly grabs and thinks of as “the cool chord” is a C minor. In fact, he thinks “C
minor” is the name for the D minor chord. Thus, it is not the case that he grabs a C minor in
a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which he intends to grab a C minor.
CHATTING. Karl has the ability to chat casually with the president of the United States, but
only in virtue of the fact that he fails to recognize him. Knowingly talking to the president
would actually freak him out. Thus, it is not the case that he chats casually to the president
in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which he intends to chat casu-
ally with the president.
BRESLAU. Ela has the ability to cycle from Warsaw to Breslau. Ela believes, however, that
“Breslau” is the German word, not for the Polish city Wroclaw, but for the country of Bel-
gium. Hence, it is not the case that Ela cycles to Breslau in a sufficient proportion of rele-
vant possible situations in which she intends to do so. She would either end up in Belgium,
or, even more likely, give up somewhere along the way.
Again, these cases seem to show that the link between intentions and perform-
ances that is postulated by the success view is not necessary. The agents in the
examples have an ability to ϕ, while it is not the case that their ϕ-ing is properly
linked to their intentions to ϕ.
Against the background of the last section, one response to the examples is
obvious. As in the last section, the agents clearly meet SUCCESSAA*. There is
some intention such that S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of situations in which
she forms that intention¹⁹. Klaus grabs a C minor in a sufficient proportion of
similar situations in which he intends to grab “the cool chord”. Karl chats casu-
ally with the president in a sufficient proportion of similar situations in which he
intends to chat with “that guy” (where “that guy” refers to the president). Ela cy-
cles to Breslau in a sufficient proportion of similar situations in which she in-
tends to cycle to Wroclaw.
What this shows is that all of the agents have the ability to ϕ in the liberal
sense established in the last section: for all of them, there is some intention they
can form, such that they ϕ in a sufficient proportion of similar situations in
which they form that intention. What they fail to exhibit is the ability in the
 And doing so counts as a success, but let’s postpone this until the next chapter.
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stronger, original sense: the intention that is properly tied to their ϕ-ing is not
the intention to ϕ.
Yet, there is more to say about cases of impairments by ignorance. To see
that, note that there seems to be a relevant difference between the sense in
which the agents we considered in the last section have the ability to do some-
thing and the sense in which the agents we are considering right now have an
ability. In the last section, the cases we looked at were crucially characterized
by the fact that there were certain parts or aspects of the agents’ doings that
are not fully controlled by the agents. Our agents were able to walk, sing, try
to hit their feet against the wall, and to play “Pour Élise” in the strong sense,
while not being in the same strong sense able to walk casually, sing in tune,
do a handstand, or play the middle part of “Pour Élise”. These aspects of
parts of their doings were something they did not fully control. In that sense,
we said, our agents are only weakly able to do the things in question.
In cases of impairment by ignorance, diminished control is not at issue at
all. The agents control their actions fully when exercising them. There is no pas-
sive or automatized element to their doings whatsoever. In this respect, they
seem to resemble agents who are able to perform an action in the strong
sense. In terms of control, they resemble agents whose intention to ϕ, and not
just some other intention, is properly linked to their performances of ϕ-ing.
Why is that? The answer has to do with the fact that in cases of impairments
by ignorance, there is a much closer relation between the intention to which the
agent’s performances of ϕ-ing are tied and the act of ϕ-ing itself than in other
cases of unintentional abilities. Cases of impairment by ignorance differ from
other cases of unintentional abilities in one very crucial respect. The thing the
agents intend to do is the act of ϕ-ing, albeit under a different description. Grab-
bing “the cool chord” is grabbing C minor. Chatting casually to “that guy” is chat-
ting casually to the president. Cycling to “Breslau” is cycling to Wroclaw.
The same is not true in the cases we looked at in the last section. It is not
true that just walking is walking casually, that just singing is singing in tune,
or just trying to kick one’s feet through the wall is doing a handstand. It is
this difference between the cases of impairments by ignorance and other unin-
tentional abilities which accounts for the fact that ignorant agents, while resem-
bling the agents from the last section in not exhibiting the proper tie between
their intentions to ϕ and their performances of ϕ-ing, have full control over
their performances of ϕ-ing.
This yields the following picture: in all cases of unintentional abilities,
agents are able to ϕ only in the liberal sense established in the last section.
They are able to ϕ only in the sense that there is some intention, the intention
to ψ, such that the agents ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
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situations in which they form that intention. But while ψ and ϕ are not necessa-
rily closely related in unintentional abilities in general, they pick out one and the
same action in the cases of ignorance. This accounts for the fact that there is no
lack of control involved in the latter.
The basic insight we need in order to be able to understand how impair-
ments by ignorance differ from the cases in the last section, then, is that “to in-
tend to ϕ” can be read in two different ways: it can be given a de dicto reading or
a de re reading (locus classicus: Quine 1956). In the de dicto reading, one intends
to ϕ only if the content of one’s intention is “to ϕ”. In the de re reading, in con-
trast, one also intends to ϕ if the content of one’s intention is “to ψ”, where ψ-
ing is ϕ-ing.
The objection from impairments by ignorance obviously depends on a de
dicto interpretation of “intending to ϕ”. In the examples, it is not the case
that the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations
in which the agent intends, de dicto, to ϕ. Klaus, for instance, grabs D minor
whenever he intends, de dicto, to grab C minor. However, and this is the impor-
tant point, in the de re sense of “intending to ϕ”, the agents’ intentions are prop-
erly tied to their performances. Klaus grabs C minor in a sufficient proportion of
the relevant possible situations in which he intends, de dicto, to grab the cool
chord. But since grabbing the cool chord just is grabbing C minor, it is also
the case that he grabs C minor in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which he intends, de re, to grab C minor. Likewise in the other
cases.
SUCCESSAA can be read in two ways, then:
(1) An agent S has the ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the rel-
evant possible situations in which S intends, de dicto, to ϕ.
(2) An agent S has the ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the rel-
evant possible situations in which S intends, de re, to ϕ.
In cases of impairments by ignorance, (1) is violated. But (2) is not. And thus,
there is a good sense in which the agents have the ability to ϕ in the strong
sense spelled out by SUCCESSAA, and not just in the weak sense spelled out
by SUCCESSAA*, in those cases. Cases of impairments by ignorance are therefore
unintentional only on the de dicto reading of SUCCESSAA.
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4.10 Upshot
Let’s wrap up our findings in this chapter. The objective of the chapter was to
develop a comprehensive view of agentive abilities – abilities to perform actions.
I suggested, somewhat provisionally, that having an agentive ability is a matter
of modal success in the sense that the agent has to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of
the relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ. I called this “the
success view of agentive abilities”, or SUCCESSAA for short.
SUCCESSAA is a hybrid of the simple conditional analysis and possibilism, in
the sense that SUCCESSAA combines both the idea that abilities are a matter of a
modal tie between the agent’s intentions and performances and the idea that
abilities are always had in view of certain facts, where those facts impose restric-
tions of the realm of the possible situations.
After introducing the basic framework, I first (→ 4.2) elaborated on the no-
tion of an intention, as it figures in the success view, and provided a rationale
for formulating the view in those terms. An intention, I said, is simply an action
initiating propositional attitude in the sense that it is part of its causal role that it
will typically initiate behavioral episodes corresponding to its content. The be-
havioral episodes which are caused by intentions (in the right way)²⁰ are actions.
Why does the success view feature intentions and not any other motivational
state? Because only intentions are both action-initiating in the specified sense
and not themselves actions. This is important, because only an action-initiating
state secures that a failure to ϕ really counts against the ability and does not
simply trace back to overriding other mental attitudes, and only a mental
state that is not itself an action secures that SUCCESSAA does not run into a re-
gress.
The lion’s share of the chapter (→ 4.3–4.7) was devoted to presenting the
merits of SUCCESSAA. As I argued at great length, SUCCESSAA accounts for all
of the adequacy conditions for a comprehensive view of (agentive) abilities
and does not run into any of the problems that beset the simple conditional anal-
ysis and possibilism. Let me briefly walk you through those merits once more.
In section 4.3, I showed that the success view provides a comprehensive ac-
count of degrees and the corresponding kind of context sensitivity of ability
statements. The degree of an ability to ϕ, I argued, corresponds to the weighted
proportion of the relevant intention situations in which the agent ϕ’s. Here, we
 “In the right way” means: by non-deviant causal chains. How to think of non-deviance is a
problem of action theory and falls outside the scope of this book. For an overview see Wilson &
Shpall (2012, section 2).
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added the first important supplement to the original statement of the success
view.What matters, for an agent’s ability to ϕ is that the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient
weighted proportion of the relevant possible situations in which the agent in-
tends to ϕ.
In section 4.4, I showed that the success view does not run into problems
with cases of impeded intentions. The success view entails what I called “the ex-
istential requirement”: for SUCCESSAA to be met, there have to be relevant pos-
sible intention situations to begin with. As I argued, the existential requirement
is not met in cases of impeded intentions. In such cases, there are neither rele-
vant intention situations, nor are there any performance cases among the rele-
vant intention situations. That is not to say that there is no good sense in
which coma patients retain their ability to raise their arm whatsoever: depending
on whether the coma is varied or held fixed across the possible situations, there
will or will not be relevant intention situations and arm raising situations among
those. This is exactly right: the problem of the impeded intention only arises
when we are interested in what the agent can do in view of the impediment,
such as the coma.When we are interested in what the agent can do, abstracting
away from the coma, the agent retains lots of abilities. The success view can ac-
count smoothly for both senses.
In section 4.5, I argued that the success view provides a comprehensive ac-
count of general and specific abilities. When thinking about an agent’s general
abilities, we hold different sets of facts fixed than when we think about her spe-
cific abilities. In the case of general abilities, we are interested in what the agent
can do in view of her stable, intrinsic properties. In the case of specific abilities,
we are interested in what she can do in view of all kinds of temporary, extrinsic
features that concern her current situation.
In the course of the section, I also systematized various ideas about the gen-
eral/specific distinction that have been floating around in the literature. In sec-
tion (a), I looked more closely at general abilities and argued against the idea
that we only ever hold intrinsic features fixed in the case of general abilities. In-
stead, I argued, stability of features is what counts. I also argued that there is not
one sense of “general ability”, but many, which vary in accordance to just which
set of stable, mostly intrinsic properties we hold fixed.
In section (b), I looked more closely at specific abilities and argued that
there is not one sense of “specific ability”, but many. I explicitly distinguished
three that seem to me to be of particular systematic interest: (i) particular abil-
ities, or abilities that are had in view of the totality of facts that obtain at some
point in time, including the agent’s motivational states; (ii) conative abilities, or
abilities that are had in view of all facts of a situation except for the agent’s mo-
tivational states; and (iii) opportunities, or abilities that are had in view of the
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features of the situation that are external to the agent. I also argued that there
are many more good senses of “specific ability”, which vary in accordance to
just which set of features of the situation we hold fixed.
In section (c), I looked at the ways in which general and specific abilities de-
pend on one another. Here, I argued that some specific abilities will be such that
having such an ability requires having a corresponding general ability. I also ar-
gued that having a general ability generally requires that there be various possi-
ble situations in which the agent has a corresponding specific ability.
In section (d), I looked at degrees of specificity and argued that an ability A1
is more specific than an ability A2 if and only if the kinds of facts that are held
fixed in the case of A1 are a proper subset of the kinds of facts that are held fixed
in the case of A2. I also argued that this only yields a partial ordering of the spe-
cificity of abilities, which I take to be exactly right.
In section (e), finally, I looked at the ways in which hypothetical circumstan-
ces enter our thinking about abilities. I argued that the structure of ability state-
ments has four placeholders for circumstances: “S can ϕ” is to be read as “In C1,
S can, in view of C* and when C3, ϕ-in-C2”, where hypothetical circumstances
can enter via C1, C2, and C3, yielding different interpretations of the sentence.
In section 4.6, we turned to masks and saw that the success view explains
the workings of masks very smoothly. Masks are not a problem for the success
view, because the mask – the interfering factor in the actual situation – is usu-
ally varied across the relevant possible situations. That means that the very small
proportion of situations in which the mask is present do not in any sense have
priority over situations in which it is not present. And hence, the fact that the
actual situation is a mask situation is not of particular interest. The actual situa-
tion does not have any special status among the realm of the relevant possible
situations. Despite the mask, there may well be a sufficient proportion of perfor-
mance cases among the relevant intention situations.
In section 4.7, I showed that the formal problem Kenny noted about possibil-
ism does not arise for the success view. Quite to the contrary: the success view
explains very smoothly why the laws that hold for the “can” of possibility do
not hold for the “can” of ability.
In sections 4.8 and 4.9, finally, we turned to two closely related natural ob-
jections to the success view. In section 4.8, I discussed the objection that the suc-
cess view runs into problems with what I called “unintentional agentive abili-
ties” – agentive abilities which can only be exercised as long as the agent
does not intend to exercise them. In section 4.9, the worry was refined by exam-
ining a particular kind of unintentional agentive abilities: abilities that can only
be exercised as long as the agent does not intend to exercise them, because the
agent is epistemically impaired in certain ways.
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In response to these objections, I introduced a somewhat weaker version of
the success view,which accommodates such cases: on that view, an agent has an
agentive ability to ϕ if and only if there is some intention to ψ, such that the
agent ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which the agent intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not specify the same action
type, but where ϕ-ing in response to intending to ϕ counts as a success. Depend-
ing on whether ψ and ϕ pick out the same action type and depending on wheth-
er they pick out the same action type de dicto or de re, the view yields varying
senses of “having an ability”.
We are now in a position to formulate the fully comprehensive view of
agents’ agentive abilities we were after in this chapter:
AGENTIVE ABILITIES. An agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a suf-
ficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which S in-
tends to ψ, where ψ will typically be de dicto or de re identical to ϕ
and in any case be such that ϕ-ing in response to the intention to ψ
counts as a success.
As I said: the last bit of this condition – that ϕ-ing in response to the intention to
ψ has to count as a success – will strike you as mysterious, because so far I have
not talked about success as such. It’s a cliff hanger. Everything will make sense
in the next chapter, where we will proceed to extend the view to abilities of the
non-agentive kind.
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5 The success view II – Non‐agentive abilities
So far, I have focused exclusively on agentive abilities – abilities to perform ac-
tions. In this chapter, let me turn to non-agentive abilities: abilities to engage in
behaviors that are not actions and that are typically, or can even only be exer-
cised without a foregoing intention on the agent’s part. Examples of non-agen-
tive abilities include biological abilities like the ability to digest, produce saliva
or adapt one’s pupil size to the light conditions, perceptive abilities like the abil-
ity to hear, see, or smell, and overtly non-agentive abilities like the ability to un-
intentionally read street signs or advertisements.¹
Non-agentive abilities elude the success view as I have formulated it for
agentive abilities. Like the simple conditional analysis, the success view of agen-
tive abilities postulates a modal tie between intentions and performances.When
it comes to non-agentive abilities, however, intentions do not seem to play a cru-
cial role. And thus, it seems odd to analyze non-agentive abilities in terms of a
modal tie in which intentions are so crucially involved. The suspicion suggests
itself that the success view, while reasonable for agentive abilities, reaches its
limits when non-agentive abilities come into focus.
As we will see in the course of this chapter, the success view of agentive abil-
ities is indeed ill-suited to account for abilities of the non-agentive kind. On clos-
er inspection, however, it will become clear that there is a version of the success
view that applies to both agentive and non-agentive abilities alike.
As I’ll argue, abilities are quite generally a matter of success across a suffi-
cient portion of modal space. In the case of agentive abilities, that is to say that S
has an ability if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant pos-
sible situations in which the agent forms some suitable intention. In the case of
non-agentive abilities, a structurally analogous analysis can be provided. On the
view I’ll lay out in what follows, S has a non-agentive ability if and only if S ϕ’s
in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which some S-trig-
ger for ϕ-ing is present, where an S-trigger is a trigger for ϕ-ing, in response to
which ϕ-ing is a success.
From here, one can go in two directions. One can leave it at that and argue
that non-agentive abilities are abilities insofar as they exhibit an analogous
modal structure to agentive abilities. As far as one is willing to concede that in-
tentions are S-triggers for actions, however, one can go even further and formu-
late a unified set of truth conditions for abilities tout court.On that view, S has an
 Since this example will come up so frequently in this chapter, I should once again note that I
am borrowing it from Löwenstein (2017).
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ability tout court if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant pos-
sible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present. Combined with the
idea that intentions are S-triggers for actions, this yields that agentive abilities
are special instances of abilities tout court. Both agentive and non-agentive abil-
ities fall under the same analysis, on this view, the only difference being that the
S-triggers for actions and mere behaviors differ. I myself have sympathies with
the unified picture. But one can go either way here.
5.1 The success view for non-agentive abilities
Abilities, I said in the beginning of the last chapter, are a matter of success. In
the case of agentive abilities, this basic idea was spelled out in terms of what
I then called the agent’s modal success rate: the proportion of performance
cases among the relevant intention situations. Apparently, this account does
not carry over to unintentional abilities one-to-one.
What does carry over one-to-one, however, are the structural features of the
account. Non-agentive abilities, too, are a matter of success. As in the case of
agentive abilities, this idea can be spelled out in terms of a modal success
rate. Again, what matters is the proportion of performance cases among a subset
of the relevant possible situations. The only difference is the subset which mat-
ters. In the case of agentive abilities, the agent’s intention plays a crucial role.
Success, in the case of actions, has to do with a sufficiently strong modal tie be-
tween intentions and performances. That is why the relevant possible situations
are restricted to the ones in which the agent forms a proper intention.
In the case of mere behaviors (which is the word I introduced for behaviors
that are not actions), such as hearing, digesting, unintentionally reading street
signs, or dissociating, in contrast, the agent’s intention does not play a crucial
role. Instead, in such cases, success consists in showing the right response to
certain external triggers in the world, so to speak. Hearing sound when there
is sound is a success. Digesting food when food is ingested is a success. Uninten-
tionally reading a street sign when facing a street sign is a success. Dissociating
when subjected to a potentially traumatic experience is a success.
Structurally, however, non-agentive abilities are not all that different from
their agentive siblings. Performing an action of ϕ-ing is a success when exercised
in response to an intention to ϕ. Being engaged in a behavior that is not an ac-
tion is a success when exercised in response to some suitable external trigger.
But apart from that, I submit, the analysis of the two runs along the very
same lines. Thus, on the view I want to suggest,
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SUCCESSNAA. an agent S has a non-agentive ability to be engaged in some mere behavior ϕ
if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situa-
tions in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present.
An S-trigger for ϕ-ing, as I would like to use that word, is any trigger such that ϕ-
ing in response to that trigger counts as a success.² Note that S-triggers play the
same functional role in SUCCESSNAA that intentions play in SUCCESSAA. They
mark out a feature of a situation that has to be present in order for ϕ-ing in
that situation to be a success. The only difference is that we can specify what fea-
ture of the situation that is in the case of agentive abilities: the situation has to
be one in which a suitable intention is formed.
Why? Because for an action to be a success is precisely for the action to fol-
low a suitable intention. In the case of non-agentive abilities, we cannot specify
the feature of the situation in a similar vein. All we can say is that there has to be
some trigger, such that ϕ-ing in response to it is a success. Really, though, the
role of that is no different from the role of intentions in SUCCESSAA. I’ll talk
more about the exact relation between SUCCESSAA and SUCCESSNAA later on
(→ 5.3). For now, let’s focus exclusively on SUCCESSNAA.
Let’s go through some of the examples of non-agentive abilities to see how
SUCCESSNAA applies. First, abilities to have sense perceptions. An agent has the
non-agentive ability to smell, on the view I have just laid out, if and only if the
agent smells in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which
some S-trigger for smelling is present. What is an S-trigger for smelling? Subjec-
tion to odor, I guess. Thus, an agent has the ability to smell if and only if she
smells in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which she is
subjected to odor.
The scheme is the same in the case of all perceptual abilities. In the case of
seeing, substitute “subjection to odor” with “subjection to some visual stimu-
lus”; in the case of hearing, substitute it with “subjection to sound”; in the
case of tasting, substitute it with “subjection to some gustatory stimulus”.
What about abilities to undergo biological processes? Take the ability to
sweat. What is an S-trigger for sweating? That the agent’s body needs cooling,
I guess. Thus, SUCCESSNAA yields that an agent has the ability to sweat if and
only if the agent sweats in a sufficient proportion of relevant possible situations
in which the agent’s body needs cooling.
Likewise in the case of other biological abilities. In the case of adjustment of
the pupil size, the S-trigger is the agent’s subjection to a change in the lighting
 If you don’t like the causal connotation of “in response to”, please feel free to substitute it
with a less causal-sounding term like “vis-à-vis”.
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conditions. In the case of producing saliva, the S-trigger is that the agent’s body
needs saliva.
The same, finally, goes for the examples of overtly non-agentive abilities –
abilities which are unintentional for conceptual reasons. To evaluate whether
an agent has the ability to unintentionally read street signs, we have to check
whether she reads street signs in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which some S-trigger for unintentionally reading street signs is pre-
sent. What could be such a trigger? One’s subjection to street signs, I should
think. Thus, an agent has an ability to unintentionally read street signs if and
only if she unintentionally reads street signs in a sufficient proportion of the rel-
evant possible situations in which she is subjected to street signs.
This, then, is the success view for unintentional abilities. In the following
sections, it is going to be worked out in more detail.
5.2 Degrees and the distinction between general and specific
abilities
The success view for non-agentive abilities resembles the success view of agen-
tive abilities closely (more on the exact relation between the two in the next sec-
tion), and in fact, it functions analogously in all crucial respects. As before, the
domain of the relevant possible situations will vary across contexts, which ac-
counts for the distinction between general and specific non-agentive abilities.
Moreover, the degree of an agent’s non-agentive ability to ϕ will be determined
in the same way as the degree of an agent’s agentive ability to ϕ: it is determined
by the success rate. Thus, in the case of non-agentive abilities, it is given by the
proportion of the performance cases among the relevant possible S-trigger situa-
tions.
Let me briefly elaborate on both of those aspects of the view. First, degrees.
Like agentive abilities, non-agentive abilities come in degrees. A child does not
have the ability to unintentionally read street signs at all; reading street signs, or
reading anything at all, for that matter, requires effort and is hard work. The bet-
ter the reading skills of a reader become, however, the more often will it happen
that the agent grasps the meaning of written words just by glancing over them.
The agent has become much better at unintentionally reading street signs. Even-
tually reading short words and phrases becomes an automatism. The reader is
now very good at unintentionally reading street signs.
The success view for non-agentive abilities accounts for the stages of an
agent’s ability to unintentionally read street signs in terms of a variance in the
agent’s success rate. The better an agent is at some doing ϕ, the higher the pro-
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portion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant S-trigger situations. The child who is
unable to ever read anything unintentionally will not read any street signs unin-
tentionally in situations in which her amount of training in reading is held con-
stant and she is faced with a street sign. The more practiced reader will uninten-
tionally read quite a few street signs already in situations in which her amount of
training is held constant and she is faced with a street sign. The highly trained
reader, finally, will unintentionally read virtually any street sign in situations in
which her amount of training is as in actuality and she is faced with a street sign.
So far, we have gotten along with the simple proportion of performance
cases among the relevant possible trigger situations to account for the variances
we observe in agents’ degrees of non-agentive abilities. All we had to do, so far,
is count.What this shows is that an agent’s ability to unintentionally read street
signs can simply be evaluated on the dimension of reliability. In the case of
agentive abilities, we saw that there is usually a second dimension involved:
the dimension of achievement. How good an agent is at ϕ-ing has to do, in
part, with how well she performs in various situations.
When it comes to non-agentive abilities, this dimension can play a role as
well. Take perceptive abilities, like the ability to see. How good someone is at
seeing depends not only on the range of situations in which the agent sees. In-
stead it depends to large parts on how well the agent is seeing in those situa-
tions: how clearly she sees things, say. Or take the psychological ability to disso-
ciate. How good someone is at dissociating will not only depend on how reliably
the person dissociates in traumatic situations. It will also depend, for instance,
on how fully she dissociates. How fully, that is, she manages to encapsulate the
traumatic experience.
As in the case of agentive abilities, the degree of an agent’s non-agentive
ability will hinge not only on the simple proportion of performance situations
among the relevant S-trigger situations, but also on the agent’s degree of ach-
ievement in each of the performance cases. What we need to do, then, is to
weigh the performance cases in accordance to the agent’s degree of achieve-
ment. The overall degree of an agent’s ability to ϕ will eventually hinge on
one or both of those dimensions, depending on context. All of this is old
news. The success view yields the same account of degrees in the case of non-
agentive abilities as in the case of agentive abilities that I suggested earlier on
(→ 4.3).
Let’s move on to the distinction between general and specific non-agentive
abilities. I take it to be clear that there is no difference between agentive and
non-agentive abilities when it comes to the need for the distinction between gen-
eral and specific abilities. Non-agentive abilities, too, can be general or specific,
and the two come apart in a range of cases. I can have the general ability to un-
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intentionally read street signs, for instance, but lack the specific ability to unin-
tentionally read street signs in a particular situation.
The agent may, for instance, be blindfolded. She may have taken some drug
which impairs her automatic recognition mechanisms. Or there may simply be
no street signs around for her to read. In all of those cases, the agent is unable
to unintentionally read street signs in the particular situation she finds herself
in. Yet, the blindfold, the drug, and the absence of street signs do not impair
her general ability to unintentionally read street signs.
The success view for non-agentive abilities yields the right results in those
cases because the sets of the relevant possible situations will differ depending
on the kind of ability we have in mind.When we are interested in the agent’s spe-
cific abilities, the agent’s being blindfolded, drugged, or not in sight of any street
signs will be held fixed across the possible situations. The relevant possible sit-
uations will contain only situations in which the agent has the mentioned (in-
trinsic or extrinsic) properties. And given that selection of relevant possible sit-
uations, it will not be the case that the agent reads street signs unintentionally in
a sufficient proportion of the relevant intention situations.
When we are considering the agent’s general ability, in contrast, we are not
holding those facts fixed across modal space. All we are holding fixed is the
agent’s automatic recognition mechanism plus some background assumptions
about the world, for instance. And given that selection of the relevant possible
situations, there will be a sufficient proportion of relevant intention situations
in which the agent unintentionally reads street signs.
5.3 The broader scheme: the success view of abilities tout
court
Let’s take stock. We started out, in the last chapter, with an account of agentive
abilities. On the preliminary version of that view,which we worked with through-
out the largest part of the last chapter,
SUCCESSAA. an agent S has an agentive ability to perform an action ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in
a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which S intends
to ϕ.
In this chapter, we looked at non-agentive abilities – abilities to be engaged in
doings which are not actions. Such mere behaviors, as I called them, can or
can only be exercised without a foregoing intention on the agent’s part. For abil-
ities of that kind I suggested a structurally analogous analysis. The only differ-
5.3 The broader scheme: the success view of abilities tout court 159
ence between the two analyses is that the restriction to intention situations,
which played a crucial role in connection with agentive abilities, has been swap-
ped for a restriction to situations in which an S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present – a
trigger in response to which ϕ-ing counts as a success. Thus, I said,
SUCCESSNAA. an agent S has an non-agentive ability to be engaged in some mere behavior ϕ
if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situa-
tions in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present.
So much for the upshot. With both views before us, we can now focus on their
relation. Things fall into place quite neatly. For as we can now see, the condition
stated in SUCCESSAA is in fact an instance of the condition stated in SUCCESSNAA.
Actions are successful insofar as they realize the agent’s intentions. Thus,
what we do by restricting the relevant possible situations to the intention situa-
tions in the case of agentive abilities is exactly what SUCCESSNAA postulates we
do for non-agentive abilities: we restrict the relevant possible situations to the
ones in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present. In other words, the condition
stated in SUCCESSAA is actually a special instance of the more general condition
stated in SUCCESSNAA. The condition stated in SUCCESSNAA is therefore not only
the proper account of non-agentive abilities. Rather, it gives us an understanding
of abilities tout court – of agentive and non-agentive abilities alike. The general
formulation of the success view of ability is the following:
SUCCESSABILITY. An agent has an ability tout court to ϕ (where ϕ can be an action or a mere
behavior) if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant pos-
sible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present.
This yields the following view. Generally, abilities are a matter of ϕ-ing in a suf-
ficient proportion of relevant possible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-
ing is present. In the most paradigmatic instances of agentive abilities, ϕ-ing is
an action, and the crucial S-trigger situations are situations in which the agent
intends to ϕ. In the case of non-agentive abilities, ϕ-ing is a mere behavior:
the agent responds passively to the world. The S-trigger situations will therefore
be different; they will be situations in which the agent is subjected to the world
being a certain way.
The success view of agentive abilities turns out to be an instance of a broader
scheme in the following way, then. Abilities are a matter of success. Success is a
matter of a modal success rate. The modal success rate, in its general form, is the
proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant possible situations in which some
S-trigger to ϕ-ing is present.When ϕ-ing is an action, the situations which matter
are situations in which a suitable intention is formed.
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When ϕ-ing is a mere behavior like hearing, digesting, or unintentionally
reading street signs, the situations which matter will instead be such that the
agent is subjected to the world being a certain way: to the occurrence of a
sound, the ingestion of food, and the presentation of a street sign, for instance.
In the case of the action as well as in the case of the mere behavior, however, the
agent’s ϕ-ing is linked to some trigger in the same normative way: ϕ-ing counts,
in response to the trigger, as a success.
Let’s consider a worry. My remarks on the relation between SUCCESSAA and
SUCCESSNAA hinge crucially on the assumption that an intention is an S-trigger
for an action. A forteriori, it hinges on the assumption that an intention is
some trigger for an action at all. I don’t find this particularly problematic. An in-
tention, we said, is characterized by the fact that it is part of its functional role
that, if nothing intervenes, it leads to action. I take it that there is a good sense in
which an intention can thus be seen as a trigger for action.
Perhaps you are inclined to think that treating intentions as triggers for ac-
tions stretches the notion of a trigger beyond its reasonable boundaries. In that
case, let me offer you an alternative formulation of what it is for an agent to have
an ability tout court, which will yield the same picture I have outlined before, but
without the commitment to intentions being S-triggers for actions:
SUCCESSABILITY_II. An agent has an ability tout court to ϕ (where ϕ can be an action or a
mere behavior) if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the rel-
evant possible situations in which ϕ-ing counts as a success.
As is easy to see, this alternative formulation is neutral on whether or not inten-
tions are S-triggers for actions. In the case of agentive abilities, the relevant pos-
sible situations in which ϕ-ing counts as a success will be intention situations. In
the case of non-agentive abilities, the relevant possible situations in which ϕ-ing
counts as a success will be situations in which some suitable external trigger is
present. No commitment to actions being S-triggers for actions here.Yet, agentive
and non-agentive abilities turn out to be of the same general kind, of which
agentive abilities are the paradigmatic instance.
With the full view of abilities now before us, let us turn back to the stronger
and the weaker reading of the success view of agentive abilities we talked about
in connection with finkish abilities in chapter 4.8. On the stronger reading of
SUCCESSAA, with which I worked throughout the largest parts of chapter 4, an
agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if she ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion
of the relevant possible situations in which she intends to ϕ. On the weaker read-
ing, which I presented in order to account for the finkish cases, an agent has an
agentive ability if and only if she ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant
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possible situations in which she intends to ψ, where ϕ and ψ need not be de
dicto or de re identical as long as ϕ-ing in response to the intention to ψ counts
as a success.
Now that we have the success view of abilities tout court before us, these two
readings can be integrated quite neatly into the overarching picture. Both the
stronger and the weaker reading of SUCCESSAA are covered by SUCCESSABILITY.
Thus, we get a smooth transition from non-agentive abilities where the S-trigger
is an external stimulus to agentive abilities where the action type specified in the
intention differs de re from the action type the agent has an ability for, to agen-
tive abilities where the action type specified in the intention differs only de dicto
from the action type the agent has an ability for, to the most paradigmatic kinds
of agentive abilities, where the action type specified in the intention is identical,
de re and de dicto, with the action type the agent has an ability for. In response to
all of those triggers, ϕ-ing is a success. That is why the intention need not be the
intention to ϕ in the case of agentive abilities – the ability is agentive simply be-
cause the S-trigger is some intention at all.
5.4 Abilities and dispositions
With the full picture of abilities now before us, an intriguing perspective on the
relation between abilities and dispositions suggests itself. According to that per-
spective, abilities simply are dispositions of sorts – they are dispositions for suc-
cessful responses to S-triggers.
When we started out thinking about abilities in chapter 1, one of the explan-
atory challenges for a comprehensive view of abilities we identified was to elu-
cidate the exact relation between abilities on the one hand and dispositions on
the other. That there has to be some interesting relation is obvious. The two look
way too similar to be completely unrelated. Most importantly, both dispositions
and abilities are modal properties in the sense that they can be instantiated with-
out being manifested. Moreover, they both seem to be closely connected to coun-
terfactual conditionals, both can be masked, both come in degrees, and both ex-
hibit the corresponding kind of context sensitivity.
In view of those similarities, it is a commonplace that abilities simply are
dispositions of sorts. In fact, the idea that abilities are dispositions is as old
as the contemporary literature on abilities itself. It can be found in the writings
of Ryle (1949) and Moore (1912) and has since been stated as a platitude all over
the place. Ernest Sosa, for instance, simply presupposes that “abilities […] are a
special sort of dispositions, familiar examples of which are fragility and solubil-
ity” (Sosa 2011: 80).
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Recently, the view that abilities are dispositions of sorts has enjoyed new
popularity, thanks to the so-called new dispositionalists³ (Vihvelin 2004; Fara
2008; Smith 2003), who have used it as a foundation for a new route to a com-
patibilist solution of the free will problem.⁴ Vihvelin, for instance, writes that “[t]
o have an ability is to have a disposition or a bundle of dispositions” (Vihvelin
2004: 431).⁵ Fara, in much the same spirit, defends the view that “[a]n agent has
the ability to ϕ in C if and only if she has the disposition to ϕ when, in C, she
tries to ϕ” (Fara 2008: 848).⁶
I think the new dispositionalists and all the others are more or less right.
Some abilities are indeed plausibly thought of as dispositions of sorts. But,
and here we have made some real progress, we are now in a position to under-
stand why this is and just what sort of dispositions they are. Consider again the
success view of non-agentive abilities:
SUCCESSNAA. an agent S has an non-agentive ability to be engaged in some mere behavior ϕ
if, and only if, S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situa-
tions in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present.
To have the ability to hear, say, one has to hear in a sufficient proportion of the
relevant possible situations in which one is subjected to sound, to have the abil-
ity to digest, one has to digest in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which one has ingested food, and to have the ability to unintention-
ally read street signs, one has to unintentionally read street signs in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant possible situations in which one is subjected to street
signs. In all of those cases, one shows a successful response in a sufficient pro-
portion of the relevant possible S-trigger situations.
 The term has been coined by Clarke (2009).
 That they have used the idea that abilities are dispositions of sorts to pursue a compatibilist
strategy is what makes them new dispositionalists in the first place. The idea that abilities are
dispositions of sorts itself is not new at all, as the other quotes above show.
 That Vihvelin speaks about bundles is rooted in the fact that she distinguishes between basic
abilities – roughly: abilities to perform basic actions – and complex abilities – roughly: abilities
to perform complex actions. Basic abilities correspond directly to individual dispositions, on her
view. Complex abilities correspond to bundles of dispositions (Vihvelin 2004: 431).
 Fara’s view may look a lot like the conditional analysis, but in fact, it is to be read differently.
“ϕ-ing when trying” is not to be understood in terms of the simple counterfactual, on Fara’s
view. Instead, Fara wishes to remain neutral on how the modal connection is to be spelled
out. Fara’s view is therefore fully compatible with the success view. Indeed, the success view of-
fers one way of spelling out what Fara suggests.
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Now let’s do a little experiment: let’s drop the success condition. Let us pos-
tulate that one has a non-agentive ability to ϕ if, and only if, one ϕ’s in a suffi-
cient proportion of the relevant circumstances in which some trigger for ϕ-ing is
present. No mention of the requirement that the trigger has to be such that ϕ-ing
in response to that trigger counts as a success. Then it seems that we can gener-
ate counterexamples to the analysis quite easily.
Sugar dissolves in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations
in which it is placed in a liquid, but it seems odd, to say the least, to say that
sugar has the ability to dissolve. Klaus Kinski used to freak out whenever some-
one provoked him, but it does not seem to be the proper description to say that
Kinski therefore had the ability to freak out. Slash needed a pacemaker when he
was 35, because his heart failed to pump blood in a potentially deadly proportion
of all kinds of circumstances, but it would be flat-out bizarre to say that Slash’s
heart therefore had the ability to fail to pump blood. (Compare this to the perfect-
ly fine statement that the heart of a healthy person has the ability to pump
blood. – Here, the success relation is respected; hence, the ability statement
makes perfect sense.)
What sugar, Klaus Kinski and Slash have are not abilities.What they have is
something else: dispositions. Sugar has the disposition to dissolve, Klaus Kinski
had the disposition to freak out, and Slash’s heart had the highly dangerous dis-
position to fail to pump blood.
This suggests the following picture. First, take the following plausible view
of dispositions:
DISPOSITION. An object X has a disposition to ϕ if and only if X ϕ’s in a sufficient propor-
tion of the relevant possible situations in which some trigger – in the case of
a disposition, a stimulus – for ϕ-ing is present.⁷
Let’s square this with the success view of abilities:
 Note that DISPOSITION also entails an existential requirement: DISPOSITION can only be met
if there is a relevant possible stimulus situation to begin with; otherwise the proportion is un-
specified. This may seem wrong at first. There is a good sense in which a rubber ball is disposed
to bounce when hitting the floor, even if it is nailed to the wall. (Fara (2008: 852) disputes this,
but see Clarke (2009) and Whittle (2010) for a good case against Fara). And this finding seems to
be at odds with the existential requirement. Note, however, that when contemplating disposi-
tions, we usually hold only intrinsic features of the object fixed across the relevant situations.
Given that only those features are held fixed, there will always be relevant situations in
which a stimulus is present. And therefore, the sense in which the rubber ball retains the dis-
position to bounce is, in fact, smoothly accounted for by DISPOSITION. In section 5.7, I’ll devel-
op an analogue of this argument in more detail in connection with non-agentive abilities.
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SUCCESSABILITY. An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion
of the relevant possible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is
present.
If this is true, then it is quite natural to think that abilities are simply dispositions
for successful responses to S-triggers. Or, to put it differently: it seems natural to
think that abilities are dispositions to ϕ in response to triggers, in response to
which ϕ-ing counts as a success. The success condition is the missing piece in
distinguishing abilities from dispositions, on that view. That is why it is perfectly
fine to say that my heart has the ability to pump blood, whereas it is obviously
bizarre to say that Slash’s heart has the ability to fail to pump blood. Slash’s
heart has a disposition to fail, not an ability. As Millikan puts it: “No matter
what dispositions a mechanism happens to have, what determines its abilities
is what it was selected for doing” (2000: 63). To keep our terminology sharp,
let us say that a disposition is a mere disposition when it is a disposition, but
not an ability.
I said that this view is an intriguing one, and I am going to talk a bit more
about the instructive perspective it provides in a moment. To avoid misunder-
standings, however, let me add one caveat right away. The view about abilities
and dispositions I have been offering depends on one crucial assumption: the
assumption that DISPOSITION is the proper view of dispositions. The grounds
on which this assumption seems plausible are that abilities and dispositions
look so similar that there is good reason to assume that their analyses will
look very similar as well. Thus, given that the success view is correct for abilities,
DISPOSITION seems like a very reasonable view of dispositions.
Of course, this does not prove DISPOSITION to be the right view of disposi-
tions, nor does it do anything to annihilate the arguments that have been provid-
ed for alternative accounts of dispositions (e.g. Vetter 2015; Fara 2005; Mumford
1998; Choi 2006, 2008) or against views of dispositions that have the overall
structure that DISPOSITION exhibits (e.g. Vetter 2015). The objective of this
book has been to come up with a viable view of abilities. It has not been to
argue for or against a certain view of dispositions. Thus, I am well aware that
DISPOSITION does by no means follow from the success view of abilities, and
I am just as aware that it is controversial. Given that the success view of abilities
is on the right track, however, DISPOSITION is prima facie a reasonable view to
entertain as well.
What I want to argue for now is that the picture one gets by endorsing not
only the success view, but also DISPOSITION, is an intriguing one. It provides a
promising understanding of the similarities, but also of the differences between
dispositions and abilities.
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The similarities, I take it, are sufficiently explained by the fact that abilities
turn out to be special instances of dispositions. Let’s look at the differences,
then. What is often emphasized is that abilities are active, but dispositions are
passive. In the case of abilities, agents bring about change; in the case of dispo-
sitions, objects suffer change (Aristotle 1999, 9.1 & 9.8; Locke 1690, II).⁸
With the tripartite structure [dispositions – non-agentive abilities – agentive
abilities] in mind, it should be clear that the idea that abilities are active and
change is brought about,whereas dispositions are passive and change is suffered
does not quite get things right at the outset. Non-agentive abilities, after all,
seem no more active than dispositions. In both cases, change is not brought
about, but suffered. Sugar dissolves when placed in liquid. I hear your voice
when you shout in my ear. In terms of activity on the subject’s part, these two
seem rather on a par.
What is true is that agentive abilities are active in ways that non-agentive
abilities and mere dispositions are not. And that, I take it, can be explained
just fine when we look at the fact that in the case of agentive abilities, the S-trig-
ger is the agent’s very own intention. It is the agent herself who sets the trigger
for change. To have an ability is for her to show the proper response to that trig-
ger in sufficiently many cases. In this respect, agentive abilities differ from non-
agentive abilities and mere dispositions. It is because of this feature that agentive
abilities are active in ways that non-agentive abilities and mere dispositions are
not.
The tripartite structure [mere dispositions – non-agentive abilities – agentive
abilities] brings to light that non-agentive abilities have just as much in common
with mere dispositions as they have in common with agentive abilities. Non-
agentive and agentive abilities share the success relation between trigger and re-
sponse. But non-agentive abilities and dispositions share their passiveness. In a
way, then, non-agentive abilities are a middle case between the paradigmatic
cases of abilities (agentive abilities) and the paradigmatic cases of dispositions
(mere dispositions). I take this to be a very welcome result of the picture I am
suggesting. There is something to the view that there is no sharp division be-
tween dispositions and abilities. Instead, they form a spectrum with paradigmat-
ic cases of each at the sides and a transition area in between.
What I just said needs to be qualified a bit. It seems intriguing to think that
abilities just are dispositions of sorts, full-stop. But at that level of generality, this
may not be quite right. On a widely held view, dispositions are intrinsic to their
 For an interesting recent assessment of active and passive powers, see Mayr (2011: 204ff.).
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bearers.⁹ The same is not true, that generality, for abilities. General abilities are
indeed often a matter of intrinsic properties of their bearers. But specific abilities
certainly aren’t. Hence, I take it to be clear that specific abilities are not dispo-
sitions, if dispositions are intrinsic to their bearers.
This is an important insight. New dispositionalists (Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Fara
2008; Smith 2003) argue that the insight that abilities are dispositions of sorts
offers a new and very immediate route to compatibilism about freedom and de-
terminism. But the insights from the last paragraphs show that their argument to
that effect fails.
New dispositionalists argue that since (i) abilities are dispositions, and (ii)
the having of a disposition to ϕ is fully compatible with it being determined
that the disposition remains unmanifested, (iii) the having of the ability to act
otherwise is fully compatible with it being determined that one will not act oth-
erwise.
This line of argument is faulty. It is true, of course, that dispositions can be
had, even if it is determined that they will remain unmanifested. Sugar is solu-
ble, even if it is determined that it will never be placed in liquid. But that is be-
cause solubility is a matter of an object’s intrinsic properties. In determining the
relevant situations, we therefore vary whether or not it is determined that the
sugar will ever be placed in liquid (since we only hold the sugar’s intrinsic fea-
tures fixed). Thus, there will be a vast variety of relevant possible situations in
which the sugar is, in fact, placed in liquid. Among those, there will be a vast
proportion of cases in which the sugar dissolves. DISPOSITION is therefore
met for the sugar, even if the world is deterministic. But the reason for that is
that the sugar’s intrinsic facts are all that matters when it comes to determining
the relevant situations.
In the case of abilities, it is very different. It is uncontroversial that the ability
to act otherwise has to be understood as the specific ability to act otherwise for it
to be relevant to the free will issue. Virtually no one doubts that determinism is
incompatible with agents’ general abilities to act otherwise.¹⁰ What is at issue
has always been whether or not their specific ability to act otherwise is likewise
compatible with it being determined that they will not act otherwise.
The important point is that specific abilities are abilities in view of the
agent’s actual situation. Thus, the ability to act otherwise, as relevant for the
free will question, is the ability to act otherwise in view of all kinds of extrinsic
facts about the situation. It is far from clear that that ability is had, even if it is
 For counterexamples to this view, see McKitrick (2003).
 For an exception see Keil (2007).
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determined that one will not act otherwise (Clarke 2009). Whatever it is that de-
termines that one will not act otherwise will be part of the situation one is in.
Once that feature is held fixed, one will not come out as having the ability to
act otherwise anymore. No one has the ability to act otherwise in view of the
fact that it is determined that she will not act otherwise. That much, I take it,
is clear.
Thus, the important question is whether or not the features of the situation
which determine that the agent will not act otherwise do, indeed, have to be held
fixed when thinking about the agent’s specific ability to act otherwise. Surely,
this question cannot be answered by pointing out that dispositions are retained
even when it is determined that one will not manifest them. In contrast to dis-
positions, the abilities that matter for freedom are not intrinsic to their bearers.
Since they are not intrinsic, determinism may, in fact, be a threat to the ability to
act otherwise that is relevant for free will.
So much for my criticism of the new dispositionalist route to compatibilism.
Let me now return to the relation between abilities and dispositions more gen-
erally. On the view I want to advance, some abilities to ϕ – the ones we have
in view of our intrinsic properties – are dispositions to ϕ in response to some
S-trigger. Other abilities – the ones we have in view of extrinsic properties –
may not be dispositions in the ordinary sense of the word, but structurally,
they resemble dispositions closely.
5.5 The normativity of abilities
I have argued for the following account of agents’ abilities:
SUCCESSABILITY. An agent S has an ability tout court to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant possible situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-
ing is present.
An S-trigger, I said, is a trigger in response to which ϕ-ing counts as a success.
The obvious question to ask in view of my proposal is: when does a performance
of ϕ-ing count as a success in response to some trigger? When ϕ-ing is an action,
the answer is clear: an action is a success if and only if it realizes the agent’s
intentions. When ϕ-ing is a mere behavior, things are less clear. So let’s try
and see if we can say a little bit more about the conditions for a mere behavior
to count as a success in a situation. To dispel any too-optimistic expectations
right away, let me say that I will not be able to provide anything close to a com-
prehensive account of the success conditions of mere behaviors in this book. De-
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spite the fact that the ideas I will present will be somewhat tentative, however,
they will, as I hope, nevertheless be informative.
The most important thing to note is that, by and large, whether or not ϕ-ing
counts as a success in response to some trigger depends on whether or not its
occurrence in response to the trigger contributes to some end that matters in a
given context. And by “context” I mean an ascriber context: whether or not
we can correctly ascribe an ability to ϕ will hinge on whether or not some
end is salient in our own context to which ϕ-ing contributes.
Consider a plant that absorbs toxic substances from the air and detoxifies
them. Usually, this will count as a success, because it is one of our ends, as a
species, to live in a non-toxic environment. Thus, we will be naturally inclined
to describe the plant’s potentiality (a roof term I shall use for mere dispositions
and abilities alike)¹¹ as an ability: the plant has the ability to absorb toxic sub-
stances.
This is not to say that the end to which ϕ-ing contributes has to be the speak-
er’s own end. Consider an evil tyrant, whose explicit end it is to develop a chem-
ical weapon to destroy a human population in a certain area. Suppose further
that our anti-toxic plant covers large parts of that area and that the plant absorbs
and neutralizes the very substances that the tyrant intends to use for his chem-
ical weapons. He may well say, in that case, “The weapon will be ineffective in
that area. The area is covered by plants with the ability to absorb the toxic sub-
stance we are using”.
If the speaker’s own ends were crucial for whether or not the absorption of
toxics is a success or not, it would surely not be a success. But that does not mat-
ter. There is some end towards which the absorption of toxics contributes, name-
ly people’s end to survive. As long as there is some such end, one can take the
success perspective, which makes ability-talk feasible.
That is not to say that we have to ascribe an ability whenever there is some
end to which ϕ-ing contributes. We may always just as well be neutral with re-
spect to the success dimension of some doing. In the case of the plant, we
can just as well abstain from ability-talk altogether and simply ascribe the dispo-
sition to absorb toxic substances. Whether or not an ability gets ascribed de-
pends on whether or not the speaker chooses to emphasize the success dimen-
sion or not. But as soon as there is an end to which ϕ-ing contributes and which
is salient in our context, ability talk is feasible.
In the case of the anti-toxic plant, the end that mattered was our end, as a
human species, to live in a non-toxic environment, and – more generally – to be
 I follow Vetter’s (2015) use of the notion here.
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healthy and survive. Which end matters in a given context will vary, though. I
have the ability to unintentionally read street signs. My heart has the ability to
pump blood. My dog has the ability to smell to a much higher degree than I
do. With respect to all of those abilities, it is true that there is some end, to
which the respective exercises contribute. My unintentionally reading street
signs contributes to my effortless information. My heart’s pumping blood con-
tributes to my survival. My dog’s smelling so well contributes to his orientation
and – more importantly – finding his toys behind shelves and sofas.
Underlying these are, I take it, biological functions (Millikan 1984, ch. 1 & 2).
We have some system in our brains whose function it is to compute information
without our conscious effort. My heart has the function of pumping blood. My
dog’s sense of smell has the function of giving him orientation and finding
things. Functions are teleological – they have some aim built into them. So in
many cases, the ends that matter for the success of some exercise will simply
stem from the goal-directed nature of the biological functions had by things.
In other cases, the ends that matter will derive from other sources. The toast-
er has the ability, and not just the disposition, to toast bread, because toasting
bread when bread is put into the toaster is what the toaster is designed to do.
It is an end that derives from the intentions of the toaster’s designers. Again,
the telos is given by the toaster’s function, but this time, the function is not bio-
logical in nature, but derives from someone’s intentions.
The important point is not to come up with an extensive list of sources of
ends, however. The important point is to see that ability-talk is feasible as
soon as there is some end towards which the exercise of some ϕ contributes,
where ends may stem from various sources, such as biological functions, design
functions, agents’ desires and intentions, and so forth.
5.6 The existential requirement revisited
When we thought about agentive abilities, it became obvious that the condition
stated in the success view should be interpreted in such a way that it entails
what I called “the existential requirement”. To have an agentive ability to ϕ,
the agent has to be able to form the intention to ϕ to begin with; this was spelled
out in terms of the requirement that there have to be relevant intention situation
to begin with; the set of the relevant intention situations must not be empty (→
4.4).
The need for the existential requirement was the import from cases like that
of the brainwashed follower of a cult and the coma patient. In most contexts, we
obviously want to say that these agents lack the ability to raise their arm and
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leave the cult, respectively. And the reason for that is that the existential require-
ment is violated in their cases. Holding their respective conditions fixed, there is
no relevant intention situation to begin with; they cannot leave the cult and raise
their arm, respectively, because they cannot form the relevant intentions to do so
in the first place.
The existential requirement could have been formulated as a second condi-
tion for what it is for an agent to have an ability. Instead, I showed that the orig-
inal condition – the requirement that the agent ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the
relevant intention situations – already entails it. For the proportion of ϕ-ing
cases among the relevant intention situations to be sufficiently high, there
have to be relevant intention situations to begin with. If not, the proportion is
an unspecified ratio (because we are dividing by zero). Thus, the existential re-
quirement is entailed as a necessary condition by the success view of agentive
abilities.
In this chapter, I have extended the success view to cover not only agentive,
but also non-agentive abilities. I said that having an ability, quite generally, is a
matter of ϕ-ing in a sufficient proportion of relevant S-trigger situations. The suc-
cess view for agentive abilities turned out to be an instance of this more general
scheme. In the case of actions, the S-trigger we look out for is always the agent’s
intention.
The analysis of non-agentive abilities (and abilities tout court) I developed in
this chapter is structurally analogous to the success view of agentive abilities.
Thus, it, too, entails an existential requirement. For it to be the case that there
is a sufficient proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant possible S-trigger sit-
uations, there have to be relevant possible S-trigger situations to begin with.
This, then, is the more general version of the existential requirement.
It may not be entirely obvious that this is the right verdict in the case of non-
agentive abilities. In the remainder of this section, however, I will argue that it is
in fact exactly right. Non-agentive abilities, too, are had only if the set of relevant
S-trigger situations is non-empty.
When we thought about agentive abilities in the last chapter, we saw that
there are two structural grounds on which an agent can lack an ability. The spe-
cific ability to raise one’s arm, for instance, can be impeded in two different
ways. On the one hand, the agent may wear a strait jacket. On the other hand,
the agent may be in a coma.¹²
 If the agent is permanently comatose, the case is better described as one in which the agent
also lacks the general ability. We are now concerned with a different case: a case in which the
agent has the general ability, but lacks the specific one. I take it that the agent undergoing a
temporary and brief state of coma is one way in which this constellation can come about.
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In the first case, the agent lacks the ability, because the agent’s modal suc-
cess rate is too low. The ratio expressing the proportion of performance cases
among the relevant intention situations is specified, but it is zero. In any context,
that will be too low for us to be willing to count the agent as having the ability.
In the second case, the agent lacks the ability for other reasons. Here, the
ratio corresponding to the proportion of performance cases among the relevant
intention situations is not specified to begin with. The agent cannot intend to
raise her arm – thus, the relevant possible situations do not contain any inten-
tion situations. The agent lacks the ability to raise her arm because the existen-
tial requirement fails to be met.
In the case of non-agentive abilities, the same two grounds for an agent lack-
ing the ability can be found. On the one hand, the proportion may simply be too
low; on the other hand, the relevant possible situations may not contain any S-
trigger situations to begin with. Take the non-agentive ability to unintentionally
read advertisements, and let’s focus on the specific ability to do so.What can be
grounds for you to lack that ability? On the one hand, of course, you may be
blindfolded, blinded by the sun, distracted, drugged, or otherwise impaired in
such a way that you fail to read the ads in sight. All of those impediments are
such that your modal success rate in reading advertisements will turn out too
low.
On the other hand, however, you may lack the specific ability to unintention-
ally read an ad simply because there is no ad in sight. In that case, there will not
be any S-trigger situations among the relevant possible situations. Hence, you
lack the specific ability to read advertisements because the existential require-
ment fails to be met.
What this shows is that the existential requirement is important not only for
agentive abilities, but also for abilities of the non-agentive kind. No one can hear
in view of the fact that there is nothing to be heard, digest in view of the fact that
there is nothing to be digested, and adjust their pupil size to the lighting condi-
tions, if the lighting conditions don’t change.
In the case of specific non-agentive abilities, this is quite obvious, I guess. In
the case of general non-agentive abilities, a little more reflection may be needed.
Take the general ability to hear. The existential requirement postulates that an
agent has the general ability only if there is a relevant possible situation in
which sound occurs. At first sight, this may not strike you as entirely plausible.
Does not an agent retain her general ability to hear even if no sound can occur?
Suppose the world is such that the atmosphere absorbs every sound signal right
away – no sound can ever reach a human ear. Don’t agents retain their general
ability to hear in such a world?
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The answer depends on how general the ability is we are thinking about
here. There is a good sense in which agents lack the fairly general ability to
hear in a world in which no sound can occur – there is just nothing to be
heard, after all. But there is also a good sense in which normal agents can
still hear – they still have what it takes to hear sound if it were in fact occurring.
The difference between those two uses of “the ability to hear” is not that only
one is a general ability; even in the first sense, we are interested in what the
agents can do across a broad range of situations and not in a particular situa-
tion. We are dealing with two abilities on the general side of the spectrum.
Yet, the two differ with respect to just how general they are.
In the first case, we are still holding a very stable feature of the world fixed:
that the world is such that no sound ever occurs. In that case, the existential re-
quirement will fail to be met. There are no relevant sound situations. Thus, the
agent lacks the ability to hear. This seems right. In view of the fact that the agent
lives in a world with no sound, the agent cannot hear sound.
In the second case, we are holding only the agent’s intrinsic hearing related
make-up fixed. That the world is such that no sound ever occurs is varied across
the relevant possible situations, then. Thus, there will be relevant sound situa-
tions. And among those, there will of course be a vast number of situations in
which the agent hears. Again, this is correct. In view of her hearing organs,
the agent can hear.
To my mind, the second use seems like the more natural one. The ability to
hear, understood as a general ability, is usually given the fully general interpre-
tation where only the agent’s stable intrinsic abilities matter. In that case, the ex-
istential requirement will always be met. Since we vary what the world is like,
there will always be S-trigger situations among the relevant possible situations.
5.7 Proportions among infinite sets
There is an obvious difficulty with the success view as it stands. It is not clear
how to make sense of the notion of proportions of situations, as it figures in
the account. That is because many sets of situations will have infinite cardinality.
And the proportion of the infinite set among the infinite set will always be 1.
Take an example. Consider my ability to jump in view of my muscular con-
stitution. According to the success view, I have that ability if and only if jump in
a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which I intend to
jump. The relevant possible situations will be those in which my muscular con-
stitution is held fixed. That set of situations will presumably be infinite. The
length of each of my hairs will vary across the relevant possible situations,
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and since the lengths of my hairs are continuous, there will be continuously
many situations in which my muscular constitution is held fixed.
The same goes for any subset of the relevant possible situations, which al-
lows for variances along the continuous scale. The set of the relevant possible
situations in which I intend to jump are likewise infinite, because it will still con-
tain as many situations as there are lengths of my hairs. And likewise for the rel-
evant intention situations in which I jump. They, too, constitute an infinite set.
If that is true, the success view faces a fundamental problem. It seems to
lack the resources to distinguish between cases in which an agent has an ability
and cases in which an agent lacks an ability. The proportion of ϕ-ing cases
among the relevant intention situations will pretty much always be v, such
that v = the size of the infinite set/the size of the infinite set. Obviously, this is
a serious worry.
How can the problem be mitigated? First, it is important to note that the
challenge we are facing is not in any way peculiar to the success view. As we
are going to see in the next, and last chapter, every contemporary account of
abilities is in some way or other committed to the notion of proportions of situa-
tions. Greco (2007) analyzes abilities in terms of the requirement that the agent
has to be successful in a suitable proportion of a certain set of worlds (where
“worlds” should read “situations”). Maier (2013) analyzes general abilities in
terms of a suitable proportion of similar circumstances. And Sosa (2015) argues
that
archery competence, for example, is a sufficient spread of possible shots (covering enough
of the relevant shapes and situations one might be in as an agent) where one would suc-
ceed if one tried, an extensive enough range. (Sosa 2015: 98)
The same goes for recent views of dispositions. Both Manley and Wasserman
(2008) and Vetter (2015), for instance, talk about proportions of (centered) worlds
in their accounts of dispositions. What this shows is that abilities (and disposi-
tions) are generally taken to have something to do with proportions of situations.
Once we agree on that, we are in the same boat when it comes to problems con-
cerning the comparability of sets of such circumstances.
Apart from the fact that it is hard to think of a way to avoid proportions of
worlds or situations in an account of abilities, I take it to be clear that we should
also have a more general interest in a formal model which allows for there being
more circumstances of one sort than of another. There is, for instance, good rea-
son to think that graded possibilities have something to do with proportions of
worlds, and not, as Kratzer (1981) prominently holds, with closeness to an order-
ing source. Likewise, and perhaps relatedly, there is good reason to think that
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probabilities have something to do with distributions of events across worlds –
the probabilities for an event are higher, on that account, the larger the set of
(relevant) worlds in which the event occurs (Bigelow 1976).
That both graded modalities as well as probability seem to call for some
measure for sizes of sets of worlds is instructive to note. Graded possibility, prob-
abilities, and abilities seem very closely connected, after all. Suppose p is more
easily possible than q. Then one should think that the probability of p is higher,
according to some measure of probability, than that of q. Likewise the other way
around. If p is more probable than q, then one should think that p is more easily
possible, given some measure of possibility, than q. Abilities seem closely con-
nected to both. If an agent S1 is more able to ϕ than another agent S2, then
one should think that it is more easily possible, according to some measure of
possibility, and more probable, according to some measure of probability, that
S1 ϕ’s upon intending to ϕ than that S2 ϕ’s upon intending to ϕ.
If probabilities, graded modality, and abilities turned out to be a matter of
proportions of worlds, things would fall into place quite neatly. If, on the
other hand, talk about proportions of worlds turned out to be insensible after
thorough investigation, then my suggestion would be to just work with a proba-
bility framework instead.
I don’t think too much pessimism is called for, though. Just like Manley and
Wasserman (2008), I take it that there is good reason to think that proportions of
worlds or situations can in fact be made sense of. The key lies in measure theory.
As Bigelow (1976) has argued in an attempt to define probability in terms of sim-
ilarity between worlds, we can project a similarity measure onto modal space
which yields distances between worlds. Once we have those distances, we can
measure the region that is covered by any set of possible worlds.
If that is true, then the proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the relevant inten-
tion situations, which is needed to make sense of the success view as it stands,
can be interpreted as v, such that v = the size of the region of the relevant inten-
tion cases in which the agent ϕ’s/the size of the total region of relevant intention
situations.
The challenge, of course, is to come up with a similarity measure that yields
the right distances for some given purpose. This task is far from trivial, and it
would require another book to show how Bigelow’s approach can be put to
work in connection to the success view. In principle, however, measure theory
provides the formal equipment to tackle this task.
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5.8 A brief reflection on the explanatory challenges
Before closing this chapter, let me briefly get back to the explanatory challenges
that we identified for a comprehensive view of abilities in chapter 1. In the pre-
vious chapters, answers to those challenges have emerged, but I we have not, so
far, explicitly mapped them onto the challenges. Let me therefore go through the
challenges one by one and briefly say a few words about each before moving on
with the discussion of the success view.
The explanatory challenges, recall, were the following:
E1: From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn how abilities relate to
counterfactuals.
E2. From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn about the relation be-
tween abilities and dispositions.
E3. From a comprehensive view of abilities, we may hope to learn how ability ascriptions
relate to the semantics for “can” ascriptions in general.
With respect to E1, it has become evident that the relation between abilities and
counterfactuals is by no means straightforward. As I said in chapter 1.5, there is
certainly some connection between abilities and counterfactuals – if someone
has an ability, it will often be true that the agent would exercise that ability, if
she intended to –, but, as we know by now, that connection is not strong enough
to allow for an analysis of abilities in terms of a counterfactual conditional.
That is not to say that an analysis of abilities in terms of counterfactuals in
general is doomed. In fact, we will see in chapter 6.2 that there is a way of for-
mulating the success view itself in counterfactual terms. What we will see too,
however, is that the counterfactuals that play a role in such an account bear
only very little resemblance to the counterfactual that figured in the simple con-
ditional analysis and which seems intuitively linked to abilities. In fact, they bear
so little resemblance to counterfactuals that the view had better be expressed dif-
ferently. Quite generally, the upshot will be that counterfactuals do not play any
central role in an account of abilities.
With respect to the explanatory challenge of providing information about
the relationship between abilities and dispositions, we can be very brief. On
that point, we reached the verdict that abilities and dispositions are closely re-
lated indeed, in that (intrinsic) abilities just seem to be dispositions of sorts;
roughly: dispositions for success. This verdict hinges on the plausibility of the
view of dispositions I put forward in section 5.6, of course. But insofar as that
view is on the right track, (intrinsic) abilities turn out to be a special kind of dis-
positions.
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Finally, let me say a few words about the relationship of ability ascriptions
and “can” statements quite generally. As laid out in chapter 1.7, the challenge
here is to either align one’s views of abilities with the standard semantics of
“can” statements as championed by Kratzer (1977, 1981) or reject the standard se-
mantics when it comes to ability statements and thereby reject a core feature of
that semantics, namely the claim that “can” statements exhibit a unified struc-
ture in that all of them express possibility.
It should be clear that my verdict on that matter is the latter. Pace the stan-
dard semantics, “can” statements which ascribe ability are not possibility state-
ments (→ 2). Hence, it is not true that all “can” statements express possibility.
But of course, some “can” statements do express possibility. And hence, “can”
statements do not exhibit a unified structure. The standard semantics goes astray
not only in its assessment of ability statements, but also in its assumption that
“can” statements form a perfectly unified class semantically.
5.9 Upshot
Let’s wrap up. Abilities, I argued, are a matter of success. In the case of agentive
abilities, this basic idea was spelled out in terms of what I then called the agent’s
modal success rate: the proportion of the relevant intention situations in which
the agent performs an action to the relevant intention situations as a whole. In
section 5.1, I argued that this account cannot be carried over to unintentional
abilities one-to-one.
What does carry over one-to-one, however, are the structural features of the
account. As I laid out in section 5.2, non-agentive abilities, too, are a matter of
success. The difference is just that success is constituted differently. In the
case of actions, success has to do with a sufficiently strong modal tie between
intentions and performances. This is why the relevant possible situations are re-
stricted to the ones in which the agent forms a proper intention. In the case of
mere behaviors, the agent’s intention does not play a crucial role. Instead, in
such cases, success consists in showing the right response to certain external
triggers in the world.
These insights led up to the success view of non-agentive abilities, according
to which an agent S has a non-agentive ability to be engaged in some mere be-
havior ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present, where an S-trigger for
ϕ-ing is any trigger such that ϕ-ing in response to that trigger counts as a suc-
cess.
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In section 5.3, I laid out that the success view of non-agentive abilities works
analogously to the success view of agentive abilities in all crucial respects. As
before, the domain of the relevant possible situations will vary across contexts,
which accounts for the distinction between general and specific non-agentive
abilities. Moreover, the degree of an agent’s non-agentive ability to ϕ will be de-
termined in the same way, structurally, as the degree of an agent’s agentive abil-
ity to ϕ. It corresponds to the weighted proportion of the performance cases
among the relevant possible S-trigger situations. No big differences here.
Section 5.4 was all about integrating the success view of agentive and the
success view of non-agentive abilities into a common view. Doing so was easy.
As I showed, the condition figuring in the success view of non-agentive abilities
actually encompasses the condition figuring in the success view on agentive abil-
ities. Having an ability to ϕ, quite generally, is for the agent to ϕ in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant possible S-trigger situations, where this boils down to
ϕ-ing in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible intention situations in
the case of agentive abilities. Thus, we can formulate the fully comprehensive
view of abilities tout court as the view that
SUCCESSABILITY. an agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficiently high
weighted proportion of the relevant possible S-trigger situations.
In section 5.5, I laid out an intriguing perspective on the relationship between
abilities and dispositions. A prima facie plausible take on dispositions, against
the background of the success view of abilities, is that having a disposition to
ϕ is for an object to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situa-
tions in which a trigger for ϕ-ing is present. If this is right, then abilities are dis-
positions of sorts, namely dispositions in which the trigger that is required is an
S-trigger – a trigger in response to which ϕ-ing counts as a success. The differ-
ence between abilities and mere dispositions is a normative difference and
one of perspective, on that account.
Section 5.6 turned to this normative dimension of abilities and asked what it
is for ϕ-ing to count as a success in response to some trigger. The answer, I sug-
gested, is that, by and large, whether or not ϕ-ing counts as a success in re-
sponse to some trigger depends on whether or not its occurrence in response
to the trigger contributes to some end that matters in a given context. As soon
as there is some end to which ϕ-ing contributes and which is salient in our con-
text, ability talk is feasible.
In section 5.7, I spotlighted an implication of the success view of abilities tout
court, namely that the existential requirement holds, not only in the case of
agentive, but also in the case of non-agentive abilities. This may seem odd at
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first. The ability to hear, one may think, is retained, even if there is no relevant
possible situation in which an S-trigger for hearing – the occurrence of sound,
say – is present. Looking more closely, though, this is false.
There is a good sense in which agents lack the ability to hear when no sound
can occur – there is just nothing to be heard, after all. This is the sense that is
obtained in virtue of the existential requirement. Usually, though,we are interest-
ed in the ability to hear in view of the agent’s intrinsic make-up alone, and that
ability is retained when no sound can occur. That, however, does not conflict
with the truth of the existential requirement. That is because in the case of
the ability to hear in view of one’s intrinsic features extrinsic facts alone – in-
cluding the fact that no sound can occur – are going to be varied. And hence,
there will always be sound-situations among the relevant possible situations
in such a case. The prevalence of the sense in which one can hear even though
no sound can occur is therefore unproblematic for my commitment to the exis-
tential requirement.
In section 5.8, we briefly reflected on the explanatory challenges and said
that the relationship between abilities and counterfactuals is not as close as
one would have thought, that abilities are plausibly understood as dispositions
for success, and that the standard semantics of “can” statements goes wrong
when it comes to “can” statements that assign ability.
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6 The success view situated
I have developed the success view against the background of two views: the sim-
ple conditional analysis on the one hand and possibilism on the other. There was
good reason for this way of setting the stage. Those two views really are the back-
ground for the contemporary debate on abilities. Virtually every contemporary
account of abilities draws on resources that are provided by one or both of
these two background views, and the struggle to overcome the shortcomings
of the background views shines through every single one of them.
Yet, there are quite a few more recent views on the market, and those views,
of course, need to be taken into account as well. This chapter turns to this task.
My aim, in what follows, is to situate the success view among some of the recent
views on abilities, point out similarities and differences, and provide reasons for
favoring the success view over the other accounts.
Most of the recent interest in abilities stems from two debates that are taking
place in different areas of philosophy. On the one hand, there is the so-called
“new dispositionalism” (Vihvelin 2004, 2013; Smith 2003; Fara 2008). As
noted before (→ 5.4), new dispositionalists think that abilities are dispositions
of sorts. Of course, that idea is not very new (Ryle 1949; Moore 1912). What
makes new dispositionalism new is the combination of that idea with two further
claims.
First, new dispositionalists share the conviction that understanding the link
between abilities and dispositions provides an immediate and new route to com-
patibilism about freedom and determinism. In chapter 5.4, I argued that the line
of reasoning leading up to this conviction is inconclusive.
The second conviction characteristic of the new dispositionalism is more im-
portant for the points that will concern us in the course of this chapter: new dis-
positionalists unanimously reject the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.
According to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions (Moore 1912; Ryle
1949), an object has a disposition to M when C (to dissolve when placed in liq-
uid, say) if and only if the object would M, if C were the case (if it would dissolve,
if it were placed in liquid).
Just as in the case of abilities, it is nowadays widely believed that disposi-
tions cannot be analyzed in terms of a single counterfactual. In part, the reasons
for the rejection of this view are analogous to problems that have also played a
role in our discussion of the simple conditional analysis of abilities. Just like abil-
ities, dispositions can be masked, come in degrees, and ascriptions of disposi-
tions are correspondingly context sensitive. My ability to fall asleep at night
can be masked by too much street noise (Fara 2005: 50); one thing can be
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more fragile than another (Manley & Wasserman 2008: 72); and what counts as
fragile in a discussion among engineers need not count as breakable in the con-
text of a discussion among ceramists (ibid.).
What we can note, then, is that a single counterfactual is just as ill-suited
when it comes to accounting for dispositions as it is when it comes to accounting
for abilities. New dispositionalists are well aware of this fact. That is why they
reject the simple conditional analysis.
Which view of dispositions do they endorse instead? Here, new disposition-
alists diverge. The new dispositionalists are not primarily interested in a positive
account of dispositions. Their primary concern is to provide an account of abil-
ities in terms of dispositions. Only sometimes is that account then supplemented
by a positive account of dispositions.
Thus, new dispositionalist views about abilities come in different granular-
ities, if you so will. On the coarse-grained level, new dispositionalists provide an
analysis of abilities in terms of dispositions. Thus, Fara suggests that “[a]n agent
has the ability to ϕ in C if and only if she has the disposition to ϕ when, in C, she
tries to ϕ” (Fara 2008: 848).¹ And Vihvelin writes that “[t]o have an ability is to
have a disposition or a bundle of dispositions” (Vihvelin 2004: 431).² On the
coarse-grained level, then, new dispositionalists are more or less d’accord on
how to analyze abilities.³
On a more fine-grained level, this need not be the case. New dispositional-
ists need not, and do not, agree on how to analyze dispositions. Thus, new dis-
positionalist views on abilities can, and do, differ once various different views
on dispositions are plugged into the coarse-grained analysis. On a more fine-
grained level, then, new dispositionalist views on abilities can, and do, take
rather different forms, depending on the account of dispositions which is en-
dorsed over and above the coarse-grained analysis of abilities in terms of dispo-
sitions.
How does the success view relate to the coarse-grained and various existing
and potential fine-grained versions of the new dispositionalism? On the face of
it, my views are fully in line with the coarse-grained new dispositionalist view
 Fara’s view may look a lot like the conditional analysis, but is to be read differently. See fn. 62.
 That Vihvelin speaks about bundles is rooted in the fact that she distinguishes between basic
abilities – roughly: abilities to perform basic actions – and complex abilities – roughly, abilities
to perform complex actions. Basic abilities correspond directly to individual dispositions, on her
view. Complex abilities correspond to bundles of dispositions (2004: 431).
 Vihvelin (personal conversation) thinks that only what I have called agentive abilities can be
analyzed in terms of the disposition to ϕ when trying to ϕ. Non-agentive abilities correspond to
other dispositions, on her view.
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that abilities are dispositions of sorts. As I laid out in chapter 5.6, I find it very
plausible that
DISPOSITION. an object has a disposition to ϕ if and only if the object ϕ’s in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant trigger situations for ϕ-ing.
Combine this plausible analysis with my view that having an ability to ϕ is for an
agent to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of a subset of the relevant possible S-trigger
situations and what you get is the new dispositionalist’s credo that abilities sim-
ply are special instances of dispositions.
Note, however, that I am not analyzing abilities in these terms. I am not com-
mitting myself to the view that abilities are dispositions. Instead, I am commit-
ting myself to a certain analysis of abilities – the success view – and to the fur-
ther hypothetical statement that if dispositions are analyzable along the lines of
DISPOSITION – which I take to be plausible, but by no means certain – then abil-
ities turn out to be dispositions of sorts. Thus, I may be in line with the new dis-
positionalist credo that abilities are dispositions, but I am in no way committed
to it.
The coarse-grained new dispositionalist view of abilities will not concern us
any further in the present chapter. We will, however, be concerned with a few
analyses of abilities that emerge when one plugs different analyses of disposi-
tions into the coarse-grained new dispositionalist picture that abilities are dispo-
sitions of sorts. More specifically,we will look the sophisticated conditional anal-
ysis which is obtained by analyzing abilities in terms of Manley and
Wasserman’s (2008) very powerful account of dispositions (→ 6.2) and the
view one obtains by analyzing abilities in terms of Vetter’s (2015) extended pos-
sibilist account of dispositions (→ 6.3).
Let me now proceed to talk about the other strand of literature in which abil-
ities have played an important role quite recently: the literature emerging from
the so-called virtue epistemology movement.
“Virtue epistemology” is an umbrella term for a rather wide variety of views,
which differ quite substantially in many ways. According to one strand of those
views, abilities have to be considered to be at the heart of epistemic properties,
such as knowledge or justification. Among the virtue epistemologists who
phrase their views in terms of abilities, there have been serious attempts to un-
derstand that notion better. Let me give you a little bit of background on that.
As diverse as virtue epistemological accounts are on many levels, there are
two basic commitments that unify all of them (Greco & Turri 2015). The first is
that virtue epistemologists consider epistemology to be a normative discipline.
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In Greco and Turri’s words, that “implies that epistemologists should focus their
efforts on understanding epistemic norms, value and evaluation” (2015).
Different virtue epistemological accounts spell this out differently. While all
virtue epistemologists agree that epistemic norms, value, and evaluation play a
crucial role in understanding epistemological concepts, there is a divide between
virtue epistemologists who believe that those concepts cannot be analyzed in
purely non-normative terms (e.g. Zagzebski 1996, 2009) and those who think
that they can (e.g. Greco 1999, 2009; Sosa 2007).
The second commitment common to all virtue epistemological views is that
“intellectual agents and communities are the primary source of epistemic value
and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation” (Greco & Turri 2015). Greco and
Turri explain the general line of thought by way of a very helpful example:
An evidentialist might define an epistemically justified belief as one that is supported by
the evidence, and then define evidence in a way that entirely abstracts from the properties
of the person. On such an approach, it would be natural to understand intellectual virtues
as dispositions to believe in accordance with the evidence (which, again, is defined inde-
pendently, without mentioning the virtues). A virtue epistemologist would reverse the order
of analysis, defining justified belief as one that manifests intellectual virtue, and evidence
in terms of intellectual virtue. (2015)
With this very brief introduction into the two main ideas of virtue epistemology
in the background, let us see how abilities enter the picture.
Abilities play a central role in one very prominent strand of virtue epistemol-
ogy which stands in the tradition of reliabilist accounts of knowledge. On those
virtue epistemological views, knowledge is non-accidentally true belief, where
this, in turn, is spelled out in terms of belief that is true because it has been ob-
tained in an intellectually virtuous way and not by mere coincidence (Sosa 1991;
Greco 2009).
What is it for a belief to turn out right by reason of virtue and not just by
coincidence? Here, many virtue epistemologists have spelled out their view by
using the notion of an ability. Greco, for instance, lays out that
[t]o say that someone knows is to say that his believing the truth can be credited to him. It
is to say that the person got things right due to his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather
than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else. (Greco 2003: 111)
That a belief is obtained via one’s intellectual or cognitive abilities is what guar-
antees, according to the above-mentioned virtue epistemologists, that the belief
is non-accidental. That is because an ability to ϕ is had only if the agent’s suc-
cess in ϕ-ing is reliable enough. This is where the reliabilist intuition underlying
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these virtue epistemological views becomes visible. According to reliabilists (e.g.
Goldman 1979), one knows that p only if one’s belief that p is obtained through a
reliable process. The virtue epistemological twist of this intuition is the postulate
that one’s beliefs be formed in virtue of one’s intellectual abilities.
It should now be clear why it is quite important to supplement one’s virtue
epistemological view that knowledge is true belief obtained through ability with
an actual account of what it is to have an ability. In order to show that abilities
have to do with reliability, one obviously needs to talk about abilities quite a bit.
It is therefore unsurprising that two very promising accounts of abilities have
come up in the virtue epistemological sphere. One is put forward by Greco
(2007), the other one by Sosa (2015). Despite their shared virtue epistemological
background, however, the views are not equivalent. Greco’s view is neutral on a
question that is addressed by Sosa. And while Greco’s view is fully compatible
with the success view, it takes a bit more effort to see how exactly the success
view relates to Sosa’s view of abilities: Sosa’s view happens to be the very
same view one obtains when plugging Manley and Wasserman’s view of dispo-
sitions into the new dispositionalist credo that abilities just are dispositions of
sorts. Despite the fact that the new dispositionalism and virtue epistemological
accounts differ very substantially in their objectives, there are actually overlaps
in the views of abilities that have emerged against these two backgrounds.
In what follows, I will not systematize the views of abilities that are going to
be discussed along the new dispositionalism/virtue epistemology divide. And in
fact, not all of the views I will discuss have emerged from one of those two back-
ground debates. Thus, I will focus on the views themselves and systematize them
in accordance with their relation to the success view.
We will begin, in the next section, 6.1, with Greco’s analysis of abilities in
terms of success, which is neutral regarding some crucial details and thus com-
patible with a variety of other views, including the success view itself. In fact, I
fully agree with Greco’s view of abilities and see the success view as the proper
means to spell out the account more fully.
In section 6.2,we’ll move on to what I will call “the sophisticated conditional
analysis”. The sophisticated conditional analysis is modeled on Manley and
Wasserman’s (2008) account of dispositions. Moreover, it is defended by Sosa
(2015), who is a virtue epistemologist and, in a more complex version, by Vihve-
lin (2013), who is a new dispositionalist. Enriched with some ameliorations, I will
argue, the view has the same merits as the success view. But the reason for that
is that the sophisticated conditional analysis cum ameliorations simply is a ver-
sion of the success view. Since it is a less elegant and somewhat misleading one,
I suggest we should nevertheless endorse the success view instead.Yet, the views
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are really very similar, and I view its proponents as allies in most crucial re-
spects.
In section 6.3, we’ll look at a view that has not actually been defended by
anyone but is obtained by analyzing abilities along the lines of Vetter’s (2015)
account of dispositions. Since the resulting view is quite interesting from a
new dispositionalist perspective, but also, and especially, in relation to the suc-
cess view, I take it to be a fruitful endeavor to take a look at it in some detail and
see why it will not do the job.
In section 6.4, finally, we’ll look at a view which has recently been put for-
ward by Maier. Maier’s view has certainly been developed with an eye towards
free will issues, but in contrast to new dispositionalist views of abilities, it
does not emphasize any ideas about the relationship between abilities and dis-
positions. Instead, Maier thinks that abilities should be analyzed in terms of the
choice theoretic notion of an option. Doing so strikes me as unfortunate in a
number of ways. Accounting for abilities in terms of options, it seems to me, real-
ly gets some things wrong that can be accommodated for very smoothly by the
success view.
Despite the fact that I substantially disagree with some of the views I’ll dis-
cuss and think we should favor the success view over all of them, let me say one
thing right away. In principle, I consider all of the views I will be discussing in
this chapter as attempts to voice most of the core insights that I have been trying
to voice in the form of the success view. The recent views on abilities do not differ
vastly from the success view, or, for that matter, from one another. All of them,
for instance, incorporate the idea that having an ability is a matter of performing
(or, in the case of Maier’s view, having options) across a certain proportion of
worlds or situations. Regarding very many fundamental aspects, there is consid-
erable agreement between proponents of the various views I will talk about. The
devil is in the details. Let’s see if we can pin it down.
6.1 Success 1.0
Let’s start with Greco’s view on abilities as developed in connection with his vir-
tue epistemological endeavor to analyze knowledge in terms of agents’ intellec-
tual abilities. On Greco’s view,
SUCCESS_1.0. S has an ability A(R/C) relative to environment E = Across the set of relevant-
ly close worlds W where S is in C and in E, S has a high rate of success in
achieving R. (Greco 2007: 61)
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I choose the label SUCCESS_1.0, because Greco’s view is not fully compatible
with the success view; rather, it voices the same basic intuition, albeit without
filling in the details. The success view, as I have presented it, is a 2.0-version
of Greco’s account, so to speak.
To see that, let’s look at SUCCESS_1.0 in some more detail. First, note that
Greco is concerned with abilities relative to environments. Thus,
Jeter has an ability to hit baseballs relative to typical baseball environments. He has no
such ability relative to active war zones … where he lacks the concentration needed to
hit baseballs (ibid.).
Moreover, Greco points out, “abilities are tied to a set of relevant conditions”
(ibid.). Thus, “it does not count against Jeter’s having the ability [to hit base-
balls] … that he can’t hit baseballs in the dark, or with sand in his eyes”
(ibid.: 60).
I have to say that it is not quite clear to me how environments and conditions
are supposed to differ. Greco emphasizes that there is considerable overlap be-
tween the two. The tentative difference he has in mind is just that environments
are supposed to be “relatively stable circumstances”, whereas conditions are
“sets of shifting circumstances within an environment” (ibid.). Let’s grant him
that the distinction can be made sense of. Nothing hinges on this in what fol-
lows.
It should be obvious that Greco’s emphasis on conditions and environments
sits well with the success view. The success view postulates that an agent has an
ability if and only if she ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present. The crucial notion
here, of course, is that of the relevant possible situations. The relevant possible
situations can be selected as to include only those in which the agent is in a typ-
ical baseball environment in which the agent does not have sand in her eyes, for
instance. Of course, these situations will have to be otherwise similar enough to
the actual world in many respects. We always hold certain features of the agent
and the world fixed across the relevant possible situations. Greco distributes
these two onto two distinct elements of his analysis. He talks about abilities rel-
ative to environments and analyzes those abilities in terms of relevantly close
worlds.
I take it that which way one goes here is by and large a matter of taste. Let
me emphasize, however, that it is often important to drop the restriction to a cer-
tain environment and conditions when thinking about abilities. That is because
while it may not count against an agent’s ability simpliciter in some context that
the agent is unable to exercise it in extremely challenging circumstances, it may
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well count against a certain degree of her ability. If Jeter hits baseballs even with
sand in his eyes or in active war zones (or both!), while his buddy Jeff doesn’t,
then this counts in favor of Jeter being better at hitting baseballs than Jeff. By
restricting one’s focus on abilities relative to environments and conditions
right from the outset, one is in danger of losing sight of the fact that for some
purposes it is useful to drop the restrictions to environments in order to compare
success rates across environments. This is a minor point, though. By and large,
SUCCESS_1.0 is on the right track.
Secondly, note that Greco uses “rate of success” in the same way I have used
it throughout the book:⁴ as a modal notion. What matters is success across pos-
sible worlds:
[To say that someone has a high rate of success]is to say both more and less than that they
have a good track record with respect to achieving that result. … Actual track records can be
the result of good luck rather than ability. Likewise, actual track records can be the result of
bad luck rather than lack of ability. (ibid.: 60f.)
Note that Greco speaks of possible worlds instead of possible situations. I take
this to be merely sloppy and not a matter of dispute, however. Once we start
looking at the rate of success, we need to look at the rate of success even within
worlds. Alternatively, we will have to use “world” to mean “centered world” or
the like. I don’t think Greco would dispute that. Again, SUCCESS_1.0 is in line
with the success view of ability.
We can note, then, that everything Greco says (or can be assumed to mean
by what he says) is fully compatible with the success view as I have been advanc-
ing it in this book. But – and this is why I have been referring to it as the 1.0 ver-
sion of the success view itself – it is less informative in one crucial respect. Greco
postulates, roughly, that to have an ability, the agent has to be successful across
sufficient range of situations (or worlds, as Greco puts it). What Greco is silent
about, however, is what exactly this amounts to.
The answer to this question is by no means obvious. Greco’s view is, for in-
stance, compatible with a view according to which having an ability is a matter
of ϕ-ing in a sufficient proportion of the relevant worlds, full-stop. No restriction
to intention cases here.What we are evaluating, on this view, is just the propor-
tion of the ϕ-ing situations among the totality of the situations in which the rel-
evant facts obtain. Call this view “possibilism+”. It is obtained by analyzing abil-
ities along the lines of Vetter’s (2015) account of dispositions. Vetter does not
defend this view, because she sees that it results in problems, and I will walk
 In fact, I have borrowed the term from him.
6.1 Success 1.0 187
you to these problems in section 6.3. What is important for our concerns here is
just that possibilism+ is compatible with Greco’s SUCCESS_1.0.
Greco’s view is also compatible with a view, according to which having an
ability is a matter of a multitude of counterfactuals being true, each of which
has the form “If some S-trigger for ϕ-ing were present and C were the case
then S would ϕ”, where C picks out some more or less fully specified situation.
Call this view “the sophisticated conditional analysis”. Versions of it are defend-
ed by Sosa (2015) and Vihvelin (2013), and an analogue of the view has been de-
fended by Manley and Wasserman (2008) in the case of dispositions.
There are many ways to put flesh to the bones of Greco’s account, then, and the
success view offers one of those ways. Just like possibilism+ and sophisticated con-
ditional analyses, then, the success view can be seen as a more elaborate account
that is fully in line with Greco’s basic view, but by no means entailed by it.
6.2 The sophisticated conditional analysis
Having identified Greco’s view as fully compatible with the success view, let’s
move on to a view which emerges when analyzing abilities along the lines of
a very powerful account of dispositions that has recently been proposed by Man-
ley and Wasserman (2008). On Manley and Wasserman’s view, which I will refer
to as “the sophisticated conditional analysis of dispositions”,
SOPH_D. N is disposed to M when C if and only if N would M in some suitable proportion of
C-cases. (ibid.:76)
SOPH_D is quite interesting for our concerns, because it owes its potency to the
fact that it solves all of the most pressing problems of the simple conditional
analysis of dispositions. The view accounts smoothly for masks, degrees, and
context sensitivity. Since these are all issues that will have to be accounted for
in the case of abilities as well, there is good reason to think that an analogue
of SOPH_D will also prove powerful in the realm of abilities.
In what follows, I’ll argue that this is indeed so. But only after adding a few
crucial supplements to the sophisticated conditional analysis, and only because
the sophisticated-conditional-analysis-cum-supplements will turn out to be
nothing other than a less elegant and somewhat misleading version of the suc-
cess view itself. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the two views are
eventually on a par when it comes to their merits.
To get a better grip on SOPH_D, let’s look at the view in some more detail.
First, let’s try and understand what C-cases are. C-cases, according to Manley
188 6 The success view situated
and Wasserman, are first of all cases in which a proper stimulus is present. For
solubility, C-cases are those in which N is placed in a liquid; for fragility, C-cases
are cases in which N is subjected to force; for irascibility, C-cases are cases in
which N is provoked. Some dispositions have manifold stimuli; in that case,
the C-cases comprise cases in which any of those stimuli is present. Other dispo-
sitions do not seem to have a specific stimulus to begin with – in that case the C-
cases comprise cases of any kind. Talkativity, for instance, is simply the disposi-
tion to talk, not the disposition to talk in certain situations. A subject is talkative,
therefore, on Manley and Wasserman’s account if and only if the subject talks in
a suitable proportion of all cases (ibid.: 72).
All cases? Not absolutely all. For apart from the stimulus being present,
there are two more important features of C-cases. First, C-cases will have to
have the same laws of nature. That seems right. The fact that a thing breaks
upon being hit or dissolves upon being placed in liquid in worlds in which
the laws are different from ours does not count towards the thing’s fragility
and solubility, respectively. The actual laws will have to be fixed across the C-
cases.
Secondly, C-cases will have to be such that the object retains its intrinsic
properties (ibid.: 76).With their focus on intrinsic properties, Manley and Wasser-
man are in good company – dispositions are usually thought of as a matter of the
intrinsic properties of their bearers.⁵ Thus, fragility seems to be a matter of a cer-
tain molecular structure, and irascibility seems to be a matter of a certain brain
structure. And these need to be fixed across the C-cases.
So much for the C-cases. Let’s now look at SOPH_D itself in some more de-
tail. Like the simple conditional analysis, SOPH_D analyzes dispositions by
means of counterfactuals. However, SOPH_D differs from the simple conditional
analysis in one very important way. The simple conditional analysis analyzes dis-
positions in terms of a single counterfactual. If the stimulus occurred, the man-
ifestation would follow. SOPH_D, in contrast, analyzes dispositions in terms of a
very large number of counterfactuals with highly specific antecedents, each of
which specifies a something close to a complete situation.⁶ Thus, to be irascible,
say, a person will have to meet a sufficient proportion of counterfactuals of the
 Recently, a plausible case has been made for the existence of extrinsic dispositions (McKitrick
2003). If that is right, then the C-cases will sometimes comprise extrinsic features as well.
 In a critical discussion of the view, Vetter (2011) suggests that there is, in fact, a different in-
terpretation available, but I’ll neglect that second interpretation for the time being, since Vetter’s
suggestion pretty much is to interpret PROP_D in terms of the success view, which is also what I
will suggest later on.
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form “If C were the case, then the object would freak out”, where C will specify a
different situation in each counterfactual.
This difference between the simple conditional analysis and SOPH_D is cru-
cial. In contrast to the simple conditional analysis, what matters for SOPH_D is
not just what is the case in the stimulus worlds that are overall closest to the ac-
tual world. Instead, pretty much all possible stimulus cases in which the laws
and the object are as in actuality matter. If the counterfactual “If C, then N
would M” is true for a suitable proportion of the C-cases, so understood, then
the object (or agent) has the disposition. If not, it (or she) lacks it.
How does this solve the problems that beset the simple conditional analysis?
Well, the problem of degrees and context sensitivity is solved because, as Manley
and Wasserman point out,
[h]ow big a proportion is ‘suitable’ will depend not only on the dispositional predicate in-
volved but also on the context of utterance. (…) We can think of the contexts as providing
the standards for ‘fragility’ by establishing a requisite proportion of C-cases in which an
object would break, for example. In particular, for something to count as ‘fragile’ in the
mouth of the chemist it must break under a much larger proportion of the sorts of stress
conditions relevant to fragility. (ibid.)
This should sound familiar. Manley and Wasserman account for degrees in the
very same way as the success view: by means of proportional quantification
over cases, where the context determines which proportion of cases is required
in a context for the ascription of the disposition to apply simpliciter (→ 4.3). Un-
like in the case of the success view, the cases go into the antecedents of counter-
factuals, of course, but the basic mechanism for degrees and context sensitivity
is the same in both cases.
The solution for making cases is likewise familiar. As Manley and Wasser-
man lay out,
the right-hand side of our bi-conditional holds even if an object happens to be in ‘bad’ case
where its disposition is (….) masked. All that is required is that the object would break in a
suitable proportion of stimulus cases, where these will include any (…) masking cases; and
it makes no difference whether these are actual. (ibid.: 76 f.)
Here, too, the strategy is basically the same as in the case of the success view (→
4.6). Since the cases over which the quantification ranges are so diverse that the
mask will not be present in most of them, intentions and performances will
match up in a suitable proportion, even if a mask is present in the actual world.
When I introduced SOPH_D, I said that the C-cases will be highly specific;
they will specify something close to a complete situation. We are now in a posi-
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tion to see why. The presence or absence of any potential mask of a disposition
has to be settled in the antecedent of each counterfactual. That is why the ante-
cedents of the counterfactuals Manley and Wasserman postulate in their account
have to be so specific that they specify, for every potential mask, whether it is
present or not. The antecedents of the counterfactuals we obtain that way are
highly specific indeed. They specify the situation more or less fully.
Having said all this, let’s now return to our original topic: abilities. Obvious-
ly, Manley and Wasserman’s contribution to the dispositions debate is highly rel-
evant for our concerns in that connection. Let’s consider a Manley and Wasser-
man inspired account of abilities and see how it fares. Here is the view. Call it
“the sophisticated conditional analysis of abilities”:
SOPH_A. An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S would ϕ in a suitable proportion of
C-cases.
What are the C-cases this time? Well, first of all, they will be cases in which an S-
trigger is present.⁷ That, after all, is the analogue to the stimulus in the case of
mere dispositions, and it is crucial to Manley and Wasserman’s view of disposi-
tions that the C-cases are stimulus cases. Thus, SOPH_A will have to be read as
the view that an agent has an ability if and only if there is a suitable proportion
of highly specific C-cases for which the counterfactual “If C were the case, then
the agent would ϕ” comes out true, where each C-case is such that an S-trigger is
present.⁸
Note that I am already building an important insight into this interpretation
of the C-cases which goes far beyond Manley and Wasserman’s template of the
view. As we will see later on in this section, proponents of the sophisticated con-
ditional analysis, such as Sosa, think of the C-cases as cases in which the agent
is properly motivated to ϕ. But as we know by now, this is unfortunate, because
it fails to account for non-agentive abilities.
What more can we say about the C-cases? Again, we have to move beyond
Manley and Wasserman’s template here. Manley and Wasserman’s insight that
the C-cases will be cases in which the laws of nature are held fixed surely applies
in the case of abilities as well. But that is not the only restriction that will have to
be imposed on the C-cases. As we know from our discussion of general and spe-
 As in the case of the simple conditional analysis, one can in principle tinker with the motiva-
tional state in the antecedent. For reasons of unity, I will again focus on intentions.
 I am again presupposing that Manley and Wasserman intend their view to be understood in
terms of a multitude of counterfactuals and postpone Vetter’s (2011) remark that their view may
just as well be understood along the lines of the success view.
6.2 The sophisticated conditional analysis 191
cific abilities, abilities are had in view of the relevant fact, where it will vary
which facts are relevant. Sometimes, we will want to know what an agent can
do in view of her total situation; sometimes, in view of her location; sometimes,
in view of who is helping; sometimes in view of her intrinsic make-up; and so on.
To accommodate this insight within the framework of the sophisticated con-
ditional analysis, whatever facts go into the “in view of” phrase will have to be
fixed across the C-cases. As we know, this means that what is held fixed will vary
across contexts and cannot be specified in terms of a single set of rules.
Thus, the C-cases will have to be thought of as cases in which an S-trigger is
present, the laws are as in actuality, and the relevant properties of the agent –
whatever they may be in a particular context – are held constant. To make
this entirely clear, let us refine SOPH_A in the following way:
SOPH_A’. An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S would ϕ in a suitable proportion of
the relevant S-trigger cases (the C-cases), where it will vary across contexts
which S-trigger cases are relevant.
This, then, is our sophisticated conditional analysis of abilities. It derives from
the new dispositionalist assumption that abilities are dispositions, combined
with Manley and Wasserman’s view about dispositions and supplemented
with some of the crucial insights about abilities that we have gained in the
course of this book.
Sophisticated conditional analyses have recently been proposed, in different
versions, by Sosa (2015) and Vihvelin (2013). Sosa, as I read him, advances some-
thing very close to SOPH_A’. Sosa writes:
What then is required for possession of a competence? Required for archery competence,
for example, is a sufficient spread of possible shots (covering enough of the relevant shapes
and situations one might be in as an agent) where one would succeed if one tried, an ex-
tensive enough range. (Sosa 2015: 98)
As I read this admittedly sketchy passage, what Sosa lays out here is that for an
agent to have an ability, the counterfactual “If the agent tried, she would suc-
ceed” has to turn out true for a multitude of possible shots which cover various
situations in which the agent may be. This is very close to what Manley and Was-
serman lay out for dispositions and to what I have suggested as an analogue of
their view for abilities.
Note that Sosa is concerned with an agentive ability in this passage – the
ability to hit a target. Thus, he does not phrase his view in terms of S-triggers.
For the example he discusses, that is fine. When it comes to abilities quite gen-
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erally, the view will have to be stated in terms of S-triggers. Once it is thus refor-
mulated, it just is what I spelled out under the heading SOPH_A’ above.
Note, too, that Sosa is quite aware of the fact that the realm of the C-cases
will vary across contexts. He postulates that the possible shots will have to
cover “enough of the relevant shapes and situations one might be in as an
agent” (Sosa 2015: 98, my emphasis). And which shapes and situations are rel-
evant? That will vary. To see that, note that Sosa distinguishes between three
types of competence:
(a) the innermost driving competence: that is, the structural seat in one’s brain, nervous
system, and body,which the driver retains even when asleep or drunk [= seat], (b) the fuller
inner competence, which requires also that one be in proper shape, i.e., awake, sober,
alert, etc., [= shape] and (c) the complete competence or ability to drive well and safely,
which requires also that one be situated with control of a vehicle, along with appropriate
road conditions pertaining to the surface, the lighting, etc. [= situation] (ibid: 96 f.)
It does not matter for our purposes here whether or not the three types of com-
petence Sosa outlines are exhaustive. What is important is that Sosa is very ex-
plicit on his view that while a condition like being tied down, say, “does not af-
fect the inner [seat + shape] competence, nor the innermost [seat] competence”,
it “does bear on one’s complete [seat + shape + situation] competence” (ibid.:
98).
This is interesting, because, plausibly, the way the view about competence
Sosa advances delivers all of those uses of “competence” is by restricting the rel-
evant shapes and situations one might be in as an agent he talks about when he
formulates his view on competences as a whole. Sosa is thus well aware of the
fact that the C-cases will have to be varied in accordance with the context of an
ability ascription.
Vihvelin advances a somewhat different view. Brushing over some of the de-
tails, however, it becomes clear that, structurally, she defends something very
close to SOPH_A’ as well. Vihvelin argues that
VIHV. S has the narrow ability at time t to do R as the result of trying if and only if, for
some intrinsic property B that S has at t, and for some time t’ after t, if S had the
opportunity at t to do R and S tried to do R while retaining property B until time
t’, then in a suitable proportion of these cases, S’s trying to do R and S’s having
of B would be an S-complete cause of S’s doing R (Vihvelin 2013: 187).
This is quite an unwieldy condition, but for current purposes, we can focus on
the structural features of the view. As I read Vihvelin (and I may be mistaken
here),Vihvelin’s condition is just an enriched version of SOPH_A’ with a narrow-
er focus. The focus is narrower because Vihvelin is exclusively interested in what
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she calls “narrow abilities” – abilities that are held in virtue of an agent’s intrin-
sic properties. The view is an enriched version of SOPH_A’, because those abil-
ities are then analyzed in terms of a multitude of rather complex counterfactuals
roughly of the form
* If S were in a (relevant?) case in which S had the opportunity and tried and had intrinsic
property B, then the trying and B would cause S’s doing R.
As in the case of SOPH_A’, a sufficient proportion of those counterfactuals will
have to come out true. Structurally, then, VIHV is just another version SOPH_A’.
An obvious difference, of course, is that Vihvelin (as I read her) postulates
further requirements for a case to qualify as a C-case. Apart from being such
that the agent tries to ϕ in it (or, as I suggest, some S-trigger for ϕ-ing is present),
a case will also have to provide the agent with an opportunity and some intrinsic
property of the agent will have to be retained in order for it to qualify as a C-case.
But these latter two requirements are just additional layers of complexity and
can be neglected for what is to come. Everything I say in what follows applies
to VIHV just as much as it applies to the basic version of the view as put forward
by Sosa.
So much for the exposition of the sophisticated conditional analysis of abil-
ities. Let’s now move on to scrutinizing it. The view is promising – that much is
clear. As in the case of dispositions, masks, degrees, and context sensitivity are
unproblematic. I don’t think we have to go through that in detail. SOPH_A han-
dles these things analogously to the way SOPH_D does, which means that it uses
the same basic tools that also play a crucial role in the success view. I trust that
the reader has a good understanding of these issues at this stage in the book.
The real problem lies elsewhere. Just like the simple conditional analysis,
SOPH_A’ runs into the problem of impeded intentions. To yield the right verdict,
it should be possible for SOPH_A’ to be not met in such cases, thus yielding the
very prevalent sense in which a coma patient, say, cannot raise her arm. But
does SOPH_A’ yield this result? Not as far as I can see.
According to SOPH_A’, an agent has such an ability if and only if a multi-
tude of counterfactuals of the form “If C obtained, S would ϕ” are true. “C”
specifies one particular C-case in each counterfactual, and each of those C-
cases will be an S-trigger case. In the case of an agentive ability like the ability
to raise one’s arm, it will be an intention case. Thus, what SOPH_A’ postulates is
that an agent has the ability to raise her arm if and only if a multitude of counter-
factuals of the form “If S intended to raise her arm and the case is otherwise rel-
evant (and thus a C-case), S would raise her arm” are true.
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But now a problem looms. Either the coma is held fixed across the C-cases or
it is not. As I will argue in what follows, SOPH_A’ is – wrongly – satisfied in both
cases. This may not be obvious at first, because at first sight, holding the coma
fixed seems like a very promising move. The problem with the simple conditional
analysis, after all, was that it always considers the closest intention worlds and
that those worlds are located beyond the worlds in which the agent is in a coma
to begin with. The antecedent catapulted us too far out, as it were.
The same does not seem to happen if the coma is held fixed across the C-
cases. Since the agent is in a coma in all C-cases, the C-cases will comprise
only situations in which the agent is as impeded as in actuality. This promises
to yield – rightly – that SOPH_A’ will not be satisfied in the coma case. If the
antecedent of each counterfactual comprises the fact that the agent is in a
coma, then one expects that no consequent will comprise the agent’s arm rais-
ing. There will therefore not be any true counterfactuals of the form “If C ob-
tained then the agent would raise her arm”. Consequently, it seems that
SOPH_A’ will not be met.
But as good as it sounds, this line of thought is mistaken. In the coma case,
the C-cases comprise only coma cases, that much is true. But apart from that, the
C-cases have to meet some other criteria, too. Most importantly, they will have to
be cases in which the agent intends to ϕ (in the case of agentive abilities). And
here we encounter a problem. For as we know, there simply are no such cases to
begin with. No coma case is an intention case.
In the framework of the success view, this insight plays a key role in the
treatment of cases of impeded intentions. The success view (of agentive abilities)
states that the agent has to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of relevant intention
cases. In cases of impeded intentions, there are no relevant intention cases, be-
cause no coma case is an intention case. And that is good. For if there are no
relevant intention cases, then the proportion of arm raising cases among the rel-
evant intention cases is unspecified and a forteriori not sufficiently high. The
condition postulated in the success view therefore rightly fails to be met in
such a case.
The same is not true in the case of SOPH_A’, however. For at least on the
standard semantics of counterfactuals, a counterfactual comes out vacuously
true if there are no antecedent worlds (Lewis 1973: 16). Thus, the proportion of
C-cases for which it is true that the agent would raise her arm, if that case ob-
tained is actually very high. For all C-cases, the counterfactual will be satisfied.
Thus, SOPH_A’ yields the verdict that the coma patient has the ability to raise
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her arm. The obvious sense in which she cannot raise it fails to be accounted
for.⁹
Vihvelin’s more complex version of SOPH:A’ is not better off. On Vihvelin’s
view, recall, the narrow, i.e. intrinsic, ability to raise one’s arm is analyzed in
terms of a multitude of counterfactuals of the form “If S were in a (relevant?)
case in which S has the opportunity to raise her arm and tried to raise her
arm and had intrinsic property B, then the trying and B would cause S’s raising
her arm, where C is a placeholder for various circumstances.” Again, the antece-
dent seems to be impossible. Holding the coma fixed (either in the form of intrin-
sic property B or in the form of looking only at coma-circumstances), there seem
to be no opportunity worlds left.
Or are there? Let’s allow for that; an opportunity for ϕ-ing may simply be a
situation in which nothing external conflicts with ϕ-ing, in which case a coma
patient may well have an opportunity to raise her arm. Even then, though, the
antecedent will come out impossible. Holding the coma fixed, there will not
be any worlds left in which the agent tries to ϕ. Despite all complexity, the
basic problem remains.
Can this consequence be avoided, if we vary the coma? Unfortunately not.
First of all, it is entirely unclear why varying the coma should be permitted in
the first place. The sophisticated conditional analysis can only deliver an ac-
count of general and specific abilities if the context fixes the set of facts that
have to obtain throughout the C-cases.Whatever determines the relevant worlds
in the framework of the success view goes into the C-cases in the framework of
the sophisticated conditional analysis. That’s the mechanism one needs, if the
distinction between general and specific abilities is to be made sense of. It is
hard to see how one could invariably vary the coma without losing the capacity
to give a convincing account of general and specific abilities.
Even if the coma (and other impediments of the same kind) were varied,
however, this would not solve the problem of impeded intentions. Varying the
coma channels us back to the problem of the impeded intention as it arose for
the simple conditional analysis: when the coma is varied across the C-cases,
then there is no reason to assume that the agent would not raise her arm in a
suitable proportion of C-cases. The coma would be treated like a mask on that
account. While present in the actual world, it is varied across the C-cases. In
masking cases, SOPH_A’ yields – rightly – that the agent has the masked ability.
In cases of impeded intentions, this is the wrong outcome. Thus, no matter how
we twist and turn the view, impeded intentions remain troublesome for the con-
 Sosa seems to be oblivious to this problem (cf. Sosa 2015: 98).
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ditionalist – the increased sophistication of SOPH_A’ does not seem to be of
much help here.
Yet, that is not to say that SOPH_A’ is doomed. For of course, there is one
simple move open to the proponent of the view that has also proved advisable
for proponents of the simple conditional analysis. The proponent of SOPH_A’
can simply supplement her view by adding a further condition that is explicitly
designed to avoid the unwelcome consequences in the coma case and other
cases of impeded intentions.
To see how, let’s return to the first horn of the dilemma once more. The prob-
lem here was that, since the C-cases have to be both coma cases and cases in
which the agent intends to ϕ, there will simply be no C-cases to begin with.
All counterfactuals of the form “If S intended to ϕ and the case is otherwise rel-
evant (and hence a coma case), S would ϕ”, will come out vacuously true, be-
cause the antecedent specifies an impossible state of affairs. Hence, SOPH_A’
fails to account for the very prominent sense in which the coma patient lacks
the ability to raise her arm or get up from her bed.
The proponent of SOPH_A’ can avoid this problem by adding a supplemen-
tary postulate to SOPH_A’: the C-cases have to be possible states of affairs in the
first place. In cases in which the coma is held fixed across the C-cases, this sup-
plementary postulate is obviously not met. Hence, the so supplemented view
yields, rightly, that the coma patient lacks the ability to raise her arm in such
cases. (Of course, the coma does not have to be held fixed in every context. It
may well be varied, in which case the supplemented view yields, again rightly,
that the coma patient has the ability to raise her arm. This is all as before. The
problematic sense for the original SOPH_A’ is just the one in which it is true that
the coma patient cannot raise her arm.)
The supplemented view I suggest should replace SOPH_A’ is therefore the
following:
SOPH_+. An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if (i) S would ϕ in a suitable proportion
of the relevant S-trigger cases (the C-cases), where it will vary across contexts
which S-trigger cases are relevant, and (ii) there are possible S-trigger cases (C-
cases) to begin with.
Thus understood, cases of impeded intentions, such as the coma case, are ren-
dered unproblematic. Even though condition (i) of SOPH_+ is met, condition (ii)
is not when the coma is fixed across the C-cases.
But then isn’t SOPH_+ just as powerful as the success view? After all, it
seems to have the very same merits. Is it just a matter of taste which view one
adopts? As far as I can see, the answer is a qualified yes. The success view
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and SOPH_+ both account for the adequacy conditions and they don’t run into
the problems that proved destructive for the simple conditional analysis or pos-
sibilism.
The reason for that, however, is that SOPH_+ is the success view in counter-
factual guise. First of all, as should have become clear in the previous discus-
sion, the program of the sophisticated conditional analysis only gets off the
ground if some key elements of the success view are integrated. And secondly,
as will become clear in a moment, once those elements are integrated, the
two views actually turn out to be almost equivalent.
To see that, recall that the success view states that for an agent to have an
ability to ϕ, the agent has to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible
situations in which the agent intends to ϕ. SOPH_+ states that for an agent to
have an ability to ϕ, “If C obtained, S would ϕ” has to be true for a sufficient
proportion of C-cases, where those C-cases in turn are relevant possible situa-
tions in which S intends to ϕ.
The only difference between the two views is that the success view postu-
lates that a sufficient proportion of C-cases are ϕ-ing cases, whereas SOPH_+
postulates that a sufficient proportion of C-cases be such that the counterfactual
“If C were the case, S would ϕ” holds for them. At first sight, that seems to make
a difference, logically speaking. But insofar as each C-case is a fully specified
situation, the two views are in fact equivalent. And as we saw above, the C-
cases will in fact have to be (almost) fully specified situations in order for
masks to be accounted for.
If that is so, then SOPH_+ and the success view turn out virtually equivalent.
To say that a sufficient proportion of the relevant C-cases are such that the coun-
terfactual “If C were the case, S would ϕ” turns out true is only to say that a suf-
ficient proportion of the relevant C-cases are ϕ-ing cases. The counterfactual
only turns out true for some C-case, after all, if that C-case is a ϕ-ing case.
That’s just what happens when you insert whole situations into the antecedent
of a counterfactual. You do violence to the counterfactual by turning it into a ma-
terial conditional.¹⁰
Speaking of violence, let me now tell you why I think the success view, as I
have stated it in this book, is to be favored over the counterfactual rendering of
the same idea in terms of SOPH_+. I don’t see why one should use counterfactu-
als in the statement of the view, if the counterfactuals don’t actually function as
counterfactuals. Nostalgia could be one reason: “The simple conditional analysis
 As far as the C-cases are not fully, but almost fully specified situations, there is a logical dif-
ference between the views, but that difference is minuscule.
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looked so promising, so let’s see how we can tweak the framework until we even-
tually get a version that works.” Personally, I don’t find this motive very convinc-
ing, but if you are strongly attracted to counterfactuals (even the somewhat per-
verted ones figuring in SOPH_+), be my guest and cling to them. If you are rather
more of a non-sentimental type, I take it you are better off with the success view
as I have suggested it. When it comes right down to it, the counterfactuals in
SOPH_+ are a scam. Let’s be straightforward. Let’s endorse the success view in-
stead.
6.3 Possibilism+
In this section, let us look at a view we get by analyzing abilities along the lines
of Vetter’s (2015) account of dispositions. This is a fruitful thing to do, because
the limitations of the resulting view of abilities will once more shed light on
the importance of the success rate as spelled out by the success view.
Vetter’s project in her book is to reduce modality in general – including met-
aphysical modality – to the potentialities of objects and agents. Paradigmatic in-
stances of potentialities, on her view, are dispositions. Even though Vetter does
not endorse possible worlds metaphysically, she views possible worlds seman-
tics as useful enough to state an analysis of what it is for an agent to have a dis-
position along the following lines:
POSS+_D. An object x has a disposition to ϕ if and only if x ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of
the relevant possible situations.¹¹
Let’s call this view “possibilism+ about dispositions”. Being soluble, on this
view, is for something to dissolve in a sufficient proportion of the relevant
worlds; being irascible is for someone to freak out in a sufficient proportion of
the relevant worlds.
With this view,Vetter is in obvious opposition to all kinds of views about dis-
positions which stand in the tradition of the conditional analysis, because Vetter
does not believe, and she is very explicit about that (Vetter 2011), that disposi-
tions are individuated, even just in part, by their stimuli. On her view, they
are individuated exclusively by their manifestations.
In this respect, she is fully in line with the ideas of Kratzer (1977, 1981) and
others, who treat disposition ascriptions in the same way as they treat ability as-
 Vetter speaks of worlds where I used the term “situations”, but what she means by that is
just what I mean by “situations”.
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criptions: as possibility statements. On that view, which we can call “possibilism
about dispositions”, for a thing to be soluble is for it to be possible for that thing
to dissolve. This, in turn, is spelled out in terms of possible worlds: for p to be
possible is for there to be a relevant world in which p is the case. So far, nothing
new; possibilism about dispositions is analogous to possibilism about abilities
as we have discussed it at length in chapter 3.
Of course, Vetter does not endorse possibilism. Possibilism about disposi-
tions faces some of the same problems that possibilism about abilities faces
too. Like abilities, dispositions come in degrees and they are context sensitive,
for instance (Manley & Wasserman 2008). Possibilism about dispositions is
just as unapt to account for those features as possibilism about abilities is.
For this reason,Vetter squares the possibilist framework with the insight that
having a disposition is a matter of proportions. In doing so, she incorporates one
crucial element that is also part of the success view and of the sophisticated con-
ditional analysis. The degree of an object’s disposition to ϕ corresponds, on Vet-
ter’s view, to the proportion of the relevant possible situations, in which the ob-
ject ϕ’s among the relevant possible situations as a whole. This allows her to
account for degrees and context sensitivity.
While degrees and context sensitivity are accounted for by the same means
as in the case of the sophisticated conditional analysis and the success view,
however, there is one very crucial difference between Vetter’s and these other
two views. Vetter sticks closer to possibilism in that she clings to her conviction
that dispositions are individuated by their manifestation alone.
The sophisticated conditional analysis (→ 6.2) and my own suggestion of
how to analyze dispositions (→ 5.4) both put crucial emphasis, not just on the
manifestation of dispositions, but on the stimulus as well. The sophisticated con-
ditional analysis looks at a multitude of counterfactuals of the form “If x had
been in C, x would have ϕ-ed”, where C-cases are, among other things, cases
in which a stimulus is present. The view I suggested, DISPOSITION, looks at
the relevant possible situations in which a stimulus is present and evaluates
whether or not the proportion of the ϕ-ing situations among those is high
enough.
The same is not true for POSS+_D. POSS+_D restricts the possible situations
to the relevant ones – the ones in which the relevant facts obtain – and varies
whether or not the stimulus occurs. The relevant facts are facts about the object;
usually, its intrinsic properties. Everything else is varied. And while DISPOSI-
TION postulates that the proportion of the ϕ-ing cases has to be high enough
among the relevant stimulus cases, POSS+_D postulates that the proportion of
the ϕ-ing cases has to be high enough among the relevant possible situations
as a whole. The proportion that matters is therefore a different one.
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In what follows, I will not discuss Vetter’s account of dispositions. Vetter’s
book is very rich, and I could not possibly do it justice in the course of this sec-
tion. I will therefore content myself with a few remarks about the relationship
between Vetter’s account of dispositions and my own views on abilities and dis-
positions at the end of this section. Primarily, however, I want to focus on wheth-
er Vetter’s account of dispositions also provides a viable framework for abilities.
As I will argue, it does not.
Applying Vetter’s thinking about dispositions to abilities, what we get is the
following view:
POSS+_A: An agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficient proportion of the
relevant possible situations.
Let’s call this view “possibilism+ about abilities”. Let me point out very clearly
right away that Vetter does not endorse this view. In fact, she rejects it, and part-
ly for reasons I am going to discuss in a moment. Yet, POSS+_A is an interesting
suggestion, and one worth exploring, because it is so closely related to the suc-
cess view and will once more shed light on the importance of the success rate –
the modal tie between intentions (or other S-triggers) and performances postulat-
ed by the success view.
As is easy to see, POSS+_A follows the same scheme as POSS+_D. Having an
ability to ϕ, just like having a disposition to ϕ, is for the agent to ϕ in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant possible situations. No mention of intentions (or any
other S-trigger). Analogously to the case of POSS+_D, it will vary, across the rel-
evant possible situations, whether or not an intention is formed. What one
checks for is the proportion of the ϕ-ing cases to the relevant possible situations
as a whole.
The relevant possible situations, of course, are the situations in which the
relevant facts are held fixed, and as we know from our discussion of general
and specific abilities, it will have to vary which facts are relevant in a given con-
text. Sometimes,we hold only stable, mostly intrinsic facts about the agent fixed;
sometimes, we hold lots of facts about the external situation fixed as well.We do
not, however – and this is very important when it comes to the difference be-
tween POSS+_A and the success view – restrict the relevant possible situations
to the ones in which an intention is formed.
What we have here, then, is a view that resembles the success view very
closely. Subtract the restriction to intention situations from the success view
and what you end up with is POSS+_A. That makes POSS+_A a very interesting
view to look at in some detail. If POSS+_A comes out right, then the success view
would turn out unnecessarily complex.Why bother with intentions and the suc-
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cess rate, if focusing on the ratio of performances among the relevant possible
situations as a whole does the job just as well?
As we will see in what follows, however, POSS+_A does not come out right.
There is good reason for focusing on the success rate and not, as POSS+_A sug-
gests, on the ratio of performances to the totality of the relevant possible situa-
tions. For simplicity, let us focus on agentive abilities in what follows.
First of all, I take it to be highly unintuitive to look at the proportion of ϕ-ing
cases in relation to all relevant possible situations, given that the agent will not
intend, not have reasons, and not desire in any way to ϕ in the vast majority of
those relevant possible situations. Think of my general ability to hit a particular
bull’s eye; one in a bar in Sweden, say. I have that ability. I have it in view of a
variety of my features. Let’s focus on the ability in view of one set of features: my
brain structure and muscular constitution. Now, according to POSS+_A, I have
the ability to hit that bull’s eye in Sweden, because I hit it in a sufficient propor-
tion of situations in which my brain structure and my muscular constitution is as
in actuality.
But just think of how incredibly small that proportion is going to be! In the
vast – let me say it again: vast! – majority of all situations in which those fea-
tures are as in actuality, I don’t have the slightest intention or reason to go
about hitting the bull’s eye in a bar in Sweden. In fact, I will not be in Sweden
in most situations and will not have the slightest reason or intention to hit the
bull’s eye in that bar. POSS+_A, however, factors all of those situations in
when it comes to determining whether or not I have the ability to hit that
bull’s eye. It looks at the proportion of hitting situations in relation to all situa-
tions in which my brain structure and muscular constitution is as in actuality.
Now think about differences in the degree of an ability. According to POSS
+_A, someone with a high degree of the ability under consideration and some-
one with a low degree of that ability differ with respect to the proportion of hit-
ting cases among the situations in which their brains and muscles are as in ac-
tuality. But given how minuscule the proportions are in each case, the difference
will be almost unspeakably tiny.
The same is true for POSS+_D, by the way. Take solubility. Sugar has that dis-
position in view of its molecular structure. According to POSS+_D, this is because
there is a sufficient proportion of dissolution cases among the relevant possible
situations – the situations in which sugar has its actual molecular structure.
Note, however, that in the vast majority of those situations, the sugar is not
placed in any kind of liquid. Thus, the proportion of dissolving cases among
the relevant possible situations will be minuscule, and so will differences be-
tween highly soluble, moderately soluble, and almost insoluble substances.
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This is not a knock-down argument against POSS+_D or POSS+_A. But it
raises doubts as to whether the proportion the views postulate are really what
matters. In what follows, I will focus exclusively on POSS+_A and argue that
the proportion it postulates is certainly not the right one. Consequently, POSS
+_A fails. As we’ll see, the reasons for that failure speak very much in favor of
the success view.
That the proportion POSS+_A postulates is the wrong one can be seen by
looking at a case Vetter herself puts forward against POSS+_A (ms.). Take an ob-
sessive-compulsive agent, whose intrinsic psychological constitution is such that
the agent forms the intention to wash her hands every five minutes. Compare
that agent to a psychologically sane person, who only washes her hands in stan-
dard situations. We can assume that both agents are equally good at washing
their hands – they have the hand washing ability to the same degree. Their psy-
chological constitution does not make a difference in this regard.
The problem is that POSS+_A predicts otherwise. That is because, holding
each agent’s psychological constitution fixed, the proportion of hand washing
situations is going to be much higher in the case of the obsessive-compulsive
agent than in the case of the sane agent. And hence, the obsessive-compulsive
agent should come out as having the ability to a higher degree. (The example
may not be ideal; degrees of the ability to hand wash are usually almost exclu-
sively evaluated on the level of achievement. To see that this does not affect the
argument, though, I invite you to run the same argument with an obsessive-com-
pulsive dart player instead.)
What does the argument show? First, of all, I submit, it shows that there is
something wrong with POSS+_A. Perhaps you are not willing to draw that con-
clusion right away. Perhaps you are inclined to say “Wait a minute.Why can’t the
proponent of POSS+_A simply resist your move of holding the psychological
constitution of the agent fixed? The obsessive-compulsive agent does not have
the ability to wash her hands to a higher degree than any average person, be-
cause each agent’s ability to wash their hands has nothing to do with their re-
spective psychological constitutions. Why should the proponent of POSS+_A
allow for you to fix an arbitrary set of features to evaluate whether or not the
agent has the ability to wash her hands?”
In response, let me first of all clarify one thing. I fully agree that it is not le-
gitimate to fix an arbitrary set of features to evaluate whether an agent has some
ability. It is not, for example, legitimate to fix my broken arm in evaluating
whether or not I have the ability to do a handstand in view of my muscular con-
stitution. Likewise, it is not legitimate to fix the fact that I am asleep in evaluat-
ing whether or not I have the ability to sing in view of my larynx system.What is
legitimate, however, is to fix my broken arm in evaluating my ability to do a
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handstand in view of my broken arm, and to fix the fact that I am asleep in eval-
uating my ability to sing in view of my being asleep.
Casting a look back at the argument against POSS+_A, you will note that the
ability under consideration there is the ability to wash one’s hands in view of
one’s psychological constitution. To evaluate whether or not and to what degree
an agent has that ability, we are not only allowed to, but we actually have to
hold the agent’s psychological constitution fixed. And doing so, we get wrong
results. Thus, there is something wrong with POSS+_A.
But perhaps it is illegitimate to look at the ability to wash one’s hands in
view of one’s psychological constitution from the outset? What kind of ability
is that supposed to be after all? Shouldn’t the proponent of POSS+_A resist fo-
cusing on weird abilities like that right from the outset? Differently put, shouldn’t
she resist the idea that any set of facts go into the “in view of” phrase?
In response to this way of framing the objection, I would like to stress two
points. First of all, I really do think, and I wish to commit myself to this with re-
spect to the success view as well, that any set of facts can go into the “in view of”
phrase of any ascription of the form “S can, in view of F, ϕ”. Our view should
yield the right results, no matter whether we look at the ability to sing in view
of one’s larynx system or the ability to sing in view of the Chinese economy crisis
or in view of the amount of hair on my head or in view of the fact that your fa-
vorite color is red and I have never been in Korea. There is nothing wrong with
those kinds of abilities. They are weird, all right. But there are no good grounds
for rejecting them. Facts that don’t have anything to do with an ability should be
safely insertable into the “in view of” phrase and not make any difference to the
agent’s having or lacking them. This is not the case when it comes to POSS+_A.
The second, and perhaps even more important point is that the ability to
wash one’s hands in view of one’s psychological constitution is not a “weird”
ability to begin with. It is in view of her psychological constitution, after all,
that someone phobic of water does not have the ability to wash her hands.
She does have that ability in view of many other features: in view of her strength
and motor control she has it, for instance. But there is a very clear sense in which
she lacks the ability to wash her hands. To account for that sense, we need to be
looking at her ability to wash her hands in view of her psychological constitu-
tion. The ability to wash one’s hands in view of one’s psychological constitution
is a perfectly legitimate ability. I thus take it that the argument above really does
show that something is wrong with POSS+_A.
But what exactly is wrong with it? I submit the trouble stems from the fact
that the proportion of hand washing situations to the totality of relevant possible
situations is not the proportion that matters. What really matters is the propor-
tion of hand washing situations to the relevant possible situations in which
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the agent intends to wash her hands. And that is just what the success view
states. Thus, the case speaks very much in favor of imposing an additional re-
striction to intention situations upon the relevant ones as a whole.
The success view can explain very smoothly why the obsessive-compulsive
agent is not better at washing her hands than any average agent: her success
rate is not higher. The ratio of situations in which the obsessive-compulsive
agent washes her hand among the relevant possible situations in which she in-
tends to do so is just about the same than the same ratio in the case of the sane
person. This bolsters my claim that it is the modal success rate which matters
when it comes to (degrees of) abilities.Without the further restriction to intention
situations, counterexamples arise.
At least in the case of abilities, then, there is strong reason to think that an
individuation solely in terms of the manifestation – or, rather, the exercise – is
on the wrong track. Abilities, it seems, have to be analyzed by a ratio which ties
intentions (or S-triggers quite generally) to exercises. The success view postulates
just that.
In doing so, the success view does not run into the unintuitive consequence
of minuscule proportions either, by the way. The proportions the success view
postulates are usually quite high. Typically, an agent who is good at something
will more often than not succeed in doing that thing upon intending to do it.
Within the framework of the success view, minuscule proportions are the excep-
tion, not the rule, if someone has an ability.
6.4 An option-based account
Maier (2013) is concerned with a certain class of properties, which he refers to as
the agentive modalities. The agentive modalities, as Maier understands them, in-
clude options, abilities, skills, and potentialities. They are modal properties of
some agent, which involve some relation to the agent, and in virtue of which cer-
tain “can” statements are made true. Agentive modalities are the truth makers of
statements of the form “S can A” where “S” denotes the agent and “A” refers to
some act-type (Maier 2013: 2).
As Maier lays out, there are two different kinds of questions one may ask
about agentive modalities. On the one hand, there are what he calls external
questions – questions about the relationship between agentive modalities and
other modal properties, such as the question whether or not agentive modalities
are reducible to other modal properties or whether the metaphysics of modality
will “require a species of modality that is distinctively agentive” (ibid.). On the
other hand, there are what he calls internal questions, which concern the rela-
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tionship between agentive modalities themselves. “Are they miscellany, or a uni-
fied collection? If the latter, what is it that unifies them?” (ibid.).
With respect to external questions, Maier remains officially neutral
(ibid.:10), although he formulates strong reserves concerning a reductive enter-
prise (ibid.:7). What he is explicitly concerned with are the internal questions.
Here, Maier offers an account, according to which all agentive modalities can
be elucidated in terms of the most basic among them. Maier calls them options.
He writes:
There are at least two ways in which a given agent may be able to perform a certain action.
It may be now in her power to perform that action: there is, as it were, nothing between her
and the deed. This corresponds to what I have been calling options. Alternately, she may be
able to perform the action, though it is not now in her power to do so. For example, Rachel
may be able to speak Mandarin even though, under the effects of novocaine, it is not now in
her power to do so. Let us call this latter way of being able to perform an action a general
ability. (Maier 2013: 11)
The set-up of the example should ring a bell: options seem to be specific abili-
ties.¹² But they seem to be specific abilities of a special kind. As Maier has it, op-
tions are “the species of agentive modality that figures in the framing of choice
situations” (ibid.:8). This makes options particularly well-suited as a fundament
for an account of agentive abilities, in Maier’s view, because they have two im-
portant features: they are “[d]eterminate in the sense that it is perfectly clear, in
some given case, whether or not this agentive modality obtains” (ibid.:7). And
they are “[i]ndispensable in the sense that, in our theorizing about agency,
this agentive ability is one that we cannot do without” (ibid.:7).
Why think that options have those two features? According to Maier, they
have them in virtue of their role in decision theory. Options are indispensable,
because questions of rationality or morality cannot be formulated without
them. In order to be able to ask what some agent ought to do, we need to com-
pare the (moral or rational) value of her options (ibid.:8 f.). And they are deter-
minate, because otherwise the recommendations of decision theory could not be
determinate. Since recommendations like “Take the option that maximizes over-
all utility” are perfectly determinate, however, so has to be the notion of an op-
tion (ibid.: 9).
From here, it is only a small step to Maier’s full account of general abilities.
For general abilities can now be defined in terms of options:
 Maier has confirmed this in personal conversation.
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MAIER. S has the general ability to A if and only if S has, in a suitable proportion of similar
circumstances, the option of A-ing. (ibid.: 19)
This yields the following picture. On the one hand, there are options which play
an indispensable role in moral theory and decision theory and are well-under-
stood by their theoretical role in the framing of choice situations. Options are
presumably basic in the sense that their modality cannot be reduced any further.
On the other hand, there are general abilities which are defined in terms of op-
tions. To have a general ability is to have an option in a suitable proportion of
similar circumstances.¹³
So much for the exposition of Maier’s view. Let’s now see how the view re-
lates to the success view and what to make of it. Some similarities between Ma-
ier’s account and the success view should be obvious. First, Maier explicitly en-
dorses Kratzer’s insight that abilities are always had in view of certain facts. That
is why he restricts the possible circumstances to the similar ones.We obtain the
similar circumstances by holding certain facts fixed. Which facts we hold fixed
can vary. In this respect, Maier’s view resembles the success view rather closely.
Yet, I take the success view to be one step ahead. The success view speaks of
relevant possible situations where Maier speaks of similar circumstances. The rea-
son is that we may sometimes be interested in what the agent can do given cer-
tain hypothetical circumstances. As I have laid out earlier (→ 4.5 f) the relevant
possible situations will in that case contain some that are dissimilar to the actual
world in crucial respects. Maier’s account fails to provide the resources for cases
like that. The success view is more flexible in that respect.
The second obvious similarity between Maier’s view and the success view is
that both analyze abilities in terms of the notion of a suitable proportion of cir-
cumstances. The proportions that matter are different, of course. Maier counts
the options among the similar circumstances, while the success view counts per-
formances among the relevant intention cases, but the general idea of applying
proportional quantification to cases is obviously the same. Moreover, Maier does
not work with the idea of a weighted proportion, but obviously he can avail him-
self of that tool as well. Basically, the success view and Maier’s view are on a par
here.
The merits of the proportional quantification are the same in both cases, too.
Proportions deliver an account of degrees, and the ability simpliciter is had if and
only if the degree of the ability is high enough. Thus, an agent’s degree of an
ability is higher, on Maier’s view, the higher the proportion of option cases
 The class of the agentive modalities is wider. I will focus exclusively on abilities, though.
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among the similar circumstances is. Apart from the fact that Maier is interested
in a different proportion, this looks a lot like the account of degrees I developed
in 4.3.
So much for the similarities between Maier’s and the success view. Let’s now
turn to the crucial difference: the central role of options within Maier’s frame-
work. According to Maier, what matters for an agent’s ability to ϕ is the propor-
tion of the agent’s options to ϕ among the similar circumstances. Options, in
turn, are defined functionally. They are “the species of agentive modality that fig-
ures in the framing of choice situations” (ibid.:8). Here, Maier’s view encounters
some severe problems.
First, and most importantly, I don’t believe the notion of an option is actual-
ly as well-understood as Maier seems to think. In telling us that options are “the
species of agentive modality that figures in the framing of choice situations”
(ibid.:8), Maier makes it seem as though this would settle the issue once and
for all. In reality, though, choice theory knows of various ways to define options,
some of which are obviously not what Maier has in mind.
Choice theory is very often understood as a psychological model, or as Wolf-
gang Schwarz puts it, “as part of an idealized, high-level, computational design”
(ms.: 1). Such an understanding of choice theory does not seem to yield the fully
determinate notion of an option Maier is after to begin with. That is because
[s]uch a model (…) could be a descriptive model, trying to capture, to a first approximation,
the choices made by actual humans. Or it could be a normative model, specifying the
choices people should ideally make. Or it could be a constitutive model, implicitly defining
what it is to be an agent with such-and-such beliefs and desires. On each interpretation, we
can’t assume that the available acts are simply given as part of a well-defined decision
problem. Somehow the agent’s cognitive system must itself figure out the available options.
(ibid.:1)
The psychological model of choice theory does not seem to be what Maier needs,
then. Instead, options are supposed to be something objective. The agentive
paths that are objectively open to the agent at a given time, or something
along those lines.
I am not sure that this notion is as clear and well-understood as Maier seems
to. Schwarz, at any rate, puts a lot of effort into spelling out what it is to have an
option in the objective sense. And what he says will not please Maier, because,
first, it does not treat the modality of options as modally fundamental, and, as
we will see shortly, it does not sit well with Maier’s ideas about reducing abilities
to options. Schwarz writes that
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we could define objective options (for an agent at a time) as things the agent would do if
she intended (at the time) to do them. I prefer a slightly weaker alternative that retains the
existential form of our first stab: A is an objective option if some variation of the agent’s
intentions (at the time) would bring about A. (Schwarz, ms.)
In a nutshell, the view seems to be this:
CAOPTIONS. S has an option if and only if there is some variation of the agent’s intentions V,
such that, were V to occur, it would bring about ϕ.
Of course, the careful reader will immediately balk at this: what about coma pa-
tients? What about phobics? Doesn’t CAOPTIONS yield wrong results in those cases?
If the coma patient intended to raise her arm, she would. If the phobic intended
to touch the spider, she would. Hence, CAOPTIONS seems to yield that the coma pa-
tient has the option of raising her arm the phobic has the option of touching the
spider, respectively. But that seems wrong. Those agents don’t seem to have those
options.
Schwarz is well aware that demurring statements like this will be put for-
ward by those engaged with abilities. But he does not think they matter to his
project. Instead, he points out that his view of options will not be “adequate
as a general analysis of the English auxiliary ‘can’” (ibid.). But that is okay: de-
cision theory is a completely different business, on his view. Coma patients, for
instance, simply fall outside the scope of choice theory altogether:
decision-theoretic models describe the workings of an idealized cognitive system. They
don’t apply to rocks or corpses or people in a coma. Decision theory is not meant to predict
or evaluate the behaviour of these systems, so we may well set aside the question how to
delineate their options.”(ibid.)
And phobics? They do actually have the option to do what they are phobic of on
Schwarz’s account. There is what he calls a “disconnection between decision-
theoretic options and everyday normative attitudes towards people’s actions”
(ibid.). Thus, when we are considering what agents can do, in terms of an every-
day sense of “can”, “we often hold fixed various facts that should not be held
fixed when we catalogue the space of decision-theoretic options” (ibid.), accord-
ing to Schwarz. For instance,
we exclude options that would go against deeply ingrained fears or hopes or convictions
(…). Perhaps we can even hold fixed quite commonplace intentions: since you intend to
change lanes, you ought to accelerate (…). There is also a temptation to hold fixed the
past and the laws of nature, which is why some people intuit that determinism renders
praise and blame pointless: you couldn’t really have done anything else. In these respects,
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the range of options that figure in everyday normative evaluations is often more narrow
than decision-theoretic options. (ibid.)
This is bad news for Maier. Apparently, it is far from clear that options, as they
figure in choice theory, are the kinds of animals to which abilities can be suc-
cessfully reduced. If a phobia does not deprive an agent of the option to touch
a spider, because we don’t hold the agent’s deeply engrained fears fixed, then
it is hard to see how it can possibly deprive her of the general ability to touch
a spider, on Maier’s view. Holding the phobia fixed, the agent will still have
the option to touch spiders pretty much all the time. Thus, Maier’s view yields
that she also has the general ability. That is obviously mistaken. As far as I
can see, the disconnection between choice theoretic options and abilities more
generally, which Schwarz points to, is a genuine problem for Maier’s account.
There is another problem with using the choice theoretic notion of an option
as a fundament of an account of abilities more generally. The notion of an op-
tion, as it figures in choice theory, is such that it automatically renders having
multiple options compatible with determinism. Witness Schwarz again:
the kinds of choices studied in decision theory (…) do not require a strong, libertarian kind
of freedom. Decision theoretic algorithms are widely used in artificial intelligence, where it
is taken for granted that the (artificial) agent’s actions can be predicted from its internal
architecture and the inputs it receives. If you build a robot, you don’t need to specify
that it should drop towards the Earth when it falls out of a helicopter. It will do that no
matter what internal states and decision rules you build in. Not so when the robot reaches
a junction. Here the outcome is under control of the robot’s internal state: vary the state,
and the robot will choose different paths. That is all the freedom we need. (ibid.)
What Schwarz points out in this passage is that options can be had, even if the
actual future behavior of the system is determined. That is a problem for Maier
because there seems to be a clear sense in which agents cannot do otherwise, if
determinism is true. If all there is to abilities is options in varyingly large sets of
circumstances, then no such sense can be spelled out. Holding determinism
fixed, there will still be loads of options in the choice theoretic sense Maier
uses in his account. And thus, there is no sense in which a predetermined
path deprives agents of their abilities to act otherwise.
This is particularly problematic because the quest for a viable account of
abilities has always been motivated, in part, by the more overarching quest for
a more thorough understanding of the free will debate, with the compatibility
problem at its center. There is obviously a sense in which agents cannot act oth-
erwise in a deterministic world, and a sense in which they can. Which sense is
relevant to the free will problem? This question is one that Maier will not be
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able to tackle with his account of abilities, which already presupposes compati-
bilism.
Finally, let me note a third problem with an understanding of general abil-
ities in terms of options. It is hard to see how to integrate non-agentive abilities
into the framework. I surely have the ability to smell, but I am not sure there are
any situations in which I have smelling as an option in the sense in which op-
tions figure in choice theory. Options, I should think, are essentially options to
perform actions. Non-agentive abilities are by definition abilities to exhibit be-
havior that does not qualify as actions, though. There seems to be a tension
here, to say the least.
Of course, Maier will say that his view is intended as an account of agentive
abilities only. And that response is perfectly respectable, of course. But, and here
comes the qualification, the response is respectable only as long as we can think
of a principled way of extending the framework also to cover non-agentive abil-
ities.
In the case of the success view, the account of agentive abilities turned out to
be a special instance of a broader scheme, which covers both agentive and non-
agentive abilities. In the case of Maier’s view, in contrast, it is not too easy to see
what such an extension might possibly look like. If (i) the modality of options is
irreducible and basic, (ii) Maier’s account of agentive abilities is built upon those
basic modal properties and (iii) options are the wrong kinds of animals to feature
in an account of non-agentive abilities, then an account of non-agentive abilities
will inevitably feature different modal properties as their fundament. Agentive
and non-agentive abilities will then differ in the kind of modality that underlies
them. That is a genuine problem, since the challenge is precisely, I take it, to
come up with a view that accounts for the fact that the modality of agentive
and non-agentive abilities seems to be of the same kind.
We can note, then, that Maier’s account faces some severe difficulties, even
though it obviously shares some important features with the success view. The
problematic part, I have argued, is the attempt to reduce abilities in general to
the choice theoretic notion of an option. Doing so plausibly yields wrong verdicts
about phobics and other psychologically impaired agents, it fails to yield the ob-
vious sense of ability, according to which an agent is unable to act otherwise, if
determinism is true, and it yields problems when it comes to the integration of
non-agentive abilities. I take it that these are three strong reasons to try and get
along without the choice theoretical notion of an option.
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6.5 Upshot
In this chapter, we situated the success view within the contemporary literature
on abilities and among some potential views that result from mapping some of
the most promising recent contributions in the literature on dispositions onto the
ability realm. As we saw, all of the recent accounts operate with the notion of
proportions of worlds or situations. And most of them (Maier’s option-based
view excluded) spell out the same idea that also underlies the success view:
that having an ability is a matter of a sufficient performance rate across a portion
of the modal realm. In their broad outlines, then, the success view and the other
views that were discussed in this chapter do not differ too much. As always,
though, the devil is in the details. Looking more closely at each of the views,
their more subtle relations to the success view become apparent.
Greco’s (2007) view, I argued in section 6.1, is fully compatible with the suc-
cess view, in that it states, roughly, that abilities are a matter of success across a
sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations, which is the core idea of
the success view as well.What Greco does not say is how this is to be spelled out;
here, the success view adds an important layer. According to the success view,
success across a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations is for
S-triggers of performances and the corresponding performances to match up
across a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations. Greco, I said,
can thus be seen as a 1.0 version of the success view (but also of other views,
which can be seen as attempts to spell out what success across a sufficient pro-
portion of the relevant possible situations amounts to).
In section 6.2, we looked in detail at what I called the sophisticated condi-
tional analysis, versions of which have been proposed by Manley and Wasser-
man (2008) for dispositions, and by Sosa (2015) and Vihvelin (2011) for abilities.
According to the sophisticated conditional analysis, having an ability is a matter
of a sufficient proportion of counterfactuals of the form “If C were the case and S
intended to ϕ, S would ϕ” turns out true, where C picks out a highly specific set
of circumstances.
The sophisticated conditional analysis is very similar to the success view in
many ways. So similar, in fact, that once it is ameliorated in such a way that
cases of impeded intentions can be accounted for, it really just is the success
view in counterfactual guise. However, and this is really important if you have
strong inclinations towards a counterfactual account of abilities, there is good
reason to favor the non-counterfactual formulation of the success view. The
counterfactuals figuring in the sophisticated conditional analysis may look
like counterfactuals all right. Really, though, their antecedents are so specific
that they pick out particular situations. Thus, the counterfactual appearance of
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the sophisticated conditional analysis therefore turns out to be a scam on a clos-
er look and certainly not the most straightforward way of spelling out the
thought that is supposed to be captured in the view.
While sections 6.1 and 6.2 dealt with views that can be seen as allies of the
success view, I used sections 6.3 and 6.4 to discuss problems with two other
views that seem rather appealing at first.
In section 6.3, I looked at a view which is obtained by analyzing abilities
along the lines of Vetter’s (2015) account of dispositions. The resulting view,
which I called possibilism+, resembles the success view closely in that the
only difference between the two views is that possibilism+ drops the restriction
to intention situations that figures so prominently in the success view. According
to possibilism+, having an ability to ϕ is a matter of ϕ-ing in a sufficient propor-
tion of the relevant possible situations, full-stop. No further restriction to inten-
tion situations is postulated.
The view looks appealing at first, because it is obviously somewhat simpler
than the success view. As we saw, however, the view runs into trouble with cases
in which agents exhibit an increased tendency to ϕ in virtue of an increased ten-
dency to intend to ϕ. The additional layer of complexity provided by the success
view is therefore highly justified. Abilities really seem to be a matter of the modal
tie between intentions and performances and not just of the sheer proportion of
performance cases as such.
In section 6.4, finally, we looked at Maier’s (2013) option-based account of
abilities. On Maier’s view, having an ability is a matter, not of ϕ-ing, but of hav-
ing the option to ϕ across a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible circum-
stances. Options are irreducible, on his view, but well-understood in virtue of
their role in choice theory. I have laid out multiple problems with this view.
First, the notion of an option is not obviously as well-defined as Maier seems
to think. Secondly, it is not clear that an account of abilities in terms of options
yields the right verdicts in cases of impeded intentions. Thirdly, Maier’s view
seems incompatible with there being a good sense of having the ability to act
otherwise, according to which that ability is incompatible with determinism. Fi-
nally, the view does not sit well with non-agentive abilities. I take these points to
show that Maier’s option-based view of abilities is inferior to the success view in
some important ways.
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7 The success view applied – Two rough
sketches
As laid out in the introduction, I view this book, in part, as groundwork for the
more systematic and informed exploration of various philosophical questions. To
give you a flavor of how this may go, I want to close by sketching, very roughly,
two applications of the success view to well-taken philosophical problems. One
is the grandfather paradox, as it arises in connection with time travel. The other
is the free will problem.
Why am I choosing those two problems and not any other? After all, several
other philosophical problems seem to be just as well-suited to be re-considered
in the light of the insights that the success view provides about abilities. We
know that virtue epistemologists, such as Greco (2007) and Sosa (2015) analyze
knowledge in terms of intellectual abilities. Certainly, it would be quite interest-
ing to look at those abilities more closely against the background of the success
view. The same goes for other theories which feature the notion of abilities at
center stage, such as Millikan’s theory of substance concepts (2000), Mayr’s
theory of action (2011), and various views of conceivability (Yablo 1993; Menzies
1998), to name but a few.
Why focus on time travel and free will? First, of course, because I have to
make some choice. Secondly, I take it that time travel and freedom are particu-
larly interesting to look at. The time travel topic is interesting because the stan-
dard solution to the grandfather paradox appeals to possibilism – a view I have
discussed in great detail (→ 3). It is therefore easily accessible against the back-
ground of this book and gives me the opportunity to take up a few threads that
have been running through the previous chapters.
The reason for talking about free will in the outlook is that the debate about
free will seems to me to be among the debates which have been the most strong-
ly affected by a prevailing lack of understanding of abilities. That is because the
debate has been dominated, in large part, by the idea that freedom requires
agents to have the ability to act otherwise (Frankfurt 1969), but no one seems
to know how to understand this requirement. Even worse, some of the most es-
tablished players in the debate seem to be completely oblivious to the fact that
there could be open questions about the understanding of that requirement.
Van Inwagen writes the following in response to the idea that compatibilists
and incompatibilists about freedom and determinism may perhaps be talking
past each other when fighting about whether or not the ability to act otherwise
is or is nor compatible with determinism:
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I want to make what seems to me to be an important point [… ]: compatibilists and incom-
patibilists mean the same thing by ‘able.’ And what do both compatibilists and incompa-
tibilists mean by ‘able’? Just this: what it means in English, what the word means. (van In-
wagen 2008 : 333)
To the reader of this book, it should be obvious that this stance towards the
meaning of “able” is ignorant to an almost amusing degree. Ability statements,
and this much is clear, are highly context sensitive. Hence, worries about wheth-
er compatibilists and incompatibilists may not in fact talk past each other obvi-
ously cannot be settled by pointing out that they both mean “what the word
means” when they talk about abilities.
In my outlook on the applicability of the success view to the free will issue, I
will try and push this very point. More specifically, I will use the insights of this
book to come up with a contextualist view of freedom statements, which allows
for a conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between compatibilists and
incompatibilists about freedom and determinism. That is not to say that this is
the only reasonable application of the success view to the free will problem,
but it is a radical one and one worth exploring.
7.1 A paradox about time travel revisited
Let’s start with the grandfather paradox. The paradox is this: if time travel were
possible, then it would be possible for a situation to occur in which some agent
can and cannot kill his own grandfather. Since that it impossible, time travel is
impossible.
Here is Lewis’s (1976: 149 f.) exposition of the paradox. Suppose Tim travels
back to the year 1921 to kill his grandfather. Back in the past, he buys a rifle,
trains to shoot, tracks his grandfather down, and aims. Can Tim kill his grand-
father? The answer seems to be: yes and no. On the one hand, he can; he clearly
has what it takes, and the circumstances are just perfect. On the other hand, he
cannot; if he could, he could do what is logically impossible. Tim obviously did
not kill Grandfather in 1921, after all, because Grandfather lived on after that
and, among other things, fathered Tim’s father. If Tim killed him in 1921, it
would therefore be true that he killed him in 1921 and did not kill him in 1921.
Hence, it is logically impossible for Tim to kill Grandfather in 1921.
Is time travel incoherent, then? Not according to Lewis. If Lewis is right, then
the grandfather paradox is merely apparent, because it equivocates on “can”.
How so? Here, we need to take a step back and take a look at Lewis’s views
about ability statements.
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As we know, Lewis is a possibilist. That is to say that, on Lewis’s view, ability
statements – and “can” statements quite generally – express restricted possibil-
ity claims: “S can ϕ” is true, according to Lewis, if and only if S’s ϕ-ing is com-
possible with the relevant facts. In possible worlds terminology that is to say that
POSS. “S can ϕ” is true if and only if there is a relevant possible world in which S ϕ’s,
where the relevant worlds are the worlds in which the relevant facts obtain.
We also know that possibilism is a contextualist view about ability statements.
Which facts are relevant will vary across ascriber contexts. Recall Lewis’s famous
quote on that issue:
To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain
facts. Which facts? That is determined (…) by context. An ape can’t speak a human lan-
guage – say, Finnish – but I can. Facts about the anatomy and operation of the ape’s larynx
and nervous system are not compossible with his speaking Finnish. The corresponding
facts about my larynx and nervous system are compossible with my speaking Finnish.
But don’t take me along to Helsinki as your interpreter: I can’t speak Finnish. My speaking
Finnish is compossible with the facts considered so far, but not with further facts about my
lack of training.What I can do, relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, relative to another,
more inclusive, set. (ibid.:150)
Possibilism plays a crucial role in Lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox.
That is because, on Lewis’s view, the formulation of the paradox equivocates
on “can” in that the set of facts relative to which Tim can kill his grandfather
is different from the set of facts relative to which he cannot:
Tim’s killing Grandfather that day in 1921 is compossible with a fairly rich set of facts: the
facts about his rifle, his skill and training, the unobstructed line of fire, (…) and so on. (…)
Relative to these facts, Tim can kill Grandfather. But his killing Grandfather is not compos-
sible with another, more inclusive set of facts. There is the simple fact that Grandfather was
not killed. (…) Relative to these facts, Tim cannot kill Grandfather. He can and he can’t, but
under different delineations of the relevant facts. You can reasonably choose the narrower
delineation, and say that he can; or the wider delineation, and say that he can’t. But
choose. What you mustn’t do is waver, say in the same breath that he both can and
can’t, and then claim that this contradiction proves that time travel is impossible. (ibid.:
151)
Here is Lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox in a nutshell:
SOLUTION. The formulation of the paradox equivocates on “can” and the paradox is there-
fore merely apparent. That is because Tim can kill Grandfather in one sense,
but not in another, in that he can kill him, relative to one set of facts, but can-
not kill him, relative to another.
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SOLUTION seems to be widely accepted throughout the literature on time travel.¹
Yet, of course, it is ill-justified as it stands. The reason for that should be obvious.
As I have shown at length in chapter 3, possibilism is false; ability statements are
not plausibly understood as restricted possibility claims. Thus, SOLUTION relies
on a false presupposition. And as a consequence, it stands on very shaky
ground.
What I want to show in what follows, however, is that the same solution
flows out of an ameliorated view of abilities – specifically: the success view of
ability. Lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox is therefore on the right
track, despite the fact that the view of abilities which underlies it is mistaken.
To see this, note that possibilism contains two elements: a restriction of the
possible worlds to the ones that are relevant in a context, and the postulate that
there be at least one among those worlds in which the agent ϕ’s. As we know,
there is something wrong with the latter of those elements. There being at
least one relevant ϕ-ing world is often not enough for an agent to have an ability,
and it certainly does not provide the scale of reliability one needs to account for
a certain kind of context sensitivity that attaches to ability statements. That is
why we need to think of abilities in terms of a modal success rate. There has
to be, not one world, but a sufficient proportion of ϕ-ing cases among the set
of cases that matter.
Where possibilism gets things exactly right, though, is with respect to the
first element: the restriction of the possible worlds, or situations, to the relevant
ones. As we know, abilities are always had in relation to certain facts, and which
facts matter will be a matter of context. This element of possibilism should be
retained in a comprehensive view of abilities and is therefore part of the success
view as well.
Looking back at Lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox, it is easy to see
that it is the restriction to worlds that does the work in Lewis’s argument. Tim
can kill grandfather in relation to one set of facts, but not another. He can kill
him in view of his amount of shooting training, the fact that he holds a gun
to grandfather’s face, and so on. But he cannot in view of the fact that grandfa-
ther lived on, in view of the fact that grandfather later fathered Tim’s father, and
so on.
Of course, this is then spelled out in terms of the wrong framework. Accord-
ing to Lewis, Tim can kill grandfather in view of him holding a gun to his face,
because his killing grandfather is compossible with Tim holding a gun to his
face. And Tim cannot kill grandfather in view of the fact that grandfather
 But see Vranas (2009) for criticism of this response.
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lived on, because his killing grandfather is not compossible with grandfather liv-
ing on. But compossibility is not essential to the argument. The kind of quanti-
fication that is applied to the relevant worlds is only secondary here.What really
does the work is the restriction to the relevant worlds.
And because this element is retained in the success view, the success view
allows for the same take on the grandfather paradox. Tim can kill grandfather
relative to the fact that he holds a gun to his face, because he kills him in a suf-
ficient proportion of cases in which he intends to kill him and holds a gun to his
face. And he cannot kill him relative to the fact that grandfather lived on, be-
cause he does not kill him in a sufficient proportion of cases in which he intends
to kill him and grandfather lives on.
What this shows is that Lewis’s solution to the grandfather paradox stands,
despite the wrong account of abilities it was originally built upon. And the way
this was shown is by applying some of the main findings of this book to the line
of reasoning that has led to Lewis’s solution and refine it accordingly.
7.2 Alternate possibilities contextualism about freedom
Let me now sketch a second way in which the success view of ability can be put
to work. As I will argue in what follows, it offers a fresh, albeit idiosyncratic per-
spective on the free will problem by allowing for a contextualist solution to it;
one according to which the truth conditions of freedom ascriptions vary across
contexts of utterance.
For centuries philosophers have been arguing back and forth about free will.
Incompatibilists appeal to the strong intuition that nothing counts as a free ac-
tion if it has been brought about via a deterministic causal chain which does not
ultimately go back to the agent. Compatibilists emphasize a much more moder-
ate conception of what it is for an action to be free – on their view, freedom is
very well compatible with determinism. Both competing sides claim that their
conception of free will meets the commonsensical, or at least the one and
only relevant understanding of that notion; each side insists on capturing just
the right kind of intuitions about freedom of the will in their account.
Which moral should be drawn? It has been argued that the debate has
reached an impasse (van Inwagen 2000) or that our ordinary concept of freedom
is incoherent (Double 1991; Jackson 1998). Recently, John Hawthorne (2001) has
made a more constructive suggestion: freedom statements, statements in which
freedom of the will is ascribed to or denied of some subject, might be context
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sensitive in the sense that they have different truth conditions across different
contexts of use.²
Concerning the conflict between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist,
this suggests that freedom statements have different truth conditions across or-
dinary contexts and contexts in which determinism comes into focus. And while
the ordinary truth conditions for freedom ascriptions are often easily met, they
are too demanding to be met in contexts in which we focus on determinism.
This allows for a moderate compatibilism, since the truth of determinism does
not inflict the truth of our ordinary freedom ascriptions. Let’s dub this view
“freedom contextualism”.³
If freedom contextualism is on the right track, then any account which ig-
nores the context sensitivity of freedom statements inevitably falls short of ac-
counting for a pertinent class of intuitions about freedom. If successful, the
view therefore explains the dead-end situation between compatibilists and in-
compatibilists and offers a semantics of freedom statements which does justice
to the most pertinent intuitions in favor of each of the competing views. In doing
so, freedom contextualism provides a completely new perspective on one of the
knottiest imbroglios philosophy has to offer.⁴
Unfortunately, the view does not seem particularly compelling as Hawthorne
presents it.⁵ Let’s look at the view. According to Hawthorne’s proposal,
REA. S does x freely only if S’s action is free from causal explainers beyond S’s control –
Psst! – except for those explainers that we are properly ignoring. (ibid.)
Let’s call this view “the relevant explainers account”. A causal explainer, accord-
ing to Hawthorne, is “simply a state of affairs which provides an adequate causal
explanation of an action” (ibid.). The truth of a freedom statement is then con-
strued as depending on both the “causal influences upon action” and “the con-
text of attention” (ibid.). This yields the desired freedom contextualist solution to
the compatibility problem of freedom and determinism, because
[w]hen ordinary speaker utter English claims of the form ‘S did x freely’ (and their syno-
nyms), they frequently speak the truth. When we approach a God’s eye perspective on
the causal nexus, we become ever bolder when claiming that S does x freely – for as we
approach that perspective, the causes that we are properly ignoring diminishes. In the con-
 Contextualism is very influential in epistemology. See for instance DeRose (2009).
 Freedom contextualism has also been suggested by Rieber (2006). I’ll focus on Hawthorne’s
version of the view in what follows.
 But see Schulte (2014) for an interesting objection to freedom contextualism.
 Note that Hawthorne only toys with the view.
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text of ordinary life, by contrast, the causes that are properly ignored are much greater in
number and thus it is much easier for ordinary freedom ascriptions to be true. (ibid.: 69)
Hawthorne’s presentation of REA remains pretty much in the abstract. He does
not give examples for types of causal explainers we may properly ignore in ordi-
nary life, but not in the face of the consideration of determinism. One natural
way to flesh out what he may have in mind is this, though: in many ordinary con-
texts, we may ignore all but those causal explainers that are internal to the
agent; all we need to care about are the agent’s motivational states, for instance.
Freedom ascriptions made in contexts of that kind are true because the motiva-
tional states themselves are within the agent’s control.
In contexts in which determinism is considered, in contrast, we also have to
take the innumerable causal explainers prior to the agent’s willing into account.
Hence, the condition stated in REA fails to be met in such contexts: the state of
the world at some time before the agent’s birth together with the laws of nature,
say, is not in the agent’s control. Hence, our freedom ascriptions turn out false in
the face of determinism.
So much for Hawthorne’s line of argument. Unfortunately, it is not very con-
vincing. There are many problems, of which I want to highlight just one.⁶ REA
works with the notion of control. But in doing so, it obviously begs the question
against the incompatibilist. Incompatibilists will typically reject the idea that we
have control over any of our motivational states (or in fact about anything what-
soever), if these motivational states (or whatever other causal explainer we are
focusing on) are in turn determined by events over which we lack any kind of
control. In fact, this is but one way of phrasing what the compatibilism debate
is about. As Peter Schulte rightly points out,
[t]he term ‘‘control’’ is (…) vague and ambiguous. We speak of people controlling their
movements or their facial expression, but we also say that the autonomic nervous system
controls respiration, or that a thermostat controls the room temperature. It is clear, there-
fore, that in some ordinary sense of ‘‘control’’, determined agents can exercise control over
their actions, but there is presumably also an ordinary sense of this term in which control
and determinism are incompatible. (Schulte 2014: 673)
REA fails to factor this dimension of the debate in; it simply presupposes that the
compatibilist gets the matter about control right. This is a very serious problem.
In presupposing that compatibilism wins over incompatibilism from the outset,
 I point out a variety of further problems in Jaster (forthcoming).
220 7 The success view applied – Two rough sketches
REA undermines its own motivation – it makes a contextualist framework super-
fluous as a solution for the compatibilism issue.
Is Freedom Contextualism a nonstarter, then? Let’s not give up too soon.
Here is a more plausible freedom contextualist analysis:
PAP. S does x freely only if S can act otherwise than x.
But wait, you may think. How is this a contextualist analysis of freedom state-
ments? Isn’t this just a version of the well-known principle of alternate possibil-
ities?⁷ Correct. PAP is nothing other than that. What makes this a contextualist
analysis is the insight that ability statements quite generally, and thus state-
ments of the form “S can do otherwise” are in fact context sensitive. Let me ex-
plain.
The condition on freedom formulated in PAP crucially contains an ability as-
cription: “S can do otherwise”. Since acting otherwise will by definition be an
action, the ability that is ascribed is an agentive ability. Now let’s plug in what
we know about ability statements: they are context sensitive. According to the
simplified version of the success view of agentive abilities,
SUCCESSAA. an agent has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if the agent ϕ’s in a sufficient
proportion of the relevant possible situations in which the agent intends to ϕ,
where it varies extensively across ascriber contexts which situations are rele-
vant.⁸
We are now in a position to formulate our freedom contextualist analysis more
explicitly. For we can now draw on PAP and the success view to formulate the
new view that PAP, rightly understood, translates into what I will call Alternate
Possibilities Contextualism, or APC, for short:
APC. S does x freely only if S does something other than x in a sufficient proportion of the
relevant possible situations in which S intends to do something other than x, where it
will vary across contexts which situations are relevant.⁹
 Originally, the principle was formulated in terms of responsibility instead of freedom (Frank-
furt 1969) and in past tense (“could have done otherwise”).
 This is a simplification in so far as it neglects that the action type that the agent intends to
perform need not be (de re or de dicto) identical to ϕ-ing, as long as ϕ-ing vis-à-vis that intention
counts as a success (→ 4.8).
 Note again that “intending to do something other than x” can be given the de dicto or de re
reading here.
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APC has obvious merits. On the one hand, it derives the context sensitivity of
“free” from an independently motivated paradigm about freedom: freedom re-
quires alternate possibilities.¹⁰ On the other hand, it is based on the success
view of ability, which is motivated independently, in virtue of its merits as a
view of abilities quite generally. It is hard to think of ways in which a freedom
contextualist analysis could be better motivated than that.
Note as well that, in contrast to Hawthorne’s REA, APC does not beg the
question against the incompatibilist. Quite the contrary. The problem about
the compatibility of freedom and determinism is traditionally taken to arise pri-
marily against the background of PAP (van Inwagen 1983, ch. 1). PAP is therefore
one of the crucial premises in the incompatibilist’s line of reasoning. APC starts
off from this very premise. It is therefore fully in line with the incompatibilist’s
set of initial assumptions.
How does APC solve the puzzle about free will? The puzzle about free will,
recall, is that we are inclined to ascribe freedom on a regular basis. But once de-
terminism comes into focus, our entitlement to such ascriptions is jeopardized.
On the general freedom contextualist account, the puzzle can be resolved once
we notice that our ordinary claims to “freedom” and our denials of “freedom” in
the face of determinism need not be contradictory. On the APC framework, that
variance in truth conditions of freedom claims traces back to a variance in truth
conditions of the underlying “S can act otherwise” statements. So, let’s see
whether the truth conditions of “can” statements vary in the right way to explain
the postulated variances in our statements about freedom. What needs to be
shown is that the modal base of an “S can act otherwise” statement is different
when determinism is considered than in ordinary contexts.
This seems indeed plausible.When determinism is in focus, the totality of all
actual facts up to the moment in which the action is performed (including facts
about the natural laws) determine the modal base. In other words, the modal
base will comprise only situations in which the totality of facts is preserved.
In contexts of this kind, “S can act otherwise” statements turn out false. No
one can perform any action in view of the fact that she is determined not to per-
form it. If the modal base comprises only situations in which the totality of facts
up to the moment of the action is preserved, then it does not comprise any in
which the agent intends to act otherwise or acts otherwise. In fact, the modal
base contains only the actual situation itself in that case.
 Of course, the principle is not uncontroversial. See Widerker & McKenna (2003) for impor-
tant contributions to the controversy.
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In ordinary contexts, this is very different. It will not be required that the to-
tality of the actual facts be preserved in that world or that some prior state of the
world and the laws necessitate some act. That is just what makes the context or-
dinary, as opposed to one in which determinism is considered.Which facts do go
into the modal base in ordinary contexts? – That depends. Ordinary contexts
have but one thing in common: determinism is not considered. And as we
know from the consideration of various ordinary context ascriptions of abilities
throughout the previous chapters of this book, there is not one specific set of
facts that is relevant in all ordinary contexts. Sometimes, we are interested in
what someone can do in view of the program in her brain, sometimes, in view
of her broken limb, sometimes, in view of her dizziness, hoarseness, phobia,
and so forth.
If this is true then the truth conditions of “S can act otherwise” statements
will vary across ordinary contexts to the very same extent that they vary across
ordinary contexts on the one hand and contexts in which determinism is consid-
ered on the other. That is not problematic, though. As long as “S can act other-
wise” statements often turn out true in ordinary contexts, we can solve the puz-
zle about freedom just fine. And they will often come out true! In view of my
muscular constitution, I can act otherwise than shying away from the spider,
say, even though I cannot act otherwise in view of my phobia. The success
view accounts for both. I act otherwise than shying away from the spider in a
sufficient proportion of the relevant possible intention situations in which my
muscular constitution is held fixed (and my phobia varied), but it is not the
case that I act otherwise in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible inten-
tion situations in which the phobia is held fixed.¹¹
Let me wrap up. I argued that Hawthorne’s freedom contextualism is not
particularly appealing, because it begs the question against incompatibilists
about freedom. I then proposed a different freedom contextualist view. Alternate
Possibilities Contextualism (APC) starts off from a version of the Principle of Al-
ternate Possibilities and combines that principle with the success view of ability.
For an agent to be free, I argued, it has to be true that the agent acts otherwise in
a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in which the agent in-
tends to act otherwise, where it will vary by context which situations are rele-
vant. The view is well-motivated, does not beg the question against the incom-
patibilist, and explains the context-shifts posited by the freedom contextualist.
 In Jaster (forthcoming), I argue that the truth values of freedom ascriptions vary in accord-
ance to these variances in “S can act otherwise” statements. If this is true, then the truth con-
ditions of freedom statements vary across ordinary contexts to the same amount as they vary
across ordinary contexts and contexts in which determinism is considered.
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We can conclude that freedom contextualism, if plausible at all, is quite plausi-
bly spelled out in terms of APC.
The question, of course, is how plausible freedom contextualism as whole
turns out to be. Among other things, the answer to this question hinges crucially
on whether or not a contextualist semantics of freedom ascriptions can be bol-
stered on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom ascriptions.¹² I have not
addressed that question and I wish to remain neutral on it.¹³ My main purpose
here was to show how the success view of ability can be put to work when it
comes to actual philosophical problems. And as I hope to have shown, the
view provides an interesting toolbox, which allows for a fresh assessment of
some well-established problems.
 Epistemic contextualists have gone to great lengths to establish such ordinary language evi-
dence for contextualism about knowledge. See for instance DeRose (2005).
 But see again Jaster (forthcoming) for a discussion.
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Resumé and an open question
Let me give you a very brief upshot of the main findings of this book. I have de-
fended what I called “the success view of ability”. On that view (→ 5.3),
SUCCESSABILITY. an agent S has an ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a sufficiently high
weighted proportion of the relevant possible S-trigger situations.
An S-trigger situation, on that view, is a situation in which some trigger is pre-
sent in response to which ϕ-ing counts as a success.
Abilities and dispositions, I suggested (→ 5.4), differ along the success di-
mension. While it seems plausible that an object has a disposition to ϕ if and
only if the object ϕ’s in a sufficiently high proportion of the relevant possible sit-
uations in which some trigger for ϕ-ing is present, that trigger will have to be an
S-trigger in order for that disposition to qualify as an ability.
The most paradigmatic cases of abilities are what I called “agentive abili-
ties” – abilities to perform actions. The S-trigger that matters in the case of
such abilities, I argued (→ 4.2, 4.8, 4.9), is the (de dicto or de re) intention to
ϕ, or – in exceptional cases – a different intention entirely, where that intention,
too, will have to be an S-trigger. Thus, according to the success view of agentive
abilities (→ 4.10),
AGENTIVE ABILITIES. an agent S has an agentive ability to ϕ if and only if S ϕ’s in a suf-
ficiently high proportion of the relevant possible situations in which
S intends to ψ, where ψ will typically be de dicto or de re identical to
ϕ, and in all other cases be such that ϕ-ing in response to the in-
tention to ψ-ing counts as a success.
The success view is a hybrid of conditional analyses (→ 2, 6.2) and possibilism (→
3). On the one hand, it analyzes agentive abilities in terms of a modal tie between
the agent’s motivation and the corresponding performances, which is a core fea-
ture of conditional analyses. On the other hand, it establishes that modal tie by
means of restrictions on the possible situations, which is a core feature of pos-
sibilism.
The view, I argued (→ 4.3 – 4.7), is very powerful. It accounts for masks and
cases of impeded intentions; it provides an account of degrees and the corre-
sponding kind of context sensitivity of ability ascriptions; it provides an under-
standing of general as well as specific abilities and the relationship between the
two; finally, it provides an understanding of agentive and non-agentive abilities
and how they relate. The view therefore meets all of the adequacy conditions for
a comprehensive view of abilities that were laid out in chapter 1.
OpenAccess. © 2020 Jaster, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110650464-009
Some topics are underdeveloped in this book and I want to take the time to
mark out one of those topics very clearly in the end. In part, this is for reasons of
academic virtuousness, in part, however, it is also because I take this open flank
to set a highly interesting agenda for future research.
I have said nothing about the ability to intend.When I talked about agentive
abilities, I explained that the success view of such abilities does not run into the
problem of the impeded intention (→ 4.4). The reason it does not run into that
problem is that it entails what I called the existential requirement: there has
to be a relevant intention situation to begin with, in order for there to be a suf-
ficiently high proportion of performance cases among the relevant intention sit-
uations. And this requirement, I laid out, fails to be met in cases in which an
agent cannot intend to ϕ in the first place. That was all we needed to shield
the success view from the problem of the impeded intention. So far, so good,
then.
What I haven’t talked about, however, is the ability to intend to ϕ as such.
Quite plausibly, meeting the existential requirement is not sufficient for the hav-
ing of the ability to intend to ϕ, after all. The reason is simple. Agents can have
the ability to form a certain intention to different degrees. The existential require-
ment is therefore just as ill-suited as a sufficient condition for the having of the
ability to intend to ϕ as possibilism was for the ability to ϕ itself (→ 3.5).
That the ability to intend, too, comes in degrees may not be obvious right
away, because we usually do not grade the ability to intend.We do not say things
like “She is better at intending to cook” or “He is the better intender when it
comes to cooking”. However, and this is important, the ability to intend can
be diminished to varying degrees. And this shows that the existential require-
ment is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the having of the abil-
ity to intend. Let me explain.
So far (→ 2.3, 4.4), we have only ever thought about cases of impeded inten-
tions as an all or nothing matter. The coma patient lacks the ability to raise her
arm, while I have it, because she cannot intend to raise her arm, while I can. The
brainwashed follower of a cult cannot leave the cult, while the non-brainwashed
person can, because the brainwashed follower cannot form the intention to
leave, while the non-brainwashed person can. A phobic, to take another famous
example, cannot touch a spider, while normal people can, because the phobic
cannot form the intention to touch it, while normal people can. In each case,
the ability to intend to ϕ is fully impaired in one case, and fully intact in the
other.
But now think of what we can call a “mild phobic”. A phobic, that is, who
sometimes, in certain therapy sessions, manages to form the intention to
touch a spider. And then does touch a spider! Mind you: her motor abilities
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are not impaired in any way. Compare her ability to touch a spider with the abil-
ity of what we can call a “full-fledged phobic”. A phobic, that is, who cannot
form the intention to touch spiders at all and therefore never manages to
touch a spider. It seems clear that one of them is better at touching spiders
than the other one. And where does this difference in the degree of the ability
to touch spiders stem from? Quite obviously, it stems from a difference in the de-
gree to which they form the intention to touch a spider. That, after all, is the only
difference between the two agents.
The problem with the existential requirement is that it cannot capture differ-
ences in degrees of the ability to form intentions. As we know from our discus-
sion of possibilism (→ 3.5), the existential quantifier is ill-suited to do that job.
All this is unsurprising. The ability to intend, just like any other ability, will
have to be analyzed in terms of the success view, of course. It will be a matter
of proportions among properly restricted situations.
Does this lead into a regress? Does the ability to touch spiders require an
ability to intend to touch spiders and does that ability, in turn, require an ability
to intend to intend to touch spiders, and so forth? It does not. Recall that the suc-
cess view of agentive abilities is a special instance of the success view of abilities
tout court. And that stops the regress.
The ability to touch spiders is an agentive ability. It requires, among other
things, that the agent have the ability to intend to touch spiders.¹ And for that
ability, the existential requirement postulates a necessary condition (→ 4.4). To
have the ability to touch spiders, there have to be relevant possible situations
in which one forms the intention to touch spiders.
The ability to intend to touch spiders, however, is not itself an agentive abil-
ity. Intending is not an action. That is why I formulated the success view of agen-
tive abilities in terms of intentions in the first place, and not in terms of decisions
or other mental acts that seem to be actions themselves (→ 4.2).
The ability to intend will thus have to be analyzed along the lines of the suc-
cess view of non-agentive abilities. Having an ability to intend to ϕ is for the
agent to intend to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations
in which some S-trigger for intending to ϕ is present. This brings us to the ques-
tion I have not answered in this book. Which S-trigger matters in the case of in-
tentions? How can we analyze the ability to form an intention? This is a question
that has not been answered and one that will have to remain open for the time
being.
 Or form some other suitable intention, which is properly modally linked to touching spiders
(→ 4.8). For reasons of simplicity, I neglect this subtlety here.
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I sympathize with the idea that having an ability to intend to ϕ is a matter of
intending to ϕ in a sufficient proportion of the relevant possible situations in
which there is an overriding reason to intend to ϕ. But this condition is not easily
spelled out. Are the reasons which matter motivational or normative reasons? Or
are both potential S-triggers? There is obviously some more work to do here, and
I cannot say that I have made up my mind about these things.
I’ll leave that for another day. Or year.
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